Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society

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Introduction

Just as, at the end of a journey, one may look back over the ground covered so, on completing a book, one may, in introducing it, pause to reflect on the work done and attempt to define what has been accomplished. As long as the enquiry is in progress one is pushed in one direction after another so that it is not possible to see clearly the way it is taking you or where it is leading. We have been working on Mētis, with a few interruptions, for about ten years.\(^1\) One of the greatest surprises it has afforded us has been to see how, the further we advanced, the wider the scope of our study became. Each time we thought we were on the point of coming to an end the frontiers of the domain which we were attempting to explore receded before us. If there is one point which seems to have emerged as indisputable it is that the field that we undertook to investigate—a field until then neglected by Greek scholars who had never thought to enquire into the place held by Mētis in Greek civilisation\(^2\)—this field includes vast tracts of virgin ground which will have to be explored in subsequent investigations. So our book in no way covers the whole subject of Mētis. We will mention just two examples of areas where further work is necessary. The first includes the whole range of craftsman’s skills where we may refer to the study of Daedalus already completed by Françoise Frontisi; the second covers the various forms of wiley intelligence connected with particular divine powers where Laurence Lyotard-Kahn has undertaken research on the figure of Hermes.

But the reader has every right to ask a number of questions: what is the domain of studies which we have compared to virgin territory? What is its place in Greek society and
culture? How should it be approached? In sum, what precisely is the object of this book and from which disciplines are our methods derived? For various kinds of reasons there is no simple or easy reply to these questions. In the first place the type of intelligence we are attempting to define operates on many different levels. These are as different from each other as are a theology and a myth about sovereignty, the metamorphoses of a marine deity, the forms of knowledge of Athena and Hephaestus, of Hermes and Aphrodite, of Zeus and Prometheus, a hunting trap, a fishing net, the skills of a basket-maker, of a weaver, of a carpenter, the mastery of a navigator, the flair of a politician, the experienced eye of a doctor, the tricks of a crafty character such as Odysseus, the back-tracking of a fox and the polymorphism of an octopus, the solving of enigmas and riddles and the beguiling rhetorical illusionism of the sophists. Our enquiry thus encompasses the whole extent of the cultural world of the Greeks from its most ancient technical traditions to the structure of its pantheon. It operates at every level, probing it in all its many dimensions, constantly shifting from one area to another to seek out, by means of apparently heterogeneous evidence, a single attitude of mind, a single image relating to how the Greeks represented a particular type of intelligence at grips with objects which must be dominated by cunning if success is to be won in the most diverse fields of action. We have been obliged to find different methods of approach, to collate different viewpoints and perspectives, to suit the different cases considered. In certain respects our work is a linguistic study, an analysis of the semantic field of métis and of its coherence and amazing stability throughout Greek history. Sometimes it touches upon the history of technology and that of practical intelligence as manifested in the skills of the artisan. It includes whole chapters devoted to the analysis of myths and the decoding of the structures of the pantheon. Finally, it also involves historical psychology since it aims to define one major category of the mind at every stage of Greek culture and in every type of work in which it was involved. This mental category is affected by conditions of time and place and we seek to define its structure and activity, the series of
procedures by which it operates and the implicit rules of logic which it obeys. We use the term mental category advisedly, rather than speaking of a concept. We are not writing a history of ideas. It would have been impossible to do so. For the forms of wily intelligence, of effective, adaptable cunning which the Greeks brought into play in large sectors of their social and spiritual life, which they valued highly within their religious system and which we have attempted, acting rather as archaeologists, to reconstruct, were never explicitly formulated, never the subject of a conceptual analysis or of any coherent theoretical examination. There are no treatises on métis as there are treatises on logic, nor are there any philosophical systems based on the principles of wily intelligence. It is not difficult to detect the presence of métis at the heart of the Greek mental world in the interplay of social and intellectual customs where its influence is sometimes all-pervasive. But there is no text which reveals straightforwardly its fundamental characteristics and its origins.

This brings us to the second type of reason for the difficulties and—we believe—the interest of our undertaking. Although métis operates within so vast a domain, although it holds such an important position within the Greek system of values, it is never made manifest for what it is, it is never clearly revealed in a theoretical work that aims to define it. It always appears more or less below the surface, immersed as it were in practical operations which, even when they use it, show no concern to make its nature explicit or to justify its procedures. To this extent modern Greek scholars, who have neglected the importance of its role, its impact or even its existence, have remained faithful to a particular image Greek thought created of itself, in which métis is conspicuous by its absence. There is no doubt that métis is a type of intelligence and of thought, a way of knowing; it implies a complex but very coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual behaviour which combine flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various skills, and experience acquired over the years. It is applied to situations which are transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous, situations
which do not lend themselves to precise measurement, exact calculation or rigorous logic. Now, in the picture of thought and intelligence presented by the philosophers, the professional experts where intelligence was concerned, all the qualities of mind which go to make up mētis, its sleights of hand, its resourceful ploys and its stratagems, are usually thrust into the shadows, erased from the realm of true knowledge and relegated, according to the circumstances, to the level of mere routine, chancey inspiration, changeable opinion or even charlatanerie, pure and simple. So failure would be inevitable if one tried to discover mētis from an enquiry into what Greek intelligence had to say about itself when it composed theoretical treatises on its own nature. Mētis must be tracked down elsewhere, in areas which the philosopher usually passes over in silence or mentions only with irony or with hostility so that, by contrast, he can display to its fullest advantage the way of reasoning and understanding which is required in his own profession.

To be sure, these remarks must be qualified. Aristotle’s position on this point is not identical to Plato’s. For Plato dexterity (euchōreía), sureness of eye (eustochiá) and sharpwittedness (agchínousa) operate in enterprises in which mētis attempts to reach the desired goal by feeling its way and guessing. They belong to a type of cognition which is alien to truth and quite separate from epistémē, knowledge. In contrast, for Aristotle, ‘practical intelligence’ at least retains in its aims and in the way it operates many features of mētis. One could even suggest that Plato too brings into operation a kind of selection where mētis is concerned. He picks out from the skills of the artisan anything that can, by its use of measuring instruments, be integrated into a mathematical type of knowledge and that can provide the philosopher with a model of the activity of the démiourgós who, starting from the Forms, produces in the world of Becoming creations that are as real, stable and organised as is possible.

Finally, and most important, we shall have to study from this viewpoint the contribution of the sophists who occupy a crucial position in the area where traditional mētis and the new intelligence of the philosophers meet. Nevertheless in the main it is true to say that the philosophers’ writing and
teaching, as they developed during the fourth century, mark a break with a type of intelligence which, although it continued to operate in large areas such as politics, the military art, medicine and the skills of the artisan, nevertheless appears to have been displaced and devalued in comparison with what henceforth represented the key element in Greek learning.

In the intellectual world of the Greek philosopher, in contrast to that of the thinkers of China or India, there is a radical dichotomy between being and becoming, between the intelligible and the sensible. It is not simply that a series of oppositions between antithetical terms is set up. These contrasting concepts which are grouped into couples together form a complete system of antimonies defining two mutually exclusive spheres of reality. On the one hand there is the sphere of being, of the one, the unchanging, of the limited, of true and definite knowledge; on the other, the sphere of becoming, of the multiple, the unstable and the unlimited, of oblique and changeable opinion. Within this framework of thought there can be no place for métis. Métis is characterised precisely by the way it operates by continuously oscillating between two opposite poles. It turns into their contraries objects that are not yet defined as stable, circumscribed, mutually exclusive concepts but which appear as Powers in a situation of confrontation and which, depending on the outcome of the combat in which they are engaged, find themselves now in one position, as victors, and now in the opposite one, as vanquished. These deities, who have the power of binding, have to be constantly on their guard in order not to be bound in their turn. Thus, when the individual who is endowed with métis, be he god or man, is confronted with a multiple, changing reality whose limitless polymorphic powers render it almost impossible to seize, he can only dominate it—that is to say enclose it within the limits of a single, unchangeable form within his control—if he proves himself to be even more multiple, more mobile, more polyvalent than his adversary. Similarly, in order to reach his goal directly, to pursue his way without deviating from it, across a world which is fluctuating and constantly oscillating from one side to another, he must himself adopt an oblique
course and make his intelligence sufficiently wiley and supple to bend in every conceivable way and his gait so ‘askew’ that he can be ready to go in any direction. In other words, to use the Greek term, you could say that the task of the ἀγκυλομάτης one, who possesses twisting ἔτισις, is to devise the straightest way to achieve his end.

Here then, is a whole gamut of operations in which the intelligence attempts to make contact with an object by confronting it in the guise of a rival, as it were, combining connivance and opposition. It is this that we have tried to define at every level and in every form in which we have thought it is possible to detect it.

In this enquiry into the wiles of intelligence we have restricted ourselves to the Greek data. As is natural when dealing with a mental category so deeply rooted in religious thought, we have devoted the greater part of our analysis to establishing the place, functions and modes of action of Metis in myth and to illuminating the precise distribution of her manifold abilities among the various divine powers. Metis enables us to formulate certain general problems concerning the organisation of the pantheon. Some gods possess ἔτισις while others are without it. How do the two groups differ from each other and, within the first category, what differentiates its various members? In what way is the ἔτισις of Kronos or of the Titan, Prometheus, different from that of Zeus, the Olympian, the sovereign of the universe? What is it that distinguishes the ἔτισις of Athena from the closely similar ἔτισις of Hephaestus or Hermes or Aphrodite? Why do the oracular knowledge of Themis and Apollo and the magic of Dionysus lie outside the field of ἔτισις? In this part of our enquiry, in this book, we have concentrated our investigation on and around Athena, daughter to Metis, whose divine power she represents in the organised world of the Olympian gods. Given this orientation, our studies have inevitably led us on to problems which lie outside the Greek domain and consequently also beyond the scope of the framework we have adopted. The figure of Metis and her role in myths about sovereignty and—where the Orphic writers are concerned—in cosmogonical myths, call for a comparison with the mythical traditions of the Near-East,
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in particular with the accounts in which the Sumerian god, Enki-Ea also appears as the master of the waters, the inventor of technology and the possessor of a knowledge that is rich in cunning. In more general terms, Greek méthis raises the problem concerning the position which is held, in the myths of a large number of peoples, by the figure that Anglo-Saxon anthropologists refer to as the 'trickster', the deceiver. Although our book does not tackle these questions directly, it does add certain new evidence to that already collected in comparative studies. However, by not restricting our enquiry to the position of Metis in myth and to the role she plays there, by studying the particular form of intelligence that she represents, her methods of operation and the means she employs to bring about her designs we shall perhaps also have helped to direct comparative studies into a new avenue of research. Now that we have completed our own study, the programme of research we might suggest is an analysis of the methods of operation that govern the logic of wily intelligence in religious thought, that are responsible, in myth, for the successes of that intelligence and that have appeared to us to be expressed for the Greeks in the images of the reversal, the bond and the circle.

Notes

2. Carlo Diana is an exception. In a phenomenological study of Greek thought (Forma ed Evento. Principi per una interpretazione del mondo greco, Vicenza, 1967), he recognises in passing certain characteristics of méthis while considering the opposition set up between Odysseus and Achilles (p. 56 ff.)
THE PLOYS OF CUNNING
CHAPTER I

Antilochoi's Race

From a terminological point of view métis, as a common noun, refers to a particular type of intelligence, an informed prudence; as a proper name it refers to a female deity, the daughter of Ocean. The goddess Metis who might be considered a somewhat quaint figure seems, at first sight, to be restricted to no more than a walk-on part. She is Zeus' first wife and almost as soon as she conceives Athena she is swallowed by her husband. The king of the gods brings her mythological career to an abrupt conclusion by relegating her to the depths of his own stomach. In the theogonies attributed to Orpheus, however, Metis plays a major role and is presented as a great primordial deity at the beginning of the world.

With regard to the common noun, the German philologist, Wilamowitz\(^1\) appeared to have settled its fate when he noted, by way of an aside in one of his works, that after playing what was, by and large, a limited role in Homer's epic, métis survived only as a poetic memory. However, Henri Jeanmaire reopened the subject and pursued the enquiry with more rigour. Two conclusions may be drawn from his study, La naissance d'Athéna et la royauté magique de Zeus.\(^5\) In the first place, the intelligent ability referred to as métis comes into play on widely varying levels but in all of them the emphasis is always laid on practical effectiveness, on the pursuit of success in a particular sphere of activity: it may involve multiple skills useful in life, the mastery of the artisan in his craft, magic tricks, the use of philtres and herbs, the cunning stratagems of war, frauds, deceits, resourcefulness of every kind. Secondly, the term métis is associated with a whole series of words which together make up quite a wide, well-defined and coherent semantic field.\(^3\)
The history of mētis is a long one, extending over more than ten centuries down to the time of Oppian. We shall start by consulting our first testimony, Homer.

The text of Homer most suited to reveal the nature of mētis comes in Book XXIII of the Iliad, in the episode of the Games. Everything is ready for the chariot race. Old Nestor, the very model of the Sage, the advisor expert in mētis, lavishes advice upon his son Antilochus. The boy is still very young but Zeus and Poseidon have taught him ‘all the ways of dealing with horses’. Unfortunately, his race horses are not very fast; his rivals are better equipped. The young man seems bound to lose. How could he triumph over his adversaries with their faster horses when he drives slower ones? In just such a context mētis comes into its own. Placed at a disadvantage so far as his horses are concerned, Antilochus, as a true son of his father has more tricks of mētis up his sleeve than his rivals dream of. ‘It’s up to you, my lad’, says Nestor, ‘to fill your head with a mētis pantoiēn (‘manifold’) so as not to let the prize elude you’. Then follows a passage which sings the praises of mētis: ‘It is through mētis rather than through strength that the wood-cutter shows his worth. It is through mētis that the helmsman guides the speeding vessel over the wine-dark sea despite the wind. It is through mētis that the charioteer triumphs over his rival’. In the case of Antilochus his mētis as a driver conceives a manoeuvre which is more or less a cheat and which enables him to reverse an unfavourable situation and to triumph over competitors who are stronger than he is. Nestor puts it like this: ‘The man who knows the tricks (hērdē) wins the day even with mediocre horses’. So what are these tricks of Antilochus? Following the advice of his father, the young man takes advantage of a sudden narrowing of the track, which has been worn away by storm rains, and drives his chariot obliquely across in front of that of Menelaus at the risk of causing a crash: the manoeuvre takes his adversary by surprise and he is forced to rein in his horses. Taking full advantage of his disarray, Antilochus gains the advantage necessary to outstrip him in the last stretch of the race.

1. However ordinary the episode may appear it nevertheless demonstrates certain essential features of mētis. Firstly,
it shows the opposition between using one's strength and depending on mētis. In every confrontation or competitive situation—whether the adversary be a man, an animal or a natural force—success can be won by two means, either thanks to a superiority in 'power' in the particular sphere in which the contest is taking place, with the stronger gaining the victory; or by the use of methods of a different order whose effect is, precisely, to reverse the natural outcome of the encounter and to allow victory to fall to the party whose defeat had appeared inevitable. Thus success obtained through mētis can be seen in two different ways. Depending on the circumstances it can arouse opposite reactions. In some cases it will be considered the result of cheating since the rules of the game have been disregarded. In others, the more surprise it provokes the greater the admiration it will arouse, the weaker party having, against every expectation, found within himself resources capable of putting the stronger at his mercy. Certain aspects of mētis tend to associate it with the disloyal trick, the perfidious lie, treachery—all of which are the despised weapons of women and cowards. But others make it seem more precious than strength. It is, in a sense, the absolute weapon, the only one that has the power to ensure victory and domination over others, whatever the circumstances, whatever the conditions of the conflict. In effect, whatever the strength of a man or a god, there always comes a time when he confronts one stronger than himself. Only superior mētis can give supremacy the two qualities of permanence and universality which turn it into truly sovereign power. If Zeus is the king of the gods, more powerful than all the other deities, even when they band together against him, it is because he is, par excellence, the god who possesses mētis. The Greek myths which tell the story of how the son of Kronos won power and established his definitive sovereignty emphasise the fact that victory in the struggle for power had to be won not by force but by a cunning trick, thanks to mētis. Kratos and Bia, Domination and Brute Force flank the throne of Zeus, as servants forever following at his heels. But they only do so inasmuch as the power of the Olympian god is more than mere strength and is unaffected by the vicissitudes of time. Not content to
unite himself to Metis by his first marriage, Zeus made himself pure μῆτις by swallowing her. It was a wise precaution: once she had conceived Athena, Metis would—if Zeus had not forestalled her—have given birth to a son stronger than his father, who would have dethroned him just as he himself had overthrown his own father. Henceforth, however, there can be no μῆτις possible without Zeus or directed against him. Not a single cunning trick can be plotted in the universe without first passing through his mind. There can no longer be any risk to threaten the duration of the power of the sovereign god. Nothing can surprise him, cheat his vigilance or frustrate his designs. Thanks to the μῆτις within him Zeus is now forewarned of everything, whether good or bad, that is in store for him. For him there is no gap between a plan and its fulfillment such as enables the unexpected to intervene in the lives of other gods and mortals.

2. The second feature illuminated by the episode in the Iliad concerns the temporal framework within which μῆτις is at work. It operates on a shifting terrain, in uncertain and ambiguous situations. Two antagonistic forces confront each other. Over this fraught and unstable time of the ἀγών μῆτις gives one a hold without which one would be at a loss. During the struggle, the man of μῆτις—compared with his opponent—displays at the same time a greater grip of the present where nothing escapes him, more awareness of the future, several aspects of which he has already manipulated, and richer experience accumulated from the past. This state of vigilant preméditation, of continuous concentration on activity that is in progress, is expressed by the Greeks in images of watchfulness, of lying in wait, when a man who is on the alert keeps watch on his adversary in order to strike at the chosen moment. Consider how Nestor warns Antilochus of the dangers which await whoever is too sure of his strength and ceases to be on his guard; ‘One man will trust himself to his chariot and his horses and stupidly take the turn too widely, swerving from one side to the other . . . another, who is driving less swift horses knows a couple of tricks to make up for this. He keeps his eyes fixed on the post and takes the turn very sharply; he does not forget to control
his animals with the leather reins; he drives on steadily with his eyes fixed on the competitor who is ahead (dokheïat).\textsuperscript{15} 
Dokheïat, to watch closely, is a technical term in fishing, hunting and warfare. The author of the \textit{Shield}, attributed to Hesiod, uses it to describe a crouching fisherman lying in wait, ready to trap the fish with his large net.\textsuperscript{16} 
The description in the \textit{Iliad} of the hound hunting a boar has it glued to the heels of the animal ‘sticking close to its side, to its hindquarters, watchful of its every move’.\textsuperscript{17} Antilochus too knows how to watch his enemy carefully in battle. In the melee in which Hector brings terror and death, the young Greek stands aside, on the watch: ‘He keeps watching Thoon; as soon as the latter turns round he pounces, and wounds him’.\textsuperscript{18}

The man of \textit{mētis} is always ready to pounce. He acts faster than lightning. This is not to say that he gives way to a sudden impulse, as do most Homeric heroes. On the contrary his \textit{mētis} knows how to wait patiently for the calculated moment to arrive. Even when it originates from a sudden burst of action, the operation of \textit{mētis} is diametrically opposed to that of impulsiveness. \textit{Mētis} is swift, as prompt as the opportunity that it must seize on the wing, not allowing it to pass. But in no way does it act lightly (leptē). With all the weight of acquired experience that it carries, it involves thought that is dense, rich and compressed (pukinē).\textsuperscript{19} Instead of floating hither and thither, at the whim of circumstance, it anchors the mind securely in the project which it has devised in advance thanks to its ability to look beyond the immediate present and foresee a more or less wide slice of the future.

In this connection, the text of the \textit{Iliad} contains some suggestive evidence. At the decisive moment in the race, Antilochus says to his horses: ‘Go as fast as you can. I will be responsible for finding a way and an opportunity, if the path narrows, of slipping in front of the son of Atreus, without letting the moment pass’.\textsuperscript{20} The term \textit{kairōs}, opportunity, does not appear in the passage but the idea is certainly there, although in a form which we must define more closely and which the text stresses emphatically. This is an opportunity which, far from coming as a surprise to Antilochus, enables him to put into practise the plan which he has had in mind
from the start. It is mētis which, overtaking the kairós, however fleeting it may be, catches it by surprise. It can ‘seize’ the opportunity in as much as, not being ‘light’, it has been able to foresee how events will turn out and to prepare itself for this well in advance. This mastery over the kairós is one of the features which characterised the art of the charioteer. When Pindar celebrates the art of the charioteer Nichomachus, who is renowned for his ability, he praises him for having known how ‘to give the horses their heads at the right moment’ (katà kairón).21 Of the two divine horses that make up the invincible team of Adrastus, one is named Arešôn, denoting his excellence; the other is called Kairós.22 Having the swiftest horses is not enough, one must know how to spur them on at the decisive moment.

On emerging from the race in which his mētis has triumphed, Antilochus realises that owing to a lack of maturity it has not yet acquired all the weight and consistency desirable. Menelaus showers him with reproaches for his unfair manoeuvres—his dōlos.23 He calls upon the gods to witness the wrong that has been done him and insists that Antilochus should swear an oath. The young man finds himself obliged to make honourable amends. Acknowledging that he was in the wrong he pleads the thoughtlessness of youth, the impulsiveness which makes the mētis of an adolescent ‘light’: ‘Can you not imagine the excesses of a young man? His mind is hasty (kraiñoicoros) and his mētis leptē’,24 Carried away by his desire to win, Antilochus lacked weighty reflection. Absorbed in the plot he was hatching, he did not look beyond the victory to see what the consequences of his cheating would be. The craftiness of the young man saw no further than the end of his own nose. Experience gives the old man, on the other hand, a much broader vision. With the weight of all the knowledge he has accumulated over the years, he can explore in advance all the many avenues of the future, weigh up advantages against disadvantages and make decisions with a full knowledge of the situation. In Book III of the Iliad, at the turning point in the story when it seems that reason will win the day and that the war will be brought to an end by an agreement,
Menelaus insists in the name of the Greeks that, before the pact is sealed, the aged Priam should come forth in the company of his young sons: 'The minds of young men can be turned by any gust of wind (ἐκρειθόνται); when an old man accompanies them he can see, by comparing the future and the past, (ὁμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπισθὸ λέαυσε), how it will be possible to arrange everything for the best for both parties concerned.' The gift of comparing the future with the past is precisely what, unfortunately for the Greeks, their own king lacks. Absorbed in his anger, Agamemnon 'is not capable of seeing, by comparing the future with the past, how the Greeks can fight unscathed close to their ships'. The Trojans are in almost as bad a position. At their assembly, the wise Polydamus does indeed lavish his prudent advice upon them. He implores them to examine the situation from all points of view, even to look ahead to see what is going to happen. But they pay him no heed; he alone is capable of 'seeing at the same time both the past and the future'. All the Trojans are won over by Hector's appeal to give battle outside the walls. It is a fatal decision: the great Hector, forgetful of the past and blind to the future, overcome by hatred and a desire to do battle, is totally light-headed, swept away by the vicissitudes of the situation. Misled by their passions and short-sighted, the two kings, each in his camp, behave like thoughtless youths. They resemble the women Sappho describes, with their 'changeable minds, who in their lightness think only of the present'. Furthermore, the temporal horizon remains limited even for the mature man of stable common sense: for mortal creatures the future is as opaque as the night. When Diomedes volunteers for night patrol behind the enemy lines, he asks for a companion: 'When two men walk together if it's not one it's the other who sees the advantage (κήρδος) to be seized. On one's own one can see too but one's sight is shorter and one's mētis lighter'. One must be old with all the experience of a Nestor or endowed with a mētis as exceptional as that of Odysseus to be capable—to use the expression which Thucydides applies to the political flair of Themistocles—'of arriving at the most correct idea concerning the future, taking the widest point of view and
foreseeing, as far as possible, the hidden advantages and disadvantages in what cannot be seen.21

It should be added that among men one never comes across this exceptional promêthêia or prónoia, this foresight in the true sense of the word, without also encountering its opposite. Prometheus, the one who reflects in advance, has as his twin brother, his double and opposite, Epimetheus, the one who understands after the event.22 Together with fire and all the artificial skills which men need, Prometheus presents them with an intelligence which dares to take on the cunning of Zeus, and fool him. But the Titan’s mētis always recoils against him in the end; he is caught in the trap which he himself set. Prometheus and Epimetheus represent the two faces of a single figure just as the promêthêia of man is simply the other side to his radical ignorance of the future.

3. Homer gives mētis one other characteristic. It is not one, not unified, but multiple and diverse. Nestor calls it pantoiē.23 Odysseus is the hero who is polumêtis as well as poliutropos and polamêchamos. He is an expert in tricks of all kinds (pantotous dôlous),24 polamêchamos in the sense that he is never at a loss, never without expedients (pôros) to get himself out of any kind of trouble (aporia). When taught by Athena and Hephaestus, the deities of mētis, the artist also possesses a tēchnê pantoiē25 an art of many facets, knowledge of general application. The polimêtis is also known by the name of poikhilomêtis26 or aiolomêtis.27 The term poikilos is used to refer to the sheen of a material28 or the glittering of a weapon,29 the dappled hide of a fawn,30 or the shining back of a snake mottled with darker patches.31 This many-coloured sheen or complex of appearances produces an effect of irridescence, shimmering, an interplay of reflections which the Greeks perceived as the ceaseless vibrations of light. In this sense, what is poikilos, many-coloured, is close to what is aiôtios, which refers to fast movement.32 Thus it is that the changing surface of liver which is sometimes propitious and sometimes the reverse33 is called poikilos just as are good fortune which is so inconstant and changing34 and also the deity which endlessly guides the destinies of men from one side to the other, first in one direction and then in the other.35 Plato associates
what is poikilos with what is never the same as itself, oudépote 
taxíon and, similarly, elsewhere opposes it to that which is simple, haploús.

Shimmering sheen and shifting movement are so much a part of the nature of mētis that when the epithet poikilos is applied to an individual it is enough to indicate that he is a wily one, a man of cunning, full of inventive ploys (poikilóboulos) and tricks of every kind. Hesiod calls Prometheus poikilos as well as aiolómētis.48 Aesop remarks in a fable that if the panther has a mottled skin, the fox, for its part, has a mind which is poikilos.49 In The Knights, Aristophanes has one of the protagonists warned against a particularly dangerous adversary: “The man is poikilos, crafty; he can easily find ways of getting himself out of difficulties (ek tôn amēchánōn pōrous eumēchanos porizein”).50

As we have already mentioned, aíolos is a term which is close to poikilos. E. Benveniste has connected it with the root aión (skrt. āyus): this denotes, first, the life force realised in human existence and, then, continuity of life, duration of life, a period of time.51 A linguistic analysis reveals that the fundamental meaning of aíolos is: swift, mobile, changing. L. Parmentier has claimed that in epic aíolos means many-coloured (versicolor), marked with colours that overlap.52 But even if it is true that aíolos applied, for example, to the horse of Achilles, a bay with white socks,53 applies to the colour of its coat, the fact is that for the lexicographers and scholiasts who commented on the term54 it conveyed, first and foremost, the image of turbulent movement, of incessant change. When applied to objects, the word is used to refer to shields which glitter as they move;55 where animals are concerned, to worms,56 horseflies,57 wasps, a swarm of bees,58 all creatures whose wriggling and moving mass is never still; on connection with men, to those whose wily mind is able to twist and turn in every direction. Pindar calls Odysseus ‘aíolos’, a man of shifty cunning.59 Aiolómētis and aiolóboulos correspond to poikilómētis and poikilóboulos. He whose cleverness enables him to turn his hand to anything (panoúrgos), who is wily enough to discover an escape from every trap (eiporos) is, Eustathius tells us an Aeolus, Aíolos, a Poikilos.60
Why does méis appear thus, as multiple (pantoiē), many-coloured (poikilē) shifting (aiolē)? Because its field of application is the world of movement, of multiplicity and of ambiguity. It bears on fluid situations which are constantly changing and which at every moment combine contrary features and forces that are opposed to each other. In order to seize upon the fleeting kairos, méis had to make itself even swifter than the latter. In order to dominate a changing situation, full of contrasts, it must become even more supple, even more shifting, more polymorphic than the flow of time: it must adapt itself constantly to events as they succeed each other and be pliable enough to accommodate the unexpected so as to implement the plan in mind more successfully. It is thus that the helmsman pits his cunning against the wind so as to bring the ship safely to harbour despite it. For the Greeks, only like could be affected by like. Victory over a shifting reality whose continuous metamorphoses make it almost impossible to grasp, can only be won through an even greater degree of mobility, an even greater power of transformation.

There is one feature of Metis mentioned by Apollodorus which one might have thought to be secondary or a late addition but whose full importance can now be recognised. Zeus’ spouse is endowed with the power of metamorphosis. Like other marine deities (which are also “primordial” beings) such as Nereus, Proteus and Thetis, she can take on the most widely differing appearances. She can, in succession, become a lion, a bull, a fly, a fish, a bird, a flame or flowing water. We are told that, to escape Zeus’ embrace, as Thetis eluded Proteus, Metis “changed herself into all kinds of forms.”

Deities of this type nearly always appear, in myth, in the context of a trial imposed upon a hero who may be human or divine. At some crucial point in his career the hero has to confront the spells of some god of great cunning who holds the secret to his success. The god possesses the power to assume all kinds of different forms and, as the contest proceeds, this makes him a kind of polymorphous monster, a terrifying opponent, impossible to seize. To conquer him it is necessary to take him by surprise with a trick, a
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disguise, an ambush—as Menelaus does with the ancient Proteus. The hero must grasp him unexpectedly and not let go whatever happens. Once his magic power is disarmed by the bond which grips him, the deity with the power of metamorphosis reassumes his original form and surrenders to his conqueror. If it is a goddess she agrees to have intercourse with him and this marriage is the crowning point of the hero’s career. If it is a god such as Nereus or Proteus, he reveals the secrets of his oracular wisdom. In either case a mistrustful, mobile elusive being is taken by surprise, seized and secured by an unbreakable bond.

Zeus masters Metis by turning her own weapons against herself. These are premeditation, deceit, the surprise attack and the sudden assault. Conversely, in her attempts to loosen the god’s grip, Metis imitates those elusive beings which baffle men with their constant transformations and thus escape from their planned hold over them and slip through their fingers.

The many-coloured, shimmering nature of métis is a mark of its kinship with the divided, shifting world of multiplicity in the midst of which it operates. It is this way of cunning with reality which ensures its efficacy. Its suppleness and malleability give it the victory in domains where there are no ready-made rules for success, no established methods, but where each new trial demands the invention of new ploys, the discovery of a way out (pēros) that is hidden. Conversely, the ambiguous, disparate, unstable realities with which men attempt to come to grips may, in myth, take on the appearance of polymorphic monsters, powers of metamorphosis which delight, in their cunning, to disappoint all expectations and constantly to baffle the minds of men.

4. Métis is itself a power of cunning and deceit. It operates through disguise. In order to dupe its victim it assumes a form which masks, instead of revealing, its true being. In métis appearance and reality no longer correspond to one another but stand in contrast, producing an effect of illusion, apáte, which beguiles the adversary into error and leaves him as bemused by his defeat as by the spells of a magician. Antilochus’ trick, as described in the Iliad, is indeed a ‘trap’,
a *dolos* of this kind. The young man has thought out his plan carefully in advance; he has inspected the terrain and taken note of the narrowing of the track. In hatching his plot, he showed himself to be, as his father advised him, prudent (*phronēon*), guarded (*pephulagmenos*) and careful not to act in an impetuous manner (*aphradēs*) as would a driver not endowed with *mētis*. His plan furthermore demands that he should be in complete command of his horses. At the moment when they veer towards the chariot alongside he should leave nothing to chance and make sure that he is at all times in full control of chariot and team. However, to be effective, the manoeuvre must fool Menelaus and appear to be opposite of what it really is. When he sees the chariot of Antilochus veer towards his own, the king of Sparta imagines that the young man has, through lack of experience, lost control of his team. ‘Antilochus’, he shouts, “you’re driving like a madman, *aphradēs*”. It is the very expression used by Nestor to describe the driver without *mētis* who, instead of remaining in control of his horses and making them go in the direction he chooses, allows himself to be led by them, as does the poor helmsman by the winds and waves, with the chariot swerving from one side to the other of the track, at the will of the horses. The prudent trick of Antilochus adopts the guise of its opposite in order to fool Menelaus, and simulates madness. The calculating young man drives his horses along the predetermined course, feigning thoughtlessness and lack of control just as he pretends not to hear Menelaus shouting out to him to take care, *hōs ouk aiontī eōtkōs*. These features in the behaviour of Antilochus take on their full significance when they are compared to the behaviour of Odysseus, the *poliūmētis* one, the very embodiment of cunning. Consider the most subtle and most dangerous orator of Greece preparing, before the assembled Trojans, to weave the glittering web of his words: there he is, standing awkwardly with his eyes fixed on the ground, not raising his head; he holds the staff quite still as if he did not know what to do with it. He looks like a tongue-tied yokel or even a witless man (*áphron*). At the moment when he is about to speak the master of tricks, the magician of words pretends to have lost his tongue, as if he were unskilled
in the rudiments of oratory (ai'drei phoì evikós). Such is the 'duplicity' of mētis which, giving itself out to be other than it is, is like those misleading objects, the powers of deception which Homer refers to as dōlos: the Trojan Horse, the bed of love with its magic bonds, the fishing bait are all traps which conceal their inner deceit beneath a reassuring or seductive exterior.

Notes

3. We need do no more than indicate some of the most important terms that we find associated with mētis: dōlos and mētis (Od., III, 119–122); dolonomēs (II., I, 540; Od., I, 300; III, 198); poliμētis and dolē tēkhē (Homeric Hymn to Hermes 76; Od., IV, 455); akgulomētis, dolē tēkhē, phrāzezhē, kriptēs, bōhos, dōlos (Hes., Theog., 160–175); phārmaka mētisōnta (Od., IV, 227); mētis hukhaimis (II., VII, 324; Od., IV, 678); mētis and kérē (II., X, 223–225; XXIII, 322; 515; Od., XIII, 299 and 303); poliμētis and kerdalōphrēs (II., IV, 339 and 349); akgulomētis and haimulai mēchānai (Hes., Theog., 546–547; Aesch., Prom., 205).
4. The first of the mēdōntes or 'regents', Nestor always gives the best advice (cf. II., XIV, 107: amēneuma mētis): 'forestalling all the others, he starts to weave the threads of his plot', hukhaimis ... mētis (II., VII, 324). In lines 118–129 of Book III of the Odyssey, the praise of Odysseus whose mētis is without equal prompts Nestor to emphasise the cleverness they have in common which is the basis for their mutual sympathy.
5. II., XXIII, 306 ff.
6. II., XXIII, 307–308: hipposinas ... pantoias.
7. In lines 310–11 there is a clearly marked opposition between 'slowest' (bārdistat) and 'swifter' (aphkārteroi). In line 322 the adjective 'less good' (hēssonas) qualifying hippous suggests the corresponding 'better' (krixsonas) which is not actually made explicit.
8. Antilochus himself is not without mētis as is stressed in line 305: 'his father approaches him and, for his own good, gives him advice, however intelligent he may himself already be'. Three other passages bear witness to his intelligence (440: pepēnātha; 508; pepēnumēnos; 683; μέν). Furthermore, the name of his driver is Nēmōn (612).
9. Like H. Jeanneney, art. cit., p. 22, whose translation forms the basis for our own, we prefer not to translate the term mētis itself.
10. II., XXIII, 322, hēssonas, literally 'less good'.
11. This manoeuvre—or what we could call 'mēchānē—is a sort of 'swerv-
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12. Cf. the 'women's tricks' (gynaikokouleus ... méritas) of Clytemnestra (Aesch., Choeph., 626).
13. Zeus is not only mētis, he is also the mētōr hēpatoi (II., VIII, 22; XVII, 330). His mētis is the measure of all other mētis (cf. the expression: Di méton atōlanton, II., II, 169; 407; 636; X, 137).
14. Aesch., Prom., 206-207; 213; 219; 440; Apollod., I, VI, 1; I, VI, 3; Nonnos, Dionys., I, 481 ff. Note the role of Metis at the very outset of the career of Zeus: Apollod., I, II, 1; cf. also Hes., Thesp., 471 and 492. Cf. infra [p. 58-107].
15. II., XXIII, 319-325.
17. II., VIII, 340.
18. II., XIII, 545.
19. To cite only one example, where the context amusingly stresses the idea of heavy or dense conveyed by the word pukinis, consider, at Odyssey IX, 445, the trick conceived by Odysseus to escape the vengeance of the Cyclops. Clinging to the wool under the belly of the biggest ram, Odysseus is carried past his victim: 'My ram was the last to come out and moved forward heavy with its wool and with my weighty thought, kai emoi pukinā phronōnti'.
20. II., XXIII, 415-416: technēomat édē nōthō...oudé me lései. The English translation is based on the French translation by P. Mazon.
23. II., XXIII, 585: a trick which has 'fettered' (pódeiō) the chariot of Menelaus.
24. II., XXIII, 590.
25. II., 108-10. For a whole line of writers the mind of the young man who lacks mētis is blown hither and thither depending on the circumstances, just as the chariot and the ship which are without a prudent driver or a knowing pilot wander here and there at the whim of the horses or of the winds. For man in general, as for the driver, as for the chariot and the ship in particular, mētis implies, in contrast, a continuity of direction, a line of behaviour plotted out in advance and constantly followed. For this image of the young man swept along by change and characterised by 'lightness', we may refer to Theognis, 629: 'Youth and inexperience make the mind of a man light' (epikouphæiat); Plato, Laws, 699c: 'The characters of young men are naturally liable to change many times (pollās metabolēs ... metabálleun) in the course of their lives'; Theophrastus, ap. Stob., Anth., II, 11 (IV, 1, p. 340 Hense): 'It is difficult to predict the futures of young men; it is an unpredictable age (astochastos), constantly changing (pollās euchous metabolēs) and carried (pheroménas) first in one direction and then in another (allote ep’alloi).'
26. II., 1, 343.
27. II., XVIII, 249: pepnumenos.
32. Prometheus is peithilos, aioloméis (infra, n. 36, 37, 48), whilst Epiceneus is homartinoos (Hes., Theog., 511). In the Works, 85—86, Epiceneus is characterised by his inability to reflect, to phrásaih—
which is one of the verbs associated with mètis.
33. Il., XXIII, 314.
35. Od., VI, 234.
36. Peiłioímeis or peiíloímeis is the epithet for Odysseus (Il., XI, 482; Od., III, 163; XIII, 293), Zeus (Hymn. Apoll. 322), Hermes (Hymn. Hermes, 155). Peiiloíboulos is a variant: this epithet describes Prometheus (Hes., Theog., 511), Odysseus (Anth. Plan., IV, 300, 5), Hermes (Orph. Hymn. 28, 3 Quandt).
37. Aphirodite is aioloméis (Aesch. Suppl., 1037) as are Prometheus (Hes., Theog., 511) and Sisyphus (Hes., fr. 7, 4 R). Aíloloís appears several times in Oppian, Cynerg., I, 452; III, 139; IV, 25, etc.
38. Il., VI, 289 and 294; Athanaeus, 48b.
39. Il., X, 75.
41. Pind., Pyth., IV, 249.
42. The affinities between aiélos and peiílois are clearly indicated by the Homeric scholia and by the lexicographers; cf. H. J. Mette, s.v. aílolois in the Lexicon des frührigrischen Epos, (1955), p. 329.
43. Aesch., Prom., 495.
44. Aristotle, Eth. Nic., I, 10, 1100a 34.
45. Eur., Helen, 711—712.
46. Plato, Rep., 568d.
47. Plat., Theaetetus, 146 d.
49. Aesop, Fab., 37 and 119.
50. Aristophanes, Knights, 758—759.
52. L. Parmentier, Rev. belge de Philologie et d'Histoire I, 1922, p. 417 ff.
53. Id.: ibid., p. 420: on Xanthus which is a horse with white socks (Il., XIX, 404).
55. II., V, 295.
56. II., XXII, 509.
57. Od., XXII, 296–301. In this case the aíaös oistros is Athena, the
daughter of Metis.
58. II., XII, 167.
60. Eust., p. 1645, 3 ff. On the relation between Ἑλδος and ποικίλα, see
the allegorical interpretations of Iamblichus, Theol. arithm., p. 28, 11
de Felco.
62. A δόλος which has duped (ἐπορευέοιν) Menelaus (II., XXIII, 605),
but which has also bound, fettered (παδᾶσα) his chariot (585).
63. II., XXIII, 343.
64. II., XXIII, 343.
65. II., XXIII, 320.
66. II., XXIII, 426.
67. The term ἀφραδεῦς which appears in line 426 is echoed by the two
adjectives παρόρος and ἀειφρός (503). The former denotes the
outrider and, metaphorically, the thoughtless man—no doubt
through the allusion to the less definite, more wavering course of
this horse (as is suggested by P. Chantraine and H. Goube in their
notes to line 603). ἐπρορος refers to the image of the chariot which is
plying a zig-zag course (320: ἡλισθεταὶ ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα). The epithet
is particularly apposite given that in his advice to Antilochus Nestor
did not fail to indicate in advance the guidemarks which were to
enable him to stick to his course: II., XXIII, 323 (σήμα) 326 (σῆμα... 
ἀριφραδεῖς). Cf. 358 (σῆμεν δὲ τέρματ' Αχιλλεῖα).
CHAPTER 2

The Fox and the Octopus

The episode of Antilochus enabled us to give a general outline of the semantic field of mētis and of the essential features of this particular type of intelligence, taking the Homeric epic as our starting point. Mētis, informed prudence, allows Antilochus, in the Games, to gain a lead in the chariot race over adversaries with faster teams of horses than his own. Cunning, dōlōs, tricks, kérdē, and the ability to seize an opportunity, kairōs, give the weaker competitor the means of triumphing over the stronger, enabling the inferior to outdo the superior rival. Throughout the race Antilochus drives intently, keeping his eyes on the man in front of him, dokētei. To bring about a reversal of the position mētis must foresee the unforeseeable. Engaged in the world of becoming and confronted with situations which are ambiguous and unfamiliar and whose outcome always lies in the balance, wiley intelligence is only able to maintain its hold over beings and things thanks to its ability to look beyond the immediate present and forsee a greater or lesser section of the future. Vigilant and forever on the alert, mētis also appears as multiple, pantōnē, many-coloured, poikilē and shifting, aiōtē. They are all qualities which betray the polymorphism and polyvalence of a kind of intelligence which, to render itself impossible to seize and to dominate fluid, changing realities, must always prove itself more supple and more polymorphic than they are. Finally, mētis, wiley intelligence possesses the most prized cunning of all: the ‘duplicity’ of the trap which always presents itself as what it is not and which conceals its true lethal nature beneath a reassuring exterior.

This is our first model of mētis, with the features that appear in the Iliad and the Odyssey. We shall now compare
it to the model presented by our second source of evidence, namely the works ascribed to Oppian.

* * *

The Treatise on Fishing, composed by Oppian during the second century A.D. and the Treatise on Hunting by the author known by the same name⁴ introduce us into a world of traps. These include not just baits, nets, weels, nooses and snares, but also in a certain respect those animals and men which appear alternately first as hunted and then as hunter. In the two treatises, the words δόλος, τέχνη, μέχανη recur constantly, associated with the term μῆτις. In the world of animals as in that of men, relations of force are constantly upset by the intervention of μῆτις. It is not necessarily the rule that the bigger creatures eat the smaller: "Those which have not been allotted strength by some god and which are not equipped with some poisonous sting to defend themselves have as their weapons the resources of an intelligence fertile in cunning tricks and stratagems (δόλοι). They can kill a fish which is easily their superior in size and strength (και κρατητόν, καὶ ἥπαρτερον)."⁵ The defeat of the weak and the frail is not a foregone conclusion. Prawns are small, says Oppian, and their strength is commensurate with their size: "Yet, thanks to their cunning tricks (δόλοι) they are able to kill the sea basse which is one of the most powerful fishes."⁶

The μῆτις of fish can take a thousand forms. It abounds in inventiveness and is full of surprises. This, for example, is how the fishing frog operates: "The fishing frog is a sluggish creature with a soft body and a hideous aspect. Its mouth opens exceedingly wide. Nevertheless, it is a possessor of μῆτις, for all that, and it is μῆτις that procures its food. What it does is crouch, motionless, deep in the wet mud. Then it stretches out a little fleshy appendage which grows below its lower jaw; the appendage is thin, white and has an unpleasant smell. The frog waves it about continuously, using it as a bait (δόλος) to attract small fish. As soon as these catch sight of it they fall on it in order to seize it. Then, imperceptibly, the frog draws this sort of tongue back towards it and continues to wave it gently about a couple of finger-
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lengths away from its mouth. Without the slightest suspicion that it is a trap (kruptón dólon) the little fish follow the bait. Soon they are swallowed up one after another within the wide jaws of this huge mouth. Oppian goes on to remark that it is thus, by duping them, that the feeble frog catches the fish. The domain of métis is one ruled by cunning and traps. It is an ambiguous world, composed of duplicity and deceit—apátē. The fleshy appendage growing on the fishing frog is a true fishing bait and as such has a double character: to the little fish it looks for all the world like food but it is food which soon changes itself into a voracious maw. With this type of ligament dangling from its neck which it can stretch out and draw back at will, the fishing frog sets up a manoeuvre which equals the art of line fishing; and because of this ploy or sophisma, the Greeks gave it the fitting name of ‘angler-fish’ or halieus.

The fish which possess métis are living traps. The Torpedo fish appears as a flabby body, quite without vigour but, Oppian tells us, ‘its flanks conceal a cunning trick, a dōlos, its strength in weakness’. Its dōlos consists of the sudden electric shock which its harmless appearance masks and which takes its adversary by surprise, leaving it at the torpedo fish’s mercy. The sea is like a world full of snares, inhabited as it is by ambiguous creatures whose harmless appearance belies their true, deadly nature. A rock looks like a greyish mass, un alarming and still. But all the time it is an octopus. Oppian says that it is by tēchnē that the octopus merges in with the rock to which it clings. In this way, thanks to the illusion (apátē) which they thus create, they have no difficulty in eluding the pursuit of fishermen as well as that of the fish whose strength they fear. If, on the other hand, some weak creature comes within their reach, they immediately cast off their appearance of a rock and re assume that of an octopus. The same trick is their means of both acquiring food and escaping death. The world of duplicity is also a world of vigilance: both the fishing frog squatting in the mud and the octopus plastered to its rock are on the alert; they keep a look out, are on the watch for the moment to act. Every animal with métis is a living eye which never closes or even blinks.
In this world of hunting and of fishing, victory is only to be won through mérit. There is one unalterable rule for animals and men alike: be they hunting or fishing: the only way to get the better of a pólemérit one is to exhibit even more mérit. Menelaus can only seize Proteus, the polymorphic god, by resorting to ambush and disguise. Herakles can only triumph over Peryclemenes, the elusive warrior with a thousand forms, with the aid of Athena and all her mérit. How does Oppian see this type of man, hunter or fisherman, confronted with a world of traps and at grips with animals full of cunning? There are several passages in the Treatise on Fishing and the Treatise on Hunting which enable us to distinguish his essential features and to discern his most important qualities. The first quality of the hunter as of the fisherman is agility, suppleness, swiftness, mobility. Oppian insists that a good fisherman must have agile limbs, be able to leap from stone to stone, run along the bank and move as swiftly as his prey. As for the hunter, he must be energetic and hardened to withstand fatigue, but he must also be a good runner, fleet of foot, like the accomplished warrior as depicted in Homer. When Plato, in the Laws, writes that there is no more warrior-like quality than agility of body—of the feet and hands for example—his remark is equally applicable to the type of man we are attempting to define. Certain points found in myth also stress this fundamental quality. When Hermes sets out to hunt at nightfall, he plaits himself a pair of 'swift sandals' which enable him to move as fast as the wind. According to Nonnos, Ageus and Nomios, two mythical patrons of the hunt, were the owners of magical shoes: when Dionysus wants to give a mark of his favour to Nicaia, who is passionately devoted to the hunt, these are what he gives him. Tradition has it that these same shoes are also a part of the equipment of Artemis when she sets out on her great hunts. Their name makes it quite clear what they stand for: they are known as endromídes, 'racing' shoes.

The second quality of the hunter and of the fisherman is dissimulation, the art of seeing without being seen. True, Oppian nowhere says this in so many words. But we are justified in inferring it from a number of recommendations
and precepts which make the same point. In the first place, there is some purely technical information: the line on which the bait is suspended must be as fine as a hair; the snare laid on the tracks frequented by the game must be undetectable among the branches, the weel must merge in with the background of the undersea world in the same way as the octopus which adopts the colour and shape of the rock to which it clings. These recommendations concerning the instruments of fishing and hunting are an integral part of a whole series of precepts which Oppian produces for those who desire to catch fish or game: they must be very quiet, move without noise and, however fleet of foot they may be, they must also when necessary be capable of remaining quite still for hours on end. When one wants to catch a shoal of fish detected by a look-out, one must as far as possible avoid making any sound with the oars and nets. The nets must be thrown out far enough away so that the sound of the oars and the lapping of the water against the boat will not be heard by the fish. All those taking part in a fishing expedition must proceed in total silence until the fish are ‘encircled’ (κυκλούμενοι), imprisoned within the circular sweep of the huge net. In this marine world in which, as Plutarch says, every living creature harbours presentiments which change in no time into suspicions, dissimulation is to no avail without the preliminary skill of laying the bait and setting the trap. Silent and invisible, hunters and fishermen must themselves become traps.

Being silent and ever on the alert, remaining invisible, missing nothing, constantly on the qui-vive: all this is covered by a technical term relating to hunting and fishing whose importance in Homeric terminology we have already noted, namely ἀνίκοαν, to be on the look out, on the watch. The third quality of this type of man is vigilance. On this point Oppian is quite explicit: a keen eye is essential for hunting and fishing. Hunters and fishermen must always keep their eyes open and their wits about them, never succumbing to the desire to sleep. The animals for which they lie in wait never relax their vigilance. The question of whether fishes ever slept was a much debated one among the ancient writers, to such an extent that in his Historia Animalium, Aristotle
spends a long time attempting to show that they do sleep, and moreover very deeply. Some authors of technical treatises such as Seleucus of Tarsus claimed, on the other hand, that no fish sleeps except one which is, paradoxically, known as the ‘leaping’ fish, skáros. Oppian is of the same opinion: fishes are creatures which never close their eyes, even during the night. They are characterised by a nóos pandáipnos, an intelligence which is never overcome by the power of sleep. In a sense, Seleucus of Tarsus and Oppian are in the right against Aristotle despite his naturalist’s knowledge: if fish possess méthis it is not possible that they should sleep; they resemble Zeus, the god who is the embodiment of méthis, who never sleeps, whose eyes never close. The hunter must be like Hermes, eiskopos, a good lookout. In his list of hunting epithets Pollux, having noted that the hunter must be swift (kóúphos), a good runner (dromíkós) and alert (ágrounos) insists that he should also be oxís, that he must have a sharp eye, a piercing glance. When, a little further on, Pollux gives the hunter advice as to how to tackle a wild boar, this detail takes on its full importance: he must have a piercing eye to aim (stókhásethai) at the vital parts (kária), the spot where a wound is fatal.

If the hunter and fisherman show a capacity for vigilance, Oppian declares, they will make good catches, they will be dear to Hermes, the god of windfalls who is the most alert of the gods in the Greek pantheon, after Zeus whose nature is entirely alien to sleep. Mobility, vigilance and the art of seeing without being seen are all included in the quality that Oppian insists the accomplished fisherman must possess: he must be polupaípalos, full of finesse. The term may seem surprising: the literal meaning of paípalē or paípalēma is ‘the finest flour’ but, as used by Aristophanes, it is a metaphor which is applied to one who is cunning, subtle and shrewd. To be polupaípalos is to be a master of finesse. The expression is analogous to a whole series of terms which associate closely together the ideas of cunning and of multiplicity: polúmétis, the epithet applied to Odysseus, Hephaestus and Hermes, polutropos which refers both to the octopus and to the man of méthis, and poluméchanos which describes the intelligence of Odysseus. To be a master of finesse, polupaípalos, does
not only involve traps, weels, snares and nets, all the dóloi which are the weapons of the hunter and the fisherman. The context shows that it has a wider meaning: 'The fisherman must possess a mind full of finesse (polupapalos) and intelligence (moémôn), for the fish, having fallen unexpectedly into the trap, devise a thousand cunning tricks to escape from it (pollà kai aióla méchanôntai). It is the métis of the fish which obliges the fisherman to deploy an intelligence full of finesse. Oppian states this clearly on several occasions: 'It is not only in relations with each other that fish display the finesse of their intelligence, their shrewdness and their cunning (νέμα πυγνόν, métis epíklopos). Indeed, very often, they deceive the cleverness of those who seek to catch them; they often escape even when already hooked or caught in the net. Winning the battle of wits (bouléi nikékantes), they often triumph over the artifices of men'. Even when they are caught animals may, thanks to their métis, themselves remain traps: they have all the cunning of the sophist, the poikilos schemer 'who is never without a way (porous euméchanos porizein) of escaping from difficulties (améchánôn)'. Their métis even rivals Prometheus' cunning 'capable of extricating itself even from the inextricable'. To triumph over these creatures which are so resourceful, to thwart even their most startling ploys and be ready even for what is most unpredictable, hunters and fishermen must be capable of showing métis superior to theirs, they must have more tricks up their sleeves than their victims. It is by drawing on experience from the animal world that métis, can fortify itself and become full of all the resources essential to it. In his treatise on The Intelligence of Animals, Plutarch stresses this point: octopus hunting, he writes, develops a man's skill (deinotês) and practical intelligence (símesis). Conversely when, in the Laws, Plato violently condemns line fishing, the hunting of aquatic creatures, the use of weels, the hunting of birds and all forms of hunting with nets and traps, he does so because all these techniques foster the qualities of cunning and duplicity which are diametrically opposed to the virtues that the city of the Laws demanded from its citizens. If they are masters of finesse hunters and fishermen can
display an unrivaled duplicity: there is no end to their stratagems, they can devise a thousand tricks to equal the plots of animal mētis. Some fish can be caught by some fairly crude bait. An octopus grilled over charcoal easily lures a sea bream into the weel. But this facile type of fishing can become a marvel when, instead of using an ordinary snare which can catch only one prisoner, the fisherman uses a type of trap which remains open. Patiently, he allows the fish to become accustomed to the 'device', to get used to finding their food there and then, all of sudden, he captures the entire group by closing the opening of the weel with a well-fitting cover. Other victims are less naive and for them more subtle methods are necessary. To catch the antias, Oppian's advice is to fix to a double-pronged hook a living sea bass, if this be possible. If a living bait is not available, the fisherman should resort to the following subterfuge: he should attach, just above the fish's mouth, a piece of lead, known as a 'dolphin', the pressure of which gives the lifeless body the movements of an authentic living creature. Deceived by the appearance of the fish which seems to be fleeing from them, the antias fall upon it. Here again the cunning trick of the fisherman is simply an imitation—a replica of the trick perpetrated by the fishing frog.

Countless animals are endowed with mētis. Oppian describes at length the pranks (hērē) of the ichneumon, and the cunning tricks (dolos) of the Ox-ray; he marvels at the mētis of the starfish and the urchins and at the tēchnē of the crab with its twisted gait. But of all the animals which are outstanding for their mētis, there are two which call for particular attention: the fox and the octopus. In Greek thought they serve as models. They are, as it were, the incarnation of cunning in the animal world. Each represents one essential aspect of mētis in particular. The fox has a thousand tricks up its sleeve but the culminating point of its mētis appears in the way it so to speak reverses itself. In the infinite suppleness of its tentacles the octopus, for its part, symbolises the unseizability that comes from polymorphy.
When Oppian describes the cunning of the fishing frog squatting in the mud, motionless and invisible, he compares it to the fox: "The scheming fox (aṅkulomētis kerādē) devises a similar trick; as soon as it spots a flock of wild birds it lies down on its side, stretches out its agile limbs, closes its eyelids and shuts its mouth. To see it you would think that it was enjoying a deep sleep or even that it was really dead, so well does it hold its breath as it lies stretched out there, all the while turning over treacherous plots (aṅkā bouleuomena) in its mind. No sooner do the birds notice it than they swoop down on it in a flock and, as if in mockery, tear at its coat with their claws, but as soon as they are within reach of its teeth the fox reveals its cunning (dolos) and seizes them unexpectedly". The fox is a trap; when the right moment comes the dead creature becomes more alive than the living. But the skill of the fox lies in its ability to lie low, crouching in the shadows. This is how the author of the Treatise on Hunting sees it: "The most scheming (aioloboulos) of wild animals...it lives, in its intelligence, in the depths of an earth which is admirably laid out. The dwelling that it digs itself has seven different entrances linked by as many corridors and the openings are situated a long way from each other. Thus it has less cause to fear that hunters, laying a trap at its door, will make it fall into their snares". It is within this lair that it devises its plots. The misleading, enigmatic, polymorphic earth of the fox is matched by the animal's equally impenetrable mind. An animal as artful as this cannot fail to be elusive: "The fox is not to be captured by ambush nor by noose nor by net for it has no equal in smelling out an ambush; it is clever at severing ropes and escaping death through the subtlety of its cunning tricks". Oppian here uses a typical verb for 'to escape': olithicēn, which conveys the image of an athlete whose body, rubbed with oil, slips through the grasp of his adversary. For the Greek world, the fox is Cunning; in Greek a cunning trick can be called alōpēx or fox. The most common adjectives applied to the fox are aioloboulos, poikilophrōn, poiktios. It is a master of doloi: in fables, its words are more beguiling (haimuloi lógoi) than those of the sophist. The panther
can boast a many-coloured coat but the fox’s rejoinder to this is that beneath its uniformly rust-coloured fur it hides
a mind of many nuances and a polymorphic intelligence which can adapt to any circumstances. It is known as
Kerdō, the profiteer and ‘fox’ can also mean the rascal
(papinggos) or, equally, it can refer to an area of the body
which is hairless and, so, difficult to grasp. Even as early
as the time of Alcaeus, the fox appears as the model for a
certain type of man: Pittacos is a fox. He knows how to lie
low, but also knows the art of scheming in battle. Pittacos
the Fox was believed to have killed the Athenian general,
Phrynon, the Olympic champion of the all-in wrestling, in
a duel. Under his shield, the ‘Fox’ had hidden a net which
he threw over his adversary, taking him by surprise.

The mind of the fox is full of crafty wiles. Consider how
it catches bustards: it droops its head downward and gently
wags its tail. Aelian claims that the deluded (apateleisai)
bustards approach this object which they mistake for one of
their own kind. When they are within reach, the fox suddenly
turns round (epistrophain) and leaps upon them. If the
metis of the fox is immediately detectable in its skill at playing
dead, it is dazzlingly apparent in this sudden reversal. In
effect, the fox holds the secret of reversal which is the last
word in craftiness. In the fourth Isthmian, Pindar gives a
very significant description of the metis of the fox: in many
instances, he says, ‘the cunning of the weaker has taken the
stronger by surprise and brought about his downfall (kai
kreson andron cheiron on esphale techna katamarpais)’. The
courage of Ajax, the greatest of all after Achilles, is brought
down by the craftiness of Odysseus, the polimetis: it is a
victory for the Wolf over the Lion. In this way Pindar
comes to praise Melissos of Thebes, victor in the all-in
wrestling. Although small of stature, his energy is daunting:
‘His courage in battle resembles the valiance of wild animals
which roar so terribly.’ He is a lion, but a lion which is also
a fox and which reversing its position, brings to a halt the
flight of the eagle. Melissos is a past master at the feint
employed in wrestling (palaisma) of eluding the grasp of the
adversary and then, by reversing one’s body, turning against
him the force of his own thrust. Similarly, when the eagle
is swooping down on it, the fox suddenly reverses its own position. The eagle is outwitted, its prey escapes it and the positions are reversed. This is the fox’s masterstroke. But the carnivorous fox is not the only creature in the animal world to possess this talent. There is also a fish which is reputed to be able to get itself out of an inextricable situation. As soon as it is caught on a hook it swims rapidly up and severs the line half way up or sometimes even higher. Plutarch tells us more about it: ‘It generally avoids bait (dōlos) but if it is caught it gets rid of it. Thanks to its energy and flexibility’ (μυγρνίον) it is able to change its body (μεταβάλλει τὸ σῶμα) and turn it inside out (στρέψθη) so that the interior becomes the exterior: the hook falls out (ὅστε τὸν ἐχθρὸν γεγονόν ἀποπίπτειν ἀγκιστρόν). 69 Aelian provides full confirmation on the subject of this manoeuvre. ‘It unfolds its internal organs and turns them inside out, divesting itself of its body as if it were a shirt (ἑαυτῆς τὸ ἐντὸς μετεκδοῦσα ἑστρέφειν ἐκῷ ἠσπερ οἴνῳ χιτώνα τὸ σῶμα ανελιξα). 70 This fish turns itself inside out like a glove. It is the ultimate in reversal. And the name given this aquatic creature by the Greeks is ‘fox fish’. 71 There is no positive evidence based on observation to corroborate the amazing behaviour which so many writers attribute to the fox—be it the actual fox or the fish. It was not in nature that the Greeks found this type of reversal behaviour in animals, but rather in their own minds, in the conception that they formed of mētis, its methods and effects. The fox, being the embodiment of cunning, can only behave as befits the nature of an intelligence full of wiles. If it turns back on itself it is because it is, itself, as it were, mētis, the power of reversal.

While the fox is as supple and as slim as a lassoo, the octopus reaches out in all directions through its countless, flexible and undulating limbs (ἀισθήμα γίγα). 72 To the Greeks, the octopus is a knot made up of a thousand arms, a living, interlacing, network, a polypèles being. 73 The same adjective is also used to describe the snake with its coils and folds; 74 and the labyrinth, with its mazes and tangle of halls and passages. 75 The monster Typhon, too, is polypèles: a multiple creature ‘with a hundred heads’ whose trunk tapers out into its eel-like limbs.
The octopus is renowned for its mētis. Oppian compares it to a burglar who emerges under cover of night to catch his prey by surprise. The octopus is elusive: its méchanē enables it to merge with the stone to which it clings. Not only is it able to take the shape of the bodies to which it clings perfectly, but it can also imitate the colour of the creatures and things which it approaches. The elusive octopus is a being of the night. Like Hermes, called nýchios, it too knows how to disappear into the night, but it is a night which it can itself secrete, as can other creatures of its kind and, in particular, the cuttle-fish or sepia. The cuttle-fish, which is dolomētis and dolóphron, is reputed to be the most cunning of all the molluscs. It possesses one infallible weapon to deceive its enemy and to fool its victim, namely its ink which is a kind of cloud (tholós). This dark liquid, a viscous cloud, enables it both to elude its enemies and to capture its adversaries, which become its victims, as if in a net. It is this ink, this dark cloud, this impenetrable night which defines one of the essential features of the octopus and of the cuttle-fish. These elusive, supple cephalopods which develop into a thousand agile limbs are enigmatic creatures. They have neither front nor rear, they swim sideways with their eyes in front and their mouth behind, their heads haloed by their waving feet. When these creatures mate, they do so mouth to mouth and arm to arm. Thus closely linked, they swim along together: the front of the one is the rear of the other. They are oblique creatures the front of which is never distinctly distinguished from the rear, and in their being and in the way they move, they create a confusion of directions. Cuttlefish and octopuses are pure ἀποραί and the impenetrable, pathless night that they secrete is the most perfect image of their mētis. Within this deep darkness, only the octopus and the cuttle-fish can find their way, only they can discover a ἥρος. The night is their lair. They take shelter in it to escape from their enemies and emerge unexpectedly from it to catch their victims. Living traps as they are, they exploit a device that Plutarch calls sóphisma: they have a long, thin tentacle which they move very slowly to lure the fish. As soon as they are within reach, they seize
them mercilessly. But the source of their strength is the cause of their downfall. These creatures so rich in méthos can only be taken by their own traps: to catch them, fishermen throw them as bait a female of their own kind which they then grasp so tightly that nothing but death can make them let go. In order to get the better of these creatures which are truly, themselves, living traps, the fisherman must turn against them their own power of binding.

Like the fox, the octopus defines a type of human behaviour: 'Present a different aspect of yourself (epistrephe poikílon Íthos) to each of our friends.... Follow the example of the octopus with its many coils (poikílokos) which assumes the appearance of the stone to which it is going to cling. Attach yourself to one on one day and, another day, change colour. Cleverness (sophia) is more valuable than inflexibility (atropíē). Atrofíē is strictly opposed to polytrofíē, as immobility and rigidity to the constant movement of whoever can reveal a new face on every different occasion. The suggested ideal is the polýtropos one, the man of a thousand tricks, the epístrophos anthrōpōn who can turn a different face to each person. There is but one name for this man, throughout Greek tradition: Odysseus, the polýmētis one, the man whom Eustathius actually calls 'an octopus'. But the octopus is not simply characteristic of a particular type of human behaviour; it is also the model for a form of intelligence: the poikílokos nóēma, intelligence 'with many coils'.

This octopus-like intelligence is to be found in two types of men in particular—the sophist and the politician, whose qualities and functions in Greek society stand in opposition and yet are complementary just as are the separate spheres of speech and action. For it is in his shifting speeches, his poikíloi lógoi that the sophist deploys his words of 'many coils', periplokai; strings of words which unfold like the coils of the snake, speeches which enmesh their enemies like the supple arms of the octopus. For the politician taking on the appearance of the octopus, making himself poikílōkos, involves not only possessing the lógoi of the octopus but also proving himself capable of adapting to the most baffling of situations, of assuming as many faces as there are social
categories and types of men in the city, of inventing the thousand ploys which will make his actions effective in the most varied of circumstances.\textsuperscript{94}

From some points of view the poliutropos man, as a type, is hard to distinguish from the man whom the Lyric poets call the ephemeroseone.\textsuperscript{95} He is a man of the moment, a man of change: now one thing, now another; he shifts and slides from one extreme to the other. The ephemeros man is characterised by his mobility just as is the poliutropos. However, although both are mobile creatures, on one essential point they are radically different. One is passive, the other active. The ephemeros one is an inconstant man who at every moment feels himself changing; he is aware of his state of flux and veers at the slightest puff of wind. One expression used by Pindar to describe him is 'the prey of crafty time' (dolios ai\on),\textsuperscript{96} time which can make a life alter course. The poliutropos one, on the other hand, is distinguished by the control he possesses: supple and shifting as he is, he is always master of himself and is only unstable in appearance. His volte-faces are a trap—the net in which his adversary becomes entangled. He is not the plaything of movement but its master. He manipulates it and other people and does so all the more easily in that he gives the appearance of being ephemeros. The distance separating the poliutropos and the ephemeros man—corresponds exactly to that between the octopus and the chamaeleon: while the metamorphoses of the latter are produced by fear, those of the octopus are the result of its guile. Its changes, Plutarch observes, are 'a manoeuvre (m\ech\a) not a purely physical effect...this is a way of eluding its enemies and seizing the fish upon which it feeds'.\textsuperscript{97} It is this ability of the octopus and the poliutropos one, the man of a thousand tricks, to assume every form without becoming imprisoned within any, that characterises supple m\etis which appears to bow before circumstances only so that it can dominate them more surely.

The reversals of the fox and the polymorphy of the octopus and the cuttle-fish represent two complementary models of behaviour which constitute the two inseparable sides to m\etis, and they share a common factor—namely, the theme of the bond. The poliuklokos octopus is a knot composed of
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a thousand interweaving arms; every part of its body is a bond which can secure anything but which nothing can seize. The fox, which is poikilos, lives in a labyrinth, a poikilon space with passages like tentacles stretching out in every direction. The fox is a living bond which can bend, unbend, reverse its own position at will and, like the octopus, it is a master of bonds. Nothing can bind it but it can secure anything. Bonds are the special weapons of mēris. To weave (plekiein) and to twist (strēphein) are key words in the terminology connected with it. In the treatises attributed to Oppian we find nothing but bonds, ropes, cords made from twisted willow and twisted snares (dolos plektos). For both hunting and fishing, willow withies (lūgos) are the basic material; with two, three or four strands twisted together, the pieces are joined end to end to form the ‘well twisted withies’ which the good hunter always carries with him. But the art of binding is not the prerogative of hunters and fishermen alone. When Hermes wants to hide the theft of his oxen from Apollo and cause him to fall into his sly trap, he reverses the tracks of the cattle by driving the creatures backwards before him while he himself returns over his tracks so that it seems that he is coming forward at the same time as he is going backwards, thereby inextricably confusing what is in front with what is behind. Hermes, who is a living web of interweaving, is also called strophaios, not only because he often stations himself close to the door which turns on its hinges (strophiex), but because he is, as the scholiasts put it, the twisted or sly one, the strophiēs, a creature as mobile as the mime, Strophios, the father of Phlogios, also a mime, known as polustrophes; both of them could imitate the most diverse living creatures with movements of their agile fingers and hands. Strophaios is also the name given by the Greeks to the sophist who knows how to interweave (sumplekein) and twist together (strēphein) speeches (lūgoi) and artifices (mēchanai). If the wrestler is as pliable as a withy, the sophist is a master at bending and interweaving lūgoi—at bending them since he knows a thousand ways of twisting and turning (pāsas strophēs strēphēsthai) how to devise a thousand tricks (mēchanāsthai strophēs) and, like the fox, how to turn an argument against
the adversary who used it in the first place. Like Proteus, he can run through the whole gamut of living forms in order to elude the clutches of his enemy. The sophist is also a master at interweaving for he is constantly entangling two contrary theses. Like Zeno of Elea, who is a true Palamedes, he speaks with such skill that he is able to convince his audience that the same things are now similar to each other and now dissimilar, now single and now multiple.\textsuperscript{109} Speeches interwoven like this are traps, \textit{strep{	extcircled{h}}omena}\textsuperscript{110} as are the puzzles set by the gods of metis, which the Greeks call \textit{gr{	extup{h}}phoi}\textsuperscript{111} which is also the name given to some types of fishing nets. With their twisting, flexing, interweaving and bending, both athletes and sophists—just like the fox and the octopus—can be seen as living bonds.

However, with the theme of bonds we have not yet reached the last word on the subject of the \textit{mētis} of the octopus and the fox. The reversal technique of the one corresponds perfectly to the polymorphism of the other; when the fox turns round on itself it assumes a circular form where the front becomes the rear and vice versa. Like the cuttle-fish it no longer has a beginning or an end, a front or a rear: it is shapeless, a deep night, pure \textit{aporia}. The circle described by the fox when it turns round on itself makes it as elusive as the dark cloud secreted by the cuttle-fish. Now, there is a certain type of fishing net which, in Greek, is called a cloud (\textit{neph{ê}le}).\textsuperscript{112} The net, an invisible mesh of bonds, is one of the favourite weapons of \textit{mētis}. It is by means of the net that Pittacos triumphs over Phrynon,\textsuperscript{113} that Clytemnestra secures Agamemnon before stabbing him to death\textsuperscript{114} and that Hephaestus catches Aphrodite and Ares.\textsuperscript{115} The trap set for the suitors by Odysseus is a net ‘with countless eyes’;\textsuperscript{116} the chains which fix Prometheus to his rock weave a net of steel mesh around him.\textsuperscript{117} The net, ‘an endless mesh’ (\textit{âpeiron amphi{ê}leon}),\textsuperscript{118} can seize anything yet can be seized by nothing; its shape is as fluid as it can be, the most mobile and also the most baffling, that of the circle. To catch something in a net can be conveyed in Greek, as is well known, by the expression ‘to encircle’, \textit{en{ê}kle{ê}n}.\textsuperscript{119} There is no difference in kind between the \textit{mētis} of the fox and the cuttle-fish and that of the fisherman. The only way to triumph over
an adversary endowed with mētis is to turn its own weapons against it: the fisherman’s ‘cloud’ is the unyielding answer to the ‘cloud’ of the cuttle-fish. It is only by himself becoming, by means of his net, a bond and a circle, by himself becoming deep night, endless aporia, an elusive shape, that the man of mētis can triumph over the most cunning species in the animal world.

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Ten centuries separate Oppian from Homer. Furthermore, the Iliad is separated from the Cynegetica and Haliutica by all the differences that set apart an epic from a technical treatise on hunting or fishing. Yet within our field of study there is a startling continuity between them. The entire semantic field within which the concept of mētis is set, and the network of its various meanings has remained virtually unchanged. We find the same collection of words—dōlos, méchanē, tēchnē, kērdo, aπatē, aiōlos, poīšilos, haimulos—to describe the intrinsic characteristics of this type of cunning intelligence which is sufficiently quick and supple, wily and deceitful, to confront the unexpected on every occasion, to counter the most changeable of circumstances and to triumph, in unequal combat, over adversaries who are better equipped for a trial of strength. The inferiority of Antilochus’ chariot and team at the beginning of the race is exactly match- ed by the physical weakness of the shrimps or the torpedo-fish whose only compensation can be an excessive share of mētis. The concentration and vigilance which the young man displays throughout the race resembles that of the octopus constantly lying in wait for its prey. The duplicity of the driver endowed with mētis who, with premeditated cunning, simulates thoughtlessness and madness the better to fool his adversary, is the image of the living trap embodied by the fox who is really alive but is shamming dead, or of the tongue of the fishing-frog which, disguised as food proffered to the fish, masks the voracious maw which will soon engulf them.

Given the features and modes of behaviour that characterise it, the fields in which it operates, the stratagems it employs
to reverse the rules accepted in a trial of strength, mētis does indeed appear fully to represent the Greek concept of one particular type of intelligence. It is an intelligence which, instead of contemplating unchanging essences, is directly involved in the difficulties of practical life with all its risks, confronted with a world of hostile forces which are disturbing because they are always changing and ambiguous. Mētis—intelligence which operates in the world of becoming, in circumstances of conflict—takes the form of an ability to deal with whatever comes up, drawing on certain intellectual qualities: forethought perspicacity, quickness and acuteness of understanding, trickery, and even deceit. But these qualities bring into play the weapons which are their own particular attribute: elusiveness and duplicity, like spells which they use to oppose brute force. A being of mētis slips through its adversary's fingers like running water. It is so supple as to be polymorphic; like a trap, it is the opposite of what it seems to be. It is ambiguous, inverted, and operates through a process of reversal.

How should we explain this stability of terminology and, through it, of the images, themes and models associated with mētis, and what is its significance? Where Oppian is concerned could it not be simply a matter of a stylistic feature involving a deliberate use of archaisms and a conscious exploitation of epic terminology? Even if this were the case, the evidence in Oppian would have the effect of shedding some light upon the patterns of thought relating to mētis in Homer. But one cannot fail to notice that, from Homer to Oppian, throughout a literary tradition which includes Hesiod, the lyric poets, the tragedians and Plato and Aristotle, some of the terms most closely associated with mētis seem to have a special application to the fields of hunting, fishing and also warfare to the extent that this last activity is understood as analogous to the first two. In Book XII of the Odyssey, dōlos is the word used to refer to the bait or fish-hook of the fisherman. In Hesiod, at the end of the conflict in which the mētis of Zeus is repeatedly opposed by that of Prometheus, the final trick which confirms the superiority of the king of the gods over the Titan, is the creation of Pandora, the bait which Epimetheus and all mankind will fall for. Pandora is a dōlos aipūs
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an mạchanos, an unexpected trap from which there can be no escape. The meaning of the term aipus here is illuminated by the comparable passage in the Agamemnon in which Clytemnestra boasts that in order to trap her husband she has stretched the nets of misfortune so high that no leap would be great enough to clear them. The dōlos aipus mekhanos is indeed a trap, a trench so deep as to defy escape from it. When Odysseus snags fast the trap laid for the suitors, he is a fisherman pulling in the net full of quivering fish and, similarly, Sarpedon, warning Hector of the danger threatening the Trojans, fears that they will fall into the meshes of a net which will capture them all, down to the last man. Pindar writes explicitly of the métis of the fox just as Ion of Chios describes the technē of the hedgehog. In the Agamemnon, in which Aeschylus makes a haunting use of the themes of hunting and fishing, the king of the Greeks is a hunter tracking down the city of Priam so that he can throw his net over it, but a hunter who will one day be caught in the meshes woven by his own wife to trap him in his turn. When Sophocles and Euripides write of the art of the hunter and the fisherman, they lay emphasis on the devices, mekhana, invented by their ingenious minds, their many-faceted intelligence, their poikilia prapidon. When Plato portrays Eros, he describes him as having inherited from Metis, his ancestor, those qualities which make him a hunter without equal, threutēs deinēs, always lying in wait, brave, quick, with total concentration, and always weaving some scheme, aeti tinas plēkōn mekhanas. And again, it is in terms of hunting and fishing that he defines the art of the sophist who, in contrast to the philosopher whose wisdom is directed towards the world of ideas, embodies the scheming intelligence of the man of métis, plunged into the world of appearance and of Becoming. By means of his skill and rhetorical ploys, the sophist can make the weaker argument triumph over the stronger.

Nor is this all. As far back as one can trace it, the terminology of métis associates it with techniques whose relationship to hunting and fishing is obvious. A métis or a dōlos is woven, plaited or fitted together (huphainein, plēkein, tekstaínesthai) just as a net is woven, a weel is plaited or a
hunting trap is fitted together. All these terms relate to very ancient techniques that use the pliability and torsion of plant fibres to make knots, ropes, meshes and nets to surprise, trap and bind and that exploit the fact that many pieces can be fitted together to produce a well-articulated whole.

These associations seem to have had a profound effect upon one whole dimension of Greek thought. The essential features of mētis revealed by our analyses—pliability and polymorphism, duplicity and equivocality, inversion and reversal—imply certain qualities which are also attributed to the curve, to what is pliable and twisted, to what is oblique and ambiguous as opposed to what is straight, direct, rigid and unequivocal. The ultimate expression of these qualities is the circle, the bond that is perfect because it completely turns back on itself, is closed in on itself, with neither beginning nor end, front nor rear, and which in rotation becomes both mobile and immobile, moving in both directions at once. These same qualities find expression in the almost systematic use of the terminology of the curve to describe mētis. It is not just a matter of the word ἀγκυλὸμετις but also of an adjective such as skholios, a noun such as stróphis, terms composed from the root *gu used to indicate curving, for example the epithet ἀμφιπέψεις used to refer to a creature whose feet are twisted round or are capable of moving both forwards and backwards; and the root *kamp, used to refer to whatever is curved, pliable or articulated. There is a passage which is significant in this respect in the Aristotelian treatise, the Mechanica. The author writes of his theory of the five instruments which make possible a reversal of power such as that which is characteristic of mētis, or—to use the author’s own terms—which enable the smaller and weaker to dominate the bigger and stronger. He explains this amazing effect of the ‘machines’ which human ingenuity uses, by the properties of the circle: because, through its continuous curve which closes on itself, the circle unites within it several opposites each one giving birth to its opposite, it appears as the strangest, most baffling thing in the world, thaumasiōstaton, possessing a power which is beyond ordinary logic. This same paradoxical effect of reversal is also noted by Aristotle,
the naturalist, in the *Historia Animalium* which contains most of the material on the intelligence of animals which Oppian, following Plutarch and Athenaeus, was later to develop. Just as the *mētis* of Antilochus made it possible for him, with slower horses, to overtake faster teams, in the same way, according to Aristotle, the fishing-frogs, the slowest of fishes, *bradītatoi*, find a way of consuming the mullet which are the swiftest fish in the sea, *tôn tachiston*.133

However, although it seems quite clear to us that *mētis* was of abiding importance in Greek culture over a period of a thousand years, the historians of ancient thought do not appear to have paid sufficient attention to it. They were, perhaps, concerned with emphasising, by a consideration of the key works of the great philosophers, the distinctive characteristics which mark the originality of Hellenism in comparison with other civilisations: its logic of identity, its metaphysics of Being and of the Unchanging. At all events, they have often tended to neglect this other aspect of Greek intelligence which is writ large in myth, in the deification of Metis, Zeus' first wife, the goddess without whose help the king of the gods would have been unable to establish, implement and maintain his own supremacy. In order to find its way through a world of change and instability and to master the Becoming by vying with it in cunning, intelligence must, in the eyes of the Greeks, in some way adopt the nature of this Becoming, assume its forms, just as Menelaus slips into the skin of a seal so as to triumph over the shifting, magic spells of Proteus. By dint of its own flexibility, then, intelligence must itself become constant movement, polymorphism reversal, deceit and duplicity.

This is a cunning intelligence for which hunting and fishing may originally have provided the model but which extends far beyond this framework as the figure of Odysseus, the human embodiment of *mētis*, in Homer, clearly shows. There are many activities in which man must learn to manipulate hostile forces too powerful to be controlled directly but which can be exploited despite themselves, without ever being confronted head on, to implement the plan in mind by some unexpected, devious means: they include, for example, the stratagems used by the warrior the success of
whose attack hinges on surprise, trickery or ambush, the art of the pilot steering his ship against winds and tides, the verbal ploys of the sophist making the adversary's powerful argument recoil against him, the skill of the banker and the merchant who, like conjurers, make a great deal of money out of nothing, the knowing forethought of the politician whose flair enables him to assess the uncertain course of events in advance, and the sleights of hand and trade secrets which give craftsmen their control over material which is always more or less intractable to their designs. It is over all such activities that mētis presides.

Notes


3. Id. ibid., II, 128–30.

4. Id. ibid., II, 86–98. In lines 99–104 there then follows a double comparison: between the bird-catcher and the bird trap on the one hand, and the fox shamming death on the other. For a whole line of writers from Aristophanes on, this animal is known as the fishing-frog or 'angler', halieut. Its fishing technique is described in Arist., H.A., IX, 37, 620 b 10 ff; Plut., Soll. anim., 978 d; Antigonus, Hist. mirabil., XLVII; Pliny, H.N., IX, 143; Aelian, H.A., IX, 24.

5. This is the expression used by Plutarch, Soll. anim., 978 a, in connection with the cuttle-fish.

6. Oppian, Hal., II, 62, with note b by Mair (p. 286).

7. Id. ibid., II, 232–3, with note a by Mair (p. 284).

8. In his Treatise on the Intelligence of Animals, Plutarch has Phaidimos, who takes up the defence of the intelligence of fish, tell us the reasons why it is necessary for sea creatures, however cunning, to remain on the alert; each species has both advantages and weaknesses which vary depending on the enemies which confront them and 'it is by giving fish this alternative of attacking or fleeing, depending on the circumstances, that nature makes them exert themselves and accustoms them to deploy all their skill and show all their intelligence' (978c).

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10. Hesiod, fr. 33 (a) and (b) Merkelbach-West.
12. Oppian, Cynag., I, 81–109. The portrait of the hunter in Pollux, On., V, 18, vol. I, p. 266, l. 7. Bethe emphasises a number of qualities, in particular the following ones: nēos, kōphos, elaphrōs, dromikōs, oxiā...agonistēs...agropnos (young, light, swift, fleet of foot, lively...combative...alert.)
13. Cf. e.g. II., XVI, 642.
15. Homeric Hymn to Hermes, 80–3. The invention of phathādes the white shoes worn by gymasiarchs, is attributed to Hermes: Eratosthenes, fr. 9 Hiller.
17. Callimachus, Hymn to Artemis, 16 Pfeiffer.
18. Oppian, Hal., Cynag., passim.
20. These are the very terms used by Aristotle, o.e. in a passage which is echoed on many occasions in the Haliēutica (passim).
21. Plutarch, Sollert. anim., 976 c-d.
22. In order to trick Menelaus, Antilochus in his cunning has to simulate madness (cf. supra, p. 22).
23. Cf. supra, p. 15.
28. Cf. II., XIV, 247–8; Sophocles, Antigone, 606 ff; Aeschylus Prom. Vincit, 358.
29. II., XXIV, 24; Od., I, 37–40; Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, 262.
32. Oppian, Hal., III, 49.
33. Id. ibid., III, 41. The same epithet is applied, in the Odyssey (XV, 419), to the Phoenicians.
35. II., I 311; XXI, 355; [Orpheus], Lithica, 54.
39. Id ibid., III, 92.
40. Aristophanes, Knights, 728.
42. Plut., Sollert. anim., 979 a.
44. Oppian, Hal., III, 338–370.
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45. Cf. on this fish, the texts collected by A.W. Mair (o.c., p. LIII-LVII).
46. Oppian, Hal., III, 281 ff. There is another example of dolophrôn mētis in Hal. IV, 77 ff: fishing for the skírōs in which the female is used as bait for the male.
47. Oppian, Cyneg., III, 410 and 415-416.
48. Oppian, Hal., II, 146-147.
49. Id., Hal., II, 182 and 225.
50. Id., Hal., II, 167-168. The technical literature which developed around the subject of the intelligence and reason of animals has been studied by John Richmond, 'Chapter on Greek Fish-Lore', Hermes, Suppl. 28, Wiesbaden, 1973.
51. Id., Hal., II, 107-118.
52. Id., Cyneg., III, 449-450.
53. Id., ibid., IV, 448-451.
55. Oppian, Cyneg., III, 449.
57. Aesop, Fab., 119.
58. Aesop, Fab. 199.
59. Plutarch, Animine an corporis affectiones, 500 c-d.
61. Callimachus, Hymn to Artemis, 79 Pfeiffer.
63. Diog. Laertius, I, 74; Strabo, XIII, 600; Plut., De Herod. Mal. 15. As Ed. Will points out (o.c., p. 382), this anecdote has been seen as a transposition of the battle between the Retarius and the Mirmillon. The way that the fox is represented in the Greek world suggests that the anecdote is, if not ancient, at least faithful to the cunning character of the fox, Pitacos.
64. Archilochus, fr. 117 Bonnard and Lasserre: 'The fox knows many tricks, the hedgehog only one, but it is a famous one'. While this line, which has since become proverbial, stresses the polyvalence of the fox, it also, in contrast, stresses the limitations of all mētis, however resourceful it may be. Compared with the mētis of the fox, the hedgehog's knowledge may seem remarkably inadequate: at the approach of danger of whatever kind it rolls itself into a ball with all its prickles outwards. Yet all the cleverness of the cunning one is unwavailing: the fox has found its match. On this pair, cf. C. M. Bowra, 'The Fox and the Hedgehog', Class. Quart. 34, 1940, p. 26-9.
66. Isidm., IV, 34 ff. Pindar (Pyth., II, 85) writes that the wolf is successful because it knows how to 'conceal its tracks by a thousand winding detours' (ālētō pătōn hōdōi skōlai). The wolf is to the lion what the fox is to the eagle. However, it must be added, in passing,
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that the cunning of the wolf is not to be confused with the wileyness of the fox. Both are beasts of prey but the wolf attacks out in the open while the fox operates under cover of darkness, without showing himself. In this respect, the opposition between the wolf and the fox is similar to that between the falcon and the merlin (cf. Artemidorus, II, 20, p. 137, 1-3 and IV, 56, p. 279 Pack).

67. Pind., Τιμήθει_, IV, 45-47.
68. The Scholia to Pindar, Isthm., IV, 77 c (vol. III, p. 234, 12-17 Drachmann) are quite specific on this point: (by this reversal) `the fox appears to be teaching the feint used in wrestling, palatima, thanks to which the athlete lying on the ground is the winner through cunning (tēchnē) even when his opponent is the stronger man (melisma).'

69. Plut., De Soll. anim., 977b.

71. In a whole series of texts this reversal is used by the sea scolopendra.

In Hist. Anim., 621 a 6 ff, Aristotle, describing the cunning of the sea snake, uses the same expressions that Plutarch and Aelian apply to the fox-shark: `Having swallowed the hook, the scolopendra turns its body inside out so that it can eject the hook; then, by an opposite movement, it turns itself the right side out again.' This text from Aristotle can be matched by texts from Plutarch (De sera mun. omn., 567 b-c) and from Pliny (H.N., IX, 145. The sea scolopendra are huge nereids resembling ringed earth worms (cf. E. de Saint-Denis, Le vocabulaire des animaux marins en latin classique, Paris, 1947, p. 102): Of all fish, their shape most naturally resembles a flexible bond.

72. Oppian, Hal., II, 295.
73. Theognis, 215: polipous . . . poluplóhou.
74. Eur., Medea, 481: speirai . . . poluplókois. This snake guards the Golden Fleece: it never sleeps (alipnos).
75. Trag. greac. fragmenta, Adesp. 34 N°: okhēma kampais poluplókois.
76. Plato, Phaedrus, 230a. All the features of Typhon have been collected by F. Vian, "le mythe de Typhée et le problème de ses origines orientales" in Elements orientaux dans la religion grecque ancienne, (Bibliothèque des Centres d'Etudes supérieures spécialisées), Paris, 1966, p. 17-37 (especially p. 24-6).
77. Oppian, Hal., II, 233: tēchnē; 236: apatēsi; 239: doloia; 280 (in its fight against the morny): tā d'aitola héreia tēchnē plaxontai; 305: dolomēta.
78. Oppian, Hal., II, 408 ff. Like the thief, hēmerókoitos (Hes. Works, 603), or the 'sleeper-by-day', the octopus 'lies in wait during the night' (Eutym. Magn., s.v. hēmerókoitos . . . awake during the night); its vigilance is never relaxed. This is not a feature of animal behaviour but rather the description of a quality which is fundamental to méttis.
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80. In the Quaest. Nat., p. 916 b, Plutarch poses the question of why the octopus changes colour: is it an effect of fear or anger, or is it simply mimicry?
81. Cf. Aesch., Choephori, 726–728: this Hermes pronounces the word of invisibility, ἄσπον ἄποτ, which spreads the shadows of the Night over the eyes (l. 815–16.).
82. Oppian, Hal., II, 120; III, 156.
83. tholos in Arist., H.A., 524 b 14; 621 b 27; Athen., 323 d; Pliny, H.N. IX, 84; chôle: in Nicander, Alexipharmaka, 472, Gow.
85. Id. ibid., 541 b 12 ff.
86. Oppian, Hal., III, 156–164.
87. Plut., De soll. anim., 978 d.
88. Oppian, Hal., IV, 147–162.
90. Od., I, 1.
95. On the concept of ephèmeros, the essential studies are those undertaken by H. Frankel: Wege und Formen Frühgriechischen Denkens, Munich, 1966, p. 23, 39, and Dichtung und Philosophie, Munich 1962, p. 149.
96. Pindar, Isthm. VIII, 14.
97. Plutarch, Sol. anim., p. 978 e-f. When Plutarch is drawing the psychological portrait of Alcibiades (Vita Alcib. 23), he emphasises his great aptitude for adapting to situations and men and for falling in with the customs and modes of life of the most diverse types. Plutarch adds this further detail: 'Alcibiades possessed a skill for capturing men (măchané thēras anthropōn)'. But in contrast to the distinction made in the treatise Soll. anim., p. 978 e-f, here it is the chameleon, not the octopus, which is taken as the animal model for the behaviour of Alcibiades.
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102. Aristophanes, Plutus, 1154.
103. Schol. in Aristoph. Plutus, 1153.
104. Cf. Aristophanes, Clouds, 450. In Eustathius, p. 1353, 9, Hermes
the strophaius is explicitly connected with a strôphites.
106. School. in Arist. Plut., 1153: strophaios ... ton eidoa sumplê-
kein kai strôphoin Iôous kai mèchanas.
109. Plato, Phaedrus, 261 d.
111. Oppian, Hal., III, 80; Aristophanes, Wasps, 20; Athenaeus, X, 448 f ff.
112. Aristophanes, Birds, 194.
113. Diog. Laertius, I, 74; Strabo, XIII, 600; Plut., De Herod. Mal., 15.
114. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1380 ff. For vase paintings of this deadly
net, see E. Vermeule, 'The Boston Orestes Krater', Amer. Journ.
Arch. 70, 1966, p. 1 ff, together with the remarks of H. Metzger,
117. Aeschylus, Prom., 81.
118. Cf. Id., Ag., 1382.
119. Aristophanes, Wasps, 690. In military terminology, kublein or
kuklovan means 'to encircle, surround' as is shown by J. Taillardat,
120. Od., XII, 252.
121. Hesiod, Works, 83.
123. Od., XXII, 386 ff.
124. Il., V, 487–488: linon pánagron. It is indeed in an encircling net
(steganon diktion) that Troy will be caught (Aesch., Ag., 357–361).
125. Pind., Isithm., IV, 46–47.
126. Io of Chios, fr. 81 von Blumenthal.
127. Cf. the remarks of P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Chasse et sacrifice dans l'Oreste
d'Aischylé', in J-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, Mythe et Tragédie
en Grèce ancienne, p. 135 ff.
128. Sophocles, Antigone, 341–350; Euripides, fr. 27 N².
129. Plato, Symposium, 203 b–c.
130. Mêrin huphainein: II., VII, 324; IX, 93–95; 422; XII, 303; 386;
Od., IV, 678; 739; [Hes], Schied, 28, Dôlon huphainein: II., VI, 187;
Od., IX, 422; dôlon (or têchnê) plêkein: Aesch., Choephe, 220;
Eur., Io, 826; 1280; Theognis, 226 (dolopôkia); mêtin tektân-
exhtai II., X, 19. Cf. also the examples collected by J. Taillardat,
o.c., p. 232–236, who supplements these images taken from the
techniques of plaiting, weaving and building with those taken from
cooking, in Aristophanes. The verb *kurkanôn*, to prepare a mixture, is used by him in the sense of 'brewing up a scheme'.


132. [Aristotle], *Mechanica*, 847 a 22 ff.

II

THE CONQUEST OF POWER
CHAPTER 3

The Combats of Zeus

Corresponding to the human *mētis* in Homer and the animal *mētis* in Oppian, in Hesiod we find the goddess Metis, the daughter of Tethys and Okeanos, whom Zeus first married and then swallowed. In some respects, to be sure, she is a minor figure. The Greeks never devoted a cult to a deity of this name. In ritual, Metis does not appear among those who are considered true gods. But to suppose her to be a figment of the poet’s own imagination or the result of his tendency to make pure abstractions into gods would be a mistake. It would be to underestimate an essential element of religious thought—the need to name, classify and order the forces of the beyond. Religion itself does not always fully satisfy this need but it is met by vast mythical constructions like those produced by Hesiod. In this respect, what are known as Hesiod’s ‘abstractions’ are something quite other than concepts disguised as gods through the device of poetic metaphor. They are true religious ‘powers’ which preside over clearly defined types of activity and which operate within specific sectors of reality.1 The *Theogony* gives an account of the births, spheres of influence and conflicts of many divine powers and of the balance that emerged between them up to the time when, under the rule of Zeus, the definitive order of the universe was established. In this interplay of relationships the role of these ‘powers’ sometimes seems as important as that of certain gods who have a place in the traditional pantheon. And for Hesiod, Metis indeed occupies a particularly important position in the ordering of the world. She is the first wife of Zeus, the wife he takes to his bed as soon as the war against the Titans is brought to an end and as soon as he is proclaimed king of
the gods, and thus this marriage crowns his victory and consecrates his sovereignty as monarch. There would, in effect, be no sovereignty without Metis. Without the help of the goddess, without the assistance of the weapons of cunning which she controls through her magic knowledge, supreme power could neither be won nor exercised nor maintained. The Theogony especially emphasises the role played by Metis in the implementation and permanent maintenance of sovereignty. But in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Vinctus we are told that in the battle for sovereignty of the world between the Titar under the leadership of Kronos and the Olympians led by Zeus, victory had to belong to ‘whoever would win, not through strength or violence, but through cunning’. If the army of the Ouranidai and of Kronos was finally overcome it was, according to Aeschylus, because they did not heed the advice of the one who, in his rebellious Titan nature, embodied that same Metis that Zeus, in Hesiod’s version, was to make completely his own by swallowing her before she had given birth to Athena.

The differences between the two stories simply underline the persistence of the theme of cunning which lies at the heart of the myths of sovereignty. Hesiod and Aeschylus are at one in recognising in Prometheus that very type of wily intelligence, that same power of deception which the Greeks called mētis. For both of them the Titan is not only the aiōlomētēs, the agkulomētēs, the aipumētēs the dolophrōmenōn, the poikilos, the poikiloboulos, the poikūdiris one, the amazing rogue (sophiās) capable ‘of wriggling out of even the inextricable’, the master of wiles and of cheating schemes who is always mindful of his knowledge of traps and snares, his dolē tēchnē; he is also the only one who is equipped to duel in cunning with Zeus, the only one who can use apaiē against him and challenge the mētis of the king of the gods with his own. The fact is that, like Metis herself, Prometheus is the ‘foreseeing’ one who, knowing everything in advance, possesses that type of knowledge essential to anyone engaged in a battle whose outcome is still uncertain. Metis ‘knows more things than any god or mortal man’; Prometheus ‘knows more than anyone in the world about everything’. Metis, inside Zeus’ belly, will make known to him every-
thing that will bring him good or evil fortune;10 Prometheus knows in advance exactly what is going to happen; no misfortune befalls him that he has not already foreseen.11 In Aeschylus' version, which deliberately ignores the figure of Metis, Prometheus takes her place and plays the role which Hesiod assigns to the goddess. But from the point of view of the structure of the myths of sovereignty, whether or not Metis is present, the role reserved for this type of wily intelligence represented by the daughter of Okeanos is clear. From the point of view of Aeschylus' trilogy it would be impossible for Metis to play any part. For at the outset of the drama, in the first and only play which has come down to us, namely the Prometheus Vinctus, Zeus has already become the king of the gods, having triumphed over the Titans, but his sovereignty is by no means definitively assured. On the contrary, it appears to be doomed by the curse which Kronos, on the day of his downfall, pronounced against the youngest of his sons. Totally unsuspecting, Zeus makes ready for the marriage which is to hurl him from power and from the throne.12 As soon as he has consummated the marriage that he so imprudently desires with the Nereid, Thetis, the time will come when he will be taken by surprise and overcome in his turn by one who is stronger than he. Like his father, Kronos, he will be obliged to suffer the harsh law of the succession of generations. Through a son more powerful than himself, he will learn 'the distance between being king and being a slave'13. The entire trilogy is constructed on this theme of the danger that threatens the rule of the master of the gods. In depicting the sovereignty of Zeus it shows, not the aspect of stability and permanence which Hesiod conveys, but a state of crisis which Zeus can only overcome at the price of a reconciliation with the bound Titan, by releasing him from his bonds and by bringing about a transformation in the royal power which henceforth must include justice and wisdom. In such a context there is no place for Metis. Her presence, marriage and consumption by the sovereign god would guarantee the invincibility and eternity of the supremacy of the Olympian. It is because he lacks mētis that Zeus finds that, as a king, he is dependent upon the guile of Prometheus. And there are two sides
to this dependence. In order to conquer Kronos, that is to win the throne, Zeus needs the subtle plots of the Titan. In order to maintain his rule and ward off the danger to the sovereign inherent in his procreation of sons younger and stronger than himself, he must make Prometheus reveal the secret that he alone possesses. The theme of the fateful marriage which holds a threat to the career of the sovereign god is to be found in Aeschylus as well as in Hesiod, but there are significant differences between the two accounts. In the *Theogony* the account of the dangerous marriage follows immediately after the episode in which Zeus, urged by the other gods to take up the *basileia*, the royal power, has, as a good and just sovereign, divided up the honours between them. Metis, whom he makes his first wife, is to give birth to his children who will possess a ‘prudence’ equal to that of their mother. Metis’ son was thus destined to become king over men and gods in the place of his father. But Zeus, being warned, swallows his wife before she has given birth to a child. In Aeschylus, in contrast, the royal power of Zeus is not accepted unanimously. His supremacy, which is symbolised by Kratos and Bia representing brute force and violence, does not appear as yet fully justified. His subjects bow to the rule of the strongest rather than recognise the authority of a true king. Plenty of gods hold against Zeus his brutal seizure of the throne and the violence and arbitrary nature of his decrees. Zeus desires Thetis as his wife. The magic gifts of the goddess, when passed on to her son, will make him, like Metis’ son, stronger than his father: he will dethrone him. This time, however, Zeus knows nothing about it. In giving way to his own vain caprices as monarch he is preparing his own misfortune. Only Prometheus knows the terrible secret; he alone holds the means of avoiding this outcome. It is through his intervention, then, that Zeus can avoid disaster. Just as he had to ally himself with Prometheus and depend upon his knowledge in order to win his throne, so must he do to guarantee his lasting possession of it. He will also be obliged definitively to renounce Thetis, instead of making her his own by marrying and subsequently swallowing her as he did Metis in the version given by Hesiod. Thus it is only in appearance that
the two versions differ. In two different forms they both throw light on the secret springs of sovereignty; both equally stress the role played not by brute force alone but by the magic wiles of cunning intelligence, in the founding of royal power.

Aeschylus' *Prometheus* tells how the Titans, disdaining the ploys of cunning (*mēchanās haimūlas*), believed in their brutish arrogance, that they would have no difficulty in triumphing over the Olympians by force. To persuade them of the contrary Prometheus offers them his wisest counsel—but to no effect. Kronos and the Titans want to hear none of it, they refuse even to consider the matter. The only course open to Prometheus is to take his *mētis* into the other camp and align himself with Zeus. The Olympian gladly welcomes the services of the defector whose schemes (*boulaei*) are to ensure him of victory and ratify his privileges by making it possible for him to consign the ancient Kronos and his allies, in chains, to the depths of Tartarus.

In Aeschylus the theme of the *dolós* is explicit. It covers at the same time a cunning trick, a trap and a magic bond, to which is opposed brute force and which brings success in the conflict over sovereignty. But this theme is also present in all the myths about the conflicts from which Zeus has to emerge triumphant in order to climb to a position of supreme power and remain there. Even in Hesiod, it appears as a persistent underlying thread. In this connection, one preliminary observation should be made. Interpretations of the *Theogony* have habitually been influenced by the summary presented in the compilation attributed to Apollodorus and edited around the second century A.D. In the mythographer's account, the successive appearances of three generations of gods, those of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus, correspond exactly with three consecutive reigns. Ouranos is the first sovereign of the world; Kronos castrates him and hounds him from the throne, with the help of his brother Titans. Zeus, in his turn, overturns Kronos and then becomes the master of Heaven. But the text of Hesiod is different. At no point is Ouranos called a sovereign or considered to be a king. All the episodes in which he appears belong to a cosmogonical myth and it is only with the appearance of
Kronos that the theme of the competition for sovereignty is introduced. Ouranos is presented as a primordial cosmic power: the dark night sky, studded with constellations of stars. Gaia, Earth, gave birth to him without being united to anyone, by a sort of process of duplication. She made him equal to herself, ἵσον ἅπτετί, so that he covered her completely, stretched out on top of her up until the time when, following Kronos' swipe with his sickle, he became what he was henceforth to remain, the solid seat where the celestial gods dwell. He thus corresponds exactly to what Gaia had represented for all creatures ever since she appeared at the beginning of the world: a stable and forever assured foundation as opposed to the gaping, bottomless chasm of Chaos.

The dark Sky knows of no activity other than sexual. Sprawling full-length on top of the Earth, he surrounds her entirely and abandons himself within her in the Night. This endless overflowing of love makes Ouranos 'the one who conceals'; he conceals the Earth on top of which he stretches himself out, hiding his children, without allowing them to reach the light, in the place where he engendered them, in Gaia's womb, while she groans, stifling within her own depths. How could Ouranos possibly be the king of the universe when, since Earth and Sky are not yet completely separated, the universe has not yet fully emerged into existence? Kronos has to deal his blow with the sickle before the mutilated Ouranos will draw away from Gaia, leaving her forever, to retire to the place which will henceforth form a roof to the world just as Gaia has from the first constituted its floor. Only then does the universe become the organised cosmos which provides both the framework and the prize for the gods' struggles for sovereignty of the world.

Let us compare the behaviour of Ouranos and of Kronos towards their children. This will help us to detect the change of subject which takes place between the two parallel episodes, and to see how the theme of the emergence of a differentiated universe gives way to that of a struggle for sovereignty. Hesiod tells us (132-210) that Gaia had three groups of children: the Titans, the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed. All are called 'terrible'. Right from the start (ἐκ ἀρχῆς),
their father loathes them. The poet does not explain the reasons for this hatred but it is possible to do so. The father's hatred is a response to that which his children harbour towards him. This we know from the feelings of the one who is the most 'terrible' of all of them (deinobatos paidôn) and who is from the outset described as agkulonêtês, one who possesses wiley cunning.\(^{29}\) What Kronos detests about his father is that he is thalerós, vigourous, full of vitality, full of sap.\(^{30}\) We have, on the one hand, the son who possesses métos; on the other, the father who possesses unrestrained fertility. The nature of Ouranos, who is 'avid for love'\(^{31}\) prevents the children he has engendered from occupying the place in the Sun which is their due. When he hides his offspring inside the womb of Earth, he is not attempting to protect his reign against possible future rivals but rather impeding any birth which might produce beings different from himself.\(^{31}\) No new 'generation' can appear so long as the ceaseless process of engendering, in which Ouranos relentlessly indulges by remaining united with Gaia, continues. The outrage, or lôbê, which Gaia and Kronos hold against him and for which they are to make him pay, is the restricted and confined existence which his unrestrained sexuality imposes upon both mother and children.\(^{33}\) Ouranos is punished in the part where he sinned and the manner of his chastisement makes it quite clear where his sin lay. The god of the Sky is not chained up as Kronos and the Titans later are by Zeus. While he lies with Gaia in the night, his son castrates him with the stroke of a sickle. This action has crucial consequences for the cosmos. It separates Sky from Earth and makes the way clear for the coming of future generations in the course of time. It introduces a new type of procreation through union between principles which, even when united, remain distinct and opposed to each other. It lays the foundation for the necessary complementarity between powers of conflict and powers of love.\(^{34}\) Finally, through the invective pronounced by Ouranos against his children (nætheiôn), it sets in action the law of retaliation or retribution (tisis) which, administered by the Erinyes and the Children of Night, will henceforth never cease to rule the future.\(^{35}\) However, for the purposes of our study, two
features must above all be emphasised. The first is the ‘secret ambush’ which catches the enamoured Ouranos off his guard; it is a dolié tēchnē, a dōlos which is altogether worthy of the aγκυλομέτεως one. The second is the cunning quality of the exploit which, in opening the way to power to the scheming Kronos, marks the beginning of the struggles for sovereignty among the gods.

Kronos does not hide his children inside the Earth’s womb. As soon as they have moved from Rhea’s womb to sit on her lap, he grabs them and swallows them, as Zeus is later to swallow Metis. His action has nothing to do with his nature as a ‘vigorous’ god; the motivation is political, as is clearly explained: ‘He feared lest another from among the grandsons of the Sky might gain the honour of royalty (basiēda timēn) among the Immortals’. Ouranos hid his children when he abandoned himself, without defence, to his sexual desires. Kronos devours them, remaining constantly on the alert. Watchful and suspicious, always on the look-out, he behaves as befits a god of mētis ever on the alert: dōkeiōn. However, the vigilance of the one whom Hesiod calls Kronos Basileus, Kronos the king, mēgas anax, the powerful prince, and—even more specifically in another passage—‘the first king of the gods’ is not so perfect that it cannot be faulted. The Cunning One is to find one more cunning than himself. Together with Gaia and Ouranos, Rhea hatches a cunning plot or, as Hesiod puts it, she finds, with her parents’ aid, a way to conceive a mētis (mētin sumphrāssathai) so that Zeus, the last of the offspring, shall escape the fate of the others. The secret plotting of his wife eludes the vigilance of Kronos. Rhea gives birth clandestinely; she hides her son in Crete. Dissimulating, she offers Kronos a stone, wrapping it up in swaddling clothes in the deceptive guise of a newborn infant which he sees simply as fuel for his appetite. Duped by this apaiā (as Pausanias calls it), the great Kronos does not suspect that, replaced by the stone, the life of his son, invincible and impassive, has been saved for him to chase his father forcibly from the throne and reign in his place over the Immortals.

Hesiod celebrates this final victory of Zeus’ over his father
in his long account of the war against the Titans (617–885). In this war, which is the culmination of the Theogony, the Hundred-Armed have a decisive role to play. Zeus learns from Gaia that the side which persuades the Hundred-Armed to join them and obtains their help will be victorious. Thus, in this text, Cottos, Briareus and Gyges are the guarantors and architects of victory in the struggle for sovereignty. But in an earlier passage, lines 493–506, which immediately follows the account of the ‘deception’ engineered by Rhea to save the infant Zeus, Hesiod had already revealed two of the methods which were finally to assure the supremacy of the youngest son of Kronos. It would first be necessary for his father to regurgitate all the children he had swallowed, that is to say all Zeus’ elder brothers and sisters who would then fight on his side. Hesiod does not indicate exactly how Kronos, with his sly thoughts, was to be induced to disgorged. He simply suggests that, this time again, the god fell into a trap plotted (dolôthēs) with the advice of Gaia,46 ‘Overcome by the artifices and force of his son (tēchnēs biēphi te paidōs),46 he was obliged to vomit forth, first the stone which he had swallowed instead of Zeus, then all his other children. As Hesiod puts it:47 ‘He released his offspring (gōnōi . . . ἄνεικε). Apollodorus follows Hesiod’s tradition in the main essentials, but his account is slightly different and more explicit: ‘When Zeus reached maturity he made sure of the assistance of Metis, the daughter of Okeanos; she gave Kronos a drug (phārmakon) to drink, which made him vomit forth first the stone and then all the children he had swallowed; with their help, Zeus entered into the war against Kronos and the Titans’.48

Kronos devouring his children should not be compared to Ouranos hiding his but rather to Zeus swallowing Metis, where we find the same theme. In both cases a sovereign god knows that his destiny is to be dethroned by one of his sons. In Hesiod, Kronos, like Zeus, has been warned of this by Gaia and Ouranos. Both of them are thus faced with having to avert the decrees of destiny by some ingenious trick.49 Where Kronos fails Zeus is to be successful. Kronos has Gaia and Ouranos against him. They forewarned him of what would happen, but by means of mētis and the dōlos they have
concocted with Rhea, they foil the attempts of the first
king to change the order of things to his own advantage and
to keep royal power in his own hands. In contrast, these two
primordial deities are on Zeus’ side. It is on their advice
that he decides to swallow Metis ‘so that the honour of royalty
should never belong to any other than himself among the
immortal gods’. It is easy to understand Ouranos’ attitude.
He wants to make Kronos, whom he has solemnly cursed,
pay for the outrage he previously committed against Ouranos’
person. Gaia’s behaviour might seem more surprising. After
all it was she who urged Kronos to mutilate his father; it
was she who created the steel sickle, she who invented the
weapon of crime and put it into the hand of her own child.
But in this episode of the poem Gaia’s role is an ambiguous
one. First, she is related to Themis with whom she is often
confused and who, as an oracular power, represents the
law of destiny that has been irremediably established. Thus
it is through Gaia that Kronos, Zeus and Prometheus can be
informed of what the future holds. But Gaia is also related
to the Erinyes who take care that no evil deed be left un-
punished and who are charged with the responsibility of
bringing retribution (tis) to pass in the course of the years,
even for the best concealed crimes. It was upon Gaia that
the drops of blood from Ouranos’ severed member fell.
From them, in the course of years (periplomenôn d’enauiton)
she brought to birth the powerful Erinyes just as, in the
course of years (epiplomenôn d’enauiton), the great Kronos
has to regurgitate all his children. In contrast, it is the liquid
element, Ïontos, Wave, which is as fluid and as mobile
as the Earth is stable and fixed, which, for a long time (poulión
chronon) has carried Ouranos’ member out to sea. From
the foam of its sperm (aphrôs) came the cunning goddess,
Aphrodite, who presides over sexual unions and who is
always accompanied by Love and Desire. Her weapons
are neither the force of vengeance nor warlike brutality but
charming smiles, the beguiling words of female chatter,
the dangerous attraction of pleasure—all the deceits
(exapátas) of seduction.

However, it is not enough for Zeus simply to make sure
of the good will of Ouranos and Gaia in order to alter destiny
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to his own advantage. The King of the gods must bring
to bear some action of his own. Kronos allows himself to be
taken by surprise by Rhea's méttis despite his own cunning and
vigilance. He falls into the trap (dòlos) prepared for him by
the ingenious machinations (tēchnai) of Zeus. He is not on
his guard against the treacherous draught, the magic drug
(phýrmakon) prepared by Metis, who is expert in such mat-
ters. His schemes to escape the fate which has been prepared
for him rebound against him and bring about the very thing
that he thought he could avoid. Kronos can neither hold off
the time in which the generations must inexorably succeed
each other nor escape the law of retaliation established by the
castration of Ouranos: sooner or later he will have to pay the
price for the wrong he perpetrated. Kronos introduced
sovereignty through a cunning trick when he raised his hand
against his father. Through another cunning trick his sover-
eignty collapses and ends up as it started. All his wiles are
in vain so long as they allow the superior power of Metis to
exist apart from them, able to be turned against them. This
superiority of Metis is also, in a way, in this context, that of
cunning Time,—time which always ends up by taking you
by surprise, whatever you do.54 Zeus does not swallow
his children.

Forewarned of the danger that awaits him, as his father
was, he goes straight to the root of the evil. He attacks Metis
with her own weapons. Appropriating the wiles of Aphrodite,
he treacherously seduces his wife with caressing words
(haimatōnoi logoi),57 and having beguiled her wits by
cunning (dòloi phrēnas exapatēsas), he engulfs her within
himself. Apollodorus gives a brief summary of the story:
'When Metis became pregnant, Zeus swallowed her, having
taken her by surprise (phthásas), for Gaia had foretold that
after the daughter which she was carrying in her womb,
Metis would give birth to a son who would become the king
of Heaven'.58 So this time Zeus was able to make the weapons
which made the goddess invincible rebound against her,
namely cunning, deceit and the surprise attack. His victory
eradicates forever from the course of time the possibility of
any cunning trick which could threaten his power, by
taking him by surprise. The sovereign Zeus is no longer, like
Kronos or any other god, simply a deity who possesses mētis. He is mēteta, the Cunning One, the standard gauge and measure of cunning, the god himself become entirely mētis.

The second episode concerning Zeus' rise to power as king introduces the Cyclopes, although without referring to them by name. This text, which immediately follows the episode about the disgorging of Kronos, raises delicate problems of interpretation. Zeus has just delivered from Kronos' belly his own brothers and sisters who are to help him in his struggles against the Titans. Then he delivered from their accursed bonds the brothers of his father, the sons of Ouranos, houos dése patēr. This phrase can be understood in two ways, either 'whom his father had bound' or 'whom their father had bound'. In the first case it would be Kronos that had bound some of his brothers; in the second, Ouranos that had bound some of his sons. Apollodorus and Tzetzes appear to have adopted the first interpretation which must nevertheless be rejected. The position of patēr, coming after ouranidas, makes the second interpretation unavoidable. Furthermore, in his account of the conflict against the Titans, Hesiod states quite clearly that, of the sons of the Sky, the Hundred-Armed had been bound with a powerful bond by their father. However, this does not solve our difficulties. In the first place, the passage does not refer to the Hundred-Armed but to those who, in return for their deliverance, 'gave Zeus the thunder, the thunder bolt and the lightning which the huge Earth had hitherto concealed and upon which Zeus henceforth depends in order to reign at the same time over both mortals and Immortals'. Now we know from line 141 that the Cyclopes, whose names do in point of fact evoke thunder, thunder bolt and lightning, presented thunder to Zeus as a gift and made lightning for him. But if this is the case why are they not named? The phrase used by Hesiod, 'the sons of Ouranos, the brothers of his father' (or paternal uncles, patrokasinētai) can be applied not only to the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed but also to the Titans themselves, whom Zeus cannot be delivering since it is precisely they
who are fighting against him, on Kronos' side, and they whom he dispatched in chains after his victory to the depths of misty Tartarus. Nor is this all. Hesiod first introduced the offspring of Ouranos in a much earlier passage to which we have already referred (132 – 153). Among the figures which appear in the opening passages of the Theogony there are three categories of the children of Sky and Earth. The first mentioned are listed in order of birth and each is referred to by his proper name, without any generic name being given: Okeanos, Koios, Krios, Hyperion, Japet, Theia, Rheia, Themis, Mnemosune, Phoibe, Tethys and the youngest of all of them, Kronos of the cunning thoughts. The next are the three sons referred to as Round-Eyes (Cyclopes) whose names are Brontes, Steropes and Arges. The last group consists of three more boys named Kottos, Briareus and Gyges, characterised by the fact that they each have a hundred arms. Now in this passage of capital importance no mention is at any point made of either the Cyclopes or the Hundred-Armed being chained up by their father Ouranos. On the contrary, the text implies that all the children, boys and girls alike, and Cyclopes and Hundred-Armed like all the rest, received the same treatment. They were all 'hidden', as we have described, in Gaia's womb. Equally, Gaia speaks to all her children when she incites them to rebellion. It is in the name of all of them that Kronos, the only one among them not to tremble, resolves to 'stretch out his arm' to seize his father's member and cut it off. And Ouranos applies to all of them, indiscriminately, as a curse, the name, (epiklésis) of Titans, which none of them bore before, 'so that the future should hold for those who stretched their arms too far (titainontas) the punishment (tisín) that they deserved'.

In the only passage of the text which Hesiod devotes to Ouranos, his offspring and his castration, the Sky does not appear as a god of bonds. The common treatment that he inflicts upon all his children, their equal complicity in the rebellion, the same name of Titan which he gives them as a curse would lead one to suppose that after Kronos' victory they would all share a common fate. Hesiod does not specifically state that after Ouranos' mutilation the Titans were henceforward free. He does not have to say so for it goes
without saying. Since Ouranos has to move away there is no longer anything to imprison them within Gaia's womb where they were hitherto hidden. Thus the poet can, without further explanation, go on to describe how, when the time came, the sons and daughters of Sky entered into unions together and to name the children they produced. But this list, in which each god and goddess is referred to by his own name, without the term Titan being used at all, does not include either the Cyclopes or the Hundred-Armed. There is not a word about them. To be sure, since neither group produced any offspring—none of any note, anyway—there was no reason to mention them. However, Hesiod should have told us what we only learn much later and, as it were, incidentally, in connection with their deliverance at the hands of Zeus, namely that certain of Ouranos' sons, unlike their brothers and sisters, had been chained up by their father. If they were bound by Ouranos and unbound by Zeus we should have to assume, although Hesiod does not say so, that throughout the reign of Kronos they must have remained in the same state of bondage to which they had earlier been reduced. But, in this case, how can one explain why, once their jailor was set aside, these prisoners of Ouranos were not released like their brothers? Hesiod's silence on this matter raises a problem. Apollodorus, who again follows the tradition of the *Theogony*, attempts to introduce some coherence into the sequence of events. To this end, in contrast to Hesiod, he has the Hundred-Armed and the Cyclopes born earlier than the other children of Sky and Earth and—again unlike Hesiod—he applies the name of Titans only to the youngest group of children. Apollodorus also presumes that the first action of Ouranos, whom he describes as the first sovereign, was to bind the Hundred-Armed and the Cyclopes and relegate them to Tartarus. Gaia revolts against the disappearance of her sons and, as soon as she has given birth to the new batch of Titans and Titanesses, she urges them to attack the throne of Ouranos. All, except Okeanos, do so and Kronos mutilates his father. Once Ouranos has been chased from power, the first action of the Titans is to release their brothers, the Hundred-Armed and the Cyclopes who, like themselves, have been victims of
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their father's tyranny. They then place the sovereignty in Kronos' hands. Hardly has he become king than he, in his
turn, is quick to secure the Hundred-Armed and Cyclopes
in bonds and dispatch them to the underground fastnesses
whence they had come and where they were then to remain
until Zeus delivered them for the second time.

However, in our own view, the coherence that is thus
introduced, at the cost of making a few changes in the
sequence of events, betrays not only the letter but also the
very spirit of Hesiod's poem and the implicit logic of the
myth. In Apollodorus' version, it is as king that Ouranos
binds; as king that he is attacked and defeated; it is as king
that Kronos undoes the bonds and then imposes them again;
and finally it is as king that Zeus, in his turn, undoes the
bonds once more. However, if our analysis is correct, Hesiod's
Ouranos is not a sovereign. Kronos is the first to bear such
a title. And, in the Theogony, the term 'Titans' refers to those
who are associated with the first term of kingship, that of
Kronos. Each time it is used in the course of the poem this
word applies to a group defined not so much by its origins
as a family circle as by the relationship of opposition in which
it stands, in two successive periods, to the gods who reign
over Olympus. On the first occasion, the group comprises
those whom Hesiod calls the prōteroi theoi, the ancient gods
as opposed to those of the present day.66 Secondly, the term
also refers to those who are the direct adversaries of Zeus,
those who fight against the Olympians in the war waged for
the sovereignty of Heaven. The expression prōteroi theoi
Titēnes refers to two successive generations involved in a
confrontation to decide who should dominate the world.
In this sense, Hesiod's use of the word 'Titan' fully confirms
its connection, vouched for by Hesychius, with the ancient
terms Titax, Titene, meaning king and queen. The Titans
are Kings and, to be more precise, the first of the royal kings.70

Modern commentators have wrestled with all these
difficulties. They have tried to resolve them using the methods
of textual criticism, either by assuming, with Arthur Meyer,
that in the genealogy of the children of Gaia and Ouranos
the entire passage concerning the Cyclopes and the Hundred-
Armed (lines 139-153) is an interpolation, or by claiming,
as do H. Buse and M.L. West, that in Hesiod's first version this passage did not appear: the castration of Ouranos immediately followed the remark that Kronos developed a loathing for his vigorous father. They suggest that Hesiod inserted the lines 139-153 into his text later, and that he felt obliged to do so on account of the role attributed to the Hundred-Armed and the Cyclopes in the later episode of the war against the Titans. Since these figures play a role of the first importance in Zeus' victory, it was necessary first to explain who they were and where they came from. It is suggested that, in order to give the account of their births and their status which was lacking Hesiod turned back on his tracks and added the names of the three Cyclopes and the three Hundred-Armed to the progeny of Ouranos cursed under the collective name of Titans. But once the passage is inserted in this position, the difficulty is that it integrates the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed so closely with the group of Titans that the profound differences between them and the other Titans no longer seem justifiable. Why should some of Ouranos' sons be bound and not, like the rest, hidden? And if indeed they are bound why not say so? And, finally, whether they were bound or hidden, why does Ouranos' withdrawal liberate some but not others?

Such a reconstruction of the text by the philologists cannot but be hypothetical. There is no way of proving it to be correct. But insofar that it enumerates and pinpoints the difficulties, it perhaps makes it possible to draw certain conclusions from Hesiod's own confusion. However, we must formulate the problem in a different way. We should not attempt to reach beyond what has come down to us in order to reconstitute the true text. Rather, we should simply try, by studying the structure of the poem, what it leaves out and even its contradictions, to grasp the logic behind Hesiod's organisation of the myths of sovereignty. In this respect, one preliminary remark should be made. Whether we are dealing with Cyclopes or with Hundred-Armed, their chains are always mentioned in one particular context: the struggle for sovereignty between the old Titan gods, led by Kronos, and the claimants of power, under Zeus' command. No mention of them is made so long as the story
remains on the cosmogonical level of the relations between Gaia and Ouranos. The theme of binding is thus an integral part of the myths about sovereignty. Furthermore, the misfortunes of the Cyclopes and those of the Hundred-Armed are completely symmetrical. The structure of the story is the same on both occasions and so too is the function of each episode within the myth as a whole. Both groups appear as figures in chains. Zeus undoes their bonds and, although they are brothers of the Titans, they then go over to the camp of the Olympians, each group,—Cyclopes and Hundred-Armed alike—bringing with it the means of winning victory. The two episodes echo each other to the point of making one of them seem redundant. If, by providing him with the thunder bolt, the Cyclopes have equipped Zeus with the weapon which can ensure his superiority and enable him to rule over both gods and men (1,506), why should he have any need of the Hundred-Armed in order to win the battle? Conversely, if, as is stated in line 628, it is only through the Hundred-Armed that victory can be won, why present Zeus, in the midst of battle, no longer restraining his thunderbolt and relentlessly unleashing lightning from his hand to strike down the Titans from the heights of Olympus (687-711)? If we are to answer these questions, we must first broaden the scope of our analysis. Although there is a wide difference between the mode of operation of the Cyclopes, who have magical control over metals, and that of the Hundred-Armed, who are the possessors of a warrior magic, they do not merely reduplicate the role they fulfill in engineering success; both groups also fulfill a function strictly comparable to that which Aeschylus assigns to Prometheus. The comparison seems a valid one on all counts. Zeus’ accession to the throne presupposes the intervention in his favour of deities from an earlier generation than his own. These are the ancient gods related to the primordial powers which are precisely those which the new king is about to subjugate. The Hundred-Armed and the Cyclopes, who are brothers of the Titans and are the direct offspring of Earth and Sky, certainly come within this category. In contrast, Prometheus, the son of Japet the Titan, ought, according to an accurate historical chronology, to be the
same age as Zeus who is the son of the Titan Kronos. But this is not the case. The logic of the myth forces Aeschylus to adopt a quite different point of view. Aeschylus' Prometheus himself appears as a Titan, close to the primordial powers to which he appeals with his very first words just as he calls them to witness with his very last. For him Zeus and the Olympians are young, the new gods who have destroyed those of the olden days and upset the ancient division of powers. Since his own mother, Themis, is—to judge from what he says—none other than Gaia under another name(210), he too, like the Hundred-Armed and the Cyclopes, is a child of the Earth. His close relationship to the cosmic powers is marked by the visit he receives from Ocean who comes in the name of consanguinity to offer his support and also, even more, by the faithful presence at his side, right up until the final disaster, of a chorus of the daughters of Ocean which includes Metis and one of whose sisters, Hesione, Prometheus has married(560). There is a further similarity: it is the primordial mother, Gaia, the origin of everything (apart from Chaos and Night), who reveals in detail to Zeus what he should do with the Hundred-Armed if he wishes to succeed in his undertaking (626-627); it is she who tells Prometheus in advance how he should set about ensuring that victory falls to one camp rather than the other (Prometheus, 210). Again, it is she who conceals within her bosom the thunderbolt which, with her sanction, the Cyclopes later offer to Zeus so that he can use it as the infallible means of obtaining victory. And there is one final point: right from the start, as we have seen, the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed are presented in chains in Hesiod's account of the myths of sovereignty. Zeus liberates them and in return for this deliverance they promise him the support he needs in order to win. These figures, which appear first as bound and then as unbound, are themselves also masters of binding. This is evident in the case of the Hundred-Armed: in the struggle against the Titans they pin down their brothers under a mass of rock, 'they bind them with painful bonds' and despatch them beneath the Earth to the depths of Tartarus where, as faithful guards (phulakes) of Zeus, they watch over their prisoners. Just as they shackle, they
also have the power to liberate. In the *Iliad*, when the gods in league against Zeus are preparing to shackle him, Thetis, (whose affinities with Metis, the daughter of Ocean, we have already indicated), summons up the most representative of the three brothers, Briareus, to save him. The mere presence of the Hundred-Armed at Zeus’ side is enough to ward off the chains with which he was threatened. 77

Hesiod’s Cyclopes are not presented so obviously as possessors of the power of binding. However, these craftsmen who make Zeus’ weapons for him, underground, are related, as divine blacksmiths, to Hephaestus whose quality as a magician has been well-established by Marie Delcourt. Hephaestus is the master of the talismans which can liberate, and also of unbreakable bonds which are all the more to be feared because they are impossible to see. 78 According to one account in the Orphic literature, which mentions, following Hesiod, that the Cyclopes obtained the thunderbolt for Zeus and made lightning for him, Hephaestus actually learnt his craft from the Cyclopes. 79 Nor is this all: just as in the battle against Kronos Zeus trusts in the Hundred-Armed (*pisto*, 651 and 735), unlike the Titans who refuse to trust the wise advice of Prometheus (*pithein, Prometheus*, 204), so, in relation to the Cyclopes, to assure his reign he puts his trust (*pisunos*, 506) in a device which they give him to win his favour. This device is not a weapon in the ordinary sense of the word. With infallible and immediate effect, it deals human beings a sudden death that comes from Heaven. But, so far as the Immortals, against whom Zeus must fight, are concerned, its role is that of a magic instrument of domination. Through it Zeus can ‘tame’ his divine enemies by hurling them to the ground, paralysing their strength and pinning them down. To strike a god with his thunderbolt is, for the Master of Heaven, to bind him, to chain him up, depriving him of the vital force that previously animated him, and to relegate him, forever paralysed, to the frontiers of the world, far from the dwelling of the gods where he used to exercise his power. Hesiod and the other poets who followed him describe the terrifying effects of this shaft of fire with which Zeus assaults his enemies, in two different ways. Firstly, they use images of cosmic disorder. The air catches
fire, the waves and ocean seethe, the earth, sea and sky collapse into each other. Tartarus, undermined in its turn, shudders; all the different regions of the cosmos and all the elements are once again mixed up in a confusion resembling the primordial chaos.\textsuperscript{86} The power of the thunderbolt is such that it reduces the world to its, so to speak, ‘original’ state and therefore the victory it brings Zeus symbolises a complete reordering of the universe.

On another level, the effects of the thunderbolt appear more limited and more precise. Whether the Titans or Typhon are involved, the images and often the very expressions echo each other. The Titans who used to occupy the heights of Othrys\textsuperscript{81} eventually find themselves flat on the ground where the Hundred-Armed crush them beneath a mass of boulders.\textsuperscript{82} Zeus has chased them from Heaven(820). Typhon is knocked over and collapses on the ground(858). The thunderbolt ‘makes him fall from the height of his arrogant boasting’ (Prometheus, 360) just as Prometheus predicts to Zeus that a god will come who, possessing a fire even more powerful than lightning, ‘will bring him down in an ignominious fall’ (Prometheus, 919). The Titans are blinded by Zeus’ thunderbolt, their energy (mēnos) flags and their fighting power fails.\textsuperscript{83} Typhon, who is characterised by the ‘indefatigable’ power of his arms and legs (chēres, pōdes),\textsuperscript{84} is struck precisely where his strength lies, in his limbs (guía) and, mutilated (guāthais), he falls(858). ‘His strength (sthēnos) is crushed to dust, reduced to nothing by the thunder’ (Prometheus, 362).

Other texts suggest that this drying up of the menos and paralysis of the limbs is the result of a magic power of binding. In the Iliad, Agamemnon fears that the power of Zeus ‘might chain up the energy and arms’ of the Greeks.\textsuperscript{85} And bonds are again suggested by the expressions most frequently used to describe the sovereign god’s power of striking with thunderbolts. In the Theogony Kronos is ‘tamed’ by the blow Zeus deals him (857) just as, in Pindar, the enemy of the god is ‘tamed’ by the thunderbolt (Pythian, 8, 24) or, in Aeschylus, the wrath of Zeus is going to ‘tame’ the progeny of Ouranos (Prometheus, 163-164). The verbs damiāo, damáo and dannēmi may not originally have had the meaning of chaining
up, as Onians suggests, but they do refer to the constraint man imposes upon wild animals by means of a yoke, reins or a hobble. The close semantic relationship between 'to tame' and 'to bind' is borne out by several passages in Homer, of which we may note two, taken from the _Iliad_, in particular. The first presents Poseidon, the earth-trembler, whose trident is in many respects similar—through its cosmic effects—to the thunderbolt of Zeus. In Apollodorus' version, the Cyclopes do not only forge the thunderbolt of Zeus, as instrument of victory. They also present Poseidon and Hades, at the same time, with weapons which are to belong to them: 'The Cyclopes gave to Zeus thunder, lightning and the thunderbolt, to Hades the dog’s helmet and to Poseidon the trident. Armed with these devices, they conquered the Titans and threw them into Tartarus where they installed the Hundred-Armed to guard them.' Aeschylus' _Prometheus_ also associates the thunderbolt and the trident as instruments of domination: the hostile god whose destiny is to overthrow Zeus 'will invent (heurésai) a fire more powerful than the thunderbolt, with an amazing noise louder than the thunder, which will shatter the weapon of Poseidon, the trident, the scourge of the sea which shakes the Earth' 

In our passage from the _Iliad_ Poseidon magically intervenes during the fight between Idomeneus whom he protects and the Trojan Alcahoos. Spellbinding the flashing eyes of the latter (thélxas ósse phaeīnd'), just as the dazzling thunderbolt in the _Theogony_ blinds the Titans (óssē d’ámérde . . . auγê, 698), he 'tames' (edámasse) the Trojan warrior and 'chains his dazzling limbs' (pédēse phūdima guā). The text goes on: 'The man can no longer turn and flee, nor can he avoid the blows. He remains there, stock-still, like a pillar (stēlē). The comparison between the fighter magically rooted to the spot and the funerary column here takes on its full significance not only because death, by shackling the living man, makes him as immobile as stone, but also because the stēlē symbolises the fixity, the rooting to one particular spot of the ground of the mobile, elusive and ubiquitous power represented by the psuchē of a dead man. The second passage from the _Iliad_ is just as telling. The sons of Aloeus, Otos and Ephialtes, have 'bound' Ares in a cruel bond (dēsan
kraterēi eni desmōi). In other words, they have confined him in a bronze jar from which the god cannot escape. Chalēpōs hē desmōs edāmna, as Homer puts it: 'a cruel bond has tamed him'. The expression is all the more striking in that the bronze jar which tames Ares as if it were a bond has inevitably been connected with the jar, also hooped with bronze, whose mouth Poseidon closed with bronze doors, namely Tartarus, as Hesiod describes it in precisely the passage describing the prison to which Zeus banished the Titans.99

Wielded by Zeus, the blinding flash of lightning which he uses as a projectile against which there is no defence, affects the gods with the same 'paralysing' stupor as men suffer from the glitter of metal arms, the glare of bronze which lights up the very sky and grips the enemy's heart with terror. The phrase used in the Theogony: 'ōsse d'āmerde ... augē (698), the flash of the thunderbolt blinded the eyes (of the Titans), corresponds word for word with the one in the Iliad: "ōsse d'āmerde augē" (XIII, 340), the flash of bronze blinded the eyes (of the warriors). Lightning, compounded from light and fire, like the white steel of Kronos' sickle (hārpe), originates within the dark bosom of the Earth where it at first lies hidden (505). Gaia arms her son with the hārpe, the dolos that she has conceived. The skill of the Cyclopes fashions the thunderbolt for Zeus. With their craft (mēchanat) as much as with their strength, they make from the primordial power of fire the weapon for the new sovereign to wield, the weapon which makes him qualified to rule over Heaven, high in the brilliant aether—that is, so long as no son of Metis or of Thetis, in turn, 'invents' a fire even more powerful than the thunderbolt. Even the gods, however shining, brilliant and dazzling they themselves are in the vigour of their youth, cannot with impunity face this most intense blaze of fire, this the brightest light of all. There is no weapon capable of killing the Immortals. But the bolt of fire which Zeus the sovereign wields inevitably consigns his enemies to the Shadows, to the Night where, far from the light of the Sun, the conquered gods must remain, in chains. The Theogony tells us that the dazzling light of the thunderbolt and of lightning blinds the eyes of the Titans 'despite their strength'. For this reason he describes
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them as chthonioi.\textsuperscript{93} It is an epithet which has puzzled modern commentators. Mazon translated the phrase into French as ‘fils du sol’, sons of the earth, as if it were a question of gé
genes. True, the Titans are the children of Earth, but Hesiod never calls Gaia chthon and the Titans are usually
cconnected genealogically with their father, not their mother.
Hesiod refers to them as the Ouranidai. In this context the
term ‘chthonioi’, as West correctly points out in his com-
mentary,\textsuperscript{94} is equivalent to hypochthonioi, or subterranean:
the Titans in fact do dwell hypó chthonos (717), underground,
where they have been dispatched by the Hundred-Armed.
When Hera addresses them in the Homeric Hymn to Pythian
Apolio, striking the earth with the palm of her hand as she
does so, she calls them ‘the Titan gods who dwell beneath
the earth’.\textsuperscript{95} This description of them as subterranean even
before the Hundred-Armed have consigned them to the
depths of Tartarus, is not simply an anticipation. The
Titans, now cut off from the light of the Sun, deprived of
their sight, henceforth belong to the sphere of Night.\textsuperscript{96} Once
and for all they lie at the mercy of Zeus, delivered over
without defence to an enemy whose eyes unlike theirs,
remain wide open and whose vigilance never wavers. And
the weapon of fire which takes them by surprise and deprives
them of their sight constitutes, to use the phrase from
Aeschylus’ Prometheus, the ápgrunon bélos (358), the bolt
which is ever awake and never knows the night of sleep.\textsuperscript{97}
All that then remains to be done by the Hundred-Armed is
to finish off, by implementing it, so to speak literally, the
task which the weapon made by the Cyclopes had already,
in its own fashion, accomplished when it cut the Titans
off from the world of waking and of light. The warriors who
fought for Kronos are pinned beneath stones and ‘put in
the shadows (eskiasan)’ by the Hundred-Armed, fettered
in painful bonds and relegated underground in the dark
depths of Tartarus from which they are never to emerge
again.\textsuperscript{98}

In the fight against Typhon the different episodes are
similarly linked so that, together, they convey the mythical
theme of the vigilance of a sovereign whose supreme feat
is to take by surprise, paralyse and chain down the enemy
by striking him with a thunderbolt. In Hesiod, ‘Typhon would have been king over the Mortals and Immortals alike if the father of the gods and men had not suddenly, with his piercing eye, caught sight of him: the blast of his thunder was sharp and strong’. There is a total contrast here with Kronos who, whilst keeping a sharp eye open and remaining constantly on the watch (466) is nevertheless taken by surprise by Rhea’s deception. In Epimenides’ version, this need for the monarch to maintain an unfailing vigilance is stressed even in the plot of the story. By lowering his guard, even for a moment, Zeus almost forfeits his supreme power. Taking advantage of the fact that the Olympian, who ought never to doze off, allows sleep to close his eyes, Typhon goes up to the royal palace, through the doors and reaches the interior. He already has his hand on the royal power when Zeus suddenly counter-attacks, fatally striking him down with his thunderbolt. In the Theogony, the description of the encounter with Typhon recalls the struggle against the Titans. Zeus’ thunderbolt shakes the cosmos from top to bottom. From the heavens down to the depths of Tartarus everything shudders and seethes; Typhon is struck down, battered with blows and mutilated. To give the victory which “tamed” his enemy its full significance, Zeus hurls him down into Tartarus. In Apollodorus, the king of the gods blasts his enemy and then piles the mass of Etna on top of him just as the Hundred-Armed had crushed the Titans under stones in order to bind them down. In Pindar, in fact, Typhon lies ‘lettered’ (dōdetai) beneath Etna: the ‘column of the sky’ keeps him bound and the whole of Sicily presses in on him (πίεσαι). How should we understand this expression? In the Odyssey, Hermes contemplates the magic bonds with which Hephaestus pinned Aphrodite and Ares, immobile, to their bed of love and he jokingly wishes that he too could be pressed together with the goddess by even more powerful bonds (en desmoi kraterais pieitheis). In another passage Odysseus asks his companions to fasten him tight (πίεσαι) with many bonds so that he can resist the call of the sirens. We can, perhaps, even venture to describe what kind of bonds these were, in the mythical imagination, which press
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Typhon beneath Etna. Prometheus describes with compassion the fate of impetuous Typhon, a rebel like himself, 'tamed by force', whose henceforth powerless body lies far away 'held tight by the roots of Etna (ιπποιμενος ρυθισασιν Αιναιαίς ηιπο).137 Prometheus himself, like Typhon and the Titans, is bound by the king of the gods. In some representations he appears in the position described in the Theogony: chained to a pillar by bonds which cannot be loosened.168 In Aeschylus' tragedy he is even bound twice, the first time, at the beginning of the play, by Hephaestus who nails him to a rock, using unbreakable fetters. The blacksmith god does this against his will, on the orders of Zeus whose immediate representatives Kratos and Bia, Domination and Violence, are at his side. Hephaestus' power of binding does not operate like that of Zeus, at the level of sovereignty, but lower, acting merely in the service of Power. Its nature is purely instrumental. At the end of the play Prometheus is chained a second time. Hermes comes in Zeus' name to demand from him the secret of the marriage which can threaten to dethrone the king of the gods. When the Titan refuses to divulge it Zeus unleashes his thunderbolt against him. This time too the unleashing of the weapon which is the symbol of supremacy in the hands of the sovereign has a twofold significance. It is a catastrophe of cosmic proportions 'which confounds and shakes the universe'.(994) The earth is uprooted from its foundations. With its roaring surge the sea even obliterates the path of the stars in the Sky (1045–1050). But for Prometheus, who is already in chains in the open air, it is also a further trial to be endured in his subjugation. The flame of the thunderbolt smites into pieces the rock to which he is fettered; henceforth his body is to be buried underground (1018): it is a curved stone that henceforth will hold him in its embrace, petraia d'agkáli se bastásei (1019). Prometheus even suspects that he will finally be hurled into Tartarus, joining Typhon and the Titans there where they are enclosed in bonds which cannot be loosened, desmois alaitois.109 However, his fate in fact turns out quite differently. The sufferings of Prometheus are reminiscent not so much of the punishment of the smitten Titans but rather of the misfortunes initially endured by those of
Ouranos’ sons whose assistance later proved to be necessary to the new master of the Heavens. Prometheus bound is followed, with Zeus’ consent,\textsuperscript{110} by Prometheus liberated, just as the Hundred-Armed and the Cyclopes were first bound and subsequently liberated.\textsuperscript{111} Each time such a change of status takes place it has a similar role in the structure of the myth. As soon as the Cyclopes are released they show their gratitude by presenting Zeus with the thunderbolt, the instrument of his victory (501 ff). Once the Hundred-Armed are delivered from their bonds, in return for this ‘unhoped-for boon’ (660) they commit themselves to throwing in their decisive weight as warriors against the Titans. Prometheus, in return for his refound liberty, is reconciled with the king of the gods and reveals to him the secret which saves his crown. The punished Titan had predicted that the day would come when ‘despite my fetters’ the monarch of the Immortals will have need of me if he wishes to learn of the perilous fate which must deprive him of his sceptre and his honours’. But, he went on, nothing will be to any avail, neither gentleness nor cunning nor threats ‘unless he first loosens these savage bonds’.\textsuperscript{112} If the hope which the chorus expresses in another passage of seeing Prometheus ‘one day treated as an equal by Zeus’\textsuperscript{113} is to prove not to be vain, this is because there is no way for the Olympian to divert destiny ‘unless Prometheus be delivered from his chains’.\textsuperscript{114} The king of the gods has to come to terms with the son of Japet to the extent that it is necessary for him to incorporate in his power as sovereign the cunning, deceipts and secret foreknowledge of the Titan. He must associate the particular type of intelligence that Prometheus represents with the structure of his power since, without it, it would founder in misfortune and end in bondage. The industry and skill of the Cyclopes, which provided Zeus with invincible weapons, and the amazing strength of the Hundred-Armed, capable of immobilising their enemies in their multiple grip, were necessary to Zeus. Like them, the wily prudence of Prometheus is also an essential feature of the power of binding which Zeus must wrest from Kronos in order to enjoy sovereign possession of it himself and thus ensure his own permanent dominion over the universe.
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However, by reason of his position in the myth, which is that of an opponent of Zeus rather than his ally, a competitor rather than a helper, Prometheus appears not so much in the role of a binder but rather as a liberator from bonds. True, it was he who taught men to domesticate animals by binding them with yoke and harness (Prometheus 462-463) but this is but one of the many technical skills which he so generously presented to them for the mortals received all their crafts from Prometheus. In Aeschylus' drama, it is his boulai, his schemes that enable Zeus to hide the Titans in Tartarus, while in Hesiod it was the lightning of the Cyclopes and the grip of the Hundred-Armed which did so. Nevertheless, there is nothing to indicate the precise nature of the stratagems used by the cunning son of Japet. On the other hand much stress is laid on his power as a loosener of bonds. Even in chains he remains somehow elusive for he is too amazingly clever to be kept in chains for ever. 'Strike still harder, Kratos', orders Hephaestus, 'Tighten them, let there be no loose play. He is capable of finding a way out even from what is inextricable.' And Prometheus prophesies: 'After I have bent beneath a thousand pains and a thousand calamities I shall escape from my bonds'. It is not only for himself that the Titan finds a way out. He 'has freed' men from the fear of death (248). Furthermore, alone of all the gods and contrary to the will of Zeus, who at the beginning of his reign desired to see the human race disappear, he accomplishes for the mortals what Zeus the Olympian did for the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed: 'See', he declares proudly, 'see what I have dared to do. I have unbound men (exelusámên, 235) and prevented them from descending, crushed, into Hades'. But in what sense was averting the destruction of men 'to unbind' them? Thanatos, Death, the Child of Night, is a terrible god with an implacable heart of bronze: once he catches a man in his snare, he retains his hold on him for ever. When Zeus deprives the eyes of the Titans of light and the Hundred-Armed relegate them to the shadows it is, as we have seen, one way of binding them. And, for them, their fetters are synonymous with their relegation to immobility in the Night of Tartarus. Conversely, 'to unbind' the Hundred-Armed and the
Cyclopes means to restore them to the light of the Sun and all the life and movement that this implies for gods and men alike. The *Theogony* uses the expressions ‘liberated from their bonds’ (659–660) and ‘restored to the light of day’ (626 and 669) indifferently in connection with the Hundred-Armed. In some versions of the Prometheus legend Prometheus also plays the same role as Hephaestus as the master of a magic power of liberation. It is he who fashions the first woman, Pandora, or even who creates the human race by giving life to inanimate matter; he loosens arms and legs from the clay damped with water which he is modelling and breathes life and movement into it. He too it is who brings help to Zeus when he suffers the pains of childbirth, having swallowed his first wife. With a double stroke he delivers him of the daughter that Metis was carrying: she is the goddess Athena who had been shut up, without means of escape, inside the head of her father. The Titan has an ambiguous position. He is the necessary ally of Zeus when it is a question of the latter winning and maintaining power but is at the same time opposed to him, so he is both hostile and reconciled with him, both chained and liberated, more or less with Zeus’ agreement yet more or less despite him. This ambiguity is confirmed by a custom we find mentioned in two fragments of Aeschylus reported by Athenaeus. According to the *Prometheus Unbound*, it is in honour of Prometheus that men put crowns on their heads *antipoina toû ekeinou desmoû*, to pay for his bonds. There is a passage in *The Sphinx* which throws further light on this polar relationship between the crown, which consecrates the religious status of an individual or is the reward of a victor, and the bond which fetters the vanquished: “For the guest-stranger (*xênô*) a crown, but a crown of the ancient type: Prometheus called it the best of bonds (*arístos desmôn*). The ancient crown of Prometheus is not made from the twigs of the bay or olive tree, as is customary, but from the willow (*ligos*). In his learned commentary Athenaeus tries in vain to understand this peculiarity: ‘A crown of willow is absurd, for willow is used for making bonds and hunting nets (*prós desmôús gar kai plégmata*). The solution is suggested by the treatise that Menodotus of Samos devoted
to the notable facts from his fatherland. There, the crown of willow is connected with a religious rite involving a 'chained statue'. It is a rite which we can now consider in some detail and involves the archaic idol made of wood at Samos, the brētas of Hera. This is, as at Sparta, Hera lugōdesmos, chained up in a willow bush so that she cannot escape without assistance. When Apollo was consulted by the Carians on this matter, he told them that, because they had bound the goddess, they must make amends on their own persons. These amends were not to be forced on them, however, but were ones to which they would agree willingly and which would not do them any serious harm.

In his commentary, Athenaeus writes: 'This is the penance which Zeus assigned to Prometheus after he had loosened his painful bonds; once the Titan had willingly consented to make amends which would do him no harm, the king of the gods ordained that he should pay this price'. On the basis of this text where the crown of willow is, to be sure, reminiscent of his earlier chains but where at the same time the bonds of the son of Japet are transformed into a crown of victory, it is not easy to see which of the two, the sovereign god or the cunning Titan has really won a definitive victory over his opponent in this contest of binding and unbinding which mētē presides over.

There is one further detail which links Prometheus with the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed and at the same time throws some light upon certain aspects of the temporary servitude that they undergo. Hesiod's Theogony has nothing to say about the way in which Zeus liberates his future allies among those of the sons of Ouranos who had remained in chains throughout the reign of their brother Kronos. Apollodorus gives us one piece of information which is, at first sight, somewhat cryptic. 'Zeus loosened their bonds after having killed their guard, Kampe'. In the animal world Kampe, the Curved One, is a type of caterpillar which can roll itself up completely into a ball. According to a gloss in Hesychius the word had the meaning of kēnos in Epicharmus. A kēnos is a sinuous sea-monster like the seals ruled by the elusive Old Man of the Sea, the magician who is a past master where cunning, subterfuge or deceit are concerned.
and who can only be overcome when bound in the vice of a
grip which cannot be loosened. In Diodorus, Kampe is a
monster produced by Earth; Dionysus slays it before meeting
the Titans. Nonnos describes it as a Nymph from Tartarus
with black wings, dark scales and curved claws like a harpe.

It seems likely that the curved character which connects
Kampe with the aghulomatos Kronos and even more with the
aghale petraia, the curved stone which enfolds Prometheus,
is what qualifies this child of Earth to be the keeper of
the bonds and subterranean guard over the chained prisoners.
However, the verb kempto means not only to curve but also to
fold or bend. This is the verb, used in the passive form,
which recurs strikingly often in Aeschylus’ Prometheus
to describe the trial the Titan undergoes while being tortured.
‘I have freed men from their bonds’, says Prometheus to the
chorus of the daughters of Ocean, ‘and that is why today I
am bent (kemptomat) beneath such torture, so cruel to suffer
and so pitiful to see’. The same expression reappears on
two other occasions: ‘I who helped Zeus to establish his
power, see beneath what agonies he bends me today’; ‘It is
after having bent beneath a thousand agonies that I shall
escape from my bonds’. Kampe is the Curved One not only
because she is the mistress of bonds but also because she
‘curves, bends’ the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed just
as in Pindar, Zeus ‘has bent’ (ekampse) those mortals who
are too arrogant.

The presence of Kampe, which is thus illuminated
by Aeschylus’ text, will perhaps make it possible for us to
take our analysis a little further. Proceeding from a study
by Kerampoulos on a method of capital punishment known as
apotumpanismos, which the Greek scholar identified as a
particularly atrocious form of public execution during which
the condemned man, who was entirely naked, was nailed by
spikes to a pole erected on the ground, Louis Gernet has
offered a suggestion as to what the legal and religious signi-
ficance of the torture of Prometheus was. According to
him, he suffered the degrading exposure of a kind of
apotumpanismos on which a passage in Plato’s Laws
provides some interesting information. For some categories
of criminals the penalty consisted in being degradingly
exposed, either in a seated position or upright (amórfous hédros è stássei) close to the sanctuaries, on the frontiers of the country. There are several points to note. The condemned man must be expelled from the city: he must undergo his punishment right on the edge of the territory, ‘on the frontiers of the country’, and his punishment has the significance of huperorismós, rejection by the world to which he formerly belonged. Furthermore the position taken up in this torture by pillory is important. As Plato indicates, the position may be one of two kinds: standing or sitting. In Aeschylus’ drama Prometheus’ fetters pin him upright to the rock. Similarly there are graphic representations which show him chained upright to a pole or pillar. Hephaestus’ first words are to warn the Titan of the fate which is in store for him: ‘You are going to stand a painful guard upon this rock, remaining forever upright (orthostádên), never sleeping or bending the knee (ou kámptón gónu). The expression kámptein gónu, to bend the knee, is used here with its usual meaning: to take some rest, to lie down, to relax. This use emphasises by contrast the meaning it takes on when used by Prometheus: the Titan “bends” beneath a trial that is all the harder to bear in that it does not allow him, even for a moment, to bend his knees. But in the most ancient depictions (in particular a carved stone from Crete, an archaic relief from Olympia and several vase paintings) the Titan is shown chained to a post in a seated position, or to be more exact crouching with his knees bent up in front of him. What does this posture signify? It corresponds to a ritual position adopted on occasions of supplication, mourning or initiation. Louis Gernet has shown that, when adopted on the occasion of punishment by torture, it symbolises a state of virtual death, the expulsion of the guilty man from the realm of life as well as from the territory of his city. The intention is not only to punish the criminal by chaining him to a post but also, through the degrading treatment which is publicly dealt him, to impair his religious status and life-force, ‘to suppress in the individual a certain “mystic” force on which depend his being and value as a being—what the Greeks called his timé’. This is indeed the kind of ‘bond’ that the king of the gods imposes on those whom he relegates
to the outer limits of the world, like those condemned to the pillory 'far from men and from the gods' so as to keep them there, stripped of every honour, immobile and powerless in a state of quasi-death.\textsuperscript{141}

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Our analyses have enabled us to grasp the role of the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed more closely and to define their position in relation to their brother Titans, to Zeus and to a figure such as Aeschylus' Prometheus. We may now perhaps attempt to clarify the obscurities in Hesiod's text by suggesting an explanation in keeping with the inner logic of the story.

In Hesiod's view, Kronos is the first monarch. As such he is the founder of sovereignty. And this inauguration of a power hitherto unknown in the world is brought about by a cunning trick inspired by Gaia and perpetrated by her clever, daring son. There are two aspects to the d\textit{olos} through which supreme power is introduced: its positive and negative qualities are indissolubly linked. It brings the universe on to a more advanced stage of development. The obstacles to genesis are removed, space is opened out and the world becomes organised. The indefinitely repeated union between Sky and Earth is followed by the rule of a monarch who, from on high in the Sky keeps a jealous watch over all that happens in the various regions of the cosmos. But, at the same time, the d\textit{olos} is a terrible lapse, a crime committed against the primordial powers which are at the origin and source of all existence. There is thus no true cosmic order without differentiation, hierarchy and supremacy. But, by the same token, there is no supremacy without conflict, injustice towards others and constraint imposed by treachery and violence. The action of Kronos and the split that it brings about in the texture of the world allowed all things to assume their own forms and take their proper place in space and time; but, in that it was a rebellion against the Father-Sky, it brought into existence the presence of evil, there to remain forever. The wrong done by Kronos can never be wiped out. There is no way of turning back. It can only
be paid for by the crime rebounding in the fulness of time to strike the one who committed it. Kronos has to undergo from his own son the same treatment that he inflicted upon his father. But so that equilibrium can be restored without the struggle for power breaking out again and rebounding forever upon one generation after another it was necessary that the supremacy of Zeus should avoid activating the process of crime and punishment that the wily métis of Kronos set in motion. The new sovereign does not have the power to immobilise time, stop the cycle of births or fix the future becoming. But he must, unlike his father, find a way of establishing an order which guarantees the stability of the cosmos along with the permanence of his rule and ensures to the divine powers whose assistance he has won the possession of perennial youth, unfailing strength and perpetual enjoyment of the honours which have been allotted to them. Zeus cannot suppress evil for it is henceforth a part of the world. All he can do is set it aside, 'distance' it from the gods by relegating it, far from them, to the furthermost frontiers of the world or by dispatching it to the Earth of men where it becomes the lot of mortal creatures.

Thus although the Olympian's royal rule follows that of Kronos, it is in no way a repetition of it. The second monarch is not a copy of the first but rather his antithesis. By overthrowing him Zeus, in effect, remedies the instability of power as it was first established. In the transition from one monarch to the other the myth expresses both continuity and rupture, both similarity and opposition.

So far as the métis of Kronos is concerned, emphasis is laid not only on its inferiority compared to that of Zeus but also on its disturbing, even malevolent quality. Kronos is terrible, deinós; his heart is full of hatred. His very malice, the malice of cunning, betrays as it were a warped distortion of the intelligence, a demented quality, the criminal blindness of átē (atasthai) (209). Although this Cunning One is distrustful and suspicious he is the reverse of prudent, to the extent that prudence for the Greeks means moderation, self-control and self-discipline (sóphrosíne). In this sense, apart from his cunning, Kronos is close to Ouranos, uncontrolled and given to excess as he is. It is a significant
similarity: in the passage concerning the chaining up of the Cyclopes by their father, Oouranos, (a passage which, as we have pointed out, is ‘out of place’ since it occurs not in the account of Oouranos’ confrontations with his children but, instead, in the context of the struggle between Kronos and Zeus), the god of the Sky is presented, as his son was earlier, in the episode preceding the castration, as being led astray by ait (aestrophosinêïs).146 The demented fury of Kronos, raising his hand against his father, is matched by that of Oouranos chaining up those of his sons whom Zeus is later to liberate. In contrast, the characteristic quality of the mind of Zeus is above all its prudence. The god who is métita as opposed to agkolomêîs appears as a careful, thoughtful (656, 657) and benevolent (503, 660) figure who shows respect for the rights of others (392–396; 424–426). In the text strong emphasis is laid on the contrast between the ‘wisdom’ (epiphrosinê, 658) which inspires the decisions of Zeus and the thoughtlessness (aestrophosinê, 502) which is a common feature linking Oouranos and Kronos together.

Thus the status of Kronos, in his intermediary position between Oouranos and Zeus, is ambiguous. In his struggle against Oouranos he is a subtle and ingenious god, the founder of sovereign power and as such is close to Zeus. But in his conflict with Zeus he is, by reason of his uncontrolled nature so given to excess, still close to the primordial and thus to Oouranos.

The sovereign power of Zeus combines all the forms of power which existed in the preceding generation dispersed among the ‘first gods’. It adds to the cunning and haughty boldness of Kronos not only the thunderbolt of the Cyclopes and the inescapable grasp of the Hundred-Armed but also Gaia’s infallible knowledge concerning the future, the shifting scheming by means of which the deities of the sea avert the inevitable and even the tricks of Aphrodite and the gentle tyranny imposed by her seductive wiles.

The power of the new sovereign god consists of more than just Kratos and Bia, Domination and Force. True, it relies on them but only so as to put them at the service of a higher order which is beyond them, for in his person Zeus combines the ultimate degree of power and the most scrupulous respect
for justice. His sovereign power is a compound of the supremacy of the monarch and a scrupulously fair distribution of honours, warrior force and the honouring of agreements, violence and persuasion, astute assessment at a glance, physical vigour and every form of intelligence.

For Hesiod, the emergence of the Olympians, the gods he calls ‘the authors of every good’, goes hand in hand with an organisation of the world in which the primacy of Zeus and the rule of justice are inseparable features. As soon as they had resolved their conflict with the Titans the Olympians urged Zeus to assume the power and the throne of the Immortals; and it was he who shared their honours out between them. The establishment of an order founded on the just distribution of functions and privileges presupposes the defeat of those primordial gods, the Titans, with all their violence. Furthermore, victory for the Olympians could not be won without the assistance of the cosmic deities which are the foundation and origin of both power and knowledge. The system over which Zeus presides is a new one but the forces which he mobilises and unifies were already present in the world before him. Gaia concedes to him the oracular knowledge that she, as a chthonic deity possesses. From Metis, the daughter of Okeanos, and from Aphrodite, born from the waves, he derives the wiles of intelligence and the duplicity of seduction. Kratos and Bia, Domination and Force, who accompany him everywhere in his capacity as king, mustered to him at the first call together with their mother Styx, acting on the advice of the Titan, Ocean, in the same way as—according to Aeschylus—Prometheus, prompted by Gaia, came to offer the young god his cunning and his schemes. The same is true for the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed. The former already have the thunderbolt at their disposal while the latter possess the power of bonds upon which the new sovereign is to depend in order to conquer and rule. But if the place of these figures preceded that of Zeus in the order of genesis what were they doing with their weapons and their power before the birth of the Olympian? They must necessarily have been unable to use them. This temporary “neutralisation” of the agents of victory, the upholders of sovereign power, is expressed
in the myth by the theme of the chaining up of the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed. But if Kronos was able to chain them up he must have been stronger, more powerful than his brothers. It is difficult, in these circumstances, to see how they could then be able to bring Zeus the success that they were unable to obtain for themselves. Conversely, if they were not reduced to impotence by their fetters, during the reign of Kronos, Zeus would not have had the opportunity to liberate them and thus win them over to his cause. If they had been liberated by the withdrawal of Ouranos, as their brothers the Titans were, they would have shared the supremacy of the latter and would have had no reason to go over to the other side. So it cannot be that Kronos either bound them or unbound them. From the point of view of the logic of the myth there can be no connection of any kind, whether positive or negative, between the sovereign power of Kronos on the one hand and the status of the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed on the other. This explains the silence of Hesiod who says not a word on this subject. However, for Zeus to be in a position to unbind them it is necessary for the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed to appear, at the beginning of the conflict against the Titans, as prisoners in chains. So at this point in the story the poet observes that they had been chained up 'by their father'. He dates the origin of their bondage to a period earlier than the reign of Kronos for he could not place it in that reign although it had to continue right up until the advent of Zeus. It is thus that this action which could not, without contradiction, be ascribed to the first sovereign, Kronos, is instead attributed to Ouranos. All the same throughout later Greek tradition it continued to be Kronos who, as king, was presented as the god of binding and unbinding but who, as a king conquered and dethroned, was presented as the god imprisoned in chains.161

Notes

1. On the deification of abstractions in Hesiod, cf. B. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, Hamburg, 1955, p. 65 ff. Certain deities to whom cults are devoted have names of the same kind as Metis, for instance
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2. Prometheus Vinctus, 212–13. We find in Homer the same opposition between dólōs on the one hand and kratos and bēd on the other. When Lycurgus means Areithoeos (whom Pausanias (VIII, 4, 10) calls aner polemikos) in single combat, he takes him by surprise from behind in a pathway too narrow for the daunting warrior to use his invincible iron mace (Iliad, VII, 135 ff.). He kills him ‘by cunning, not by strength’, dólōi ois kratet, ‘by forestalling him in a treacherous manner’, hopophthas (cf. Pausanias, VIII, 4, 10: having killed him dólōi kai eu sun tōi dikai, by cunning and not fairly); cf. also Od. IX, 406 and 408: Odysseus triumphs over the Cyclops ‘by cunning, not by strength’, dólōi oude tiēphin. On the role of mētis and use of dólōs in conflicts of war, cf. Od., III, 119–121: for nine years the Greeks have shut in their enemies inside a network of ambushes of every kind, pantolkos dólōs; but none could equal Odysseus in mētis: he was supreme over all of these pantolkos dólōs was concerned.

At II, III, 202, the poliomētis Odysseus knows pantolkos te dólous kai mēdes paln, all the ways of guile and cunning strategem.

3. Aiolomētis: Theogony, 511; akgulomētis: Theog., 546; Works, 48; aipomētis: Prometheus, 18; delphionēm: Theog., 550; pokiles: Theog., 511; Prom., 308; paikuloboulos: Theog., 541; poliādritis: Theog., 616; sophistās: Prom., 62.

4. "... dainos... heurēs kai amēchānōn piron", Aesch., Prom., 59.

5. Theog., 547, 551, 555, 560.

6. Theog., 537, 555; Works, 48.

7. Even if the derivation of Promētheus from mēdes, metis or manthanō, to learn, is not certain (cf. M. L. West, Hesiod, Theogony, 199, p. 308), in the minds of the Greeks there was an undeniable connection between the name of the son of Japet and promētheia, foresight, promētheia, foresight; and equally between the name of his brother Epimētheia and epimētheia, afterthought; cf. Theog., 511 and 559; Works, 89; Aeschylus, Supplices, 700.

8. Theog., 887.

9. Ibid., 559; Works, 54.

10. Theog., 900.


12. Ibid., 908.

13. Ibid., 927.

14. Theog., 894. Throughout the passage the repetition of the verb phrōde, to think (892 and 900) associated with phradosumēnai (891) thoughtfulness, periphōrē (894) and epiphōrē (896) thoughtful, is noticeable.


16. Ibid., 762.
Compare the lines 117: πάντων ἡδος ἀσφαλέας αἰεί, 'immovable foundation for all things forever' (Gaia) and 128: μακαρεστὶ θεοὶς ἡδος ἀσφαλέας αἰεί, 'an immovable seat for the blessed gods forever (Ouranos)'; cf. on this point, M. L. West (o.c., p. 193–94) who shows that even if the former is qualified by lines 118–19 which appear in all the manuscripts, the two phrases are not, as has sometimes been claimed, incompatible. Line 128: οὐχ ἐκ τοῦ μακαρεστὶ θεων ἡδος ἀσφαλεῖς αἰεί, 'so that there should be an immovable seat for the blessed gods forever' refers, in our own view, to the future status of Ouranos, to what he will be not in the immediate future, as in the preceding line (hīna min peri pānta kalliptein, 'so that he should cover her entirely') but later, when he has become what he was destined cosmically and religiously to be: above the world, a fixed and immobile sky in which the heavenly gods could take their place (cf. Schol. ad Hes. Th., 128, p. 185 Flach). In the first place the verb kalliptein as used by Hesiod means not only 'to cover' like a lid but also 'to hide' (cf. Theog., 539 and 541); it should therefore be connected with the verb apokriptein in line 157. For Sky to 'hide' Earth he must still be lying on top of her. Thus in lines 176–8 Ouranos amphib de Galēi (...) epescheto kai rhesamusthē pāntōi, 'remains attached to Gaia and spreads out covering her entirely'. Such is, indeed, the situation before Kronos intervenes. Secondly, the expression hēdos asphalēs aei suggests that Sky remains fixed and immobile and consequently no longer descends on Gaia to be united with her. On this point cf. Od., VI, 43 and Pindar, Nemea, VI, 5–7: ἐς ὠρὲς ἠραμένος υφὸς ἐς κατά μιν ῳς υφὸς, 'the bronze sky remains an immovable seat for ever more'. Hesiod conveys these two positions of Ouranos by using two quite distinct propositions, the first introduced by hīna, the second by ὕψος followed by the optative. In this connection it should be noted that the Mountains, Oiōres, which Gaia gives birth to, as she does to Ouranos, without Eros, that is to say without being united with a male god, are also described as being the seat of a particular category of deities, the Nymphs, whose birth Hesiod tells of later on; cf. line 187 for the birth of the Melian Nymphs.

25. Ibid., 176–78.
26. Ibid., 157: pāntas apokriptaike, 'he hid them all'.
27. The use of the verb ἐρέχομαι (ἐστιν ὅτι οὔχ ἐστὶν ἐπάγων, 'he came, bringing the night', 176) implies that Ouranos is not constantly stretched out on top of Gaia; 'he comes' to be united with her. But this is not to say that he is for the rest of the time in his place, as Sky. As used in
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Hesiod’s text the word, in our opinion, has the more specific meaning given it by the Greeks when it appears in the context of intimate relationships, of sexual union with a woman, as in Herodotus, II, 115 and VI, 68. The fact that by being united with Gaia the black Sky ‘brings night’ shows that, by not constantly remaining in his proper place, he prevents the light of day (cf. 124: Ἑμὸν) from regularly succeeding the darkness. This is why, by covering Gaia and hiding his children within her womb, he does not allow them ‘to ascend to the light’ (157).

28. Ibid., 160: Gaia groans within herself, steinoménē, being confined, restricted and choked. Cf. II., XXI, 220: the river Scamander cannot flow because it is steinomenos nêkios, ‘choked’ with the corpses which are filling it and preventing it from pouring into the sea, just as Gaia is ‘choked’ by her children who can find no way out.


30. Ibid., 138.

31. Ibid., 177: himeinôn philôtatos. In contrast Gaia conceived Ouranos ἀτερ φιλότατος οἰκίσατο, ‘without tender love’ (132). But this love, which is excessive both because it is incessantly repeated and because of the lack of distance between the two powers, makes it impossible for the union to bring a new generation into the light of day. In his constant desire for philôtés, Ouranos is close both to the primordial powers of Eros and Aphrodite (the goddess accompanied everywhere by Eros and Himeros, Love and Desire, 201) and also to that of Night. Philôtês is indeed one of the prerogatives of Aphrodite (206) but it also appears among the sinister progeny of Night (224), the night that Ouranos, in his continuous desire for sexual union, causes to reign.

32. Ouranos hates his children right from the first (ex archê, 156). As soon as they are born he hides them within the depths of Gaia. This information is hardly compatible with what we are later told in another passage and in the quite different context of the conflict between Kronos and Zeus (617–620). In the case of the Hundred-Armed, as soon as their father becomes angry with them, envying their unequaled strength, their height and their size, he binds them with a powerful bond. We shall be returning to consider the problems posed by the ‘chainimg up’ of the Hundred-Armed, which is not mentioned in the text upon which we are commenting at present. But let us note, straight away, that if the height, size and strength of the Hundred-Armed was such as to provoke the envy of their father, they cannot have been those of newborn infants. To be sure, the gods grow very quickly but Hesiod is careful to stress, in the case of Zeus, that the newborn infant had to grow in strength and size before taking on Kronos (cf. 492–493).

33. Ibid., 165.


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36. Ibid., 174. Ouranos hid Gaia (háléptoi 127) and hid his children (apokrátaske, 157). Similarly, Gaia hides Kronos (kráptasa) and positions him in ambush (lékhei) at the spot where his father will come, all unsuspecting.
37. Ibid., 160 and 175.
38. Ibid., 461–2
39. Ibid., 466.
40. Ibid., 476 and 486.
41. Ibid., 486. The text reads: theoν protétai basilei, the first king of the gods. At least, this is how Mazon interprets it. But M. L. West, in his critical edition, suggests the reading: theoν protévιn basilei, the king of the first gods, pointing out that Hesiod calls the Titans prōteroi theoi (cf. 424), and that the phrase ‘the first king’ is expressed by Hesiod as ho protéron basileus (this correction is adopted by Peppmüller: cf. West, o. C. p. 301).
42. Theog., 471.
43. Pausanias, VIII, 36, 3; IX, 41, 6.
44. Theog., 489–491.
45. Ibid., 494.
46. Ibid., 496.
47. Ibid., 495.
48. Apollodorus, I, 2, 1. In Apollodorus the maturity (télēos) of Zeus corresponds with the evidence of Hesiod (492–494): as the years passed the strength (ménos) and the limbs (gía) of the young prince grew rapidly. The role of Metis is reminiscent of the mēnis of Rhes (471); furthermore, the phaímaka or magic philtre is also connected with mēnis and its powers. Cf. Odyssey, IV, 227, the phaírmaka mētēonta, Helen’s ‘cunning drugs’.
49. Cf. Theog., 464; pépeínto; 894: haimar to.
50. Ibid., 891–893.
51. The powers who preside over vengeance have a dual role and a dual origin: originating from Gaia, they are known as the Erinyes; from Night or Nux, as the Krês, the implacable avengers (núlēpoinos, 217) and Nèmèis. On the Erinyes, Ætìopoinos (or nùlēpoinos according to Rulmken), cf. [Orpheus] Argenautica, 1365. More generally, on the association between the Erinyes and the Keres cf. M. L. West, o. C. p. 229, note to line 217.
52. Theog., 184.
53. Ibid., 493.
54. Ibid., 188–90.
55. Ibid., 205–206. Aphrês means both the white foam of the sea and the sperm which rises or spurts from the mutilated body of Ouranos (cf. ap’æthánatou chroís ðrēmvo, 191). More generally, on the relationship between sperm and foam cf. Diogenes of Apollonia, fr. B6 and A24 in Diela-Kranz, FVS, II, p. 65 and 57; Hippocrates, On generation, I, 2 and 3; Aristotle De Gen. Anim., 736a 10–24; O.F., fr. 127 and 185 Kern. Just as the Erinyes, produced by Earth from the blood of Ouranos, are close to the Keres and to Nemesis, the children
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of Night, so Aphrodite, produced from the sperm of Ouranos in the sea, is close to Ἀφάτη, Deceit, Παθιάσις, erotic tenderness, and to Πευκεῖς ἱγος, Lying Words, who also belong to the sinister progeny of Night. The criminal action of Kronos engenders both on Earth and Sea divine powers which, while being opposed to each other as hatred to love or conflict to harmony are still all equally ambiguous: there is a ‘white’ and a ‘black’ aspect to the Erinyes and to Aphrodite; cf. on the Erinyes, Pausanias, VIII, 34, 3; on Aphrodite, the use of epithets such as Μαλαιτής, Black, Μυχήν cavernous, Βιουμένη, benevolent (by euphemism).


57. Theog., 889–890 which can be compared with 205 (Aphrodite) and 224, 229 (on the descendants of Night).

58. Apollodorus, I, 3, 6. Ρηπανθή, to take by surprise, to forestall, is used in the same way in another passage of Apollodorus. Zeus, in his justice ‘forestalls’ the Giants when he gathers the πάρμακον produced by Gaia which would have made them invincible if they had managed to obtain it. We find the same verb, ἡπωπηθάνον at Il., VII, 144, to indicate that Lycurgus finds a way to kill a particularly daunting foe by dominating him ‘through cunning and not by force’. Cf. supra, n. 2.

59. Theog., 501–502; cf. the commentary by M. L. West, o.c., p. 304.

60. Theog., 617–618.

61. Ibid., 504–506.

62. Ibid., 501.

63. Ibid., 164; Πάϊδας εμοί καὶ πατρὸς ἀστάθαλον... ‘sons born from me and from a furious father...’

64. Ibid., 167–170 and 178.

65. Ibid., 208–210. The play on words operates on two levels: Titans (Τιτένες)-titānēs, Titans-tītis; cf. Sch. at 209, p. 187 and 231 Fisch.

66. Ibid., 337 ff.

67. Marriage is only mentioned in connection with Briaresus: he marries Cynopolea, the daughter of Poseidon (818–19). But no mention is made of any offspring.

68. Apollodorus, I, 1, 1–5.

69. Theog., 434 and 486; cf. M. L. West, o.c., p. 200. The term πρότερα implies that they came before another generation namely that of Zeus. The Olympian god does not wrest from Hecate what she had obtained with ‘the first Titan kings’. The meaning of the expression is made clearer in the following line (425): she retains ‘what had been given to her originally in the first allotment’, τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχῆς ἐπελε δασμός.

70. Pausanias recalls the tradition of Elis, according to which Kronos was the first king of the Sky. Zeus was held to have fought him for the throne at Olympia (V, 7, 9–10). And, in point of fact, it was at Olympia that a college of priests each year, at the spring equinox,
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sacrificed to the first god, on the summit of Mount Kronos. These priests bore the title of Basilai, the Royal Ones.


72. Hesiod’s Cyclopes seem to be different from the wild shepherds of the same name in the Odyssey and also from the giant builders of walls mentioned as early as in Tytæus (fr. 9, 3, C. Prato), and who are also sometimes referred to as Cheirogástores or Echeirogástores, those who have arms on their stomachs (Schol. to Hesiod, Theog., 139; Hellenicos of Lesbos, fr. 88 Jacoby, Schol. to Aristides, L.II, 10, p. 408, Dindorf). In Hesiod, the Cyclopes are underground artisans who fashion the magic weapons of sovereignty. They have one eye in the middle of their foreheads and are characterised by their strength (i.e. their skill (mēchanai). The Hundred-Armed (on whose name cf. M. L. West, o.c., p. 209–210) are characterised not only by their energy and their terrifying stature but also by the monstrous plurality of their arms which their mobile and tireless agility makes it impossible to approach (if one reads line 153 as ἀπλατοὶ) or constantly changing in shape, or inimitable, (if one reads ἀπλατοὶ). The essentially warlike significance of these multiple arms is clearly expressed in the course of the struggle against the Titans. In this passage (670–678 and 713–720) Hesiod repeats expressions which he has used earlier. ‘They each had a hundred arms which sprang in a terrifying way from their shoulders’. But these arms, or rather these hands (χεῖρες) are armed with rocks under which they are to crush the Titans (673 and 715). Within the ranks of the Hundred-Armed, as within those of the Titans, each warrior shows what strength (θύρωδι) and hands (χεῖρες) can do (677). Elsewhere there is a striking analogy between the description of the Hundred-Armed who are ὀξινοὶ, strong (148), δεινὸς τε κρατερός, terrible and powerful (670) and that of the men of the race of Bronze which is devoted to making war. This race is called δεινῶν τε καὶ ὀξινῶν (Works, 145). The parallelism is made even more striking by the use, in lines 148–150 of Works, of the phrase used in the Theogony to describe the Hundred-Armed: ‘Their strength was great and the arms which were attached to their vigorous bodies at the shoulders were invincible’. One may compare the expression used by Hesiod to describe the death of the warriors of the race of Bronze (line 152): ‘tamed by their own arms (χεῖρας ἐν όποισι διστερέσσειν δακτύλιοι), they departed for Hades’.

A text from Plato’s Laws (795 ff.) provides a good commentary on the nature and function of the Hundred-Armed. Plato remarks that the good boxer must be ambidextrous: ‘The [good] athlete is capable of fighting on his left side and does not move that side as if it were numb or lame whenever he is compelled to bring it into action through his opponent shifting to the other side. In precisely the same way, in regard to the weapons of war and everything else, it ought to be considered the correct thing that the man who possesses two sets of limbs, fit both for offensive and defensive action, should
so far as possible suffer neither of these to go unpractised or untaught. Indeed if a man were gifted with the frame of a Geryon or a Briareus, with his hundred hands he ought to be able to throw a hundred darts'.

The Hundred-Armed's monstrous plurality of arms and heads calls to mind the theme of the double warrior who is invincible because he enjoys the combined strength of two men. Such is the case of the Malionidsai, the two twins whose human father is Actor while their divine father is Poseidon (on the relationship between the Hundred-Armed, Briareus, and the sea and Poseidon cf. M. L. West, *O.C.*, p. 210 and 379). The *Iliad* presents the two brothers as closely interlinked in driving a chariot (XXIII, 658 ff and scholia). Ibycos describes them as, between them, composing a single being, with their limbs attached to a single body (Athenaeus, II, 58a). This double warrior must have been daunting indeed. To kill him, Herakles has to attack him treacherously, taking him by surprise, lying in ambush for him when he is not on his guard (Pindar, *Olymp. X*, 36–38; Pausanias, V, 2, 1; Apollodorus, II, 7, 2). Such also is the case of Geryon, said to have three heads (Hesiod, *Theog.*, 287); three bodies (*Aeschylus, Ag. 870*), joined to a single pair of legs (Apollodorus, II, 5, 10) or, elsewhere, six hands and ten feet (Stesichorus, fr. 6 Berk); Aristophanes adds another detail when he says of Geryon, in the *Acharnians* (1052), that he has 'four plumes', that is to say four heads, each wearing a helmet. In pictorial representations Geryon appears with his many bodies clad in hoplite uniform, with helmets, cuirasses, shields and lances. The expression which Aristophanes puts into the mouth of Dikearchus ironically addressing Lamachus: 'Do you want to do battle against a Geryon with four panoplies?' is glossed by the scholiast as follows: 'Do you want to fight against someone who is invincible (*achata*machētós)?'

Georges Dumézil, to whom this chapter on the Greek myths about sovereignty owes much (even if we do not agree with him as regards certain details in the interpretation) was well aware of these aspects of warrior magic which confers upon the warrior gods all the weapons of *māya*, ranging from cunning to plurality of forms and the gift of transformation over and above their bodily strength. He writes: 'The warrior must be able to be beyond laws, not only moral but even cosmic and physical ones; to defend order he must be in a position to pass beyond it, to step outside it—at the risk sometimes of yielding to the temptation of attacking it' (*Ordre, fantaisie, changement dans les pensées archaïques de l'Inde et de Rome—à propos du latin māya*, *Revue des Études latines*, 1954, p. 145). The story of Peri Clymenus, which we shall have occasion to return to, illustrates this theme of the warrior who possesses the magic power of metamorphosis. To conquer him Herakles needs, with the aid of Athena, to reverse the weapons of cunning and trickery against him.

74. Just as it was Gaia who at first held in concealment the thunderbolt
which was to be Zeus' weapon, it was she who created the white steel metal and the harpe, the weapon used by Kronos (161–162). Prometheus, for his part, reveals to men all the treasures which Earth held hidden from them: bronze, iron, gold and silver (Prometheus, 500 ff).

75. Theog., 718.

76. According to M. L. West, the expression: pistoi phulakes Dios refers only to the assistance they gave to Zeus, not to their role as jailors. Contra cf. Tzetzes, Th., 277. In view of the mutual undertakings which were both given and honoured between Zeus and the Hundred-Armed, there seems to be no reason why the latter should live in Tartarus except as guards. Alternatively one would have to accept, with M. L. West, that Zeus banished them too there. But Hesiod says nothing of this.

77. Iliad, I, 402 ff.


81. Ibid., 634.

82. Ibid., 693 ff and 715.

83. Ibid., 711. The expression: σκληρή μάχη must be understood in the context of line 638 of which it forms an antithesis. For ten years 'the end of the war remained in suspense for all equally': ἵνα τέλος τοῦ πολέμου ὁ θεός points out (ο.ό., p. 341), the metaphor expresses the weighing of each of the hostile camps in the balance of destiny. At first the scales remain equally tipped. But when Zeus brings his thunderbolt into action the scales are tipped.

84. Theog., 823–824.

85. Iliad, IV, 73; μένος καὶ σχίσας ἕτεροι.


87. Il., XIII, 434 ff; V, 385 ff; cf. also Od., III, 269 and XVIII, 155–156.

88. Apollodorus, I, 2, 1. The Cyclopes here assume the role of distributors: to each god they allot the weapon which belongs to him alone and which defines his sphere of action. In this way the Cyclopes are related to Prometheus whose role as the distributor is strongly emphasised in myth cf. J.-P. Vernant Mythe et Pensée chez les Grecs, II, p. 9 ff.

89. Prometheus, 922–925. The same association of the thunderbolt the trident appears in Pindar, Isthmian, VII, 59–106. Zeus and Poseidon are rivals for the favours of Thetis. Themis prophesies to them that this Nereid will bring into the world, as fruit of this union, a son 'whose hand will discharge a blast more to be feared than the terrible thunderbolt of trident' (71–75). Having received this warning, the two kings agree to give up their plans and instead marry Thetis to a mere mortal. In this version Prometheus is no longer the only one to know the secret of Themis-Gaia. The place of the Titan endowed with μέτις is taken by the wisdom of the gods
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who 'in their prudence did not allow this union to take place'. The thunderbolt of Zeus and the trident of Poseidon are also closely associated in the Iliad, XX, 56–58: Zeus thunders from above; Poseidon strikes the Earth from beneath.

90. II., XIII, 434–437.
91. Ibid., V, 385 ff.
93. Ibid., 697.
94. M. L. West, o.c., p. 351.
95. Homeric Hymn to Apollo, I, 335; also Iliad, XIV, 203–204.
96. Cf. Callimachus, The Bath of Pallas. To describe Athena blinding Tiresias, who is guilty of having glimpsed her in the bath, the text uses the phrase 'Night took his eyes' (82).
97. On this impossibility of escaping the eye of Zeus, cf. Prometheus, 902–906. The chorus of the daughters of Ocean are hoping that the love of one of the great gods does not cast upon them ἀπηθοκλωμενον, an eye which it is impossible to escape. They go on to say that it is a war that it is impossible to fight, ἀπόλλεος ... πέλλεος, from which there can be no escape, ἀπορὰ πάριμος. And they conclude: 'I do not see any way of escaping the mēsis of Zeus'.
99. Ibid., 838–839; Zeus' penetrating eye and his clap of thunder are again associated at II., VIII, 132–133. This close connection between the power of the gaze of the sovereign god and his weapon, the thunderbolt, is stressed particularly in Prometheus Vinctus. The ἀγρυγνωμένος ἰέλος the ever-alive bolt of fire which is the thunderbolt of Zeus is opposed by the brilliance of the terrifing gaze (gor-γógων τέλας) which flashes forth from the eyes of Typhon like lightning ἐστραπία; cf. the name of the Cyclops Steropes); the flashing glance expresses the monster's plan to overthrow Zeus' supremacy by force (356–358). In the conflict the sovereign god and the rebel who aims to dethrone him confront each other, as it were, eye-ball to eye-ball. But the piercing gaze of Zeus proves even swifter and more devastating. Typhon is overcome by the violence of a gaze such as he himself had wished to employ to smite Zeus and he finally subjected by the 'hand' of the master of the Sky: πρὸς θιάν χαῖρομενον (333). The close link which we believe it is possible to establish between the eye of Zeus and the fire of his thunderbolt seems all the more to be expected given that the eye was generally conceived by the Greeks to be of a fiery nature. Aristotle acknowledges that for the majority of philosophers the eye and sight are connected with fire (De sensu, II, 437a 19 ff). There are many instances of the Ancient writers considering the glance to be a ray, ἀκίτις, emitted from the fire of the eye in the direction of its object (Empedocles, fr. 415 (B 84), in Jean Bolick, Empédocle, vol 2, p. 135, 1. 6; Plato, Timæus, 45 b–c). Empedocles calls the flame at the centre of the eye which Aphrodite enveloped and protected in membranes as if in a bed of delicate
cloths, the koirē kiklōps, the little girl (or pupil) with a round eye (cf. J. Bollack, o.c., vol. 3, p. 324 ff.). There are perhaps grounds for believing, as was suggested by Mr Van Berg at our seminar at the École des Hautes Études, that there is a direct link between the round eye of the Cyclopes and the function which Hesiod ascribes to them of being the masters of the fire used in metal work, the creators of the thunderbolt (Theog., 141: teixīsan te keratōn) to be used in the service of Zeus. If this were the case the three Cyclopes in Hesiod could be described, in terms of their relationship to the three Hundred-Armed, as those who gave the king of the gods the power of the eye and the gaze, as opposed to the three Hundred-Armed who brought him the power of the hand and the arm.

100. Epimenides, fr. B 8, in Diels-Kranz, FVS², I, p. 34.
102. Apollodorus, I, 6, 3.
103. Pindar, Pythion I, 52 and 34–36.
105. Od., XII 164.
106. Prometheus, 353: prōs bían cheirōmenon. On the use of the verb cheirō, to manipulate but also to subdue, to tame, cf. Plutarch, Mor., 567 e, where the term refers, as does dāmmēm, to the domestication of the wild animals which men pāgais ἐ δόλοις cheirōsanto, 'have subdued by means of nets or traps'. The Hundred-Armed, with their hundred hands, are particularly well qualified to confer upon Zeus the power taming, cheirōm.
107. Prometheus, 365; cf. also Pindar, Olymp., IV, 11.
108. Theog., 521–522. This pillar, khōn, recalls the pillar of the Sky of his brother Atlas and also the one which subdued Typhon.
110. Theog., 529. It is an essent which is not always presented as being spontaneously or even freely given.

III. According to Hesiod, chained up by Ouranos; according to Apollodorus, chained up by Ouranos and then again by Kronos. Certain texts which are later than Hesiod also mention the Titans being liberated by Zeus. But they are moralising interpretations to glorify the magnanimity of the king of the gods. In such circumstances his action appears as purely gratuitous; there is no question of anything being offered in exchange. He is no longer confronted with the problem of establishing or safeguarding sovereignty; on the contrary, his power is henceforth so firmly established that he can afford the luxury of pardoning even those who were his rivals. Furthermore, according to the religious thought of the Greeks, Kronos and the Titans remain Kings. It is all the more difficult to imagine them chained up in all perpetuity since, in certain traditions, Kronos rules over the Island of the Blessed cf. Works 169a. The case of Typhon is quite different. The Theogony presents him exactly as it does the Titans but he remains in a state of bondage for as long as the reign of Zeus—that is to say, order—exists. On the liberated
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Titans, cf. Pindar, Olymp. II, 77; Pythian, IV, 291; and even Hesiod in a passage which is probably interpolated, Works, 169 a-e.

Prometheus, 167–170; cf. also 375–376 and 510.

Ibid., 509.

Ibid., 769–770.

We should note, however, that from the point of view of a structural analysis, the Cyclopes and the Hundred-Armed are also, in some respects, opposed to Zeus before being associated with him. They are, after all, with regard to the generation of gods they belong to and to their parentage, related to the Titans and opposed to the Olympians. They therefore pass from an original position in which they confronted Zeus to a position later acquired in which they stand beside him.

Prometheus, 59; cf. also 470–471.

Ibid., 512–513.


Cf. Prometheus, 1020: Prometheus, being buried beneath the grip of the rock which enfolds him, will have to wait a long time before returning to the light.

Apoll., I, 7, 2; Paus., X, 4, 4; Callimachus, fr. 192 Pfeiffer; Aeschylus fr. 369 Nauck; Aristophanes, Birds, 684; Herondas, Memes, II, 28–30; Philemon fr. 89 Kapp; Stobaius, Florilegium, II, 27; I., 272; Eust. Magn., i.e. Homihon, p. 471, 1 ff; Ovid, Metamorphoses, I, 80 ff; Servius, in Vergil, Eclogues, VI, 42.

Ibid., 452.

Athenaeus, 674 d-e.

Ibid., 512.

Ibid., 671 f.

Ibid., 673 b.

Ibid., 672 f.

Cf. Hyginus, Poet. astr., I, 15, p. 54 Bunte: (Promethea) nonnulli estiam coronam habeisse dixerent, ut se victorem impune dicere; itaque homines in maxima laetitia victorique coronas habere instituuntur.

We had already written this chapter when we encountered the study by Angelo Brehm whose conclusions agree, for a large part, with ours: 'La corona di Prometheus', Hommages à Marie Delcour, Coll. Latomus, vol. 114, Brussels 1970, p. 234–242.

Apollodorus, I, 2, 1.

Od., IV, 400 and ff.

Diodorus, III, 70.

Nonnos, Dion., XVII, 236–264.

Prometheus, 237.

Ibid., 506 and 512–513.

Pythian, II, 51.

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301. Louis Gernet wonders whether the word _mason_ in Hesiod's _Theogony_, at line 522, should not, when applied to Prometheus, be taken as an allusion to his adopting a seated position rather than to his undergoing the torture of the 'pole'. On other interpretations of the text cf. M.L. West, _o.c._, p. 312.

136. Plato, _Laws_, 9, 855c. Aeschylus' _Prometheus_ emphasizes the public nature of his ordeal; the punishment is made even more painful by the fact that he is exposed to the sight of all; cf. 92–93, 118–119, 140, 155–159, 244–246, 298–299, 302–303, 540–541, 553–554, 1093.

137. _Prometheus_, 31–32.

138. _Iliad_, VII, 118; XIX, 72; _Od._, V, 453; Sophocles, _Oedipus at Colonus_, 19 and 85; Euripides, _Hecuba_, 1080 and 1150.

139. Cf. as well as line 32, line 396.

140. L. Gernet, _o.c._, p. 300–1.

141. As a result of his victory, Zeus distributes honours and privileges among the Olympians and strips the Titans of their _time_ by the very same action that binds them to the outer confines of the world; cf. _Theog._ 629 and 885 on the one hand and 421–429 on the other.

142. Thus by chaining and overthrowing Kronos, Zeus becomes the instrument of the avenging Erinyes of Ouranos. Hesiod makes this clear at two points: at line 210 Ouranos warns the Titans that their crime will not remain unavenged, that the future will not fail to bring retribution for it; at line 472, Ouranos and Gaia, together with Rhea devise the plan which, by saving Zeus, will make Kronos pay to the Erinyes the debt he owes his father. It is understandable that, to make the punishment fit the crime, Kronos’ chastisement has sometimes to be imagined to follow the model set by the crime he himself committed. But it is quite clear that these versions, which appear to have developed within such sects as the Orphics, are of secondary importance. Apollonius Rhodius states that there is an island where the sickle with which Kronos castrated his father lies hidden; he goes on to claim that the Phaeacians themselves are descended from the blood of Ouranos (_Argonautica_, IV, 982–994). The scholarist notes that Alcaeus is in agreement with Akouslaos when the states that the Phaeacians originated from the drops of blood that fell from Ouranos (_Sch. Apoll._, IV, 992–Alcaeus fr. 116 Bergk, 96 Edmonds, 199 Reinach). Lycophron, in lines 761–765 of his _Alexandra_, and the scholarists of this passage echo this theme but put Kronos in the place of Ouranos, suggesting that Zeus castrated him in his turn (_Scholia to Lycophron, Alexandra_, 762 p. 243 Scheer). Similarly, in his _De Menibus_ Lydus states that Aphrodite was born from the sexual organs of Kronos, that is to say, he adds, from time (_apò toû auðinos_, 4, 64, p. 116, 21 ff. Wünsch). In our opinion these indications, which are alternative to Hesiod’s tradition on the myth and separate from it, cannot contribute in any way to our understanding of the _Theogony._

143. _Theog._, 657.

144. _Ibid._, 885 ff; _Works_, 80 ff; cf. also _II._, XIX, 127–129.
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145. *Theog.* 502. Gaia had already, even earlier at line 164, described Ouranos as atázhaleis, "madly arrogant".

146. *Ibid.*, 395-396: "And those whom Kronos had left without privileges or dignities (átrimos, agorastos) he, Zeus, undertook to obtain for them privileges and dignities as was rightful, hē thēmis estin".


CHAPTER 4

The Union with Metis and the Sovereignty of the Sky

Having consummated his marriage with Metis, Zeus takes the Titaness, Themis, as his second wife.¹ The combination of these two marriages ensures the supremacy of the new king of the gods, for the two goddesses correspond to each other, forming a pair of powers that are both complementary and opposed. Both are oracular deities whose knowledge encompasses the entire cycle of time. Both, through their relationships with the primordial cosmic realities, water and earth, possess powers that existed before the reign of Zeus and even before his birth. Themis, the child of Earth, is patron to the oracles of the earth; Metis, the daughter of Okeanos and Tethys, represents divination through water, as do the Old Men of the sea.² But the omniscience of these two earliest wives of Zeus differs and it is the difference between them that explains why the sovereign of the gods does not turn to Themis until he has entirely assimilated the virtues of Metis and has, by swallowing her, himself become mētētē. The omniscience of Themis relates to an order conceived as already inaugurated and henceforth definitively fixed and stable. Her pronouncements have the force of assertoric or categorical propositions. She spells out the future as if it was already written and since she expresses what will be as if it were what is, she gives no advice but rather pronounces sentence: she commands or she forbids. Metis, by contrast, relates to the future seen from the point of view of its uncertainties: her pronouncements are hypothetical or problematical statements. She advises what should be done so that things may turn out one way rather than
another; she tells of the future not as something already fixed but as holding possible good or evil fortunes and her crafty knowledge reveals the means of making things turn out for the better rather than for the worse. Themis represents the aspects of stability, continuity and regularity in the world of the gods: the permanence of order, the cyclical return of the seasons (Themis is the mother of the Hórai), the fixity of destiny (she is also the mother of the Moirai who ‘give either good fortune or bad to mortal men’). Her role is to indicate what is forbidden, what frontiers must not be crossed and the hierarchy that must be respected for each individual to be kept forever within the limits of his own domain and status. Metis, on the other hand, intervenes at moments when the divine world seems to be still in movement or when the balance of the powers which operate within it appears to be momentarily upset. When there are struggles over the succession, conflicts over sovereignty, confrontations and revolts, or when a new prince is being promoted—at moments like these the times of the gods become violent and dramatic. In order to emerge triumphant the powers of the Beyond must display not only courage and strength but also intelligent initiative, cunning and resourcefulness.\(^5\)

By being united with Metis Zeus, who has just overthrown Kronos and upset the ancient state of things, is not merely recognising the services done him by the goddess but furthermore acquiring the means of inaugurating a truly new order. By taking Themis as his wife he is conferring upon the rules which he has just announced and the distribution of honours and privileges that he has just effected the value of an unassailable order. As well as consecrating the accession of the new sovereign and the fall of the first monarch, his double marriage also establishes that it will be impossible henceforth to alter the situation.

The cunning of Metis constitutes a threat to any established order; her intelligence operates in the realm of what is shifting and unexpected in order the better to reverse situations and overturn hierarchies which appear unassailable: all this is expressed in the myths concerning the dangers inherent in her progeny. The children of Metis inherit
from her the devious intelligence which characterizes her. Armed with such a weapon, the son produced by this goddess must inevitably call the supremacy of his father into question once again and overthrow the reigning king in order to introduce a new rule. But Zeus is no ordinary king. By marrying, mastering and swallowing Metis he becomes more than simply a monarch: he becomes Sovereignty itself. Because all the *mētis* in the world, all the unexpected possibilities which cunning time conceals are now within Zeus, sovereignty ceases to be the stake played for in a series of indefinitely repeated conflicts and becomes, instead, a stable and permanent state. At this point the king of the gods can celebrate his marriage to Themis and beget fine children for her: the Seasons and the Fates. His irrevocable decisions have fixed the succession of future events as it has the hierarchy of the different functions, ranks and honours. He has settled them by ordinance once and for all. Whatever comes to pass in the future has, for all time, already been foreseen and determined in the head of Zeus.

Hesiod does not tell us in detail how Zeus set about seizing Metis, swallowing her and making himself *mētieta, mētīōs*. All he says is that when Metis was on the point of giving birth to Athena, Zeus ‘deceiving her wits by a cunning trick thanks to his use of seductive words, swallowed her up inside him’. It cannot have been easy to lay hands on her. One scholium to this passage tells us that Metis had the power of assuming as many forms as she wished. Once Zeus had ‘misled her and made her small’, he swallowed her. This is a common theme in folklore. A witch or magician possesses the power of metamorphosis which makes him or her invincible. Pretending to test their power, the hero invites them to assume various forms until they take on the appearance of an animal small and weak enough to be mastered without risk.

The story of Periclymenes and his fight against Herakles appears to follow the same model. It is, in fact, Hesiod who is the first to tell the story and so establish the legendary tradition, in a passage in the *Catalogue of Women* known to us from two scholia, the first to the *Iliad* and the second, which quotes Hesiod’s actual lines, to the *Argonautica*.
of Apollonius Rhodius. In Hesiod’s account, Periclymenes is presented as the most daunting of the sons of Neleus. His grandfather, Poseidon, has given him the power of taking on every kind of form in the course of a fight. This warrior boasts that he will triumph, through his magic, over the son of Zeus, the powerful Herakles. The hero slaughters him nonetheless, when he comes to ravage Pylos, but to triumph over this assailant with the power of metamorphosis he has to fall back on all the cunning of Athena who brings her vigilance to his aid. Periclymenes changes himself into first an eagle, then a lion, then a monstrous snake. On Athena’s advice, Herakles waits until he changes himself into a fly and then squashes him with his club. In a slightly different version which Hesiod also gives, he takes advantage of the fact that Periclymenes has alighted, in the form of a bee, right in the middle of the yoke of his chariot horses, and acting upon Athena’s instructions, kills him with an arrow. In both cases it is the mētis of the goddess which sets the situation up and brings it to its successful conclusion. Her scheming wiles reverse against the warrior magician the power of metamorphosis he received from his grandfather, the god of the sea. Athena does not only tell Herakles the best moment to strike and point out his adversary to him whatever disguise he may have assumed. She also engineers the opportunity for the hero to exploit when she treacherously persuades Periclymenes to change into an insect (either a fly or a bee) in order to madden the horses being driven by his enemy. It is thus true to say that, in Hesiod’s version, Athena uses the same ‘deceitful ploy’ against Periclymenes and his power of metamorphosis as the king of the gods, in the Theogony, uses against Metis before she can give birth to the daughter who is to possess the terrifying ‘prudence’ of her mother to the same degree as Zeus himself.

In a theogony recorded by Chrysippus, the story differs from the Theogony of Hesiod in that the union between Zeus and Metis is placed not at the beginning of the god’s matrimonial career but during a quarrel between him and his legitimate wife, Hera. Nevertheless, this other version confirms Hesiod’s so far as the main points are concerned: it too mentions the swallowing of the cunning goddess
who is taken by surprise and trickery. The text is explicit:
having fled from Hera in order to be united far away with
the daughter of Okeanos and Tethys, Zeus 'tricking Metis
despite all her knowledge' (or, according to another reading,
'however twisting she might be')\textsuperscript{11} seized her and deposited
her in the depths of his entrails for fear lest she should
give birth to a son more powerful than the thunderbolt; this
was the reason why the son of Kronos who is enthroned above
the aether suddenly swallowed her; she was, at the time,
with child with Athena, to whom Zeus gave birth from his
head on the rocky banks of the river Triton. And Metis
remained hidden within the entrails of Zeus'.

The scholiast to Hesiod associates the theme of the meta-
morphoses of Metis with the episode of her being swallowed
up by Zeus\textsuperscript{12} but Apollodorus places it at the very beginning
of her relations with the sovereign of the gods. He writes
that Zeus 'was united with Metis who assumed all kinds of
forms in her efforts to elude him, and when she became
pregnant he swallowed her, having caught her by surprise'.\textsuperscript{13}
In this version the marriage and the swallowing appear as
two aspects of a single confrontation which Zeus has to
enter into in order to approach the goddess, be united with
her and finally assimilate her entirely. The shifting and
evasive Metis deploys all her magic tricks to escape the
embrace of Zeus. She brings into action the same *dolē tēchnē*,
the same skill in trickery which is used by Thetis against
Peleus, by Proteus against Menelaus, and by Nereus against
Herakles.\textsuperscript{14} In all these cases the plot of the mythical
story is basically the same. Whatever their differences all these gods
of the sea share with Metis not only the gift of polymorphism
but also a wily intelligence and knowledge of an oracular
kind. All those who confront them must, with a stratagem,
trick, ambush or disguise, take by surprise a being which is
extremely cunning and suspicious and always on its guard.
They must seize it in a stranglehold which cannot be loosened
whatever happens. Once its magic has been disarmed by the
bond which grips it and it has exhausted the entire cycle
of its metamorphoses, the monster must surrender to its
conqueror. So the cunning one meets more than its match;
the vigilant one is taken by surprise; the master of bonds is
himself bound; the creature which had the power to run through an entire cycle of forms finds itself, in its turn, encircled and enclosed. What had been confused and enigmatic becomes, to the advantage of the one who dominates it, clear and unequivocal. The price these fluid, ambiguous and contradictory polymorphic deities have to pay when they are defeated is to reveal, without equivocation, the means, solution or expedient that their adversary is seeking. However, Zeus is the only one to carry to its ultimate conclusion his conflict with the aquatic creature which embodies all the powers and prerogatives of the intelligence of cunning. He does not simply imprison Metis within the clasp of his arms, as Peleus grasps Thetis to force her to unite with him, as Herakles grips Nereus and Menelaus seizes hold of Proteus in order to force their prisoners to lay bare the secret on which the success of their enterprises depends. By swallowing her Zeus locks upon her the bond which is to hold her forever imprisoned. He encloses her forever within himself so that, being a part of his own substance, she will give him the constant knowledge of the chances that the future holds which will enable him to control the shifting and uncertain course of events.

In a dramatised form the plot of the conflict against the deity with the power of metamorphosis expresses how the victor contains the prerogatives of mētis, how he acquires the resourceful cleverness which enables one to get out of inextricable situations. Even the succession of stages in the struggle underscores the transition from what is mobile and fluid to what is stable and unchanging, from what is obscure to what is clear, from the contradictory to the unequivocal, from the uncertain to the assured, in short—to put it in Greek terms—from the aporia in which the hero is lost to begin with to the pōros, the ingenious expedient which is at his disposal at the end of the trial and which can enable him to carry out all his plans successfully. When the god is taken by surprise, in order to escape he assumes the most baffling of forms, those which are the most at variance with each other and the most terrible; in quick succession he becomes flowing water, a burning flame, wind, a tree, a bird, a tiger or a snake. But the series of transformations cannot continue
indefinitely. They constitute a cycle of shapes which, once exhausted, returns to its point of departure. If the monster's enemy has been able not to lose his grip, at the end of the cycle the polymorphic god must resume his normal appearance and his original shape and thereafter retain them. So Chiron warns Peleus that whether Thetis turns herself into fire, water or a savage beast, the hero must not lose his hold until he sees her resume her first form, her archaia morphē.\textsuperscript{15} So too Eidothee puts Menelaus on his guard against the tricks of her father Proteus: 'Hold him fast no matter what he may try in his burning desire to free himself; he will assume every kind of form, will transform himself into whatever crawls upon the earth, into water and into divine fire; but you must hold on to him without flinching and grasp him even more tightly; and when in the end he will reach the point of agreeing to speak he will reassume the features you saw him to have when he was sleeping. At this point quit violence, unbind the old man and ask him which god is causing your difficulties'.\textsuperscript{16} And indeed Proteus, who finds himself seized unexpectedly, thanks to the double trick of an ambush and a disguise,\textsuperscript{17} deploys the full range of his wicked tricks, his olophōia, in order to escape; all the resources of his dolē technē are brought to bear.\textsuperscript{18} First he changes into a lion, then a dragon, then a panther, then a huge boar; he becomes running water and a towering tree. But all in vain; the vice does not slacken. Once his store of magic tricks is exhausted Proteus once again becomes what he really is: a truthful and open Old Man of the Sea. The struggle of force and cunning gives way to a forthright discussion in which each party henceforth speaks openly, without trickery or deception, atrēkōs.\textsuperscript{20}

So to dominate this power of trickery represented with all its sheen and subtlety by a god with the gift of metamorphosis it is necessary to encompass all its manifestations at once and keep it enclosed within an unrelenting vice. The texts themselves are quite clear on this point. Menelaus anxiously asks Eidothee how an ordinary mortal like himself can possibly subjugate a god such as Proteus. The sea nymph tells him how: he must fall upon her father, taking him by surprise, seize him and not let him go. When the opportunity
arises Menelaus, together with his companions falls upon the Old Man of the Sea and, having thrown his arms around his body, he holds him tightly refusing to release him. Chiron tells Peleus to grasp (sullabein) Thetis and keep hold (kataschein) of her. Heralcles, having grasped (sullabon) Nereus, bound him (édete) and did not unbind him (ouk éluse) until he gave him the information he sought. The pictorial illustrations are even more telling. Whether it be Heralcles fighting Nereus or Triton, or Peleus seizing Thetis, all the representations show the hero immobilising his enemy with a locking hold, enfolding him in the vice-like grip of his two arms which are locked together, the left hand riven to the right. But once the contest is over the encircling arms are opened to free the god whose métis enables him to take on every kind of shape. Metis, on the other hand, being 'hidden within Zeus' entrails' remains forever locked in the hold with which he treacherously seized her when he swallowed her.

Just as Zeus reverses against Metis the goddess’ own particular weapons—cunning, trickery and surprise—Menelaus, in order to get the better of Proteus, has to counter the ‘tricks’ of the sea god with ambush and disguise, the dòloi thought up by Proteus’ daughter so that he too is caught in a trap. Moreover, it is only while he is sleeping, when his usual mistrust is inoperative and his vigilance lulled, that the god with the power of metamorphosis can be taken by surprise and overcome. He can only be caught when his métis has momentarily deserted him. Heralcles falls upon Nereus while he is sleeping. Eidotoe tells Menelaus of the plan she has conceived to deliver her father up to him, defenceless: the Greek must lie in ambush, watching for the moment when Proteus abandons himself to the first sleep. As soon as the god stretches out on the sand to take some rest, he is gripped in a stranglehold.

Sleep, Húpnos, is a powerful and daunting divinity. He casts his magic net over every living creature, over even the swiftest thought and the most agile mind. With his fetters he can capture any thing that moves as soon as he so desires, casting them into invisible chains which resemble
those that his twin brother, Thanatos or Death, uses on mortal men, never to release them again.

The exceptional vitality and mobility of the gods does not enable them to escape the paralysing power of Hypnos. They too can be caught in his nets and there they remain for as long as he wants them to, diminished, enfeebled, with their earlier vigour extinguished and their vigilance eclipsed. During these moments of hiatus, when their mētis is dulled, it is possible to take them by surprise. In the Iliad, Hypnos can, without boasting, claim that it is easy for him to send all the immortals to sleep, even the circular ever-flowing stream of Okeanos, the father who engendered every being.²⁶ There is only one deity against whom his binding power fails because the mētis of this god knows neither rest nor respite. ‘... but Zeus, the son of Kronos, I can neither approach nor send to sleep even if he himself orders me to do so’.²⁷ Through the mētis within him the sovereign god remains in a constant state of vigilance. Knowing no sleep, his eye which never closes keeps him forever alert. No attack, no cunning, no other mētis can any longer take him by surprise. In contrast, Kronos, cunning as he was and possessing the power to bind through his twisting mētis, was nevertheless cast into chains. Having been chased from his throne he leads an existence that is no more than the shadow of that of a god, the mere dream of sovereignty. Within the confines of his place of relegation he henceforth spends his entire time sleeping.

The human weapons of mētis—nets, weels, traps, snares and pitfalls and anything that is twisted together, woven, plotted, arranged and contrived²⁸—are thus matched in the world of the gods by the magic bonds that are invisible and unbreakable. A divine being cannot die; it can only be bound. What does this binding mean? First, that the god loses one of his principal prerogatives: the power of instantaneous movement from one spot to another; the gift of ubiquity which enables him to be present at any place in the world where he chooses to manifest himself in less time than it takes for a flash of lightning or for the swiftest thought to move. The chaining up of a god relegates him to the furthest confines of the cosmos or even to an inaccessible
beyond such as the abyss of Tartarus whose entrance has been blocked for all time, or in a cavern on an island cut off from the rest of the world. Even when a god is chained up somewhere within the organised universe his immobility so utterly reduces his sphere of activity and his power and being are thus so diminished that he appears as an enfeebled, impotent, exhausted figure existing only in that state of quasi-death which sleep represents for the gods.  

So it is that an Orphic legend portrays Kronos sprawled out and snoring after having bitten into the ‘food of trickery’ which Zeus made him taste by luring him with honey, or with his head nodding on his heavy neck, fettered in the bonds of Húpno ste who can tame all creatures. Plutarch in two of his treatises, mentions Kronos relegated to an island where he sleeps, guarded by Briareus, or lying asleep in a deep cavern for, as both texts point out, ‘this is the sleep which Zeus contrived for him in order to chain him up’.  

There are many intermediate stages between the lethargy of the dethroned Kronos and the untiring vigilance of the sovereign Zeus. The myths about sovereignty exploit these different degrees of alertness and presence of mind in the gods to suggest dangers which, at certain moments threatened the royal rule of Zeus himself. The struggle in which the Olympian has to engage against Typhoeus or Typhon, after his victory over the Titans, is particularly instructive in this respect. In Hesiod, Typhoeus is a prodigious monster (pélṣor), the last offspring produced by Gaia from her union with Tartarus. Whatever the original models with which one might be tempted to compare this Greek figure, in Hesiod’s work he possesses a number of original features which must be clearly distinguished. Through his mother, Gaia, Typhoeus appears as a chthonic power opposed to the celestial gods. Through his father Tartarus whom Hesiod describes as érōeis, dark and misty, he is related to Erebus and Nux who emerged directly from Chaos. On both sides he appears as one of the original powers. He was born late, and is therefore younger than Zeus, and into a universe already differentiated and ordered but he continues the line of ‘those who were in the beginning’; the primordial beings whom Hesiod places at the very origins of the world.
Not only do his antecedents endow Typhoeus with exceptional strength and vigour but this very type of energy makes him a power of confusion and disorder, an agent of chaos. The strength of his arm is but one of the significant characteristics which Hesiod gives him: there is also the indefatigable mobility of his feet. In contrast to the Hittite Ulikumi, to whom he has often been compared and who presents a threat to the king of the sky by reason of the inertia of his gigantic body, Typhoeus is in constant movement. His feet are akamatoi, indefatigable; as they speed along they neither tire nor need to rest. The excessive violence of his nature also manifests itself in the monstrous cluster of heads that emerge from his shoulders. A hundred snake heads writh above his body, multiplying in a most amazing fashion the number of his eyes which blaze the searing flash of his burning gaze in every direction at once. Instead of possessing one voice in keeping with his essential nature, Typhoeus combines within his person a thousand different sounds. Sometimes he speaks as a god, sometimes he imitates the cries of a beast and becomes a bull, a lion or a dog and sometimes he whistles stridently. This cacophony, this multiplicity of noises is the expression in sound of the polymorphism of a monster which Nonnos more conveniently imagines as combining the whole range of animal species in his appearance, while the scholiast to Aeschylus' Prometheus sees the hundred heads of the monster as a collection of every kind of wild animal. With his vigour, mobility and vigilance and his blazing glances multiplied a hundredfold, Typhoeus is truly in all his chaotic being an adversary to match Zeus. 'Then', writes Hesiod, 'a deed impossible to remedy would have been accomplished on that day; then Typhoeus would have been king over the mortals and the immortals alike, if the father of gods and men had not suddenly, with his piercing eye, caught sight of him. The blast of his thunder was sharp and strong.' Aeschylus is directly in line with the tradition following Hesiod when he presents Typhon's attack against Zeus as a contest in which, with the sovereignty of the world at stake, the flashing lightning from the innumerable eyes of the monster are opposed to the thunderbolt which the metoīs one holds forever at the
ready. The same theme again appears, as we have seen, in Epimenides' version: Typhoeus takes advantage of the fact that sleep has closed the eyes of Zeus to creep into the palace. He is on the point of grasping the sovereign power when, at the moment when all seems lost, Zeus opens his eyes: the monster falls to the ground, smitten down by his lightning. However, the only text to mention a passing moment of weakness on the part of Zeus and a temporary eclipse of his sovereign power is Apollodorus' Bibliothèke. Apollodorus' Typhon, like those of Plutarch and Nonnos, incorporates certain features which link him with the Hurrian-Hittite Ullikumi and the Egyptian Seth. It is all the more telling then that, despite these contaminations, the logic and meaning of the myth in these versions remain in conformity with the rest of the Greek tradition as expressed in the work of Hesiod. In Apollodorus, Typhon, the son of Ge and Tartarus, is the most powerful, the most gigantic of all the creatures engendered by Mother-Earth. He is half-man, half-beast and his feet rest upon the earth which gave him birth. His head which is taller than the mountains touches the very top of the sky. When he stretches out his arms one hand clasps the sunset, the other the sunrise. Through his massive body he thus brings together the above and the below and the west and the east, confusing together all the different directions of space just as, in Hesiod, the most diverse of voices are confused within him—those of the wild beasts that inhabit the earth and those of the gods who dwell in the sky. And the analogy can be carried still further. In Hesiod's Theogony, the body of the smitten Typhoeus is hurled by Zeus into the depths of Tartarus. The monster gives birth to the sudden winds and stormy squalls which erupt from dark Tartarus and gather unexpectedly over the earth or the sea to rage wildly on every side at once, confusing all the directions of space in their uncontrollable whirlwinds. The evil which would have resulted for the cosmos and the gods from the victory of Typhon would have been a return to disorder, to a state of chaos resembling the directionless space formed beneath the earth by Tartarus—an abyss of limitless wandering where there is no above or below and no right or left.
same evil, for which 'there is no remedy' is henceforth represented, to the men who live upon the earth's surface, by the stormy winds born of the monster. Hesiod writes: 'There is no salvation for men against this scourge.' He contrasts these winds whose origins are subterranean, nocturnal and chaotic to the regular winds, Boreas, Notos and Zephyr. These winds have a divine and celestial origin, being the sons of Eos and Astraios and they are the brothers of the morning star and of all the other stars whose light, shining in the night, provides points of reference strung out across the dark dome of the sky, each evening marking out fixed and unchanging paths upon it. The regular winds which always blow in the same direction and which mark out navigation routes on the vast ocean also give direction and order to the visible world by establishing the boundaries and connections between its various regions.

Hesiod's Typhoeus has affinities with the stormy winds which reduce human space to a state of confusion resembling the primordial chaos and this gives a fuller and at the same time more precise significance to the information on Typhon provided by Apollodorus. It emphasises that this monster retains the character of a 'chaotic power' in the mythical thought of the Greeks. There is another point too on which Apollodorus' text amplifies Hesiod's Theogony, confirming the role played by wiley intelligence in the exercise of sovereign power. The theme of the ὀλος, the cunning trick and deceit lies at the very heart of the whole story. At first the battle is conducted from a distance between Typhon with his mouth and eyes darting flames and his arms hurling smouldering rocks and Zeus who smites him from afar with his thunderbolt. Then Typhon advances towards the sky and the conflict is continued at closer quarters. Zeus strikes his enemy with the ἀρπή, the weapon of Kronos, and when he perceives that the monster is wounded he closes in to grapple with him. However, Typhon immobilises Zeus by enfolding him in his snaky coils. He seizes his ἀρπή and severs the sinews of his hands and feet. Then he throws the paralysed body of Zeus over his shoulder and carries him away to Cilicia where he places him in the Corycian cave. He hides the god's sinews inside a bearskin and installs a
guard or *phylax* in the shape of a snake-woman, *Delphinē*, who is given the same functions as those Zeus entrusted to Briareus when he set him to guard the Titans and Kronos entrusted to *Kampe* who was set in charge of the Hundred-Armed. 47 And that appears to be the end of the affair. The defeated Zeus finds himself in the same state of bondage as he imposed upon Kronos. He is immobilised in the depths of a cavern; his might gone, he lies there stripped of the strength of his hands and feet—the very strength which, in Hesiod’s *Theogony*, qualified Typhoeus to be the opponent of the king of the gods at least for such time as the monster eluded the thunderbolt and avoided being himself mutilated, *guoítheis*. 48 However, the salvation of Zeus and the reestablishment of his royal power are engineered by the intervention of two ‘tricksters’, 49 the cunning Hermes and his accomplice Egerian—two figures whose roles correspond, in the structure of Apollodorus’ account, exactly with that of Metis in Hesiod, and that of Prometheus in Aeschylus. The two companions manage to steal the sinews of Zeus without being seen and reattach them to the god’s body. Once the sinews of his hands and feet are once more in place Zeus recovers all the strength which is his (*tēn idian ischin*). He appears without warning before Typhon who is dumbfounded, and sets off in pursuit of the monster, blasting him with his thunderbolt. But the outcome of the duel would have remained indecisive if another trick and deceit had not been contrived by the Moirai. To dupe Typhon they play upon him the same trick of the ‘food of deceit’ that, according to the Orphic tradition, Zeus used to cast Kronos in chains. They persuade Typhon to taste a fruit which, they convince him, will give him strength without equal. The drug which is claimed to bring invincibility, the *pharmakon* which is supposed to bring the prodigious strength of the monster to its peak is in reality, however, an ‘ephemeral fruit’, the very opposite of the food of immortality, and eating it inevitably results in the exhaustion of one’s strength, and death. The primordial violence of the monster is disarmed by the crafty intelligence of Zeus’ acolytes, who are successful in hoaxing him.

In the first two books of his *Dionysiaca* which are devoted to the story of Typhon, Nonnos introduces into the theme
of the cunning trick an element of almost baroque ornamentation. But behind the wealth of fantastic detail the entire range of terminology traditionally connected with métis come into play. Zeus, who is immersed in his love-affairs, carelessly leaves his thunderbolts lying around in some neglected corner of the sky. The smoke from them betrays their presence. Acting upon Gaia’s advice, Typhon reaches right up to the top of the aether and steals the sovereign weapon. In his arrogant brutishness the polymorphic monster can be seen as an anti-Zeus, the sovereign of disorder. What the bastard, the néthos, is to legitimate children, he is to true royalty. He embodies the vengeance of the Titans and of Kronos whom he intends to reinstall, in his own company, in the sky. All the Olympian gods have fled from their heavenly home. In order to implement the crafty plan which he has thought up with Eros’ assistance, Zeus asks Cadmos to help him. Cadmos, who is a subtle and ingenious king, disguises himself, with the assistance of Pan, as a shepherd. Rigged out in this misleading costume, he sets out to confront the young tyrant who has already thrown the cosmos into confusion, armed with nothing but a flute from which he draws the most beguiling notes. Typhon’s furious violence is lulled by the music and, unsuspectingly, he draws nearer, forgetting in his cave the weapon he has just stolen. Cadmos pretends to be terrified. Typhon reassures him and suggests that he should carry him off up to the sky where he shall live with the new monarch, singing praises of his glory. Cadmos then asks for an instrument more worthy than a flute to celebrate the victory won against Zeus. He needs a lyre but he has no strings. Typhon, not suspecting any trick and blind to the tissue of lies woven to bring about his downfall, brings him the sinews that Zeus lost in the earlier battle. Cadmos continues to play sweet music while Zeus, taking advantage of the fact that the vigilance of his enemy has been lulled, slips undetected into the cave, seizes his weapons and disappears. Cadmos also disappears, Zeus having concealed him in a cloud. The music stops. When Typhon comes to his senses he recovers his habitual fury. He looks for the thunderbolt and realises, too late, that he has been fooled. Night has already fallen and sleep envelops everything in
nature that moves. Typhon himself lies stretched out on the
bosom of his mother, Gaia. His snakes heads rest, curled up
in the depths of the caves. Only Zeus is awake and on the
watch. In the morning the monster challenges the Olympian
to battle. He attacks him with his multitude of arms, his
ferocious animal heads, his snaky hair, with rocks, mountains
and the very waters which he hurls from the sky. But, despite
the thousand forms assumed by the monster, Zeus completely
obliterates him with the incandescent blast of his thunderbolt.

Oppian’s account, which is even stranger although from
a literary point of view less sophisticated,\(^{50}\) does perhaps
suggest a comparison with the myth of Illuyanka but there
are nevertheless connections between it and the text of
Apolloodorus and, through him, it links up with the Hesiodic
tradition where, in the myths about sovereignty, the theme
of cunning is closely associated with that of food and swallow-
ing up. In Oppian, the whole tale is presided over by Hermes,
the poikilōmētis one who was the first to conceive schemes
appropriate to fishermen of exceptional skill (boulás dē
perissondōn haliēōn...prētītōs emēsao), to reveal all the tricks
of catching and killing fish. He has entrusted to his son Pan
the skills of the depths of the sea (fishing) and it is Pan who is
said to be the saviour of Zeus and the killer of Typhon. He
tricks the terrible monster (dolōsas), baiting him with the
promise of a feast of fish. In this way he treacherously
persuades him to leave the great grotto where he was lying
in safety at the bottom of the sea and rise to the edge of the
shore where the thunderbolt of Zeus strikes him, setting fire
to all his heads at once. To be sure, this Typhon who is
betrayed by his greed owes much to the older of the two
known versions of the Hittite myth of Illuyanka.\(^{51}\) The
serpent Illuyanka has fought against and defeated the god of
the Storm who occupies in the Hittite pantheon the place
corresponding to that of Zeus. With the help of an ally, an
ordinary mortal by the name of Hupasiya, the goddess
Inara then organises a great celebration banquet to which
she invites Illuyanka. The serpent leaves its lair in order to
attend and stuffs itself with so much food and drink that it
can no longer get into its hole. Hupasiya chains it up and
all that remains is for the god of the Storm to slaughter it.
There is no denying the similarity between the two stories. But even if Oppian has given Typhon certain characteristics of the Hittite Illuyanka, it is true to say that they required little modification to be incorporated completely into the Greek myth about this opponent of Zeus. Oppian’s Typhon, who is a connoisseur of fish and feeds upon them, is himself not so much a serpent, like Illuyanka, as a fish. The only way to conquer him is to fish for him. And to catch him in this way all the métis of Hermes is called for, all the traps which can be devised by the cunning god who is a master of snares and weels and the inventor of the dóloi which, even as early as in Homer, can be used to refer to the bait used for fishing. Thus the supremacy of Zeus among the gods is affirmed through the same type of devious intelligence which presides over hunting and fishing and gives man the upper hand over even creatures as subtle as the fox and the octopus. Nor is this all. Oppian’s Typhon meets his end, a victim of his own greed. Like the bait which fishermen use to draw fish from the waters and which conceals death under a beguiling appearance of life, the feast of fish offered to him is a lure, an apásti like the honey to which Kronos is so partial and which Zeus uses as an ‘ambush’ into which his father falls, or like the fruit of the Moirai from which Typhon believes he will derive a surplus of power but which in reality deals him the fate of all beings that are ephemeral. Now the same theme of food which is a trap is to be found in another passage of Apollodorus also concerning Zeus’ struggles against his enemies. This time it involves the Giants whose position appears equivocal so long as the conflict which sets them in opposition to Zeus remains unresolved. Are they defeated and mortal, or invincible and immortal? The gods have been told that they will never emerge triumphant on their own. Zeus needs the help of a lesser being than himself. For the Giants to be killed he must obtain the aid of an ordinary mortal. Herakles, who has not yet been deified, fills the bill. But Ge, learning of the danger which threatens her sons, the Giants, sets up a counterplan. She sets out to seek for a phármakon with the power to prevent the Giants from perishing even at the hand of an ephemeral creature. At this, Zeus prevents Dawn, Moon and Sun from appearing
and unexpectedly forestalling Ge (phthásas), he himself
cuts and gathers the herb of immortality just as, again in
Apollodorus, he surprises and forestalls Metis (phthásas),
catching and swallowing her before she can give birth to
an invincible son. Both the structure and the terminology of
the account stress the close link established in the Bibliothèque
between the various episodes in the conquest of sovereign
power: Metis dupes Kronos by making him take a phármakon
which, instead of increasing his inner strength, forces him to
disgorge those who are to conquer him; Zeus dupes Metis,
swallows her and keeps her for all time inside him; Zeus
dupes Ge by cutting the herb of immortality which would
have made the Giants invincible if they had been able to
swallow it, from under their very noses; the Moirai trick
Typhon by making him swallow a food which looks as
though it is a potion for immortality but which in reality
condemns him to defeat and death. In the accounts of Zeus’
struggles for sovereignty, Apollodorus’ text lays a decided
emphasis on the role of the swallowing of food—sometimes
deceptive and sometimes authentic. Does it, in so doing,
distort Hesiod’s thought as expressed in the Theogony or
does it, on the contrary, illuminate one of its guiding themes?
The swallowing theme is already present in Hesiod at two
crucial points which are set in clear opposition to each other.
Kronos swallows his children but the mètis of Rhea forces
him to disgorge all those whom he had already consumed.
In contrast, Zeus gulps down Metis and keeps her forever
in the depths of his stomach.

There are other episodes which throw light on the signi-
ficance of these two corresponding parts of the myth as told
by Hesiod. When Zeus has liberated the Hundred-Armed
and restored them to the light of day, he decides to enrol
them in the struggle which has been going on for ten years
between the Titans and the Olympians without either side
being able to gain the upper hand. Before entering into
the conflict Kottos, Gyges and Briareus appear to have been
in a position comparable to that of the Giants in Apollodorus.
Although not mortals, they do not yet fully possess that state
of constant vitality and youth which characterises the
Immortals. Only after the gods have offered to share with
them their nectar and ambrosia—the foods of immortality which are their exclusive privilege—can the Hundred-Armed, now quite won over, play their decisive part in winning victory. ‘Then’, writes Hesiod, ‘did warrior fury fill their breasts’.57 This food, which multiplies tenfold the divine energy which had no doubt lain dormant as long as the Hundred-Armed were confined to their chains, is the exact counterpart to the pharmakon in which, according to Apollodorus, Typhon thinks he will find the renewed strength he needs to oust Zeus from his position, but which instead reduces him to the destiny common to all ephemeral beings. In Hesiod, the effects of this food of immortality are opposed to those which are produced, in the world of the gods, by the waters of the Styx. He relates that when a quarrel breaks out setting one god against another Iris, in order to confound the guilty party goes off, to fetch some of this primordial water which is to be found in an underground branch of Ocean. She brings it back in a golden ewer. The gods who are in conflict pour a libation of the water on the ground to support their oath of good faith. It seems likely that, as custom dictated, they also drank some of it. The perjuror then fell to the ground where he remained speechless and without strength for the whole of one Great Year. As if enclosed within a magic slumber, so long as this lethargy lasted the sleeper partook of no divine food: ‘No more did he approach his lips to the ambrosia and nectar, to feed off them’, writes Hesiod.58

This makes it easier for us to understand the importance in the Theogony of the distribution of shares of food between the gods and men as established by Prometheus when he inaugurated the first sacrifice. Let us recall to mind the main line of the story.60 In the beginning gods and men live together, sitting down to table at the same feasts. But Prometheus is given the responsibility of allotting to each group its own share of food. He plans to exploit the opportunity thus offered him to hoodwink Zeus and defraud him to the advantage of the humans. This is the beginning of a duel of cunning and deceit between the Titan endowed with métis and the sovereign who is métioeis in which both of them use the weapons of dòlos and apaté. A huge ox is slaughtered
in the presence of both gods and men and Prometheus divides it into two portions, each of which is a trap. The first looks extremely appetising but in reality consists only of the animal’s bare bones. The second conceals beneath the skin and stomach—which are inedible—all the best pieces. Honour where honour is due: the first choice must fall to Zeus. Pretending to fall in with the Titan’s plans, the Olympian ‘who has perceived and understood the cunning ruse’ reverses against the men the trap into which Prometheus thought he, Zeus, would fall. The inedible portion—all the whitened bones which the humans will henceforth burn on their altars as sacrifice to the gods—is in fact the only truly good one. Men keep the meat which they will cook to revive their failing strength. But this is an ‘ephemeral’ food as is the food treacherously proffered to Typhon by the Moirai. Whatever needs to feed upon it and enjoys this meal must experience a hunger which is constantly renewed, the failing of his strength, fatigue and death. Whoever feeds only upon the smoke from the bones and upon the smells and perfumes, by the same token, enjoys the feasting of immortality and sits at the tables where nectar and ambrosia are consumed.

Each category of living creatures thus has the food which suits it and which it deserves. Mortal men receive the cooked meat of a dead animal. The Giants and Typhon receive in place of the phærmakon of immortality, the fruit which is ephemeral. Kronos receives the trick-food which imprisons him in the bonds of slumber. The Olympians and the allies of Zeus who have been delivered from their chains, receive nectar and ambrosia. But Zeus, and Zeus alone, feeds upon the divine food which, through his cunning, he has succeeded in swallowing and assimilating with his own substance: the goddess Metis, the drug which imparts the ultimate intelligence and cunning, the true phærmakon of everlasting sovereignty.  

Notes

1. Hesiod, Theog., 886: Prisēn [...] Mētis, and 901: Deuteρēn [...] Thēmin. Scholars have often noted the regular triadic structure of Hesiod’s catalogue of Zeus’ wives, from line 907 (his marriage with
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Eurynome who succeeded Themis) to line 929 which brings the catalogue to a close (with the exception of lines 910–11 which Mazon excludes). To this extent the first two wives of Zeus form a separate group; both fall outside the triadic enumeration of the marriages that follow theirs. The fact that both have this position is emphasised by the identical phrase Hesiod uses at the end of the two passages devoted to these two goddesses: agathón te ἀκόν te which appears first in line 900 (Metis) and again in line 906 (Themis).


4. Ibid., 904–906.

5. Seen from the point of view of men rather than from that of the gods, one could say that these goddesses correspond to opposite aspects of the oracular function. The divining words of Themis express the necessity, the irrevocability of divine decrees which men can do nothing to avoid. When Metis is consulted as an oracle she speaks of the future from the point of view of a trial between men and gods, seeing it as a subtle and dangerous game where nothing is fixed in advance, in which those consulting the gods must know how to time their questions opportunely, accepting or rejecting the oracle and even turning into their own advantage an answer given by the god in favour of their adversary.

Our interpretation of the couple formed by Themis and Metis perhaps makes it easier to understand the association of *Aisa* and *Póros* in Alkman's *Parthenion* where they are considered as primordial deities and called the most ancient of gods: *geraitatoi sîm* (π θεόν) or *daimônîn geraitatoi* (depending on the reconstruction of the text). H. Franke (Dichtung und Philosophie, 1962, p. 183–184) interprets *Aisa* as the principle of Destiny seen as an absolute constraint, and *Póros* as the expression of that element of initiative which the future leaves to an intelligence which is capable of making the most of every opportunity. The relation between *Aisa* and Themis is obvious and that between *Póros* and Metis would be evident even without the evidence from Plato. The association of *Aisa* and *Póros* as a pair of opposed and complementary powers is in every way parallel to that of Themis and Metis. It should be added that while the passages concerning Metis and Themis in the *Theogony* each close with the same phrase: agathón te ἀκόν te, the words have opposite meanings in the two cases. Where Metis is concerned they indeed refer to the good and the evil which the goddess foretells to Zeus so that the king of the gods should always be in a position to find a means to bring about the former and avoid the latter. In contrast, in the case of Themis they refer to the good and the evil which are allotted once and for all for the unfortunate human beings by the three *Moirai*, (The names of the *Moirai* themselves express clearly that there is no way for the mortals to revoke or turn aside the destiny (*Aisa*) which they, the *Moirai*,
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7. Schol. Hesiod. Theog., 886: Pòlèshas ôn autén ho Zeis kai mikrèn poùshas katéptien: 'Zeus having misled her and made her tiny, swallowed her'. The manuscript has pòkraîn which F.A. Peley and Goering read as mikrèn. Should we, with A.B. Cook (Zeus, a study in Ancient Religion) III, p. 744 n. 4, understand pòkraîn in the sense of the antidote which the Greeks called hierà pòkraîn? This would mean that Zeus persuaded Metis to change herself into a few drops of liquid which it was then easy for him to drink. We would then have the same theme as the swallowing by Kronos, but reversed: Metis makes Kronos drink a phàrmakon which forces him to disgorge those whom he had hoped to keep forever inside him. Zeus is able to transform Metis into a phàrmakon which enables him to swallow her and keep her forever deep within him.


10. In this version, Hera, to get her revenge, gives birth to Hephaestus all by herself. Hephaestus is superior to all the gods in technical know-how and skill. Zeus meanwhile gives birth to Athena who is supreme where all forms of practical intelligence are concerned.

11. The text has: polis dimèonosan which Bergk emends to polis démèosan. If one keeps the reading polis dimèosan this 'twisting' must be interpreted as a reference to Metis' transformations, her constant passage from one form to another.

12. The scholiast writes: 'Metis possessed the power to transform herself however she wished'.


17. Odyssey, IV, 457–459: dòlos: 441, 463: bòhos. The dòlos conceived by Eidooth is to disguise Menelaus and his three companions by covering them with sea skins. When they slip into these skins of the sea creatures
which have just been flayed maybe the humans take on a little of the
sinuous personality of their adversary and perhaps they thus share
in his wily intelligence.
18. Od., IV, 410 and 460; dolē tēchnē: 455.
23. Id., II, 5, 11.
24. Id.: sullabōn dē autōn kosmōmenon, having seized him while he was
sleeping.
27. Ibid., 247–248.
29. Ares, who is brutally bound by the two sons of Aloeus, Otos and
Ephialtes, is shut up in a bronze jar for thirteen months; if Hermes
had not found a means of setting him free, the god with the insatiable
desire for war would have wasted away (apollato); when he emerges
the god is already exhausted and diminished (ēē teirōmenos): Iliad,
V, 385–391.
30. Orphicorum fragmenta", 148 and 149, p. 190 Kern; Porphyry Caeve
of the Nymphs, 16. Note the expressions: phagōn dolēssan edēōn
'having eaten the food of trickery' (O.F., 148) and iōn did melitos
dolon, 'the cunning play with the honey' (Porphyry i.e.). Cf. J.H.
Wassink, 'The dreaming Kronos in the Corpus Hermeticum',
Annales de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et Slaves
31. De defectu or., 420 a; De facie in orbe lunae, 941 ff; desmōn gēr autōi
iōn hēpnon memēchanē̂thai and ōn gēr hēpnon autōi memēchanē̂thai
desmōn hupō tou Thēōs.
32. Theogony, 836.
33. Cf. F. Vian 'Le mythe de Typhée et le problème de ses origines
orientales', in Eléments orientaux dans la religion grecque ancienne,
Paris, 1960, p. 17–37; P. Walcot, Hesiod and the Near East, Cardi,
1966, especially p. 9–16.
34. F. Vian (o.c., p. 34) very rightly notes: 'Ulikusmi is a block of stone,
deaf and blind, to be feared only on account of his huge size. He is,
in effect, like the Indian Vrata, the symbol of passive Resistence:
a force of inertia, the Obstacle... Typhoeus is of a quite different
nature'.
35. Theogony, 824.
36. Ibid., 826–27.
37. Ibid., 829–35.
38. Ibid., 829–30: phōnai [...] pantai̓ on épílē̂thai, making heard voices of
all sorts; cf. Antoninus Liberalis, Metamorphoses, XXVIII, 1:
phōnās dē pantai̓ on épílē̂thai.
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Aeschylus, Prometheus Vinctus, 351; cf. the remarks by M.L. West, Hesiod, Theogony, Oxford 1966, p. 386.
40. Theogony, 836–839
41. Prometheus Vinctus, 356–358; cf. supra [80–81].
42. Epimenides, 11 fr. B8, in Diels-K., FVS, II, p. 34; cf. supra, p. 81–82.
43. 1, 6, 3.
44. Hesiod’s text strongly emphasises the relation between the chaotic abyss of Tartarus, the disordered nature of Typhoeus and the confusion of the storm winds; cf. Theog., 742 (Tartarus); 832–835 (Typhoeus); 875–876 (the storm winds).
45. Ibid., 876.
46. Ibid., 378–382.
47. Cf. supra, p. 86 ff.
48. Theogony, 858.
49. In the sense that the historians of religion give to the word trickster.
51. F. Vian, o.c., p. 28 ff.; P. Walcot, o.c., p. 14 ff.
53. 1, 6, 1.
54. Id., 1, 3, 6.
56. Ibid., 629–641.
57. Ibid., 641.
58. Ibid., 775–806.
59. Ibid., 795–797; cf. on this point J. Rudhardt, Le thème de l’eau primordial dans la mythologie grecque, Berne 1971 p. 94–97. The author clearly points out ‘the correlation between the myths about the Styx and those about ambrosia’.
61. Theogony, 551.
62. Our interpretation thus confirms, for fundamental reasons, the reading πÎRÎN by A.B. Cook, which is in agreement with the text of the manuscript in the scholium to the Theogony, 886; cf. supra, n. 7.
III

AT THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD
CHAPTER 5

The Orphic Metis and the Cuttle-fish of Thetis

The figure of Metis and the episode of her being swallowed by Zeus also appear in the Orphic theogonies known as those of the Rhapsodes (to distinguish them from other versions) and, as O. Kern points out, it would be difficult not to see this version as borrowed from Hesiod’s Theogony. Within the framework of an enquiry devoted to mérits it is not possible to consider all the material in the ‘Orphic’ theogonies. However, we should like to draw attention to the points which have a direct bearing on our own problem. In our view they support the thesis put forward by scholars who believe in the authenticity of this body of myth. It is, to be sure, peripheral compared to a more ‘orthodox’ version such as Hesiod’s. However, following the discovery at Derveni of a roll of papyrus transcribed towards the end of the fourth century BC, which contains a commentary on an Orphic theogony which is necessarily earlier than this date, it is no longer possible today to see this tradition as an artificial construction of late neo-platonism having no real connection with the religious figures and circles which, as early as the sixth century, placed themselves under the patronage of Orpheus to disseminate their Hiaroi Logoi or sacred speeches.

The Orphic theologians gave the name of Metis (and those of Phanes, the Dazzling One, he who appears and makes things appear, and Protagonos, the First-Born) to the great primordial deity which, upon emerging from the cosmic egg, carried within it the seed of all the gods, the germ of all things, and which, as the first creator, brought into the light the entire universe, setting it upon the course it was to follow and endowing it with all its diversity of forms. By so doing they chose to follow the tradition presented in Hesiod’s
Theogony where the goddess Metis, who is not mentioned in Homer, occupies the position and plays the role that we have already attempted to describe. But in fact the links they have with Hesiod simply serve to stress how different their own tradition is, and the apparent connections and similarities underline rather the differences of emphasis that exist between their accounts of the emergence of the world and Hesiod’s. The stories in which Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus once again succeed each other and the theme of the swallowing of Metis are parallel but what emerges is a new theology of genesis—and one which differs profoundly from the version which it initially appears to have adopted as model.

In Hesiod Metis is a goddess whose role, necessarily a subordinate one, is inconceivable unless related to the male deity whose companion and acolyte she is, namely Zeus, the Father and King. True, Metis is certainly indispensable to Zeus, first by her presence at his side and later within him, but only to perfect the supremacy which is the particular characteristic of the sovereign of the gods and of which, throughout the history of his actions, he has shown himself to be a complete master. When Zeus swallows Metis, at the end of the Theogonic myths, he is completing the process by which, through the various stages of his battles against the primordial powers of disorder, there gradually emerges from the original chaos an organised, differentiated and hierarchical cosmos which from now on is stable.

For the Orphics, Metis is no longer regarded as female. This deliberate departure from Hesiod must have seemed paradoxical, even provocative, since from a linguistic point of view the common noun mētis was, for the Greeks, a feminine one. Metis now becomes an androgynous god with a twofold nature, being both male and female, diphēs.6 This lack of distinction or sexual ambivalence has a fully positive purpose: it implies that Metis-Phanes transcends the opposition between male and female which, since it came into being later on, must be seen as a limitation to one sex to the exclusion of the other from which even the gods themselves are not exempt. Metis is no longer a woman and subordinate to Zeus. As a bisexual being its position is higher or, at least, beyond.
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Clearly in this context the swallowing episode takes on a quite different significance. In the fifth generation of the gods, (the sceptre having passed from Phanes-Metis to Nux or Night and thence through Ouranos and Kronos into Zeus' hands), Zeus swallows Phanes-Metis and deposits it inside his stomach. But this time it is not a question of the young sovereign god assimilating the powers of a female companion in order to immobilise the course of the universe in the state established by his own victory and new reign. On the contrary, by totally identifying himself with the earlier power, Zeus intends to turn back beyond Kronos and Ouranos, to the primordial state which originally existed and complete the cycle of genesis within himself so that, everything having emerged from the one, all is now again reabsorbed within it. In this way a 'second creation' can take place, similar to the first, the creation of Phanes-Metis. It is Zeus 'the beginning, middle and end' of all things, 'born the first and the last', appears not only as the master of the Cosmos, the supreme King—like the Zeus in Hesiod's Theogony—but also as the primordial creator who is both male and female, from whom all individual and transient things have been produced in the way in which they were from the first entities in Hesiod—Chaos and Gaia. On the one hand, with Hesiod, the account of the theogony follows a linear development, passing from disorder to order, at which point progress is arrested at the summit of the curve by the swallowing of Metis. On the other, with the Orphics, the story takes the shape of a cycle in which expansion is followed by concentration. The unified whole is made manifest first by a process of the dispersion of separate parts through time and space and then, with the swallowing of Metis-Phanes, by a reintegration of these separate parts within the whole. For the rest, the purpose of this second generation which establishes a connection from Zeus back to the first creator Phanes-Metis is to bring into existence this world which is ours and which is ruled not by Zeus but by the son to whom he relinquishes his throne, namely the Orphic Dionysus who represents the sixth and last generation of sovereign gods. Plato already tells us that only his arrival could complete the order of the song—in other
words that, in the poems attributed to Orpheus, his accession to the throne marks the end of the process of theogony. Why does Dionysus take the place of Zeus in this way? For the devotees of Dionysus it was not merely a matter of substituting their new master for the supreme god of the official religion or of setting up opposite Zeus a Dionysus to be as much his equivalent as his rival, his double so far as religious values and functions were concerned. Like his father Zeus and, through him, like the Phanes-Metis contained within him—the Phanes-Metis who itself originally contained both Zeus and Dionysus—the Orphic Dionysus indeed represents the total unity of the dispersed, multiple, individualised, shifting world over which he comes to extend his power in the sixth generation. But of all the Greek deities, his is the only divine career which incorporates this alternating equilibrium, this oscillation between the one and the multiple, the same and the other, between the concentration of the whole and its dispersion. This is something he takes upon himself in the course of his Passion, something which directly affects the life of men since it is the mythical foundation for the miseries of the human condition at the same time as, on a ritual level, it also points the way to salvation. To this extent it can be said that the entire Orphic theogony is orientated towards and forms, as it were, a prelude to the creation of mankind with which it reaches its point of culmination in the sixth generation: then, and then only, can the song come to an end. The body of Dionysus, cut into tiny pieces by the Titans and then reconstituted starting from his heart which remained miraculously preserved, expresses and sums up the whole of the theogonic process which has taken place up to this point. Now, however, the process takes on a specifically human significance. Not only does the race of men, produced from the ashes of the Titans blasted by Zeus’ thunderbolt, carry the burden and, as it were, the guilt for the criminal dispersion of the god’s limbs but, by purging their ancestral crime through the Orphic rites and way of life, men can themselves return through Dionysus to the lost unity and find once more the golden age. This the Orphics (again taking their inspiration from Hesiod only to stress the divergence of their position) situate
not during the age of Kronos but in the reign of Phanes-
Métis, in other words at the time of the primordial totality,
the original One that was in the beginning.
The transformation of Zeus' first wife into a powerful
primordial deity is not simply the result of the sect's desire
to challenge the currently accepted mythology. This promot-
ing of Métis, who loses her female status and is raised to the
apex of the hierarchy of the gods is in line with certain
characteristics already clearly indicated in Hesiod's "Theogony.
These made it inevitable that this mythical figure should
assume the role of the original creator at the beginning of
the world. In that she is a power of the waters, fluid and
polymorphic, who promotes fertility and nurtures growth,
like her sisters, the other daughters of Ocean, Métis remains
extremely close to her mother Tethys who, according to one
ancient tradition for which Homer provides evidence, was
herself "génesis pantes" and thus gave birth to all things both
divine and human. Her gift of metamorphosis fitted her to
represent the complete unfolding of a cycle of forms which is,
in a sense, already contained in the original form, the "archai
morphē" and which, once the cycle is completed, returns to
its first origin. Finally, and most important, Métis' connec-
tions with forewarned prudence and subtle reflexion made
it possible for this primordial Power to be credited with a
dimension of intelligence, to be made to represent pre-
meditation and thus to embody the action of genesis on two
levels, cosmic and mental. The birth of the world certainly
consists in the emergence into the light of day of what
originally lay buried within the darkness of the First creator,
inside its hollow belly. But at the same time this genesis is
presented as a process of establishing intellectual order
analogous to the operation through which an intelligence
which can foresee the future conceives, plans and devises
the entire course of future events. While it is meditating,
the future is already established in its mind even before
coming to be in the outside world. The power of binding
which Métis possesses can, at this point, be seen to have a
new application. We know that, for the Greeks, the destiny
which 'binds' men is 'spun' by the Moirai. Similarly, with
its qualities of métis and omniscient cunning, the primordial
Power weaves, plaits, links and knots together the threads whose interlacing composes the tissue of Becoming, linking the sequence of generations and events in a single complex, as one contrives a trap. A remark made by Aristotle proves that, well before the Hellenistic period, the Orphics used weaving as a model of intelligent activity to give an account of the process of creation: he notes that in the lines attributed to Orpheus, that which is living is produced (ginasthai to zoion) in the same way as a net is woven (homoios...tai tou diktiou plotoi).

The papyrus from Derveni provides valuable confirmation on this point. In column 14, which is a gloss to one line in the Orphic poem which might be: Moira epêklaoen, Moira has spun, the commentator notes that, in current word usage, one can say 'what Moira has spun will come about' even without knowing the significance of either the word 'Moira' or of 'spun'. He adds: 'Orpheus gave the name, Moira, to phronesis, intelligence...Even before Zeus was mentioned Moira, the intelligence of the god, existed, always and everywhere'. In column 15 he goes on: 'When one says that Moira has spun one is trying to express that the phronesis of Zeus has fixed all things, present, past and future, as they must be born, exist and die'. One might be tempted, with Merkellbach, to claim a connection between the phronesis mentioned by the commentator of the Orphic poem and the noesis of Diogenes of Apollonia or the Noos of Anaxagoras. However, it should be noted that the term phronesis has a meaning that is less abstract, less purely intellectual and philosophical than noesis and noos, and refers to the forewarned prudence which is the characteristic attribute of metis.

In column 19, the gloss refers to a line in which Orpheus is describing the creation by Zeus of Ocean, with his huge currents. But this act of creation is expressed by the verb mesa: Zeus 'meditated', 'conceived' the strength of Ocean. The external creation, the craftsmanlike production is first a 'thought' within the mind of Zeus, and the commentator describes the meaning of medomai more precisely by stressing the fact that Zeus does not produce anything that is not himself or that is foreign to his phronesis: the might of Ocean is, in fact, his own, Zeus'. The same term mesa reappears
three times in one of the fragments attached to the Theogony of the Rhapsodes, used here to describe the creation—or what we would probably call the invention—by Demeter of ambrosia, nectar and honey. It is used again, in another fragment of the same collection, to describe the creation by Phanes-Metis of the moon: ‘He meditated (mēsato) another immense earth which the immortals call selēnē and the inhabitants of the earth, mēnē’.17

In column 20 of our Derenx papyrus, specific mention is made of the creation of the moon—or rather, since this time it involves not Phanes-Metis but Zeus, to a recreation of the moon. And the commentator shows that the intellectual operation undertaken by Zeus when he, in his turn, conceives or invents the moon, corresponds to a purposiveness that is no less intellectual where men are concerned. Shining in the darkness of the night sky, the moon ‘reveals’ (phainai) to those who are capable of reflection a sign which tells them what they must and must not do. The moon teaches farmers and sailors when they must cultivate their land or set out on their voyages. For if the moon did not exist men would not have learnt the measure (arithmón) of either the seasons or the winds’. In ‘meditating’ on the moon, Zeus was already thinking of the mētis of the farmer who knows how to recognise the order of the seasons and of that of the sailor who can read the stars, using the position in which the divine intelligence has placed them to work out the direction of the winds and the navigation routes to be followed.

Our information on the Orphic Phanes-Metis is too incomplete and too widely dispersed for us to undertake an analysis comparable to the one we have made of the Metis of Hesiod’s Theogony and the traditions that followed it. Our approach must necessarily be less direct. So we have attempted to distinguish the particular orientation and characteristics of the Orphic theogony by a somewhat oblique method, setting up a contrast with Hesiod’s in order to reveal the differences between them. It is, however, possible to use such a method to throw further light—this time from a different angle—upon the mythical figure of Phanes-Metis and its status and functions.
A chance to do this comes with the discovery of a papyrus published in 1957 by E. Lobel. It is a commentary on a 'cosmogonical' poem written by Alcman in Sparta during the seventh century BC. So even as early as the archaic period a poet who was as little a "theologian" as Alcman and whom one imagined to be restricted to the characteristic themes of choral lyric, was writing of a version of the genesis of the world which was very different from that of Hesiod. There is nothing Orphic about Alcman's theogony. However, it draws upon certain mythical models whose antiquity is thus fully confirmed and which are not without relevance to those used in the hieroi logoi.

Alcman places the Nereid Thetis at the beginning of the world. She is associated on the one hand with Πόρος and Τέκμωρ and on the other with Σκότος. How can we explain this at first sight paradoxical role given to the mother of Achilles in the genesis of the cosmos and her association with Πόρος, Τέκμωρ and Σκότος? With regard to the main lines of the system expounded by Alcman, we accept the conclusions of M.L. West in his latest article which summarised them as four main points: in the beginning there was a state where form was lacking and in which nothing could yet be distinguished; then came Thetis whose activity appears to have had a craftsmanlike character; next, together with Σκότος, there appeared Πόρος and Τέκμωρ, the latter at least operating as a principle of differentiation within the darkness; thanks to Πόρος and Τέκμωρ light—the daylight and the light of the stars at night—succeeded black Night and total darkness.

We are leaving to one side one important problem which we cannot deal with within the framework of this study. The commentator lets it be understood that Thetis operates like a worker in metal. It should be remembered, in this respect, that for Alcman as for Homer the sky was, in effect, made of bronze. According to Alcman, Ouranos was the son of Akmion, the anvil. Furthermore when Hephaestus is hurled from the heights of the sky (like the bronze akmion, in Hesiod, which falls upon the earth) it is Thetis, the marine goddess in the depths of the sea who secretly takes him in and it is at her side that he begins to work with metals,
learning how to make *daidala*. Finally, there are affinities between the daemons of the sea and metallurgy which are most clearly revealed in figures such as the ‘Telchines’. Thetis herself has another name which may be significant: *Purraië*, she who has reddened in the fire. However, in his latest study, M.L. West has produced forceful arguments to support the thesis that the commentator rather than Alcman himself is responsible for the idea of a Thetis who is a metal worker, forging the sky as she would a *chalkeus*.

Whatever the solution one adopts on this point, a prior problem nevertheless remains. Despite the fact that in Alcman’s Sparta this Nereid had her own temple and secret *xoanon* which no one except the priestess was permitted to see, Thetis is, all-in-all, a relatively minor figure. How then are we to explain why she is presented as a great primordial deity? Following Bowra and Lloyd-Jones it has been generally accepted that the reason for Thetis’ position in Alcman’s cosmogony is not that she is a sea goddess, the wife of Peleus who won her by binding her in the vice of his arms despite her metamorphoses, but rather that her name lent itself to a kind of play of words on the theme of *tithési*. According to this view, Thetis used as a noun meant she who founds, disposes, establishes. This meaning can be justified on the basis of the scholium to Lycophron, *Alexandra*, 22, where Thetis is called *aitia euthesias*, the cause for the good arrangement of the cosmos, and also the scholium T to Book I of the *Iliad* (399): ‘It is said that Thetis is *tēn thēsin kai phūsin toū pantōs*, the arrangement and nature of all things’. But these two scholia suggest even more than what is claimed for them. Thetis is called not only *thēsis* but also *phūsis toū pantōs*; and the scholium to Lycophron is even more explicit: it defines Thetis as the sea, *Thētis hē thalassa* and states clearly that if Thetis is the cause of *euthesia* this is because at the beginning of the world the liquid element first became redistributed and condensed and then the solid earth appeared, *ephēnē hē xērā*, and this was the good order (*eukosmia*) of the universe. Thus there is plenty of evidence for the play on the word Thetis but it occurs within the framework of a cosmogony in which the sea, personified by the Nereid, constitutes the primordial element.
For the rest, it is quite strange that such surprise has been felt at the rôle given to the daughter of Nereus. There are sufficiently close links between Tethys, the wife of Oceanos, who is presented by Homer as the génesis pantes, the origin of all things, and Thetis, the wife of Peleus, for the grandmother and granddaughter sometimes to appear as doubles. In the Mythographi Vaticani we read: 'Ophion, et secundum philosophus Oceanos, qui et Nereus, de matre Theitide gemuit casum.' In Homer, Thetis is associated with another Nereid who, like herself, stands out from the anonymous group of sea-goddesses: this is Eurynome. In the most profound depths of the abyss of the sea, in a kind of Beyond, far from the gods as well as from men, Thetis and Eurynome together welcome in Hephaestus when he has been hurled from the heights of the heavens. Now, in the cosmogonies associated with that of Pherecydes of Syros, this Eurynome played the same role of primordial deity as Thetis. Together with Ophioneus or Ophion, an Old Man of the Sea resembling Proteus, Nereus or Triton, she reigned over the world with her husband until Kronos and Rhea dethroned this ancient couple of the sea by making them fall, in the course of a struggle, from the height of the sky to the depths of the Ocean. This Eurynome, the primordial goddess of the sea, had her temple at Phigalia and it was closed and secret as was that of Thetis in Sparta. It was thrown open only once a year and on that day the ancient xoanon depicting the goddess, half-woman and half-fish and chained in bonds of gold could be seen. So Eurynome was a deity of bonds, both a binder and herself bound, again just like Thetis who, although she was bound in the embrace of Peleus, was also a mistress of bonds since, in the Iliad, when all the gods in revolt against Zeus wish to chain him up, it is she who 'liberates him from the bonds' by bringing Briareus up from the depths of the Ocean. But there is a third goddess whose role in myth is so similar to that of Thetis that she appears to be her double. A.B. Cook writes: 'Metis, like Thetis, was a sea-power; Metis, like Thetis, was a shape-shifter; Metis, like Thetis, was loved by Zeus; Metis, like Thetis, was destined to bear a son that should oust his father.' Now, as we have seen, in the Orphic
theogonies it is Metis who is raised to the dignity of a great primordial deity. One of the reasons why these sea deities were so fitted to take this cosmogenical role at the beginning of the world was that they possessed the power of metamorphosis. In a sense, they already contained within them all the forms that could appear in the course of the Becoming, forms which they alternately concealed and revealed to the light of day. Thus in the ‘Rhapsodic’ theogonies, as soon as Zeus,—a cunning Zeus, mérmoros—had swallowed Metis, he contained within him the fire and the water and the earth and the aether, the night and the day and Metis the first genētōr (or first genētis, according to whether the deity is considered to be male or female). Similarly, the Orphic Hymns are addressed to Nereus in his capacity of original principle of all things, archē hapánton; and they refer to Proteus as the first-born, the prōtogenēs, he who has made manifest the principles of the whole of nature, pásēs phūseōs archēs hós ἐφήγη, by changing holy matter by metamorphosis into every kind of form, hūlēn allāssōn hierēn idēais poluμorphais. And the hymn is brought to a close after referring to the prophetic knowledge of Proteus who, like Metis, knows the past, the present and the future: Pánta gár Prōtē prōte phūsis exkatēthēke, for primordial nature has disposed all things within Proteus. This is an expression which is altogether analogous to the scholium which presented Thetis as the nature and arrangement of everything, phūsis kaî thēsis tou pantōs.

To be sure, these texts are late ones and it is difficult to establish the origins of the tradition with which they are connected. One can do no more than point out that on the sculpted pediment of the Hecatompedon, dating from the beginning of the sixth century, which shows Herakles’ struggle against Triton, with the hero gripping the monster in the same encircling hold as Peleus uses on Thetis and Menelaus on Proteus, one can also see the god Nereus lifting his triple, bearded face from the water and surveying the scene with a malicious expression. In each of his left hands, the Old Man of the Sea holds the symbols of the various elements encompassed by his polymorphic nature: water, air and fire.
This power of metamorphosis possessed by the Old Man of the Sea and the goddesses of the sea is associated with a particular type of intelligence compounded of craftiness, cunning and trickery which comes into play when, instead of contemplating the immutable essences, one has to come to grips with the shifting, multiple and unpredictable entities of Becoming. In this world of constant change what is necessary is a mind which is pantopóros, fertile in inventiveness, capable of devising a plan (mêchos, méchanê, boule) suited to the circumstances of every occasion, and of finding a way out and expedient, pòros, to escape from the aпорία or, as Aristophanes puts it in The Knights, ὅ τιν amêchánôn pòrous euμêchánous porizein, to be able to find clever ways out from impossible situations. We have stressed the importance within the semantic field of métris of words such as aiōlos, poikilos, dōlos, dōlos, doλiē technē, kerdalēs, kērdos, skolēs and méchanê. In this connection we should note that while certain Orphic cosmogonies place Chrònos at the origin of the world, this is the Chrònos apathitōmētis who is the possessor of imperishable métris and who contains all things within him just as the cunning of the man of métris conceives in advance traps contrived to catch the victims he seeks; this is the cunning Time mentioned by Pindar in the VIIIth Isthmian,—cunning Time which turns the path of life this way and that, now to one side and now to the other, dōlīos aîōn... helissōn biou pòron. In Plato, Metis is in fact the mother of Pòros who is united with Penia to give birth to Eros. To be sure, Plato is poking fun but there is every reason to suppose that, in his ironic way, he is repeating the most ancient of mythical themes. Plato does not present Eros as a god, a theôs in the true sense, but rather as a daimōn, an intermediary who reigns over the world of Becoming, midway between the immutable Forms and matter with no form or determination. From Metis and Poros Eros inherits a mind which is ever alert, never at a loss for an expedient (pòrot) to obtain (porizein) in this universe of barrenness (penia) into which he is plunged all the riches towards which he is attracted, in other words the Forms, knowledge and beauty. Thus, on a metaphysical level Penia represents lack of form and absence of determina-
tion. Plutarch is quite correct to translate *penia* by *hûle* meaning brute matter.\textsuperscript{43} Now, as M.L. West quite correctly points out, the presence of *Póros* and *Tékmôr* in Alcman's poem implies that before they made their appearance there was a state of matter negatively defined as *áporon kai aték-marton*, by an absence of *póros* and *tékmu̇r* and so, in this sense, *penia*.\textsuperscript{36} Chaos is conceived in the same negative way in the later Orphic texts. The *méga chásma* is described negatively as a darkness lacking everything: *ástaton kai ápêron kai aôriston*, without stability, without limits, without determination and again ‘adiakritôn pántôn óntôn katâ skotoëssan omichlên’. Because there are no distinctions everything is confused in a dark fog. It is an abyss which has no *oudê ti peîvar hupên, ou puthmên, oudê tis hêra*,\textsuperscript{47} neither limits nor bottom nor foundation. Meanwhile Nereus is presented in the Orphic Hymn as the positive counterpart to all this privation: *hêdrën...puthmên pôntou, gaiês pêras, archê hapantôn*,\textsuperscript{48} the foundation and base of the ocean, the limit of the earth and the principle of all things.

Is the relationship between Metis and Poros and Eros pure invention on the part of Plato? Eros already had a role to play in the cosmogonies parodied by Aristophanes in *The Birds*.\textsuperscript{49} When he emerges from the cosmic egg laid in the limitless lap of Erebus, *Érebous d'en apeirôs kolpois*, he brings light with his golden wings which resemble eddies of wind, and reveals what has hitherto been indistinct. Similarly, the Orphic Hymn to *Prôtôgonos* refers by the name of Phanes to the one ‘who dispersed the shadowy darkness’, *skotoëssan omichlên*, and who, by means of his wings, brought the brilliant light, *lampron phâos*.\textsuperscript{50} It is true that Aristophanes mentions neither Metis nor *Póros*. However, as early as in Hesiod, Metis is fully personified. Her status is that of an authentic and important deity about whose adventures many a tale is told. The reason why Zeus takes her as his first wife in a marriage which consecrates his victory in the struggle for sovereignty, and why he swallows her in order to ensure that his reign shall last forever is that Metis ‘knows more things than any other god or mortal man’ and that, lodged within him, she will enable him ‘to know in advance everything that will bring him either good
or bad fortune', in other words all the possible vicissitudes of becoming. In Alcman, not only is Pòros himself personified in the text but furthermore he is certainly conceived to be a primordial deity since, in another poem, the Louvre Parthenéon, he is paired with Aisa, Destiny, and together they are given the title of geraitatoi, the most ancient of the gods. There is also a fragment of Parmenides which suggests that it was not Plato who invented the relationship between Metis and Eros. When Parmenides passes on from his description of the world of Being to that of Becoming, he introduces a great female deity who may have been known by various names: Dike, Ananke, Aphrodite. This daimôn, who governs the multiple and changing world in which light and darkness are equal forces opposed to each other, gives birth to Eros who becomes the first and most ancient of the gods. But the term used to describe how the ancient Eros is produced indicates that this great goddess is also a goddess who possesses mētis. What Parmenides says is that she 'conceived' Eros first of all the gods, prōtiston men Ἐρώτα theōn mētisato pāntōn. Like the term mēdonai, whose use by the Orphics we have already noted (and this parallelism is particularly significant), the verb mētonai implies a kind of creation but one which involves not so much giving birth as a mother-goddess as a mental operation carried out by the intelligence typical of a knowing daimōn who steers (kubernai) the world, plotting out its route in advance, just as a pilot guides a ship over the sea.

The comparison of the divine daimōn, that is to say, the pilot seems all the more apt given that the movements of the stars and the sun, by which the whole course of the Becoming is regulated, trace hodoi, kēleuthoi or pòroi in the sky. These are visible routes which plot out the various regions of space and which also represent paths or doors for the sea, its pòroi kaiōs, since the stars emerge from the waters when they rise and plunge again into them when they set, and, above all, the sun begins its nightly journey through the river Ocean all over again every day. This journey is described by the verbs diapleiō, perainō, pòreiō or by expressions like that used by Aeschylus in a fragment from the Daughters of the Sun, cited by Athenaeus: 'diaballai polin oidmaisenta
peridromon póron, he crosses through the circular “current” with its powerful waves. According to a tradition reported by Diodorus Siculus, Onopides learnt, among other information received from the Egyptian priests, that the sun has its oblique ‘course’, loxēn échei tên poreia.54 The Argonautica of the Pseudo-Orpheus similarly mentions an astéra pamp- hanioúnta di’ éeriioke poreiês, a bright star hurtling through the ‘paths’ of the air.55 It also mentions a diviner who has learned astron poreias, the ‘routes’ of the stars,56 just as Ankaios, who is to replace the pilot Tiphys as steersman of the Argo, can plot its course because he knows poreias ouranias astron,57 the heavenly ‘paths’ of the stars. Aratos specifies as a name for the Pleiades the Hephtáporei, the ‘Seven Ways’58 and Athenaeus notes that through these Hephtáporei teknaírontai ta peri tên zōen hoi anthrōpoi59 men can glean information about their own lives—their pòros biou.

It is perhaps possible to be more specific about the location and significance of these seven póroi which serve as a tekmar to men. At the furthest point of the sea’s horizon at the spot where the vault of the sky appears to rest upon the surface of the waters and where the Greeks situated the circular course of the river Ocean, the seven póroi of the Pleiades emerge from the passages leading from the depths of the sea to the sky and plot the paths which communicate between that space occupied by men and that occupied by the gods. Aratos stresses that the Pleiades ‘are well-known by the name of “The Seven Ways” (Hephtáporei) despite the fact that only six are visible to the naked eye. It is not as if, within the memory of man, any star has disappeared from the sky. But that is what is told, so seven stars are distinctly named.’ Now certain poets, Simonides and Pindar in particular, also refer to the Pleiades as the Péleiai or Pcleidiades: they are the ‘doves’ of the sky fleeing before Orion, the wild hunter. Following Moiro of Byzantium and the philologist Crates, Athenaeus points out that the mission of these heavenly doves is to bring Zeus ambrosia, the liquor of immortality which is obtained from the waters of the river Ocean at the furthest limits of the terrestrial world, where the sea and the sky meet. This could be the explanation for the enigmatic
expression used by Homer, in the Odyssey, when describing the Plagktat the 'shifting' rocks which form the passage way through which no human vessel can pass. Homer explains that not even birds can get through, 'not even the timid doves (pêleiai) which carry ambrosia to Zeus the father. Each time the sheer rocks claim one of them and Zeus has to replace it to make up their number'⁶² So it is as if each day one of the heavenly doves were missing which is the reason why, as Aratos puts it—although in different terms—no more than six are ever visible. Notwithstanding they are known as the 'Seven Ways' for Zeus does not want their number to be diminished. The Pleiades are the daughters of Atlas; we may therefore conclude that, in Homer, the sheer rock (lis pêtê) over the top of which they must fly constitutes a 'pillar of the sky' which Atlas symbolises and which holds the above apart from the below or the sky apart from the sea, while yet keeping open between them the passage way through which the Pleiades pass each day when they soar into the sky there to trace out their pôroi.

It is therefore legitimate to attribute to Alcman's personified Pôros a role which is analogous to that generally ascribed to Têkmôr by the commentators. Into the darkness (skôtos) of the sky and waters which were originally indistinguishable, he introduces differentiated paths which make it possible to discern upon the vault of heaven and the sea the various directions of space which provide orientation in an expanse originally pathless and without any point of reference, aporon kai atêkmarton.⁶³

The fact that Pôros and Têkmôr who, as a couple, accompany the sea goddess Thetis share the same function can be better understood if one bears in mind how closely they are associated in the terminology connected with navigation where the art of the pilot or, to be more exact, his métrie⁶⁴ derives both from divination and from knowledge of the stars: in order to determine his route over the undifferentiated expanse of the sea the navigator must work it out from the signs shown to him by the gods, and in particular from the movements of the stars in the night sky. Hesychius and the Suda⁶⁵ both use a proverbial expression which, we are told, is derived from navigation: ástros tekmaiæsthai, to conjecture
according to the stars, is an expression used in connection with those who journey (or navigate) along a long and solitary route, ἐπὶ τὸν μακρὸν καὶ ερέμην ἁδὸν πορευόμενον. Thus the Argonauts tried to conjecture where the passage-ways lay, πόρποις τ' απετεκμαίροντο, through which to escape from the shallow, marshy waters in which they had lost their way but because they lacked the necessary μέτις (οὕτων μέτιν ἔχον) they were obliged to wander there blindly all day long.66 Just as the pilots' 'conjecture' (τεκμαίρεσθαι) which route they should take on the basis of various signs, the gods or diviners plot it out for them (τεκμαίρεσθαι) by fixing directions and points of reference for them in advance. According to the anonymous author of the Περί ἀπίστου, Phaeton plotted out for the sun the path it was to take, τὸν του ἅλλου δρόμον τεκμαίρατο.67 Similarly, the helmsman Tiphys is, in his turn, able to navigate the Argo by steering by the sun and stars, τεκμαίραθαι πλοῦν ἐδιοὶ τε καὶ ἀστείρι.68 In the Odyssey, Odysseus tells his companions that Circe has fixed a different route for them, ἄλλην ἁδὸν τεκμαίρατο.69 No doubt in laying down the direction they were to follow, the goddess gave the navigator precise points of reference. In another episode Calypso orders that they should navigate ποντοπορεύομεναι keeping the Great Bear always to their left and Odysseus steers at the helm with his eyes fixed constantly on the night sky.70 The path of the ship follows the path of the stars which are, as Euripides says of the σῶμα καιμός in Hecuba, a nautilois τέκμαρ, a point of reference which makes it possible for sailors to determine the route they should take.71

But in the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius the cosmological meaning that a word such as τέκμαρ can have when associated with the idea of paths traced in the sky and over the sea appears quite clearly. When the ship sets out Orpheus sings a song, a hymn telling of the birth of the world. The Argonauts are about to open up the paths of the sea for the first time and establish once and for all where the passage-ways are. The hymn gives their journey a cosmological significance which, as we shall see, is confirmed by the episode of the κατωλᾶς with which the sea voyage comes to an end. Orpheus sings of the origin of the cosmos: at first
the earth, sea and sky are confused together in one indistinct form; then, as the result of strife, Νείκος, they separate out from each other; then: ‘ἐὰν ἡμεικά αἰεὶ ἐν ἀιθήρι ἔκκληστι αὔστρα σελήνας τε καὶ ἑλίοιο κύκλου’, as they emerge from the primordial chaos the stars, the ‘routes’ of the moon and sun form in the sky the ἔκκλησι which is henceforward fixed for evermore.

Thus Πόρος and Τέκμωρ indeed appear jointly to have held the role of dissipating the total darkness which reigns in the Night of the primordial waters by opening up the ways through which the sun, as it passes, will bring the light of day and the stars will trace the luminous paths of the constellations in the night sky. If Alcman chose to personify as the companions of Thetis these two principles rather than, for example, ἱδώς and σήμα, it must be because their richer and more complex semantic significance lent itself more easily to the exercise of the mythical imagination. In the most concrete sense πόρος means a path, passage or ford and τέκμωρ a distinctive mark, an indication or sign. But both terms also have another, intellectual meaning. In the case of πόρος it is an obvious one and is connected with μέτας; it means a stratagem, the expedient which the cunning of an intelligent being can devise in order to escape from an aпорία. In Aeschylus’ Prometheus, πόρος is closely connected with τέχνη. The Titan gives men τεχνασ τε καὶ πόρους; fire is called διδάκαλος τέχνης πάσι καὶ μέγας πόρος, the master of all the skills and the supreme resource. But in some of its uses, as Fraenkel correctly notes, τέκμωρ also has the same psychological implications; it is synonymous with μέχος, plan, remedy for a difficult situation. Thus it is easy to understand why Thetis, the sea goddess endowed with the same type of cunning intelligence and resourceful mind as Metis or the Old Man of the Sea, by her mere presence evokes Πόρος and Τέκμωρ. The text of our papyrus (lines 15–16) runs: τῆς θέτιδος γενόμενας ἀρχῆ καὶ τέλος όμος πάντων εγένετο, once Thetis appeared the principle and end and of all things appeared together. According to the commentator, ἀρχῆ here refers to Πόρος and τέλος to Τέκμωρ, and Thetis takes the role of a τεχνίτης or artisan. M.L. West is certainly correct in maintaining that Alcman can never have said anything of the kind. The author providing the gloss has
imposed an Aristotelian terminology on the original text. However, the text did perhaps invite misinterpretation in this way to the extent that in it Thetis appears endowed with a knowledge, a sophia in the archaic sense of the term, a técne like the dolis técne with which Proteus is credited in the Odyssey and which consists in the power of metamorphosis and knowledge of all the chasms and paths of the sea for the one whom the Orphic Hymns describe as possessing klêidas pòntou, the keys of the sea. Consider the setting for this story of Menelaus: we are told that the gods have bound his path by chaining up the winds. Menelaus is held captive on his island, unable to take to sea again. We are twice told that he is unable to find a tékmor to escape from this aпорia. In other words, he lacks both a scheme to get himself out of trouble and some indication of the route he should follow, some sign which will enable him to plot his course over the undifferentiated expanse of waters. It is at this point that Eidothea makes her intervention: she advises him to ‘bind’ her father. If Menelaus can lay hold of him and maintain his hold despite all his dolis técne, the sea god will be obliged to tell him, without any further trick or ambiguity, atrekhés, ‘hodón hê màtra helêithou nóston th’, the points of reference to mark the outward bound route and also the return journey.

In the light of this it would seem understandable that Pòros should appear as the arché, and Tékmor as the têlos. Pòros is the path taken, the way through; and têkmor the goal aimed at, the end of the undertaking. Thus, in the Iliad, Posidon marches through the sea which opens up before him as he passes, thálassa diistato; the god takes three strides and with the fourth hiketo tékmor, he reaches the goal he had set himself. Tékmor was all the better suited to be associated with Thetis since the word is a part of the terminology used in connection with divination and also astronomy and navigation, implying the manifestation of a divine boule, a sign given by the gods to convey their decision and at the same time to make it irrevocable. Thus when Zeus gave his assent to Thetis’ request with a nod he thereby gave her the mágiston têkmor. Musaeus also speaks of the tékmor enargês, the clear sign given by the gods to mortals so that they can distinguish good things from evil.

But it was fitting for Pòros, even more than for Tékmor
to have a place at the side of the primordial deity of the sea. In this position he symbolised the transition from a chaotic expanse of sea to a space which was defined and ordered. The studies of Bucholz, Lesky and Benveniste make it possible to give a precise indication of the relationships between Póros and Póntos in archaic Greek thought and in what could be called their religious perception of navigation and the sea. In contrast to thalassa, pelagos and kíona, póntos means the great, unknown open sea, the expanse of sea where the shores are lost to view and where all that can be seen are the sky and the water which, during starless nights or in misty storms become indistinguishable, forming a single, dark, indistinct mass where there is no point of reference to help one find one’s way. Póntos, who is the father of Nereus and grandfather of Thetis, also denotes the depths of the sea as opposed to the surface of the waters, the depths seen as an abyss, laitma, shrouded in the same darkness as misty Tartarus. Lesky held that the etymology of póntos indicated that it meant ‘path to be journeyed’. But Beneveniste has shown that póntos corresponds to the Vedic pāṇthāh which, in contrast to terms which apply to plotted, fixed paths and established routes, means a way which has not been plotted in advance, a voyage undertaken across an unknown and hostile region, a path to be opened up where no proper path exists or can exist. Thus, although Póntos may not be an ápóron pelagos, a sea which cannot be crossed, it is at least the ábuson pelagos ou múl eúporon, the abyss of the sea which it is not easy to cross, which Aeschylus mentions in the Supplices. If the Argos is referred to as pontopóros níus and a sister of Thetis, one of the Nereids, is called Ponto- pórēa, the reason is that navigation on the high seas involving crossing the Póntos is, every time it is undertaken, a new adventure, an exploration of a virgin expanse, unmarked by any trace of men, a póros to be opened up and constantly replotted on the wide surface of the waters, just as if they had never been crossed before.

To this extent there is in the mythical thought of the Greeks another space which is analogous to the expanse of the sea. Hesiod writes that if an ánemos, an anvil or meteorite, is dropped from the heights of the heavens, it takes nine days
to reach the earth. It takes the same time to reach Tartarus from the earth. However, if it is cast into Tartarus it cannot reach the bottom even in a year but will wander there forever on an endless course. Tartarus cannot be crossed because it contains no fixed or established directions. It is a misty darkness, an opaque mass in which there is neither top nor bottom, neither right nor left, a space lacking all orientation. Hesiod expresses this lack of direction with an image. He says that Tartarus is swept with squalls, thieilai, blowing hither and thither, entha kai entha first one way and then another, and their unceasing eddies mix up all the directions of space, confusing them all in a Night similar to the Night of primordial chaos.

The Poitos would have remained like Hesiod's Tartarus, an image of chaos itself if Thetis had not brought Póros and Tékmôr along with her. When a ship is out in the open sea, in the night, with no land visible at the horizon, the expanse of the sea is, for all that, not lacking in orientation and order. There are fixed directions there because, in the first place, the regular movements of the stars in the sky form luminous signs which serve as tékmor to the sailors. Secondly, certain winds, the regular ones, namely Zephyr, Boreus and Notos, which always blow at the same times and in the same directions, constitute the póroi of the sea's expanse. It is they which carry the ships from one shore to the other, in one definite direction, over the vast surface of the sea "as if along the current in a river". The Peri animênon stresses that certain winds are particular to certain types of crossing. Between them, along fixed courses, they link the various parts of the Greek world together. When, in the Odyssey, Athena wishes to save Odysseus, she commands the winds to sleep, she chains up tôn állon anêmôn keleíthous, all the paths of the winds with the exception of Boreus who then plots out one, single póros. In contrast, an áporos ánemos is either a wind so violent that it is impossible either to make use of it or to fight against it, or else a total absence of wind like that experienced by the Greeks at Aulis, which placed them en aporiai tou plôu pollêi, made it totally impossible for them to sail.

These regular winds whose courses give direction to the
expanses of the sea and make it possible to cross it stand in contrast to the storm winds which Hesiod describes in the same terms as the squalls (thiellai) of Tartarus: they arise unexpectedly, blowing wildly from all sides at once, confusing all the directions of space in their disordered eddies. 97 The regular winds come from the gods. According to Hesiod they are the offspring of Eós and Astraios. 98 Eós is the light of day which appears when the dawn breaks at the gates of the sea at the point, tēkmor, of the East where the sun rises from the Ocean into the sky. Astraios is the nocturnal light purveyed by the twinkling stars when the sun, having completed its course, once more plunges into the Ocean at the point which is the tēkmor of the West. These winds are the elder brothers of the morning star and of all the luminous bodies. In his Phainomena, Aratos stresses this relationship between the winds and the stars; the directions taken by the former are adjusted to the movements of the latter. 99 By means of their paths, thus harmonised, they establish the East and the West, and the North and the South, thus giving orientation to a space which, without them, would remain formless and undefined.100

The chaotic winds do not come from the gods; they are unrelated to the luminous bodies but are instead connected with the realm of night. 101 They emerged from the corpse of Typhon which Zeus threw into Tartarus. According to Pherecydes the thiellai, like the sons of Boreus and the Harpies, have Tartarus as their domain or moira. According to some versions, the storm winds come from the mouths of hell, the bóthroi; 102 according to others they are born out on the high seas, in the misty expanse of the open deeps which some authors sometimes call chásma, as they do Tartarus. 103 When they blow over the Póntos they not only bring with them disorder to the pórói and confusion to all the directions of space, but they also make the sea and the sky indistinguishable from each other, drowning them both in the same impenetrable night. In this sense, through them the expanse of the sea is returned to its original state of chaos, to the áporon and the atēkmarton. Everything becomes confused once more in this state described as Night, Darkness, Erebus, dark cloud, black cloud, fog or misty darkness (Nux, skótos,
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Érebos, homichlē skotōessa, kuanēē nephēlē, achiōs, sōphos ērēoidēs). In Homer, when Zeus is contemplating the destruction of a ship, he waits until sight of land is lost, until there is 'only sky and water to be seen, and then the son of Kronos summons up a black cloud, kuanēē nephēlē, over the hollow ship and this makes the sea grow dark'.

Aeschylus is more precise. He writes of the fury of the wild winds when the swell of the seas (póntou) is about to 'confuse and obliterate (sugkōsien) the path (diōdous) of the stars in the sky'.

Valerius Flaccus illuminates the mythical background to these images of the storm at sea. He, following many other authors, describes the Black Rocks, the Kuāneai which are also known as the 'Shifting Rocks', the Plagktai, that is to say the skoltos pōros referred to by Apollonius Rhodius, the twisting passage through which no ship can pass: the rocks move from side to side, constantly clashing together like a door which slams shut and becomes a smooth wall as soon as anybody attempts to pass through it. They also move up and down, rising from the depths of the abyss of the sea right up to the sky.

Situated at the furthermost confines of the world, these are the impassable 'gates' the columns to which form the pillars of the sky, kiones ouranoû, but instead of being fixed like the pillars of Atlas and keeping the Above constantly at a distance from the Below, these are still shifting and are forever mixing the waters of the sea with the fire of the sky. Even as early as in Homer, the ship which attempts to pass through them is caught both by the waves which roar beneath them and by the whirlwinds of fire, thúellai purōs, which burn at their summit. Pindar compares them to the gales in a storm: according to him the double rocks are alive (zōai), they roll (kulindes-konto) from side to side faster than the swarms of deafening winds.

Now, for Valerius Flaccus, the Black Rocks are the exact spot where, deeply hidden in the ground, lies the path iter, taken by the storm winds when they rise from the underworld to the surface of the sea. That is where they usually spring up to mix the sky with the sea, miscere polum fretumque; as soon as they escape night weighs down on all things with a sky as black as pitch, piceo premit nox omnia caela. Similarly, when Typhon appears above the sea he
brings night and mixes the Above with the Below, extulit adsurgens noctem, imaque summis miscuit.\textsuperscript{118} However, it is in Apollonius Rhodius that the full cosmic significance of the storms on the high seas becomes apparent. When the ship sets out, Orpheus sang of the setting in order of the world, when the stars first made their appearance together with the paths of the moon and the sun, to be a \textit{tēkmai} fixed forever in the sky. Towards the end of its journey, out on the wide gulf of the sea, \textit{mēga laima}, the ship is caught in a ‘daunting night’, described as \textit{katoûlās}. This phenomenon is described in two ways.\textsuperscript{114} It is a whirlwind in which all the winds are knotted and twisted together in an inextricable tangle; and it is an impenetrable darkness, as black as pitch. Apollonius writes: ‘The stars cannot pierce through this Night, nor can the rays of the moon, as if black chaos (\textit{mēlan chā só}) had fallen from the sky or darkness, \textit{skotio}, had risen from the depths of the Barathros’.\textsuperscript{113} This is the black chaos that blankets the sea the moment when, in the absence of regular winds and the shining light of the stars, the \textit{Pōntos} returns to its state of \textit{áporon} and \textit{atēkmartōn}. In the \textit{Idylls}, Theocritus describes the ship which, through not taking account of the setting and rising of the stars is swept up in terrible storms. It is caught in the night. But all of a sudden, through the intercession of the Dioscuri, the storm dies down and a luminous calm, \textit{liparē galēnē}, descends. The dark clouds are parted and in the midst of them, \textit{Arctoi ephānēsan}, the Bears appear together with the light of the Crib, indicating (\textit{semainousa}) a time in every way favourable to sailing.\textsuperscript{118}

The salvation of the Argonauts is similarly likened to the world suddenly emerging into light out of the primordial night.\textsuperscript{117} Jason, finding that he is unable to steer the ship, prays to Apollo \textit{Aiglētēs}. In the total darkness the god suddenly causes a brilliant light to shine in the sky from the top of the Black Rocks, the \textit{Melântesioi}. The Argonauts then discern an island in the expanse of waters and set sail towards it. It turns out to be called \textit{Anaphē}. \textit{Anaphē}, she who appears, calls to mind Metis-Phanes who, by moving its shining wings, is to say by setting the winds and stars in motion, disperses the ‘shadowy darkness’ and thus brings in the ‘brilliant light’.\textsuperscript{118} Furthermore, Apollo's title of
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Aiğlētēs calls to mind the name of the sacrifice at Delphi which commemorated the end of the Deluge, when at last land emerged from the infinite immensity of the waters and Deucalion was able to get a foothold there and engender the human race. The sacrifice was known as the Aiğlē.\textsuperscript{119}

Thus the episode in the Argonautica is constructed around the same pair of opposites, black and white, that is brought into play in the cosmogonies, to express the origin of the world: a misty darkness is opposed by the light which makes things visible and sets boundaries upon space.

Alcman’s cosmogony is constructed with just such a schema: on the one hand there is Škōtos, on the other Pōros and Tēkmōr. The same pattern is to be found in the so-called Orphic cosmogonies and in the mysteries of Phyla, as is shown by the paintings in the telesērion. These depicted an old man with white hair and wings. We are told that he is the archaikos Eros but he could equally well be prēbhus Pōros, geraiatatos tôn theōn, the ancient Poros, the oldest of the gods.\textsuperscript{120} The old man was pursuing a woman who was totally black (kuanoeidēs). He symbolised phōs, light, while she represented skoteinōn hydōr, the dark water.\textsuperscript{121}

Day and night, light and darkness—a deity such as Metis is both at the same time, just as it is both male and female. Through its polymorphic power it transcends these oppositions. In the so-called rhapsodic theogonies it is Metis who, immediately upon emerging from the cosmic egg, gives birth to Núx and is then united with her and so produces the entire line of gods. In Acousilaos, by contrast, Núx and Ėrebus give birth to a shining Metis who is associated with Aither and Eros. And what of Thetis? First and foremost—and of this there can be no doubt—she represents τo skoteinōn hydōr, the dark waters, the night of the bottom of the sea. She is the goddess of the dark depths of the sea and lives en benthessin halōs, at the bottom of the marine abyss, in what Euripides calls the ἄντρα μυξία, the dark caverns which are as dark as the daughter of Nereus herself.\textsuperscript{122} When she rises up from the bottom of the sea to meet her son Achilles on the shore, she resembles a homichlē, a dark mist
emanating from the sea which Homer describes—uncharacteristically—as white, because compared with the darkness of the depths where the goddess usually resides the surface of the water, rimmed with spray, looks light and luminous.\textsuperscript{123} In Book 24 of the Iliad, when Thetis leaves the depths of the sea to journey to Olympus, she wears her kάλλυνα κυάνεων, her dark veil. And as if the adjective κυάνεως, expressive though it is, did not suffice, the poet adds that there is no clothing darker, μελανέων.\textsuperscript{14} It has been suggested that Thetis’ black veil can be accounted for by the fact that the goddess is in mourning—either for Patroclus, who is already dead, or for her son who is soon to die. But this explanation is quite unacceptable. In the first place Thetis would never wear mourning for Patroclus nor would she wear the ritual weeds before her son was even dead. Moreover, we have incontrovertible evidence that the epithet κυανέα is applied to Thetis because she is a deity of the sea and quite apart from any particular circumstances. Through Philostratus we know the text of the prayer ritually addressed to the daughter of Nereus by the Thessalians on the occasion of their annual pilgrimage to Trony: she was invoked by the name Thetis κυανέα.\textsuperscript{126} Besides, in the Orphic hymns, all the primordial deities of the sea are called Κυαναί, or dark ones, for the same reasons as the wife of the τελεστήριον of Phyla. Tethys, the mother of the black clouds, is called κυανόπεπλος, Nereus is κυανωγότης, the daughters of Nereus κυανωγότης.\textsuperscript{126} But these dark deities of the depths of the sea can also bring light, day and salvation. We know from a gloss that when they are saving lost ships (as Thetis, leading her sisters, saves the Argos during the crossing through the ρόος of the Plagktai), all the daughters of Nereus have the role and significance of Λευκωτήτις.\textsuperscript{127} They are the white ladies of the sea. They rise up, amid white spray, from the deep abysses. In Apollonius’ Argonautica the daughters of Nereus propell the ship through the passage way through the Plagktai, Thetis herself taking the helm. It is she who directs the vessel and finds a way through: θυμεν κέλευθον, thus opening up this ρόος in the sea and fixing it forever.\textsuperscript{128}

Among the animal creatures which legend particularly associates with the wife of Peleus and her metamorphoses
there is one whose symbolic value in myth is, significantly, the same as that which Alcman attributes to the goddess of the depths of the sea. According to one tradition which probably goes back, through Euripides to the Cypria, when Thetis was pursued by Peleus, in order to escape from him she deployed the entire cycle of her transformations until the hero managed to seize her and be united with in the form of a cuttle-fish, sēpia. This representation of a Thetis Sepia must have been very old. Herodotus, in particular, tells us that it was at Cape Sepias, or the Cape of the Cuttle-fish, that Peleus overcame Thetis; the entire sēpias promontory where the sea abounded in cuttle-fish was consecrated to Thetis and the daughters of Nereus.

Now, the ancient Greeks saw the cuttle-fish as the paradigm of an animal possessing mētis. For Aristotle it was the most cunning of fish, panourgōtatos. Plutarch names it as the epitome of vigilance and cunning. Oppian calls it the sēpia dolómētis, dolophrōn, sēpai kerdelēi. As early as 1913 a study by Louis Siret made it quite clear that even in neolithic societies the octopus and cuttlefish probably symbolised water and the sea. But the overall image that these cephalopods evoked in the minds of the Greeks needs to be more precisely defined. For the ancient Greeks the mētis of the octopus was above all connected with its polymorphic powers. The octopus is as supple and fluid as the water in which it moves and it moulds itself to the shape of each of the rocks to which it clings. Furthermore, it can even take on their colour in order the better to become indistinguishable from them and to make itself invisible. Aristotle notes, similarly, that according to some writers the cuttlefish takes on the colour of any body it approaches. The suppleness of molluscs, which appear as a mass of tentacles (polyplokoi), makes their bodies an interlaced network, a living knot of mobile, animated bonds. Instead of hair (hōste plōkoi) the head of the cuttlefish carries long tentacular appendices which the creature uses, as it lies on sandy beaches, as fishing lines to lure and capture fish. It is a technique which Plutarch calls a sóphisma. When a storm is brewing it reaches out with its tentacles to grip firmly on to the underwater rocks, in the same way as a ship is tied with a cable to rocks along
the shore or casts anchor in the open sea as a precaution against the swell. When it comes to mating the males and females unite closely (sumplékontaı), mouth to mouth, interlacing their tentacles. The cuttlefish swim along together in this way, united mouth to mouth, arms interlinked as if they were but a single creature, but a disturbing and paradoxical one whose beginning and end, right and left, and front and rear are impossible to distinguish. Thus they are linked together in an indissoluble embrace. (It is an embrace which eventually brings about their destruction for the cuttlefish with the power of binding finds itself trapped, in bonds, in its turn when, in order to catch them, the fishermen turn against the cuttlefish themselves this attachment which links the male to the female.) They swim along as if intertwined, moving in opposite directions for while one swims forwards the other is moving backwards. Indeed, are such terms as forwards or backwards and bottom or top even applicable in their case? The anatomy of these creatures is 'inverted', their eyes being placed close together on one side while their mouth lies on the other side and their heads are crowned at the top with feet which undulate like a moving halo. They move along obliquely, combining several different directions at once like the crab or the seal. They are polymorphic and have pliable tentacles. All these characteristics reveal the cuttlefish to be close to the primordial deities of the sea whose métis, as subtle and flexible as the coming-to-be over which they preside relates not to that which is straight and direct but to that which is sinuous, undulating and twisting; not to the unchanging and fixed but to the mobile and ever-changing; not to what is predetermined and unequivocal but to what is polymorphic and ambiguous.

Another disconcerting aspect of the cuttlefish is its colouring which is initially reminiscent of the complexion, colouring and temperament of a woman as opposed to those of a man. In the Assembly of Women Aristophanes draws a comparison in which he associates the cuttlefish, whiteness, and women. The women of Athens have donned false beards to disguise themselves as men. This prompts one of them to remark 'you'd think grilled cuttlefish had been dressed up in beards'. Taillardat rightly comments: 'Women who
stay at home have skin as white as cuttlefish and even when they have tanned themselves in the sun their tan is superficial and they look more like cuttlefish browned in a pan than like men who are really dark.\textsuperscript{141} It is a point the scholiast sums up with the remark: \textit{leukai gar hai sepiai}, for cuttlefish are white.

However, these white cuttlefish carry within themselves a liquid which is black, their \textit{tholos}. When they emit this ink they create an impenetrable darkness all about them within which they hide—a cloud of night in which all the paths of the sea become obscured and confused.

Following Aristotle, Plutarch, Athenaeus and Oppian all explain how this happens. Aristotle noted that the cuttlefish hides, \textit{kréptetai}, in its ink and, pretending to be continuing on its way forwards, it turns back and is lost in its \textit{tholos}.\textsuperscript{142} Plutarch writes that it behaves in such a crafty way, \textit{technoménē}, as to make the water disturbed and opaque so that darkness, \textit{skótos}, is spread around it which enables it to escape secretly, eluding the eyes of the fishermen. He goes on to say that in this way the cuttlefish imitates the gods of Homer who often surround those they wish to save by hiding them with a dark cloud, \textit{kuanēē nephēē}.\textsuperscript{143} According to Oppian the cuttlefish play their tricks, their \textit{kérdos}, in the following manner: their \textit{tholos kuanos} or black ink is located close to their head. It is a liquid blacker than pitch, a kind of magic philtre, \textit{phārmakon}, which can produce a dark cloud (\textit{achlitos hugrēs}). When they emit this mist of night, 'the black cloud of liquid (\textit{iôhēr achluōsēs}) disturbs the water all around and conceals (\textit{êmâldune}) the paths (\textit{kêleutha}) of the sea' at the same time making it impossible to see anything. In this way the cuttlefish find their own \textit{póros} through the \textit{aporia} they have created: 'they swiftly escape along the path created by the \textit{tholos, diá tholōontos póroio}'.\textsuperscript{144}

In this text about the cuttlefish spreading its night deep down in the water, it is interesting to find Oppian using both meanings of the word \textit{póros}: on the one hand to suggest a way of getting out of difficulties, the stratagem employed by a creature of guile endowed with \textit{mētis}, and, on the other, to refer to a path, way through or crossing.

Thanks to this digression on the cuttlefish we find
Athenaeus providing us with what may be the best clue to understanding the place of Thetis in Alcman’s cosmogony, where she is paradoxically associated both with the nocturnal Skótos and, at the same time, with the shining Píros and Télenor. Citing Matron, the author of parodies, he hails Thetis as ‘the daughter of Nereus, sē pie euπlókamas, the cuttlefish with the beautiful curls (and the many tentacles), the terrible goddess with a human voice, ἡ μονὴ ἰχθύιας οἴσα to laukon kai melan oída who, since she alone is a fish, can alone know both white and black at the same time’.

Notes

3. O. Kern, Orphicorum Fragmenta (referred to as O.F.), Berlin 1963 (1st ed. 1922), fr. 85, p. 157: ‘The august Dalmôn, Metis, who bears the illustrious seed of the gods and whom the Blessed Ones on the summit of Olympus called Phanes, the First-Born’.
4. Ibid., fr. 168, 1, 9, p. 201 and fr. 169, 1, 4, p. 207: Metis, πρός γενέσις; Metis, πρός γενέσις.
5. O.F., fr. 87, 1, 1, p. 159.
6. Ibid., fr. 167 a, p. 199: ‘So then, as he had swallowed the substance of Eukepasilas Protagonos, he contained within his hollow belly the substance of all beings and he mingled the strength and vigour of the god in his own limbs. This is why, with the god, all things were once again collected together inside Zeus,’ Cf. also fr. 167h, 168, 169.
7. O.F., fr. 168, 1, 31–32, p. 202: ‘And having hidden all things [within himself], Zeus had once again to bring him out from his heart so as to produce him in the joy-giving light, through a magical action’.
9. O.F., fr. 168, 1, 3: ‘Male Zeus was, and the imperishable Zeus was a young bride (μυμφή).’
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12. *Ibid.*: ‘Within Metis-Phanes there existed and pre-existed “the great Bronios and Zeus who sees everything”’.

13. Just as Zeus, starting with his heart, ἀπὸ κρατίδος, brought back to the light all that he had hidden when he swallowed Phanes-Metis.

14. *De gen. anim.*, 733 b 20. In the cosmogony of Pherecydes, Zeus weaves a multi-coloured veil (ἔνθρος) which he offers, on the third day of his marriage, to his companion so that, once she has donned it, she wears embroidered on her apparel the entire range of forms which constitute the organised world. Compare Porphyry, *The Cave of Nymphs*, 14: ‘Thus it is that, in Orpheus, we are shown Core, the sφηρα of all beings who bear seed, busy weaving. Elsewhere the ancient writers have called the sky a veil which, they say, envelops the heavenly gods’. On the Orphics’ use of the terms χιτόν (dress) and ἴσυμνον (envelope), with a cosmogonical meaning, cf. *O.F.*, fr. 60 = *FVS*, I, 1 B 12, p. 11, l.13–14 and 21. On the cosmic significance of weaving cf. Nonnos, *Dionysiaca* 41, 257 ff. It is thus that we should interpret the equivalence the Orphics established between σπέρμα (seed) (Metis is called σπέρμα κλωτίν θεόν, the illustrious seed of the gods) and μῖτος, the thread of the woven tissue *FVS*, I, p. 19, l.2). On a fragment of a black-figure vase found in the Calbeiron of Thebes, μῖτος is depicted, in association with Krateria, the Powerful One, next to a young child called Protolao (the first people, the first of the human race); cf. *Ath. Mitt.* 13, pl. IX.

15. R. Merkelbach, o.c., p. 25.


19. l.9–10: τῶν ἱδίων πάντων *τῶν τιτάνων* ragentēn kai apōθετον, the matter of all things being in a state of confusion and incompleteness l. 23–24: *eis adiaphrēt[ō] n...* r[ων] ἱδίων, matter being still indistinct.

21. L. 17–19: And, on the one hand, everything had a nature similar to the matter of bronze while, on the other, Thetis’ nature was similar to that of the craftsman (toi techhuton).

22. Eustathius, ad II., 1154, 25; D. L. Page, o.c., fr. 61, p. 53.

23. Hesiod, Thogony, 722; cf. also the two anvils attached to the feet of Hera whom Zeus suspended midway between heaven and earth, Iliad, XV, 18–20.

In some representations of the Return of Hephaestus it would appear that Thetis is present in the procession which brings the god back, in the reverse direction, to the summit of Olympus (cf. H. Metzger, Revue des Etudes Grecques, 81, 1968, p. 161). On the Francois vase Nereus is shown among the figures who, led by Dionysus, are taking part in this bringing back of the blacksmith god to the sky from which he had earlier been ejected.


26. Hesychius, s.v. Porphaleis; cf. Marie Delcourt, Pyrrhos et Pyrrha, Paris, 1965, p. 36. On Thetis being pursued by Hephaestus who desires to be united with her and who wounds her in the foot (it is well-known that the magic craft of metal workers is often associated with some anomaly of the foot or legs), cf. Scholium to Lycophrón, Alexandra 175 p. 84–85 Scheer and Scholium to Pindar, Nemesis, IV, 81 Drachmann. The second version of the ejection of Hephaestus also throws light on the affinities between metallurgy and the sea deities. Hephaestus lands on Lemnos, among the Sintians. He is united with the daughter of Proteus, Cabirio and fathers the Cabires.


29. Scholium to Lycophrón, 22, p. 23 Scheer.


31. Mythographi Vatican, I, 204.


34. Pausanias, VIII, 61.

35. Iliad, I, 401–6.


37. The metamorphoses of Metis: Apollodorus, I, 3, 6; Sch. Hesiod
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Theog., 886; of Thetis: Pindar, Nemea, IV, 62 (101); Apollodorus III, 13, 4–5; Pausanias, V, 16, 5; Sch. Apollonius Rhodius, I, 582; Sch. Lycephon, Alexandra, 175 and 178; Etym. magnum, s.v. Sepid; Phoebus, Bibli., 149b.

38. Cf. supra n.4.
40. Illustrated representations and literary texts concur in their depiction of this hold which imprisons the god with the power of metamorphosis within the vice formed by two arms linked to form a circle, one hand being riveted to the other. The meaning of the struggle and of the victory won over the god with the power of metamorphosis is clear: a stratagem, ambush or disguise must be found to take by surprise a creature which is extremely cunning, very mistrustful and always on the alert. The adversary must be seized in the bond of the hero’s arms and not released whatever happens. Once its power has been disarmed by the bond in which it is gripped and it has run through the entire cycle of its metamorphoses from beginning to end, the monster must resume its original shape and surrender to its victor. If the latter seeks the answer to a question it must now provide it without ambiguity or deceit, openly and without equivocation. Thus a cunning creature is outwitted by one more cunning than itself; the creature of vigilance is taken by surprise; the master of bonds is himself bound; he who could run through an entire cycle of metamorphoses himself finds that he is caught within a circle; the polymorphic creature is reduced to a single form; what was enigmatic is revealed in full clarity.

41. Cf. J. Charbonneaux, La sculpture grecque archaïque, 1939, p. 23–4. On the basis of the different versions and of illustrated depictions, Ninck drew up a table showing the shapes taken by the gods of the sea (Proteus, Nereus, the Telchines, Acheloos, Metis, Nemesis and Thetis) in the course of their metamorphoses and from this it emerges that the river (flowing water), fire and water are the forms most often mentioned (Die Bedeutung des Wassers in Kult und Leben der Altier, 1921, p. 161–165).
42. Prometheus, 758 ff, the aióniomētis, aghuliomētis one (Hes., Theog., 511 and 546) is even capable of finding a way out of an inextricable position: hoperein kox amēkēnōn pōrōn (Aeschylus, Prometheus, 59).
43. Isthm., VIII, 14 (27).
44. Plato, Symposium, 203b ff. The parallelism between Thetis and Poros, Metis and Poros has been recognised by A. Garzya, Studi..., p. 24 and C. O. Pavese, p. 118 (o.c. supra, n. 18).
45. Plutarch, Moralia, 374d; cf. also Plotinus, Enneades, III, 5, 7. Pánia, here, is associated with what is aeriston kai álogon kai ápereon, without determination, without reason, without limit, like the first hulē in Alcman’s poem.
46. Plato defines the state of penia as one of being deprived, endêas (204a); cf. endeias, 203d) and lacking, áporeos (204b; cf. also 230b and 203e).
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47. O.F. 66 and 67 Kern.
48. Orphic Hymni, 23, p. 20 Quandt.
49. Birds, 36 ff.
50. Orphic Hymni, 6, p. 6 Quandt.
51. Hesiod, Theog., 887 and 900.
52. Alcman, Partheneion I, 13–15, p. 2 Page, together with the scholium ibid., p. 6; cf. 1.20–21 of the Oxyrychus papyrus where it is clear that prósis refers to Póroí. Just as there is an archadós Ærōs and just as Nereus is called géranos and proespaitatos (Hesiod, Theog., 233–4), so there is a prósis Pórois who is the oldest, geraítatos, of the gods—in other words he belongs to the category of primordial deities.

On the significance of Pórois associated with Aísa rather than the interpretation of D. L. Page (Alcman. The Partheneion, 1951) or that of M. L. West (61. Qu. n.s. 17, 1, p. 7ff) we favour that of H. Fraenkel o.c. (supra, n. 18) p. 183, according to which the two principles were opposed as on the one hand an expedient, implying initiative and a relative freedom, and on the other destiny, which implies total constraint (cf. the comparison with Euripides, Medea, 1415ff and Archilochus, fr. 8). For C. O. Pavese, o.c. (supra, n. 18), p. 118–119. Pórois is associated with Aísa as the “way” of “destiny”. To say that ‘Destiny’ and ‘Way’ are the most ancient of the gods is to recognise that Destiny is always pórmos, that it always finds a way and a means to be fulfilled. On these points, cf. supra [p. 127, n. 5].
54. Póroí halós; Od. XII, 259; Plato, Timæus, 28d; Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica, IV, 1556; enaθai póroí; Aeschylus, Persians 453. On the stars rising from the sea and setting in it, cf. Hesiod, Works, 506, 616, 632; Iliad, VII, 422. Callimachus, writing of the island of Delos before it had taken root and when it was still mobile, floating over the fast flowing waters of the sea, says: ‘You wandered freely over the waves. Your name then was Asteria; indeed, in order to escape marriage with Zeus, you plunged from the heights of the heavens into the deep abyss, like a star, astéri isē (Hymn to Delos, 35–8).’
55. Athenaeus, XI, 469f; Sterischorus, fr. 6, 1–4 Diehl: óphra dii Ókeanos pórasis; on the expression pórois Ókeanōs cf. Aeschylus, Prometheus, 531; Hesiod, Theog., 292.
56. Diodorus Siculus, I, 98, 3.
57. Ps. Orpheus, Argonautica, 781.
58. Ibid., 37.
59. Ibid., 207.
60. Aratus, Phaenomena, 257.
61. Athenaeus, XI, 489 3; the account of the Pleiades continues down to 492; compare Aratus, Phaenomena, 254–263 and Od., XII, 61ff. According to Anaximander there were exhalations, ekphoóai, made in the sky through passages, póroi, similar to the stop holes in a whistle or flute, ekphoóai ἀπομάκρυνεν ὀρόεις τῆς αὐτῆς. It was
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through these póroi that the heavenly fire appears to us in the form of stars. Thus the moon appears to wax or wane according to whether these póroi in the sky are stopped up or open (Anaximander Α 11 = Hipp., Ref. I. 6, 4–5). In Aristotle exhalation constitutes the process by which humidity, rising from the waters in the form of vapour and then falling again in the form of rain, constantly makes its way upwards towards the sky, only to return thence to the earth. Aristotle imagines this circuit to be like the course of a river which brings its beginning and its end together by flowing into itself, in a circle, and he wonders whether this flux was not what the ancient writers called Ocean, with its circular póros (On Meteorology, 347b, 1–10).


63. Cf. in Pindar, Ol., VII, 45 (82), the dark cloud of oblivion lacking any reference point, létas atékhmati nêphos, which hides the straight way, orthán hodóin, from the mind. Like a dark cloud, the expanse of the sea is atékhmatos, at least so long as it is not crossed by currents or regular winds which plot the ‘routes of the sea’, the póroi kalès, across its surface. Cf. Oppian, Hal., I, 364; Poseidónes: atékhmatos pereítai; [Orpheus], Arg., 1150: thanks to the powerful blast of Zephyr, 'vou' atékhmaton húdor Okeanou belarúsetai' the water which spreads out in the Ocean so noisily does not lack distinguishing marks”; Nonnos, Dionys., 13, 537: ‘in the hidden depths of the sea without point of reference (atékhmatos)’ (cf. M. L. West, CL. Qu. n.s. 17, p. 3, n3).

64. Cf. Il., XXIII, 316–317: “It is by mêtis that the seerman guides the swift ship over the wine-dark sea despite the wind”. On the relation between mêtis and navigation cf. infra, p. 215 ff.

65. Suda, s.v. ‘astraios teknoairêsthâi”; Hesychius, s.v. ‘astraios semioiásthâi”.


70. Od., V, 270ff.

71. Euripides, Hecuba, 1273.

72. Ap. Rh., Arg., I, 499–500. On this meaning of têkmar associated with the stars, cf. Aeschylus, Prometheus 454ff: so long as Prometheus had not yet taught men about the rising and setting of the stars, they had no sure sign, têkmar bébôion, to indicate the different seasons.

73. As M. L. West points out (CL. Qu. 17, 1965, p. 3, n. 3) the word póros is never used to refer to an overland route, only for sea or river ways. This meaning of a sea route, or at any rate a water way, is most striking in Thucydides, I, 120, 2: ‘Those who dwell in the mesôgeia, not en póros . . .’ To dwell en póros thus means to live close to the shore on the circuit of the sea routes, as opposed to living in the mesôgeia, in the interior.

74. Aeschylus, Prometheus, 477 and 110–111.

75. Compare Od., IV, 373 and Il., II, 342; Od., XII, 392.
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76. IV, 455.
78. II, IV, 361 (absence of winds); 380 and 468 (Menelaus 'prevented' by the gods who have 'bound' his path); 352, 360, 373, 466 (Menelaus held prisoner).
79. II, IV, 373 and 466. For this double meaning of ῥῦκμαρ as both indication (sign) and also plan (way of getting out of trouble) see a passage in Apollonius Rhodius (II, 411–413) analysed infra, p. 287 ff.
81. Compare 465 and 486.
82. 389, 475–480. Cf. in the Derveni papyrus, the role of the moon which reveals to the eyes of men, and especially to sailors, the sign which makes it possible for them to know the measure (arithmòn) of the seasons and winds; supra, p. 139 ff.
83. XIII, 20.
84. II, I, 225–226.
85. Musaeus, fr. 7 in FVS', I, p. 23, 1.11.
88. Plato, Timaeus, 25d.
89. 47o.
90. Od., XII, 69; Hesiod, Theog., 256.
92. Ibid., 743–4 with the scholiion. On the meaning of the expression ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα cf. the phrase μεγά χάσμα πελώριον ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα, O.F., fr. 66a, p. 147 Kern.
93. In the passage of Hesiod quoted Tartarus is called μεγά χάσμα, the great yawning gap (740) just as, in the Phoenician Maidens Euripides refers to the 'deep gaps of Tartarus, Tartarou ... ósussa c[hásmata]' (1604–1605); cf. also O.F., i.e. and Plutarch, Mor., 1674b.
94. Od., XIV, 254; a fine, full Boreus leads us quite straight like the current of a river, ἥνει τε κατὰ ῥόον ... ; 256, all you had to do was take a seat and allow the wind and steeersmen to direct you, τὰς ἀνεμίδας τε καὶ ἐλεύθερον.
95. Od., V, 382ff.
96. Herodotus, VI, 44, 2; Apollodorus, Ep., III, 19.
97. Hesiod, Theog., 860ff. Compare 872ff and 742; ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα ... πρὸ ἀφθάλλα ἀφθάλλι. Similarly, in Homer, the storm winds blow ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα, πρὸς ἀπλάθειν, ἀλλοτρ ... ἀλλοτρ (Od., V, 329ff).
99. Aratus, Phaenomena, 785ff; 905ff; 926ff. On the relations between the winds, the movements of the sun and of the stars, the cardinal points, cf. Aristotle, On Meteorology, II, 4–6, 359b 25–365a 12; Problemata, XXVI.
100. Cf. [Orpheus], Arg., 1049ff; 'Indeed I can see already that a strong
zephyr is blowing and it is not an indistinct (athekmarton) water of the 
Ocean which breaks upon the beaches'.

101. Cf. Od., XII, 286: ἐκ νυκτίν d' ἄνεμοι χαλεποί, the bad winds are 
the sons of night. On the relation between the storms and the world 
HOMÈRE’, Phoenix 21, 1967, 4, p. 242ff. and 259. The author stresses 
that the storm is referred to as being ἀλαίνη, dark (II., XI, 747), 
ερεμῶ, obscure (II., XII, 375; XX, 51).


103. Etym. Magnum., p. 772, 1,51 (Gainford); Dionysophanes, in Sch. 
Apol. Rhod., I, 826. At Titane there was an altar to the winds, where 
one a year the priest made a nocturnal sacrifice of the ἱερος type. 
He also carried out certain secret rituals over four deep holes, βόθροι, 
to assuage the 'wild' winds. One may imagine that these four holes 
corresponded to the four directions in space. The apotropaic action 
of the rite took the form of a setting in order of the winds, as opposed 
to the cardinal points and the orientation of space (Paus., II, 12, 1). 
At the place known as the βάθος, the Bottom (cf. the expression 
βάθισσαν βέραθρον, the very deep chasm, II., VIII, 14 and βάθος 
Ταταρόν, the chasm of Tartarus, Aeschylus, Prometheus, 1029), 
the Arcadians offered sacrifices to the lightning, thunder and storm 
winds, θυϊαί (Paus., VIII 29, 1–2). Here, every two years the 
mysteries of the Great Goddesses were celebrated. A spring and a 
flame spurting forth side by side from the ground showed that com-
unication was established with the underworld. It is well-known 
that, in Hesiod (Theog., 728 and 730) the depths of Tartarus contain 
a confused tangle of the 'roots', the 'springs', the 'extremities' of 
all those things which, by becoming distinct from each other, are 
to produce the organised cosmos: the earth, the sea, the starry sky 
and the misty darkness. As M. L. West points out in his commentary 
(Hesiod, Theogony, 1966 p. 361), Hesiod imagines that the clear 
distinction between the earth, the water, the fire of the sky and 
the misty darkness gradually disappears in the underworld and these 
opposed elements are brought together in what constitutes their 
common root. To this extent Tartaros represents, in spatial terms, 
what Chaos does in temporal ones: the primordial indeterminacy 
from which the world will later be organised into regions and different-
tiated cosmic elements. Anything which, in one way or another, 
brings together or confuses elements made to remain apart and 
separate is thus in some respects related to the primordial chaos— 
whether it be deities with the power of metamorphosis, amphibian 
animals which do away with the frontiers separating sea, earth and 
air, floating islands which, through not being 'rooted', sometimes 
loom up like land and sometimes disappear into the sea, or the storm 
winds which 'in the night' cause 'two enemies until then irreconcil-
able, such as sea and fire, to conspire together and reveal themselves 
as allies' (Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 650–654). In Plato and also in 
Plutarch, rivers of water and of fire in Tartarus run alongside each
other and sometimes flow into each other (Plato, *Phaedo*, 113a-b; Plutarch, *Mor.*, 167a: ‘rivers of fire and the flow of the Styx are there intermingled’). Similarly, the winds of disorder, born from the corpse of Typhon, which escape as storms from Tartarus, appear in two guises: as wet and ‘misty’ winds which bring the darkness of night to the open sea (cf. Hesiod, *Theog.*, 872–877, in particular the expression αἱ ἀφοιδία πόροι, towards the open sea with its dark mists); or as the burning winds which dry up the land and destroy the crops (Ibid., 878–880 and Plutarch, *Mor.*, 364a-b, 366a, 367d, 372a). In the legend of Typhon the monster is associated either with phenomena connected with the water, rising water, rivers or marshes; or else with phenomena connected with the earth or with fire: scorched land, volcanoes (F. Vian, ‘Le mythe de Typhon’ in *Éléments orientaux dans la religion grecque ancienne*, Paris 1960, p. 23).

104. Herodotus, IV, 85: χάσμα πελάγεων, the chasm of the sea; cf. Sophocles, *Antigone*, 589: ἀβέβα υἱόχαλων, the sub-marine abyss. We know that in Hesiod Erebus is the son of Chaos (*Theog.*, 125). The adjectives ἀβεβαῖος, ἀβεβαίος, dark, misty, are commonly applied to the open sea just as they are to Tartarus.

105. *Od.*, XIV, 300–304; cf. also the formulaic expression: Poseidon or Zeus enveloped the earth and sea in clouds; it was night falling from the sky’, and the remarks of B. Moreux, *o.c.*, p. 242.


107. *Ibid.*, 320–322: the rocks are not rooted at the bottom of the sea; but they meet, banging against each other so as to form but a single one.

108. *Ibid.*, IV, 945–947: now, resembling high cliffs, they reached up into the air, now, on the contrary, deep down, they rested firmly on the very bottom of the sea; cf. also Valerius Flaccus, I, 580ff.

109. Cf. *Od.*, I, 54; Aeschylus, *Prometheus* 394. Note that in Pindar it is a pillar of the sky, ἄλοιπον  ἀγωνία, which holds the body of Typhon prisoner under its weight (*Pythian*, I, 16; cf. also Aeschylus, *Prometheus*, 364ff).


111. Pindar, *Pythian*, IV, 371–373. With their horizontal and vertical movement which ceaselessly confounds the directions of space—the above and the below, and the east and the west the Clashing Rocks indeed fill a role analogous to that of the storm winds in the logic of mythical thought. By rooting them to the bottom of the sea, immobilising them forever, the Argo gave orientation to the expanse of the sea. In a way, it set the world in order by opening up the navigation route. In Homer, *Achilles* (*Aitos*, the mobile one but also the Cuneing One) is the master and coordinator of the winds; he has “chained up their paths” by shutting them up in an *askós*, a wine-skin made from the hide of an ox. He lives on a floating island surrounded, like Tartarus (Hesiod, *Theog.*, 726) by a wall of unbreakable bronze (*Od.*, X, 4–5 and 19–20). In Valerius Flaccus (1.570ff) Achelous’ dwelling is again a floating island. One block of stone is the home
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of storms, winds and tempests. The other is the home of divine blacksmiths. For their craftsmanlike activities to succeed the metal-workers must in fact, like Aeolus, control the winds, enclosing them in the askôs, the bellows which enables them to melt and model the bronze. (Cf. the equivalence suggested by Herodotus, I, 67–68, between the oracular pronouncement: 'Two winds blow, forced to do so by necessity; there is blow and counter-blow' and the forge where the blacksmith strikes the iron. In the story in Herodotus, Lichas, the Spartan benefactor discovers 'the winds in the forge bellows, right under his nose; the blow and the counter-blow in the hammer and the anvil'. In Apollonius Rhodius, in order to get the Argo to pass through the pòros of the Piagetai, Thetis has to gain the support on the one hand of Eolus and, on the other, of Hephaestus (Arg., IV, 818–821 and 773–778).

112. Valerius Flaccus, Arg., I, 504ff

113. Ibid., IV, 515ff.

114. Ap. Rhod., IV, 1695; Sophocles, fr. 433 Pearson (together with the note); Photius, Lex., p. 150, 9; Eustathius, together with the scholiac, p. 1736, 32; Hesychius, s.v. katouláda, II, p. 449.

115. Ap. Rhod., Arg., IV 1696ff. The cosmological significance of the travels of the Argonauts has been stressed by R. Roux, Le problème des Argonautes, 1949. He sees them as, among other things, an expression of the conflict between the sun and the darkness. In this respect one significant episode should be noted. The route of the return journey, which is to be different from that of the outward one, is revealed to the sailors by Argos. This hero learnt of it from the priests of Egypt. It was the Egyptians who opened up the routes of the world in primordial times 'when the heavenly signs did not yet accomplish their nightly revolution, there was as yet no moon and the Deluge had not yet come to pass'. The Egyptians noted down on tablets píasat hodos kai paírata, all the routes and limits that they had discovered on sea and on land. Argos had hardly finished speaking when an amazing thing happened: a furrow produced by a luminous ray marked out in the sky far ahead of the ship the direction to be followed by the Argonauts in order to cross the sea (IV, 257–297).


118. Cf. supra, p. 145.


120. Cf. supra, p. 146 and n. 52.

121. Cf. J. H. Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, 1957, (1st ed. 1903), p. 644 where the text of the anonymous author of the Philostrapoumena, together with a commentary can be found.

122. II., I, 358; XVIII, 36, 38, 49; Euripides, Andromache, 1224.

123. II., I, 359. The Orphic Hymn to Protagonos hails the primordial god as he who dissipated homichlein ikotiessan, the dark clouds (6–7); in the theogony of Hieronymus and Hellanicos (fr. 54, Kern), Chronos, at the origin of the world, engenders "the misty Erebus
(Nomichlides). On the usual description of sea, especially the p̄̃̄nos, as dark cf. B. Moreux, o.c. (supra, n. 104). Just as the dark waters of the depths of the sea appear, on the surface and along the beaches, white with spray, similarly when the dark Thetis walks on the waters she is the goddess with feet of silver (Il., I, 538; XXIV, 79; Od., XXIV, 92).

124. Il., XXIV, 93–95, together with the two different explanations already given by the scholia; cf. B. Moreux, o.c., n. 105 and 145, and J. Lindsay, The Clashing Rocks, 1965, p. 55–57.

125. Herouc., XIX, 14ff.


128. Arg., IV, 93ff.

129. Schol. to Lycophron, Alex., II, 175, p. 84–85 Scheer: 'According to Euripides, when Thetis was pursued by Peleus, like Proteus, adopted many forms and thereupon he seized her in the form of a sepia and was united with her'; ibid., 178: 'Following the advice of Chiron, Peleus seized her while she was taking on all sorts of forms and was united with her in the form of a sepia'. For this tradition and its origins, cf. A. Severyns, Le cycle épique dans l'école d'Aristarque, 1928, p. 92; Francis Jouan, Euripide et les légendes des Chants Cy­priori, 1966. F. Jouan acknowledges that the theme of the metamorphoses, which some writers claim to belong to an ancient 'popular' version of the myth, also appears in the Cypria (p. 72). He believes, on the other hand, that Euripides may have elaborated on the material and invented the detail of the transformation into a sepia (p. 76 and 86). However, in the first place this metamorphosis is mentioned in several texts without any reference to Euripides (these are discussed by Jouan, p. 59, n.6. And secondly, the consecration of Cape Sepias to Thetis, the placing there of her union with Peleus, the close affinities of the sepia both through its physical characteristics and, through its behaviour, with certain of the attributes and powers of the goddess of the sea—all these points seem to indicate that Euripides had no need to invent a detail which would have struck his Athenian audience as grotesque taken out of the context of its traditional mythical background.

130. After the storm which destroyed their fleet at Cape Sepias the Persians offered sacrifices to Thetis and to the daughters of Nereus: 'They sacrificed to Thetis because they had learnt from the Ionians that it was here that she had been abducted by Peleus and that the entire Sepias promontory belonged to her and to the other Nereides'. Her., VII, 191–2; cf. Etym. Magn., s.v. Sepías; schol. Apoll. Rhod., I, 582; 'Sepias: the promontory at Iolcos, called by this name because it was there that Thetis, fleeing from Peleus, was changed into a cuttlefish'. Athenaeus, 30d, mentions that the sea round Cape Sepias abounds in cuttlefish.

131. Aristotile, H.A. IX, 37 (622a 8); plnt., Mor., 978a-b; Oppian, Hal., III, 168: the squid (seukhë) uses the same metis as the cuttlefish; 11,
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120: σπιζ ðóλ-μετίς; I, 312–313: σπιζ ðóλφρόν (cf. also III, 156); IV, 160: σπιζ ιερδαλεί.


133. The polymorphism of the octopus, Theognia, 215; Pindar fr. 43 Schroeder = Ad., 10, Puech; Aristotle, H.A., IX, 37 (622a 8); Oppian, Hal, II, 233; Athenaeus, 314f, 317f, 513d Plut., Mor., 978e and 979b–979c. On that of the cuttlefish, Arist., H.A., IX, 25, 19: 'Some people claim that the cuttlefish alters its colour to match that of the place where it is living'. Cf. supra [p. 38 ff].

134. Plutarch, Mor., 978d; Aristotle, H.A., IX, 37, 622a 1; IV, 1, 524a 3; 6, 531b 6; Oppian, Hal., II, 120ff. Note that the cuttlefish is described by Oppian as fishing πρες ιν ραθονξιν, lying on the sandy beaches. The ancient Greeks considered the cuttlefish and molluscs in general to be amphibian creatures, able to live at the bottom of the sea but capable also of emerging on to dry land to feed on fruits, especially olives and figs (Oppian, Hal., I, 307ff; Plut., Mor., 916a; Athenaeus, VIII, 371c). So these creatures belong on the borders between water and land, as it were establishing a communication between these two elements. In a similar manner, seals are both terrestrial and marine creatures (Oppian, Hal., I, 406); their haunts are in the depths, under the sea but they come, like Proteus in the midst of his herd of seals, to sleep on the sandy shores, en ραθονξιν. Psmathea is the name of one the Nereid, Thetis' sister. After her union with Aeacus, the father of Paleus, she gave birth to Phōkos. But before this she had tried to escape from the father, just as Thetis tried to escape from the son, using her powers of metamorphosis. Psmathea took the form not of a cuttlefish but of a seal. Thetis herself, during the Greeks' return journey from Troy, changed herself into a seal (Phoebus, Bhl., III, 140b). The Greeks even believed that squids (τευκτίδες) were also able to fly in the air. As Oppian says, they could leave the air to unite with Amphitrite (the sea) (I, 423 and III, 166). Because they bring together elements which Zeus has taken care to distinguish, separate and set apart from each other—the shining aether, the air, the fluid water and the earth—amphibians are a race "common to" all the elements. Through this group the elements, even though opposed to each other, "exchange reciprocal pledges" (Hal., I, 412ff). This function of the amphibians sets them among the primordial powers who represent a power of creation which preceded the emergence of a clearly differentiated cosmos. They are, in a way, analogous to those 'roots', 'sources', 'extremities' mentioned by Hesiod, which merge into each other and become confused together in the depths of Tartarus.

135. Aristotle, H.A., IV, I, 523b 32; Oppian, Hal., II, 120ff; Athenaeus, 523d.

136. Aristotle, H.A., V, 541b 12, 544a 1; Athenaeus, VII, 323e.

137. H.A., V, 6, 541b.
139. Black is male, brave; white is woman, cowardly, effeminate. As Eustathius puts it, *leukoi hoi deiloi*, white are the cowards. The softness of cuttlefish, and more generally of all molluscs (*tā malāhēs*), as well as their whiteness, brings to mind the delicacy of the female body (cf. Plutarch, *Mor.*, 916 a-c). On this relation between white, soft and female cf. J. Taillardat, *Les images d’Aristophane* 1965 (1st ed. 1962) p. 166; J-P. Vernant, *Mythe et Pensée chez les Grecs* 1974, vol 1, p 150–151. Elsewhere Linton Humphrey has pointed out to us that in modern Crete the term used to refer to the cuttlefish,*soupiē*, also applies to the sexual organs of the woman. Athenaeus, citing Dicole, reports that molluscs incite pleasure and sexual desire (VII, 316 c). Several *hetairai* in ancient literature are called *Sēpia* (Archippos, fr. 27, I, p. 802 Edmonds; Antiphanes, fr. 26, II, p. 172 Edmonds; cf. also F. Bechtel, *Die attische Frauenämter*, 1892, Index.

IV

THE DIVINE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE: ATHENA, HEPHAESTUS
CHAPTER 6

The Eye of Bronze

Because of her many functions and the many different ways in which she was believed to make her interventions Athena, like most of the deities who were city-patrons, seems an elusive figure. Confronted by the problem posed by the multiple facets of her being, a traditional analysis based on etymology and aimed at defining a god in terms of his own particular essence appears to have to choose between two solutions, neither of which can be proved. One might postulate either an original warrior deity or an original fertility power whose characteristics altered with the passing of time. Alternatively one could suggest that, right from the start, there were two Athenas, distinct from each other but complementary and that the combination of the two accounted for the most important of the functions attributed to the goddess.¹ All such genetic interpretations are at fault not only because they try to identify an Athena isolated from the other gods but also because they fail to distinguish the areas of activity which are peculiar to Athena and the method employed when this divine power takes action. One example from the myths themselves will immediately show the importance of the distinction made by Georges Dumézil when he pointed out that the mode of action employed by a god is more significant than the list of places where he intervened or of occasions which prompted him to do so.² In a study on the origins of the Athenian Bouphonia,³ U. Pestalozza has attempted to show that the virgin warrior Athena masked a mother-goddess whose symbol was the plough and whose primary activity was ploughing. Now, one of the principle arguments this Italian scholar uses to promote his theory is a myth reported by Servius in his Commentary to the Aeneid.⁴
'Once upon a time there lived in Attica a young girl called Murmix. Athena was very fond of her both because she was a virgin and also because she was clever with her hands. One day her benevolence was changed to hatred. This is why: Athena had seen Demeter invent corn and she wanted to show the inhabitants of Attica how they could obtain this fruit of the earth more rapidly. So she invented the plough. But Murmix, who knew about Athena’s invention, made so bold as to steal the ploughshare and went to the men, declaring to all and sundry that the gift of Demeter would only bear fruit if men used her invention which alone was able to turn over the earth and make it easy for the corn to grow'. We may pass over the anger of Athena and the punishment meted out to Murmix who was changed into an ant and condemned to have to steal a few grains of corn in order to survive. What does this myth show us? In it Athena undeniably appears as a divine power directed towards work on the land and, to be more specific, towards ploughing and its productive effects. But does this mean, as Pestalozza claims, that she is a mother-goddess, a power of fertility and fecundity? On the contrary, the entire story demonstrates that, although Demeter and Athena here share a common field of activity, their respective modes of action and means of intervention are radically different.

In the land of Attica which is the first to receive the gift of Demeter Athena intervenes as a power endowed with sollertia, manual skill and practical intelligence: it is she who makes the instrument, the technical object which will make it easier to harvest the corn of Demeter. As opposed to Demeter, the deity of cultivated, fertile land, Athena represents the skill and technical inventiveness which can complement the activity peculiar to the goddess of cereals. True, there is no hard and fast division here. According to some mythical traditions Demeter herself brings, along with her cereal riches, the instruments which help to cultivate them and make it possible to feed upon cultivated plants: it is she who presents men with the plough and the mill. But in this case the instruments revealed to men by Demeter are simply the more or less indispensable complements to the cultivated life for which this goddess is responsible. In
her capacity as the great deity who presides over agriculture Demeter can cover every aspect of the cultivation of cereals, including those which are, strictly speaking, technical. Nevertheless, however wide the scope of her domain, Demeter's mode of activity never varies: its nature is to promote fertility and is never specifically technical. Athena, on the other hand, is a power of technology who may make an intervention in the domain of agriculture. Her activity does not take the form of promoting fertility but is specifically of a technical nature. When Servius' Latin myth presents an Athena inventing the tool used for ploughing it remains directly in line with archaic Greek mythology. In Hesiod's Works it is the 'handman of Athena' who alone is competent to make the farmer's plough, to 'embed the piece of curved wood (giōs) in the heel which carries the ploughshare and then fix it carefully to the beam'.

The example we have given which stresses the manual dexterity of Athena seems to set a high value on this form of practical intelligence which the Romans called sollertia and the Greeks called mēsis. And there might be reason to fear lest, in stressing Athena's technical skill, we might neglect her activities as a warrior power and her superiority over the other gods in the profession of arms. However, we would point out that the reference to mēsis is fully justified by the very nature of Athena: of all the gods she, as much as Zeus himself, is the power who shows the closest affinities with the goddess Metis. For if Zeus swallowed Metis in order to become pregnant with mēsis', Athena is the daughter whom Metis was expecting at the very moment when she allowed herself to be taken by surprise.

It is through her mother then that Athena is well-endowed in metis and that she is born pollēboulos and poliamēsis; and it because she is the fruit of Metis' womb that she herself is sometimes called Metis, just as her mother was. Now the Athena called Metis whom we know and whose title appears in an entire religious tradition is not—as one might have expected—an Athena presiding over the work of the craftsman or over technical activity. She is a warrior Athena, the goddess clothed in bronze as she was on the day of her birth and bearing the dazzling armour which, according to a little
known version, Metis conceived at the same time as she conceived her daughter. For example, the Athena Chalkioikos of Sparta, who bears the name of Metis, is not simply the patroness of the city whose festival, each year, is celebrated under the direction of the ephors with the participation of all the young men in arms; she is furthermore an armed Athena, clothed in warrior bronze. It may be that the epithet by which she is known, Chalkioikos, 'with the house of bronze', refers in part to certain features of her sanctuary some components of which, such as the roofing or ornaments, may have been entirely composed of metal. But it may also refer to the fact that Athena belongs to the race of the men of Bronze, the warriors whose vocation to war is so total that their very houses (oikoi) are made of the same metal as the arms by which they die and by which they have lived.

Just as one speaks of 'warrior function' in connection with the third race in Hesiod's myth or in connection with the Spartans or the Giants, it is tempting to do so where Athena is concerned—and all the more so since, by renouncing marriage and vowing to remain a virgin, Athena has in a way rejected her femininity and thus emphasised her quality as a warrior to the maximum degree. But in the domain of war, as in that of technology, the essential term by which a divine power can be defined remains that power's mode of intervention, that is to say, in this case, the particular way that Athena uses the mētis with which she is so richly endowed.

We must examine at greater length how it is that 'prudence' makes it possible to master the horse and to guide a ship through squalls during the night. But first we must briefly indicate how this same form of intelligence can play a role in the theatre of war directed by this bronze-clad power. It is true that in making sallies against enemy positions a sure eye and speed of execution are required as well as courage; for lying in wait and setting ambushes the prudence of the fox and the dexterity of the krypeia are necessary if one is to remain unseen and not be taken by surprise; all these military operations demand qualities of cunning and duplicity which the fourth century Greeks later acclaimed in their generals and stratēgoi, their professional leaders in a type of warfare which had by then become much more technical. It is also
true that in some of these manoeuvres Athena's assistance and advice were sometime called upon. But the métis of the goddess in armour also employs other, more secret, means which draw upon disturbing magic craft and mysterious spells.

According to the mythical accounts of her birth, the daughter of Zeus and Metis made her appearance amid a burst of light and tumult: 'shining in the brilliance of her arms, a dazzling vision of bronze', she came into the world emitting a great war cry.31 'This Athena cannot be dissociated from the arms she bears, arms which Metis herself conceived and wrought as a blacksmith's true masterpiece, all the more wondrous in that the métis which gives them the life that shines in the metal enhances the dazzling intelligence or métis of the child born from Zeus and the wife he swallowed up. The glare and sound of bronze express the warrior power which Athena possesses and which, in the Iliad in particular, she causes to flash forth in battles and affrays,23 for example when Achilles, to prevent the Trojans from carrying off the body of Patroclus, advances right up to the trench enclosing the Greek camp. He is not clad in his own armour as Patroclus is wearing that, and he has not yet received the armour that Thetis has gone to fetch from Hephaestus.33 But, for the moment, Athena lends him hers. She throws her long-fringed aegis over his shoulders and makes a brilliant flame leap from his body, a radiance which extends up to the aether. Having arrived at the trench, face to face with the Trojans, Achilles halts and lets out a shout 'and Pallas Athene for her part lets her voice be heard... it resembles the shattering sound of the trumpet on the day when enemies, destroying human life, fall upon a city'. The immediate effect is a panic-stricken rout: 'Hardly have they heard the voice of bronze (ópa chálkeon) than each man's heart is troubled'. The horses turn back and their drivers lose their heads, 'seeing the bright flame burning, terrible to behold', on the brow of the warrior, the flame 'whose brightness comes from the goddess with the dazzling gaze', Athena Glaukopis.26

In order to make the warrior she has chosen to protect invincible the daughter of Zeus covers him with the 'terri-
fying' aegis, half-shield, half-breastplate which is surmounted with the masks of Rout (Phóbos), Strife (Éris) and the monstrous head of the Gorgon. This is the absolute weapon which Hephaestus was believed to have given to Zeus to spread panic in the ranks of men or, perhaps, according to an alternative tradition, which Metis herself forged for her daughter, thus presenting Athena with a weapon 'over which nothing can prevail, not even the thunderbolt of Zeus'. Like the shaft of fire belonging to the Sovereign of the gods, the aegis smites the enemy with paralysis like that of a thunderbolt, the magic power of which is here reinforced by the mask of the Gorgon with its gaze of death which freezes all that it alights upon into the immobility of stone. This mesmerising power of the Gorgon which is deployed by the aegis is, in Homer's epic, also acknowledged to exist in the eyes of the frenzied warrior who is possessed by Lússia, Madness, or in the terrible glare projected by a shield of bronze.

The aegis, the Gorgon, the dazzling fire and the shattering voice are all aspects of the warrior magic which Athena Glaukópis possesses and whose secret lies in her flashing, mesmerizing gaze. Like the nocturnal bird which follows her wherever she goes, the screech-owl (glaux), which attracts and terrifies other birds with the fixity of its eye full of fire as much as by its cry, Athena triumphs over her enemies with the eye and also through the voice emitted by her weapons of bronze, the weapons which Homer often likens to the shattering flare of lightning and the rumbling sound of thunder. The 'voice of bronze' which Athena and her protégé sound out together when they give their war cry is, quite simply, what corresponds in the realm of sound to the 'eye of bronze' with which the daughter of Metis—whom the Greeks call the goddess 'with the brilliant gaze' (glaukópis) and the power 'with the sharp eye' (oxúderkés) —mercilessly transfixes her enemies.

In the field of war the 'prudence' or mētis of Athena operates as a mesmeric mechanism which incorporates certain magical aspects of the behaviour of the archaic warrior such as his grimacing countenance, his Gorgon-like gaze and his war cries, together with various religious attri-
butes connected with metal: for instance, the glittering of swords, the flashing of helmets and the muffled sounds made by harness trappings of bronze. However, the 'piercing glance' projected by the weapons of Athena is not the same as the harmful and malicious look cast upon their neighbours' harvests by the oxuderkeis Telchines, the blacksmiths who guard their secrets so jealously. Athena does not make her own weapons of war. Rather, she herself, as the goddess who emerged fully armed from Zeus skull, is the product of a metallurgical operation. Her blazing gaze is not the evil-eye cast by the artisan but rather the terrifying flashing of bronze which has been wrought for warlike purposes. This is not to say that, on a theological level, there was the same separation between manual activities and the profession of arms that existed within a number of city-states. The mētis of Athena, which lies very close to the knowledge of Hephaestus, makes use of certain of the properties of bronze considered as a metal produced and animated by the fire of the blacksmith. However, she applies these properties to the field of active warfare in the effective deployment of arms borne or brandished by men of war.

Notes


2. La religion romaine archaïque, Paris, 1966, p. 179; 229. An excellent example of this distinction is provided in the analysis Dumézil made of the god Mars in Rome, in this same book (p. 208–235). Opposing all those who write at length of a Mars connected with agriculture, Dumézil gave a perfectly rigorous demonstration that Mars was never a fertility power even when he did intervene in the domain of agriculture and herding: his modes of action, even within a rural framework, show him to be a fighter always ready to destroy the enemy, a god whose vocation is decidedly that of a warrior.


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6. Hesiod, Works, 430ff ed. P. Mazon, Paris 1914, p. 106ff, for the commentary. Other arguments could be advanced, notably Athena's twofold significance in Boeotia and Thessaly where she is known as Boïdote and Boarmia: Schol. in Lycophron, Alex., 359 and 520 Scheer. Tzetzes, who emphasised the part played by phrónësis, prudence, in the ancient sense of the word, which is part of the skill of adjusting and binding, is without doubt in the right in contrast to Pestalozza who uses such evidence to support the thesis of a 'Mediterranean' Athena (art. cit. p. 444).

7. II., V, 262; Od., XVI, 282; Homeric Hymn to Athena(1), 2. In Od., XIII, 298–299, Athena reminds Odysseus that, of all the gods, it is she who is admired for her méthis and tricks, hérade.

8. Orphic Hymns, 32, 10.


17. The scope of the questions raised deserves to be treated at greater length. However, we will restrict ourselves to indicating just a few points rather than consider the matter exhaustively at this point.

18. II., XIII, 275: the lókos is the supreme trial in which the courage of the warriors is revealed. It is trial of bravery and of intelligence.

19. Xenophon, Cyropédie, I, 6, 27; Memorabilia, III. 1, 6.
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20. As is the case in the nocturnal expedition led by Odysseus and Diomedes, in which they conquer Dolon, the cunning one, who is disguised in a wolf skin (II, X, 272–464).


23. This armour, wrought by Hephaestus, will be brighter than fire (II, XVIII, 610).

24. The trumpet is an instrument with a sharp sound (οξιφόνος) whose use in battle was believed to have been invented by Athena, an Athena whom the people of Argos called ‘Athena with the sharp glance’, οξυδαρκής, and also ‘with the trumpet of war, σάλπιξ’. Cf. Paus., II, 21, 3 (the sanctuary of Σάλπιξ on the Agora); Etym. Magn., 708, 2 and Schol. Lyc. p. 195 Scheer (the invention of the trumpet by Athena; Anthol. Palat., VI, 46, 3; 151; 159; 194) (dedication of the instrument to Athena); lecythus with red figures of the first half of the fifth century, BCH, 1966, p. 741, fig. I: a ‘trumpet’ Athena.

25. II, XVIII, 222.

26. Ibid., 227.


29. II, XV, 309.


31. II, XXI, 401

32. II, VIII, 349 (Hector: ‘in his eyes there shines the gaze of the Gorgon’); XI, 36 (the shield of Agamemnon).

33. Democritus, FVS, II, 127, 13ff; J. Lydus, De Mens., IV, 54; Aristotle, Hist. Anim., IX, 2, 609a 15; Aelian, Nat. Anim., I, 29. The meanings of glaukos—the colour light blue, a flash (cf. the collected material in P. Chantraine, ‘Grec glaukos, Glaükos et mykénien Karaubo’ in Mélanges J. Carcopino, Paris 1966, p. 193–203) support an interpretation suggested some time ago by W. F. Otto (Gli dei della Grecia, Florence, 1955 p. 68–69) but developed many years earlier by Jessen (s.v. “Glaukopis”, R. E. (1901) c. 1404ff). Cf. also L. Lacroix ‘La chouette et le croissant sur les monnaies d’Athènes’, L’Antiquité Classique 34, 1965, p. 130–143. In a recent study, ‘La chouette d’Athènes’ (Rev. Études Anciennes 72, 1970, p. 5–30) Claude Meiliier has tried to show that the screech-owl was borrowed from Athena Ergôs, the goddess of the spinning women, and was added to the attributes of the warrior and aristocratic Athena of the Acropolis in the fourth century. The author would like to account for this transformation by the ‘class struggle’ (p. 30) and the rise of the déme. But we should not forget that weaving and woolwork also involve the matis of Athena. It would not be difficult to demonstrate this point and in doing so one would no doubt be led to pose the
problem recognised by Claude Meilier in other terms and to formulate it in the categories which the Greeks themselves used in thinking about technological activity.

34. II., XI, 16, 44-46; 83; XVII, 591-6 etc.

35. Athena: glaukopis, gorgōpis, oxuderkēs, optillais, opthalmēis and narkaiā. At Argos, where she is associated with the oxiphōnos trumpet, Athena is the object of a cult addressed to her as oxuderkēs (Paus. II, 24, 2) and she is associated with Diomedes, his warrior exploit and his shield.

36. All these spectacular aspects of warfare are archaic features which were relegated to the heroic past by the advent of hoplite tactics as early as the seventh century. Nevertheless, they remained elements in the ideological parlance of the city state, in particular in tragedy.


CHAPTER 7

The Live Bit

We have learnt from the work of Georges Dumézil that the best way to define a deity is to differentiate it from other deities and classify it. When we undertake to define the reciprocal relationships existing between the various gods and to establish the positions they occupy in relation to each other, we must take as our fundamental point of departure the forms of complementarity and opposition which link or separate any two divine powers, considering them under the three heads of religious practice, myth and graphic art. There are sufficient grounds for undertaking an analysis of this kind if there is evidence of a more or less close relationship between two deities within the framework of a single sphere of activity. Such is the case, in several contexts, for Athena and Poseidon. So let us, without more ado, take the example we have decided to examine: in the Greek world there was an Athena Hippia who was closely associated with a Poseidon Hippios. The two deities share a single domain, that of the horse whether in harness or mounted, and regardless of whether chariot training or riding be involved.

Of all the places where an 'equine' Athena is worshipped together with the Poseidon who presides over horses,1 Corinth is perhaps if not the most important at any rate the most interesting. When Pausanias visited the city in the second century AD., he did not fail to note the presence of a sanctuary devoted to the Athena known as Chalinitis, 'of the bit', situated not far from the tomb of the children of Medea. The author of the Periegesis took the opportunity to make a brief comment: 'Athena was, they say, the deity who gave assistance of the most practical kind to Bellerophon, particularly in presenting him with Pegasus after she, with
her very own hand, had tamed him and broken him in to the bit (χειρόσαμενέ ... ἐνθείσα αὐτῇ τοῖς ἱπποῖς χαλίνών).² The myth which Pausanias refers to in this way is well-known to us from the detailed account of it given by Pindar in one of his Olympians, the thirteenth, written in 464 to celebrate the double victory, in both the foot race and in the Pentathlon, of an illustrious Corinthian:

Once Bellerophon strove vainly, beside the spring, in his eager desire to bind (σείχατε) Pegasus, the son of the Gorgon crowned with snakes, until at last Pallas brought him the bit like a golden band. Thereupon his dream became reality; the daughter of Zeus said to him, 'You are sleeping, son of Aeolus; come, take this instrument to charm your steed (φαλάντον ... ἱππαίον), and, sacrificing a white bull, go and present it to your grandfather, the Tamer of horses, Damastos'. These were the words which Bellerophon thought he heard Athena of the dark aegis say to him as he slumbered in the darkness. At once he leaped to his feet and, seizing the wondrous (τέρας) object which lay beside him, he gladly went and found the seer of the land, the son of Coiranos, and told him the whole story—how, at the bidding of the oracle, he had lain down to rest for the night, on the altar of the goddess, and how Athena herself, the daughter of Zeus who hurls the thunderbolt, had given him the golden object which tames wild (δαμασιφρόν) strength. The seer bade him obey this dream with all speed and when he had sacrificed the powerful four-footed beast to the god who bears the earth, to dedicate an altar to Athena Hippe ... Then, full of fire, the warrior Bellerophon seized the horse which gallops in the sky and placed in its mouth the magical instrument which was to make his steed docile (phasismon praû).³

Like most of the myths recounted in Pindar's epinician odes, the story of Bellerophon, which forms a part of the panygyric for a Corinthian who had been victor both in racing
and in the pentathlon, has a paradigmatic significance as is shown by the entire structure of the poem. Even in the introduction, which is dedicated to the ingenious discoveries or 'sophisms' of ancient Corinth, Pindar announces his intention—later expressed more explicitly—to use the exploit of this athlete to give praise to the mētis of bygone Corinthians and to their warrior qualities. Then follow a number of details to define the nature of this type of intelligence for which the city of the victor is renowned. First, the poet writes of two mythical figures well-known in Corinth: an all-powerful sorceress, Medea, and a hero possessed of the most amazing guile, Sisyphus. Then he recalls the high deeds of war of Glauces, the son of Bellerophon. And all these elements converge to establish one figure at the very centre of the myth presented within the framework of this ode of praise: it is the daughter of Metis and Zeus, Athena, whose 'prudence' is here linked with another quality, her 'equine' nature, her position as a power connected with horses.

Right from the start the passage giving praise to the mētis of the Corinthians and their inventions, sophismata, seems inseparable from the myth telling of Athena's discovery of an instrument capable of taming a horse and making it submit to its rider. But this same form of intelligence is then further illustrated by Sisyphus and Medea, the two heroes in Corinthian mythology who are most fully endowed with mētis. With his artfulness, his gift of the gab, his skill in disguising his promises just as he changes the appearance and colour of the herds which he lures away from his neighbours, Sisyphus, the Death-deceiver, emphasises the proportion of malice which enters into the intelligence of cunning. As for Medea, the first of a long line of women who are experts in the use of poisons, love-philtres, spell-binding magic, phārma μetioenta, she is there to illustrate the importance of the part played in the technical intelligence, which is the subject of this twofold account, by another, darker, aspect, an element of magic, several features of which we have already noted in connection with Athena.

It is within this context of cunning intelligence of a
technical and magical nature that the invention of the bit and its triumph over Pegasus must be set. As in Hesiod's *Theogony*, the horse which resists Bellerophon is a magical creature: Pegasus is the son of the Gorgon. He arose on the frontiers of night from the headless neck of Medusa, in an ocean setting at the spot where the chthonic waters spurt forth, and he is thus a creature of Poseidon whose mythical image belongs to a complex of representations ranging from the horse-headed Gorgo to the Demeter Erinus of Thelpousa. In the leap which carries him from the chthonic depths to the world of ouranos to which he gains entry as the bearer of Zeus' lightning and thunderbolts, Bellerophon's steed encompasses the whole spectrum of representations of the horse which F. Schachermeyer's analysis has made it possible to define. It is a spectrum which incorporates the essential characteristics of Poseidon—Hippos and Hippios: the horse seen as a chthonic power, orientated towards the underworld and the powers of fertility which reside in fresh water and gushing springs; the horse, as swift as lightning, associated with the winds, clouds and storms; the horse seen as a bellicose animal and a power in war. In juxtaposition to these Poseidonian qualities of the horse Pegasus the reference to the Gorgon must have suggested other images to Pindar's readers—images which, in their turn, evoked what was regarded in Greek thought as a characteristic feature of the horse. In his *Treatise on Horsemanship*, composed at a time when horse expertise had become a fully technical science, Xenophon uses the adjective gorgos, meaning terrible, alarming, to describe a nervous and nettle-some beast. In this context of horse expertise the word is decidedly ambiguous. True, one of the characteristics of a pedigree horse is, as one of the lexicographers notes, an eye full of fire, bielma gorgon. However, the same adjective also covers a much wider field: gorgos suggests other meanings too, such as the flashing of armour, the dazzling virtuosity of the athlete, or the warrior frenzy which transforms the human face. The word gorgos governs the image of the gaze of the gorgon, suggesting the domain of daemonic forces and it evokes the same as what Xenophon, in the same treatise on horse expertise, calls daimonion ti, the indefinable
element of mystery which more or less accounts for the margin of doubt to which any self-respecting cavalry commander may admit where the equestrian art is concerned.

All this would suggest that in Greek thought the Gorgon symbolised one essential aspect of the horse. Many features of its behaviour—such as its highly strung nature, its neighing, its sudden moments of panic, its mettlesome disposition, its unpredictability, the foam at its mouth and sweat on its flank—reveal the horse to be a mysterious and disquieting beast, a daemonic force. In religious thought there are striking affinities, which have been noted by Henri Jeanmaire, between the frenzied horse, the Gorgon and the man who is possessed. A man who is possessed is ridden by a mysterious power which 'bridles' him (anaseirâsei) and the inarticulate sounds emitted by certain epileptics are reminiscent of that frightening laughter that the neighing of the horse appears to be, while their convulsed features seem to reflect the mask of the Gorgon. Xenophon says so quite explicitly: 'Those who are possessed have the monstrous looks of the Gorgon, a terrifying voice and superhuman strength'. When Orestes feels himself to be threatened by the intangible presence of the Erinyes, the sisters of the Gorgons, he says he feels as if he is being carried off by bolting horses: 'It is as if my horses, at a bend in the track, suddenly left the path'. But here it is not simply a case of the similarity between the man possessed and the maddened horse. In this reference to both a driver losing control of his horses and also a horse-drawn chariot failing to negotiate the turning and hurtling off the track, we are bound to recognise the presence of Ῥαξιφός, the Horse-Startler who represents one fundamental aspect of Poseidon Ἱππός. The disturbing power of this daemon to whom charioteers offered sacrifices before embarking upon their races in the Olympic Games does in point of fact come into play precisely at the spot where there is a bend in the track. For Pausanias, Ῥαξιφός is the figure around whom revolves a whole series of legends constructed around two distinct yet complementary central themes. On the one hand there are the stories in which the presence of Ῥαξιφός accounts for the magical nature of the sudden terror which grips the horses. Ῥαξιφός may be a fire-
coloured stone (petras...chroan purrhês) whose dazzling light strikes panic into the chariot team. In other stories Taraxippos is a charm buried at this particular spot by Pelops, in order to terrify the horses of Oinomaos. Elsewhere these tales of terror take the form of myths whose common feature is the image of a driver killed with his team of horses or overturned by his horses. The post marking the position of the Horse-Startler is sometimes said to be the tomb of a certain Demeon who fell, together with his horse, during a foray in war. According to others it stood at the assumed burial place of Alkathos who was so angered at falling a victim to Oinomaos that he became an ‘evil-eye’ or baskanos for all horse-drawn vehicles. Others held that Taraxippos was the name borne by Glaucos, the son of Sisyphus, who was killed by his horses in the Isthmian games held by Askastos in honour of his father. But this Corinthian Glaucos himself appears to be a reflexion of another, Boeotian, Glaucos who met a tragic end, being eaten alive by wild horses which he had been feeding with human flesh.

The horse devouring the flesh of its master, grinding it up between its teeth, is the ultimate image in this series of representations revealing the disquieting aspects of the horse and the measure in which it is a creature of the world of chthonic powers. There are two further myths which illustrate these aspects of the horse more fully; the adventures of Hippomenes and Leimone, and the story of the mares of Diomedes. In the first myth, the horse is the instrument of a punishment inflicted by one of the sons of Codrus upon his daughter who was guilty of succumbing to seduction. Hippomenes is said to have shut her up inside an isolated house together with a stallion driven mad by hunger. It is a strange punishment but seems less so as soon as the connection is made between the name Hippomenes and the name which the Greeks gave, by way of insult, to lascivious and debauched women: such a woman was called a rutting mare, the female animal on heat whose genital organs produced a discharge known as hippomanês. Leimone is condemned to be torn to pieces by a stallion who symbolises her seducer but whose consuming frenzy also conveys all the horror of the powers of the beyond. The second myth tells the tale of
the horses owned by Diomedes of Thrace, a son of Ares. These were mares born on the banks of the Cossinates whose waters were believed to madden the horses which drank from them. The mares, which acquire a taste for human flesh, are captured by Herakles in the course of one of his labours. He yokes them and presents them to Eurystheus, but later they escape and flee to the mountain next to Olympus where they are torn to pieces by true carnivorous beasts.\[^33\]

All these mythical representations to some extent reveal the monstrous nature of a domesticated animal towards which, throughout history, man has believed himself to evince almost spontaneous feelings of trust or even friendship. These representations lead us to focus upon the element in the horse which, in Pegasus, resists Bellerophon. So it is by no mere chance that, when writing of the horses of Diomedes, Euripides specifies that these animals were unfamiliar with the bit, they were *achállinoi*;\[^34\] horses which devour raw flesh are diametrically opposed to horses in harness, equipped with bit and bridle. Similarly, the bit fastened in the horse’s mouth acts upon the wild strength of the animal, affecting the mysterious violence which seems to equate the horse with one possessed or makes it a type of Gorgon. A whole series of terms used in the XIIIth Olympian makes it possible to define the mode of action of this part of a horse’s harness. Consider the words *phìltron* (l.68), *phàrmakon* (l.85), *téras* (l.73) qualified by the epithet *damasiphron* (l.78) and the concept of *métra* (l.20). *Téras*\[^35\] introduces the idea of something which is exceptional but at the same time it indicates that there is some mysterious force or supernatural power concentrated in the bit. *Phìltron* and *phàrmakon* confirm and define this essential element of magic power. The snaffle bit worn by any horse in harness, whether driven or ridden, is seen as the equivalent of the magic potions and mysterious drugs and philtres which Medea—who is mentioned immediately after the allusion to the *mètis* of the people of Corinth—knows better than anyone how to use to give Jason mastery over the bulls in the trial of ploughing, or to overpower the monstrous snake charged with keeping watch, day and night, over the Golden Fleece. The bit used on a horse appears to be endowed with a magic power
based on two things; first, the chainōs is a product of metal-
lurgy. It is born of the flame, purigenēs or purigenētēs and is a living being which never sleeps, ágrupnos, a metal
object made and imbued with life by the power of the black-
smith, the mētis of Hephaestus. In the second place, the bit
placed in the mouth of the horse acts upon it as a magic hold.
It is a bond, fettering the horse’s violence. Pindar describes
the bit as damasiphōn, that which controls the horse’s
mettle (praios and tames it, and refers to it metaphorically
as mētra, an instrument of measure and moderation. Sop-
hocles uses the same image when he calls the curb akestrē
‘whose function is to calm’ and which acts as a drug or
medicine. The same relationship between the curb and
magic is evident in the Thessalian stories concerning the
Lapiths of the Pelethronion. In this part of Mount Pelion
the first horse, having risen up out of the earth, is said to have
been tamed by a Lapith called Pelethronios, which is also
the name of a miraculous plant which grew from the same
soil and was credited with every kind of medicinal and magical
property. All this evidence shows clearly enough that if the
bit is to be effective when used on the horse and gain some
hold over its disturbing power, its nature must, in some way,
be the same as that of the horse itself; the bit too must contain
a strange and secret power within it.

One final piece of evidence is worth consideration, not
simply because it confirms the magical aspect of the horse
but also since it defines this aspect in direct relation to
Athena. It is a potter’s song which has come down to us
through a biography of Homer attributed to Herodotus. The
poem opens with a prayer addressed to Athena, begging
her to stretch out her hand towards the kiln so that its contents
may be successfully fired and covered with a fine black glaze,
bringing a good profit when sold. This opening passage is
followed by one in which the author of the song, supposedly
Homer, considers the possibility of the potters not paying
him for his work. He thereupon invokes a long list of Daemons
of the kiln: the Breaker, Sintrips, the Cracker, Smaragos,
the Inextinguishable One, Asbestos and the One who makes
things burst into little pieces, Sabaktēs. As is indicated
clearly by their functional names, these daemons make pots
burst and reduce pottery to tiny pieces. The threat they pose is made clear in the following image: ἕως ἄναθος ἰππεῖν 
βριτανία, ἰππεῖα τὰ κάμινος, 
‘may the kiln make the noise of a horse’s mouth’. A number of other images support this one: the magic of Circe, her magic poisons and the Centaurs with their untempered brutality. The entire poem is constructed around a double opposition, one concrete and technical and the other religious. First, the successfully fired pots are opposed to the broken ones and then Athena is opposed to the daemons of the kiln. On this religious level the daemons bent on destruction are likened to an uncontrolled fire which causes the pots to burst, the poisons of Circe, the onslaught of Centaurs and the disquieting sound made by the jaws of a horse. Although it is not central to the poem, a clear opposition emerges between a representation of Athena helping the potter to control the alarming power of the fire and that of a noisy, frenzied horse.

The noise made by the horse is twice mentioned by Aeschylus who uses it as an image of death and destruction. When the seven warrior leaders surround the city of Thebes ‘the bits between the horses’ jaws ring out the sound of massacre’; panic increases with the din of the chariots, the screech of the axles and the noise made by the bit born of fire, the bit which never sleeps in the mouths of the horses. This voracious, consuming horse whose mouth, at moments of fury, makes the bit ring with sound (a bit which here takes on the disturbing characteristics of the fire which produces it) is presented to us as an inverted image of the horse which submits to the curb by the will of Athena. All the same, the warhorse which fills the Thebans with terror in Aeschylus’ tragedy is not quite the same as the frightening beast mentioned in the potter’s song. The latter makes a grinding sound with its jaws which—no more than the wild mares of Diomedes—have never known the bit, whereas the former is a warhorse, by definition a horse which is ridden, bridled and in harness. But apart from being the instrument used by the horseman to guide his steed, by virtue of its fiery nature and the metallic clinking sound it makes, the bit which moves in its mouth is also a kind of echo of the sinister sound which comes from the animal’s jaws. In the attack of the
Seven against Thebes, the horse’s agitation and its evident impatience and mettlesomeness add emphasis to the power of the warrior seeking to strike terror into the hearts of his victims. Pindar’s myth also makes this point emphatically. As soon as Athena presents Bellerophon, here described as powerful and courageous (harterós), with the bit he leaps on to the back of Pegasus the horse and, clad in his bronze armour, puts his steed into a ‘warrior pace’ (enoplia paizein), a kind of pyrrhic dance often said to have been invented by Athena, which was performed in full armour either before or after a battle. While obedient to the orders of his master, Bellerophon’s horse makes the flashing of his rider’s shining bronze armour even more alarming by performing this dance of war. The burning gaze of the armour-clad Athena is further enhanced by the sound made by the instrument born of the fire through which she herself confers power over the brutal violence of the creature of Poseidon.

The ambiguous relations that exist between the horse and the bit reveal a particular aspect of the technical object, the instrument which tames the horse, and they allow us to reach a preliminary definition of the kind of intelligence at work in Athena’s dealings with this animal. We can now attempt to specify the reciprocal relationship established by their common links with the horse between the two divine powers featured in Pindar’s myth. In the myth of Pegasus the respective roles of Athena and Poseidon are clearly indicated and a clear distinction is made between their modes of operation. The myth is entirely dominated by an Athena ‘of the horse’, an Athena Hipilla who, in the cult devoted to her in Corinth, is referred to as an Athena ‘of the bit’, Athena Chalinitis. Thus the equine Athena is definitely to be seen on the side of the curb or chalinós. This emerges even more clearly from a remarkable study which has shown that the Corinthian legend about the invention of the bit precisely reflects a particular event in the history of technology. Taking up the hypothesis suggested by Wilamowitz, that the phármakon prai represented the invention of a more sophisticated bit, N. Yalouris has shown, in a typological study, that while elsewhere in Greece the various harness pieces are depicted in a somewhat rudimentary fashion, in
illustrations dating from before the sixth century BC., in Corinth in contrast these same pieces were drawn with the greatest care; and furthermore the coins of the city prove that a cult of Athena Chalinitis existed there as early as the seventh century. Thus the representation of the Corinthian Athena Hippia appears to be integrally connected with the perfecting of a more efficient bit and a special development of horse expertise. The Athena ‘of the bit’ first appears in a society dominated by the Bacchiades, a land-owning aristocracy similar to the knights, the hippēis and the hippocōtai who are attested in various other Greek cities at this time.\(^{40}\) The cult addressed to her is set up within a social group of ‘knights’, ‘horsemen’ for whom the beast of Poseidon is at one and the same time an instrument of war, an economic asset, a sign of social prestige and a symbol of political power. Certain customs current in this circle of nobles and aristocrats would amply justify the preeminence of a deity ‘of the bit’. For example, in the epic about the Argonauts Jason on two separate occasions presents a Thessalian horse-bit to his host;\(^{41}\) and, again, on the eve of the battle of Salamis Cimon of Athens ceremoniously places a horse’s bit on the altar of Athena.\(^{42}\)

In the sphere of technology over which, as Chalinitis, she presides, Athena’s method of operation can be the more easily defined in that it must necessarily be contrasted to the type of invention peculiar to Hephaestus. The fact is that the bit which is born of the flame is a masterpiece produced by a blacksmith and, as such, Hephaestus could well claim it for his own mētis. And yet Pindar’s myth is quite specific on this point: the bit which Athena gives Bellerophon is not regarded as a product of metallurgy, one of those masterpieces to which Hephaestus gives life through his power as a craftsman. It is thought of as a technical object which makes it possible to control a beast of unpredictable reactions. The clue to the mode of operation peculiar to Athena lies in the mythical representation of this instrument: she is the deity who presents to man, in the form of an instrument, a power both technical and magical to wield over the creature of Poseidon. The position of the latter immediately becomes clear. By reason of all the qualities we have noted in Pegasus,
the horse is a creature of Poseidon: through the features which mark it as a power of the underworld, its belligerent strength, its mettle and everything about it which needs to be controlled by applying a curb. As opposed to Poseidon, the master of horses, the role played by Athena appears doubly 'artificial'. This is, first, because she is a power orientated towards 'artifice' both in the sense of cunning and of technical adroitness, and secondly because her action intervenes from the outside, is of short duration and is applied to a concrete object which does not belong to her; because she always manifests herself 'at the side', whether it be at the side of Bellerophon or at the side of Poseidon Hippios.

Before proceeding any further we should perhaps dismiss the interpretation which might seem the more plausible in that it appears to be necessary to relate the figure of Athena Chalinitis with certain facts in the history of technology. According to this view Athena would stand for civilization, imposing domestication upon the horse, as opposed to nature which is represented in this animal by Poseidon. But such a scheme would take no account of certain important aspects of Poseidon both on the mythical and the religious levels. In particular it would not explain why the horse-drawn chariot belongs as much to Poseidon as to Athena. In effect, in the Iliad, it is Poseidon who is held to have taught Antilochus his hipposianê, all the techniques for manipulating chariot and horses. Furthermore, when, after the race, this same hero is called upon to take a solemn oath with Poseidon as witness one of his hands rests upon the horse but the other firmly grasps the driver's whip. And, lastly, it is in homage to Poseidon that horses dressed in all their harness trappings, kekosmênesi chalinais, are driven into the waters of the Dine in the Argolid. However, it would be equally mistaken to link Athena and Poseidon directly to two different stages in the history of the horse, connecting the one with the charioteering typical of the Mycenaean world and the other with the development of horse-riding which became widespread throughout Greece at the beginning of the first millenium through the intermediary of certain horse-riding peoples. Even if proof exists to show that the bit was an instrument on the development of which depended
the phase of horse-training that characterises the use of the animal for riding. 58 Athena’s relationship with the horse cannot be exclusively restricted to the curb imposed upon the mounted animal. 59 The scope of her influence is much wider, encompassing not only the horse but also the chariot and the harness-trappings used in racing. There can be no doubt of the fact that religious thought does not simply reflect a history of technology in which the respective roles of Poseidon and Athena were to represent successive developments.

*  *  *

There are a number of myths, legendary traditions and items of religious evidence concerning Athena, Poseidon and the horse, which present a set of situations through which it is possible to verify the definition of the modes of operation peculiar to each of these two divine powers. We will consider three cases from this body of evidence: the ritual of Onchestus, the legend of Arion and the story of the race between Erechtheus and Skelmis.

The first example will help us to define more closely the modes of intervention of Poseidon Hippios, for this strange Bocotian ritual makes a clear distinction between the team of horses and the chariot on the one hand, and the charioteer in his role as driver on the other. The ritual trial customary at Onchestus is described, in terms which are often enigmatical, in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo: 79 ‘From there, proceeding further, to far-shooting Apollo you came to Onchestus, Poseidon’s bright grove. There the new-broken colt, geenmes pōlos, gets its breath again, although still burdened with the weight of the chariot. However skilled, he may be the driver springs to the ground and goes on his way on foot. Once they are free of guidance the horses rattle the empty chariot; and if they break the chariot in the woody grove the drivers look after the horses but tilt the chariot and leave it there (tā dē klinantes eōsin). For this was the rite allowed to men by divine law from the very first (hōs gáρ tā prōtistih’ hosίh). And the drivers pray to the lord of the shrine; but it is the lot of the god to guard the chariot (diphron dē theou tōte moira phulásein). The analyses carried out by
G. Roux have done much to illuminate the meaning of the probationary test to which newly broken horses were submitted in this land of horse-breeders. As the chariot entered Poseidon's sacred grove situated on high ground, the driver, however skilled, would leap down, leaving the young horse free under the trees. Of the two possible outcomes to the test only the second is explicitly described but it thereby naturally implies its alternative. Left to itself the horse might keep calm despite the rattling of the car and the absence of the driver and pass through the wood without mishap, bringing the chariot safely to its destination. On the other hand, bewildered by its liberty and terrified by the noise of the unstabilised car no longer carrying a driver, the horse might bolt, crashing the chariot against the trees. In the first case the horse proves it is sufficiently well broken to withstand the din made by the chariot and continues on its way with no hand to guide it; in the second, it shows itself still to be a nervous, skittish creature like a colt which backs away when faced by another or is upset by the sudden appearance of anything. It is on behalf of the second horse—the one which is easily frightened—that Poseidon is invoked: the chariot—that is, not the car itself but the whole horse-drawn unit—is placed under his protection.

In the ritual of Onchestus Poseidon's field of operation is defined by three important features. First, it all takes place outside, beyond the driver's sphere of action. The driver abandons the chariot which becomes a horse-drawn vehicle stripped of all that a man standing upright in the chariot represents. Secondly the test takes place in a setting of terror in which the horse may become panic-stricken: the driver abandons the vehicle at the precise moment when the horse is entering Poseidon's sacred grove. Lastly, the specific request that is made to Poseidon is not that he will lead the horse-drawn chariot straight or give the horse in harness the strength and speed which will enable it to outstrip others in a race or in battle. The purpose of Poseidon's intervention is much more limited. The god of Onchestus is to protect the horse-drawn vehicle, *phuláseínn*. He is called up to protect the chariot from the danger which lurks, as we have seen, in the various forms taken by *Taraxippos*, the
Horse-Startler, the figure who is the other side to Poseidon Hippios himself.

In fact it is with the cult of Taraxippos that the Onchestus ritual has the most affinities. The nature of Poseidon’s sacred grove is similar to that of the bend in the track in the Dromos. Whether it be at Olympia or Onchestus the test is the same: either the horse will remain calm, negotiating the bend fearlessly just as it passes through the grove without alarm; or it will be struck by deima, overturning the driver in the same way as it smashes the chariot car. The Poseidon of Onchestus and the Taraxippos of Olympia follow the same pattern. Nevertheless, certain points of difference should be noted: at Olympia the chariots carry charioteers whilst at Onchestus the chariot is without a driver. Furthermore, at Olympia prayers are addressed to Taraxippos before the chariot race whilst at Onchestus the chariot is placed under the protection of Poseidon after the trial. Insignificant as this last detail may appear, it reveals an essential aspect of the role of Poseidon. If the structure of the two rituals is the same their respective timing, far from setting them apart, makes them more closely complementary. The worship of Taraxippos and the ritual at Onchestus may be considered as ‘what precedes’ and ‘what follows’ in one and the same ritual. In the one, sacrifice is made to Taraxippos—that is to say Poseidon Hippios—before the race as a prayer that he should take the vehicle with its team of horses under his protection. In the other prayers are adressed to Poseidon after the trial, begging him to take care of the chariot and horse which has been overcome by panic.

Thus the field of operation of Poseidon ‘of the horse’ is circumscribed in two ways; first by the alternative on which both tests are based—either the horse remains calm or it bolts—, and secondly by the timing which distinguishes the two trials. Poseidon is invoked either before or after the test, not while it is taking place, and thus his role seems essentially negative. He may consent not to frighten the horses drawing the chariot, not to make manifest the disturbing power which lies within the horse which is his creature; but he does not, for all that, confer any control over the horse and chariot. Since the prayers are addressed to him either beforehand or
afterwards his sphere of action falls short of that which Athena appears to represent, falls short of anything that signifies control over the horse's progress.

The second example, which revolves around Arion, will show us how the respective modes of operation of Athena and Poseidon are defined where a mythical chariot with its team of horses is concerned. This may seem a puzzling undertaking given that Arion is a unique horse without equal and furthermore a horse which carries a rider. Through his antecedents he is as close to Pegasus as a brother. Arion, like Pegasus, is a creature of Poseidon, born from the union between Poseidon Hippios and the horse-headed Demeter Erinus. He is an extraordinary beast, 'an amazing sight for men to see' according to the expression used by Antimachus in his Theban Epic in which he plays a key role in one episode. It is he who brings home on his back Adrastus, the sole survivor of the disaster suffered by the men of Argos at the gates of Thebes. There is one piece of evidence we should consider which demonstrates the fact that Arion belongs to Poseidon. It is the passage about Antilochus in Book XXIII of the Iliad. As we have seen, Antilochus' horses are not so fast as those of his opponents but, thanks to the mētis which old Nestor teaches him, he will be able to outstrip them in the chariot race. Nestor assures him that if he manages to take advantage of a bottleneck in the track in such a way as to veer in front of his closest rival so that he himself is able to take the bend first, his horses although slower will outstrip those in the race which are faster. 'And then not one of them will be able to beat you and overtake you, not even if Arion, the swift horse of Adrastus which is of divine origin, were set on your track'. There is obviously a clear opposition here between Antilochus' horses, spurred on by the mētis of their driver, and Arion the powerful who goes like the wind—the purely Poseidonian horse.

Both in Homer and in the epic cycle Adrastus appears as a horseman mounted upon Arion. But in other accounts, which appear to be of a later date, Adrastus is a charioteer like any other epic hero. Antimachus of Colophon's Theban epic describes Adrastus' team of two horses: one is called Arion, the other Kairós, which could be translated as
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Rapid Moment or Fleeting Opportunity. The excellence of Arion, with all his power of a creature of Poseidon, is complemented by the manouevreability of his partner which possesses the knack essential in racing of seizing the kairós, putting on a spurt at the crucial moment—in short all the qualities covered by the term métis when it is used to describe the skill of a driver and the control of a charioteer. Thus in this team which brings Arion and Kairos together under the same yoke we are led to recognise the two aspects of the horse represented, in terms of the deities, by the power of Poseidon and the métis of Athena. A piece of evidence from the Etymologicum Magnum appears to provide clear confirmation for such an interpretation. There was at Colonus a famous spot known as Kolonos Hippios where on one side there was an altar shared by Poseidon Hippios and Athena Hippia and, on the other, a heroon sacred to Adrastus together with Thesous, Pirithous and Oedipus. It was believed that this was the spot where Adrastus, fleeing death, had solemnly invoked the aid of the two equine powers, Poseidon and Athena Hippoi. No doubt he called upon them both together because their complicity as gods was naturally suggested by the partnership of his two horses: Arion and Kairos. We noted the antithetical relationship between Athena and Poseidon in the myth about the solitary Pegasus, the horse of Poseidon tamed by the bit of Athena. In the story of Adrastus this same antithesis is made more explicit by the presence of the two horses. Of course the difference in the presentation of the two stories is not unrelated to the fact that the horses in them are put to different uses, Pegasus being a mounted horse while Arion and Kairos form a chariot team.

In a context involving the chariot where Poseidon’s share of influence seems to be the greater, where, in the light of all this can the line be drawn between what belongs to Poseidon and what belongs to Athena? Alongside the solution suggested by Adrastus’ partnership of two horses there is another, of wider scope and no doubt more general application, that is indicated by a historian of the second century BC, Mnaseas of Patara. Writing of the technique of driving chariots which the Libyans claimed to have discovered,
Mnaseas mentions that they furthermore claimed that it was from Poseidon that they had learned the art of harnessing a chariot, ἥρμα στείχαι, and from Athena the art of driving the chariot team, ἡμιοχέων. There is a clear-cut distinction: the harnessed chariot belongs to Poseidon who is ἵπποδρόμιος as well as συγγείας; the art of driving the horses and chariot is Athena’s. What, to be more precise, does the activity of the driver (ἡμιοχέων) involve? In chariot-driving it is no longer the bit which confers mastery over the chariot. Here the effect of the bit is much less important in guiding the horse than in horse-riding. Nor yet should we simply identify the reins (ἡμία) as the technical object covered by the verb ἡμιοχέων. Athena’s role has wider connotations covering the whole system of behaviour which a driver of chariots must put into operation. It involves a quick eye, immediate reactions and paying close attention to unpredictable behaviour from the horses, to any unevenness in the track and to all the obstacles which might cause the chariot to veer off course but which a prudent driver, a ἰππόμετις one knows how to turn to his own advantage.

These different situations involving horses in which Athena and Poseidon appear as powers in competition provide us with examples of the various ways in which religious thought seeks to express the opposition and complementarity of two powers intervening within the same domain but each with a distinctive mode of operation. So far we have distinguished three formulæ: in the case of a horse mounted by a rider the animal belongs to Poseidon and the bit to Athena; in the case of a chariot with its team of horses, either each power is represented by one horse in the team or else the chariot and horses as a whole are placed under the power of Poseidon while the driver is inspired by Athena. The latter alternative, as just described, makes it easier to understand why, in the Onchestus ritual, the necessary condition for Poseidon’s power over the horse-drawn vehicle is the withdrawal of the driver. The last situation involving horses which we must now consider will reveal a fourth way of distinguishing between the influence of the two powers as they intervene to affect one and the same concrete object.

In the epic saga in forty-eight books composed in honour
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of Dionysus by Nonnus of Pannopolis at the beginning of the fifth century AD., Book XXXVII describes the funeral Games held after the death of Opheltês who was killed by Dēriades, the King of India. In the chariot race two competitors meet who are to dominate the entire contest. They are Erectheus and Skelmis. Erectheus, who drives a team of horses composed of Xanthos and Podarke, is a protégé of Athena. Skelmis is descended from Poseidon whose chariot he drives over the sea. In the long straight leading to the winning post, Skelmis is in the lead with the faster horses. Erectheus is close behind. Each competitor calls upon the power that protects him, Skelmis addressing himself to Poseidon, the master of all equestrian knowledge (*hipposūnos kubernētēra*), and Erectheus invoking the help of Athena, *hipposōs*, she who urges the horses forward. From this moment on the race becomes a contest of cunning against strength. Erectheus, the possessor of a sinuous *mētis*, *aiōnētis*, plans a more or less unfair manoeuvre which will enable him to triumph over the faster team of his rival. With a stroke of his whip he urges his horses on to draw level with Skelmis’ chariot; with his left hand he pulls roughly on the reins of his rival while with his right he belabours his horses, urging them on. Making the most of his slight advantage, Erectheus guides his chariot immediately into the path of Skelmis, veering suddenly in ahead of him; and *mētis* wins the day. Athena’s chariot and team is victorious over the horses of Poseidon. The whole episode is slanted so as to demonstrate the superiority of the chariot team whose driver does not rely upon the strength of his horses but knows how to exploit to the full the mistakes made by his rival and the opportunities that arise in the course of the race. Two lines of the poem sum up the contest between Athena and Poseidon: “The intelligence of a driver full of *mētis* is the true rudder which guides the chariot, *pēdālion diphroyio*”. With this new formula of two competing chariots rather than two horses collaborating in the same team, this last example fully confirms the difference in modes of operation which is the basis for the position of the couple formed by Athena and Poseidon in the sphere of horses and horsemanship.
When Athena and Poseidon thus confront each other through the intermediary of a concrete object—a horse either mounted or harnessed to a chariot—far from merging together with the vague, shared status of Master of Horses, each is clearly distinguished from the other by the form his or her intervention takes within a common field of operation. All the evidence about Athena Hippia shows that her province is that of control: control over the horse by means of an effective instrument, control in the driving of the chariot, whether by guiding the chariot straight along the track without veering off course or by making the most of a favourable opportunity or by seizing the kairós. Within this context of horses these are all aspects of the role played by Athena’s mētis, her intelligence which is cunning, technical and magical, all at the same time. Faced with this power which gives control over horse and chariot, Poseidon is confirmed as the master of horses but, theoretically, his power stops where artifice takes over, whether the artifice concerned be that of the bit or that of the driver. Poseidon is the Lord of the Horse and can at will control his creature’s fiery spirit or release its violence. But he is always seen as a lord who is jealous of his rights. From time to time he may concede them with a good grace but he does not like his privileges to be usurped. There is a detail in the myth of Pegasus which illustrates how well Athena is aware of this characteristic in Poseidon. When she invents the instrument which is to enable Bellerophon to control his mount Athena reminds her protégé that he must first give homage to Poseidon Damaios by presenting to him the horse in harness and wearing the bit and by offering him the sacrifice of a white bull. Athena is acting with perfect propriety, rendering to Poseidon the things that are Poseidon’s.

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4. Pind., ibid., 18–22. Sōphisma is part of the terminology of metis. It is used, for example, of the crafty methods which should enable Prometheus to get out of his unfortunate predicament (Aesch. Prom., 470); it also refers to the inventions produced by the mētis of Prometheus (Prom., 459); The expression sōphisma mēchandithai (Hdt., II, 85) refers to the ploy invented by Oibares to get Darius nominated as king of the Persians. The same text mentions that Oibares is clever, sophos, and skilled in the use of ‘philtres’ or phārmaka.

5. Pind., ibid., 49–51.


13. As well as Schachermeyr's book, we should also mention the analyses by Ed. Will, o.c., p. 204ff and his résumé in Points de vue corinthiens sur la préhistoire du culte de Poseidon', Bull. Fac. Lettres de Strasbourg, 1954–55, p. 325.


15. Pind., Ol., XIII, 63; Pegasus is the son of the Gorgon whose head is crowned with snakes.

16. There are several passages on the symbolism of the horse in H. Jeanmaire's Dionysos, Paris, 1951, pp. 281–5) which deserve to be considered at greater length than has been possible for us in this context.

17. X, 17 Delebecque.


19. P. Chantraire, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, Paris, 1968, p. 233, s.v. 'gorgos'.

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23. XI, 13.


26. Xenophon, *Symposium*, I, 10. This is how we should understand *gorgèteron*. P. Chantraire (*Dict. étymol.*, p. 234) was quite right when he indicated that *Gorgê* lies behind the adjective *gorgê*. L. Robert (*Noms indigènes . . .*, p. 159) on the other hand, writes that 'the root (of *gorgê*) implies suppleness and agile vigour'.


30. Tzetzes, *Schol. in Lyc. Alex.* 42, p. 34, lff Scheer, reports a similar legend in which a bay tree growing on a tomb strikes terror into the horses with the noise made by its foliage and the shadow it casts.


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bits are the opposite of horses which are philein, broken in to reins, in Aeschylus, Prom. 465.


38. Euripides, Hippolytus, 1222-1223.

39. Aeschylus, The Seven, 203ff. Cf. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 1067: the bit emits flashes (astræpei χαλίματος) just as do the breastplate or the shield.


41. Just as in the halter, called a desmōs in Il. VI, 507; XV, 264. Furthermore we know that the expression ‘to give a horse the bit’ apistomaiosin can also mean ‘to dominate an opponent verbally’: J. Taillardat, Les images d’Aristophane(2), Paris, 1965, p. 279.

42. Poseidon is Dàmasippos, just as is Athena (Schol. Aristophanes, Clouds, 967).


44. Oedipus at Colonus, 714, together with Jebb’s remarks in his edition (1899, reprinted Amsterdam, 1965, p. 121).


46. The scholiast who provides the commentary to Oedipus at Colonus, 714, glosses abestra with sōphronistés and notes that the effect of the bit is similar to that of remedies used to cure madness, the mamiades nosoi.


49. Two points should be made in connection with the Athena who stretches out her hand to the kiln. The first is on the subject of her craftsmanlike hand. Athens the technician is not simply a worker, kēnaios; she is always master of the operation, chairein, the artisan who is in control. In speaking of her technical intelligence and dexterity, it is her hand that is praised (Anab. Pal., V, 70, 3; 94, 1). The hand stretched out to the kiln is the sign of the mastery Athena holds over the kairōs, the moment to seize an opportunity: a good potter must recognise the moment when the pots are perfectly fired, not too much and not too little. The second point concerns Athena's intervention in pottery work. There is a piece of archaeological evidence which should be considered in connection with these lines in the potters' song. It is a tablet from Pentheskleia published by
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E. Pernice, 'Ein Korinhischer Pinax', in Festchrift O. Berndorf, 1898, pp. 75–80. On one side there is a picture of a huge screech owl perched on a potter's kiln which is in operation; on the other side we see a gnome holding his phallos in both hands and clearly exerting some kind of fascination upon the man standing before him, who is presumably the potter. These are not simply two forms of the bashania. They depict the opposition, stressed in the potters' song, between Athena the protectress of the kiln, here symbolised by the screech owl, and the daemons of pottery represented by a dwarf with the evil eye.


53. Aeschylus, The Seven, 121–122.
54. Id. ibid., 203–8.
55. Pind., Olymp., XIII, 84.
56. Id., ibid., 86.
63. Il., XXIII, 307. To be perfectly exact, Zeus and Poseidon are both mentioned.
67. J. Wisens, o.c., p. 110–35.
68. In a study entitled 'Homophonies radicales en Indo-Européen' Bull. Soc. Ling. 51, 1955, p. 22–28, K. Benveniste shows that the appearance in Homeric vocabulary of a second meaning for damādā, 'to tame an animal', derived from a primary meaning of the same root in Indo-European—'to subjugate through violence'—might make it possible to pinpoint the introduction of the breaking-in of horses and the
beginning of horsemanship. On the archaeological side we should certainly recognise the importance of the depictions of a man standing between two horses which he either holds with a bridle or lays his hands on. Cf. for example, P. Courbin, _La céramique géométrique de l'Argolid_, Paris 1966, p. 425ff and 492ff.

69. E. Delebecque, _o.c._, p. 62 found but one mention of the bit in the _Iliad_, at XIX, 393.


71. G. Roux, _ibid._, p. 15.

72. _Geoponica_, XVI, I, 10.

73. G. Roux, _ibid._, p. 18 has suggested that _phulassei_ should be corrected to _phulassam_, the infinitive being governed by _moira_.

74. Cf. G. Roux, _ibid._, p. 21, who notes in connection with Poseidon _Hippios_ and _Taráppos_ that they are 'capable of spreading panic among them (the horses) but also of protecting them from it'.


78. 1,345–347.

79. J. Wiesner, _o.c._, p. 111 and 113.

80. Fr. 32 Wyss cited by Paus., VIII, 25, 9.


82. Pind., _Isthm._, VII, p: Iolaos the most skilful of the charioteers is described as _hoppomètés._


84. Fr. 46, in Müller, F.H.G., III, p. 156.

85. Pind., _Isthm._, I, 54.

86. Hasych., s.v. "impesas".

87. Nonnos, _Dionys._, XXXVIII, 310 Keydell.

88. _Id._, _ibid._, 311–12. At line 320ff, Erectheus' chariot team is referred to by the expression 'Marathon horse' which seems to be a reference to an ancient cult addressed to Athena at Marathon (cf. N. Yalouris, _o.c._, p. 62 and _Eld. will_, _o.c._, p. 135ff.).

89. 622.

90. 316. The manoeuvre is directly inspired by Book XXIII of the _Iliad_, as is the entire account of the race. From our particular point of view this can only lend added interest to the passage: the marked opposition, in the _Iliad_, between the horse Arion and the team of Antilochus is matched by the competition between the two teams of horses one of which belongs to Poseidon and the other to Athena.
91. 221–2.
92. There is one text which appears to weigh heavily against the interpretation we have developed above. It is the chorus of Sophocles 'Oedipus at Colonus', in which lines 669 to 714–715 present, standing in opposition to an Athena who is the protectress of the olive tree, a Poseidon who is the inventor of the horses' bit. There are two reasons for this 'anomaly' which explain why in this context Athena is not associated with the horses bit. In the first place, this passage of the chorus of Oedipus at Colonus is developed from a reference to the mythical origins of Athens. Athena and Poseidon are both mentioned as founding Powers of the city of Athens and are distinguished in a context which is familiar to us not only from literary texts but also from several items of pictorial evidence such as the hydria in the Hermitage Museum and the pelike from Policoro. On the first, Athena and Poseidon, facing each other, each give a demonstration of their power: Poseidon makes the first horse rise from the earth while Athena brings forth the first olive tree (cf. H. Metzger, Les représentations dans la céramique attique du IVe siècle, Paris, 1951, p. 324–326). On the second, which was discovered during the excavations at the ancient Heraclaea (cf. N. Degrassi, "Meisterwerke frühitaliotischer Vasenmaleri aus einem Grab in Policoro", in Harkleiastudien, ed. B. Neutschi, Mitt. d. Arch. Ist., Rom. Abt., Ergänzungsheft, XI, Heidelberg, 1967, p. 217–221, plates 66 and 67), the two divine powers are both arriving on the battlefield. Poseidon is riding a horse: he is armed with a trident and accompanied by Hermes, also on horseback. Athena is seated on a chariot drawn by four horses: she is wearing a breastplate and is accompanied by Iris who is her driver. A little lower down, close to Athena can be seen the sprig of an olive tree. Within this mythical framework there is a marked opposition between an Athena who is the inventor of the olive-tree and cultivated life and a Poseidon who represents the power of horses as well as the power of the sea. For Athena the horse is first and foremost the creature of Poseidon. Athena is forced towards the olive tree by all the pressures inherent within this mythical model of the origins of the city.

The second reason we can suggest to account for this distribution of roles is that if the Athenians had attributed the invention of the horse's bit to Athena it would have been impossible for them to claim it for themselves. The existence if an Athena Chalinitis in Corinthian mythology obliged the Athenians to put forward Poseidon who was in a better position to rival Corinthian claims.

We could further point out that this chorus from Oedipus at Colonus must be considered in the context of the lines which follow it and, in particular, of the passage 1667–1668 which contains a description of the horsemen of Athens: 'The horses' bits flash on every side and from every side rises the cry of the knights giving praise to Athena Hippia and the god of the sea which holds the earth, the dearly beloved son of Rhea'. Here the knights of Athens resume their position under the patronage of Athena of the horse. It is as if, as soon as she can be
THE LIVE BIT

detached from the olive tree, Athena once again takes her place as mistress of the horse, at Poseidon’s side.

In conclusion, Poseidon certainly has every justification for delighting in the galloping of horses and in their neighing (as on the votive tablets of Pentestkouphia, near the ancient Corinth, which shows him as a hippios, standing up in a chariot which he himself is driving: H.A. Geagan, ‘Mythological Themes on the Plaques from Pentestouphia’ Archäolog. Anzeiger 85, 1970, p. 33–5). However, when he sets himself up as the inventor of the bit or of the equestrian art he is indulging in imperialistic tendencies—which is something that all the great powers of the pantheon are prone to do.

92. In his Poseidon, p. 152–153, F. Schachermeyr perceived quite correctly that Athena Hippia could not be confused with a god such as Poseidon Hippios and indicated briefly, but cogently, that Athena’s role in the domain concerned with horses is that of presiding over technological inventiveness and skill.

94. Pind., Ol. XIII, 6ff.

95. This sacrifice should be compared to another with a similar purpose in a parallel domain—that of navigation where Poseidon and Athena again appear jointly as intervening powers: it is the sacrifice made by Jason to Poseidon of the sea when his first ship, built by Athena, or at least with her assistance, is about to forge a path across the sea (cf. Valerius Flaccus, Argon., I, 196–198). Cf. infra, p. 233ff.
CHAPTER 8

The ‘Sea Crow’

In most domains in which Athena operates we have a number of rituals, myths and pictorial representations that make it possible to form an approximate picture of this power, whether she appears as the terrifying warrior goddess with the eye of bronze, the tamer of horses who invents the bit, or the artisan who is expert in the craft of weaving. At first sight an Athena of the sea, such as we appear to be suggesting may well seem not only an unlikely figure but also an intangible one; unlikely, for the sea is not an area where Athena appears to have much chance of rivalling Poseidon as she successfully does where the horse and chariot are concerned; and intangible because there is no ritual of any importance devoted to an Athena of the sea, nor any major myth about such a figure. Nevertheless, closer examination shows that a whole series of instances of intervention on the part of Athena occur within the context of the sea and navigation. When, in the Odyssey, Telemachus decides to set out in search of Odysseus, it is Athena who prepares the voyage and guides the ship. It is she who builds the ship for the Argonauts’ expedition, she who selects the pilot and comes to his assistance when he must negotiate a dangerous passage-way. And, on a more general level, it is Athena who invents the first ship known to man—whether this be the vessel belonging to Danaos or that of Jason and his companions. Finally, in several sources of evidence we find mention of an unusual Athena who bears the name of a sea-bird: aithuia.

By taking these facts as our point of departure and seeking to define the nature of this sea-bird, we hope to be able to give some indication of the nature of this area within which the various characteristics of an Athena of the sea will become
apparent. In the first pages of his Description of Greece, Pausanias refers to the existence on the coast of Megara, of a promontory (sköpelon) overlooking the sea. This is the look-out of Athena aithuia. On the self-same spot there is a tomb where Pandion, one of the kings of Athens, is buried. A brief note by the lexicographer, Hesychius, complements the information given by Pausanias: when the Metionidai had put Pandion to flight and expelled his children from Attica, Athena took the form of the aithuia to carry the deposited king to Megara, hiding him beneath her wings. As there is nothing in the evidence for Attica or in that for Megara which provides us with any further insight into this remnant of a royal myth, our only means of deciphering the features of the deity perched on this promontory of Megara are the various representations that exist of this sea-bird whose name she bears and whose shape she assumes.

The ancient naturalists, ornithologists and lexicographers have left us enough information of various kinds to enable us to establish the essential characteristics of the aithuia, although positive identification of the species to which this bird belongs is not possible. Modern scholars continue to hesitate, as the ancient writers did, between a number of types of aquatic birds ranging from the cormorant to the shearwater or sea crow and including the herring gull, the coot, the curlew, the puffin, the grebe and the skua-gull. The uncertainty results not only from the nature of the zoological evidence which does not fit into any of our own classificatory categories, but also—and even more—from the fact that the distinctive features of the ornithological species, which are often very closely related, may have been obscured by the synthetic image of the type of behaviour that the Greeks considered to be typical of a whole series of aquatic birds such as the láros, the diiptēs, the erōidios and the aithuia. Now what are the essential features of the behaviour of the aithuia which we shall for the sake of convenience refer to by the name given to it by several lexicographers,—namely the sea-crow korónē thalássios. First, it is a bird familiar to and operating close to the human race in two of their activities, fishing and navigation. In some literary traditions
sea-crows are the men of former times who invented hunting at sea. When they became birds they took up their dwelling close to ports and cities on the sea-coast. The sea-crow is both a land and a sea-bird and is thus doubly amphibious, being divided between the earth and the sea as well as between the water and the air. It nests on promontories lashed by the waves and walks slowly along the narrow strip of wet land which separates and links the solid ground and the shifting waters. To catch the fish on which it feeds it dives into the middle of the waves and, when it re-emerges carrying its prey, it seems to surge up from the swirling foam.

The sea-crow has a semantic value as an intermediary at the centre of a triangle of elements—the earth, the water and the air. It is thus peculiarly well qualified to symbolise various aspects of the world of navigation. As a sea-bird which leaves the earth to launch itself into the expanse of the sea and then returns to the shore, it can be likened to the seafarer. In this phainomena, Aratos compares sailors at sea to 'sea-crows' which come to rest in the hollows of the waves, allowing themselves to be carried by the swells of the sea.\(^8\) In Artemidorus' Oneirocritica, to dream of a sea-crow means that one will become a navigator with an intimate knowledge of the whole marine element: whoever has such a dream 'will not sail without marks of reference'.\(^9\) But while it stands for the navigator, the same bird can also represent the vessel which journeys along the frontiers of the earth, the water and the sky: the ship too is a sea-crow.\(^10\) The message that this sea-bird brings is spelt out within the framework of the same three elements: 'If the αἴθους meets a ship and plunges in mid-flight right into the water, it foretells great danger. If, on the contrary, it flies over the ship or goes and perches on a rock this is a sign of a successful journey'.\(^11\) There is a double movement here: on the one hand, by plunging into the sea the bird brings sky and earth together, telling of a storm in the offing, as several other texts explicitly state;\(^12\) on the other, by alighting on a promontory, it links together water and land and is thus the harbinger of an uneventful crossing from one point on the land to another, across the expanse of the sea.
There is a mythical episode in the *Odyssey* which confirms the importance of the *aithuia* in the context of navigation. Just as the outline of Phaeacia becomes dimly visible in the distance Odysseus experiences the anger of Poseidon: the winds blow wildly, squalls gathering from all directions, night falls from the sky, mists cover the sea and shore and water from the sky merges with the waves of the sea. At the height of this storm, when Odysseus has given himself up for lost, he is miraculously saved: I no Leucothea, the white goddess, appears out of the spray, bringing with her the veil which will make it possible for Odysseus to reach the land of the Phaeacians. Now to appear thus before Odysseus Leucothea has assumed the shape of a bird: she has changed herself into the *aithuia* or sea-crow. Here, in the *Odyssey*, at a point where the story depends upon an opposition between Leucothea and Poseidon, the sea-crow, appearing like a power shining out of the stormy night, brings salvation to the navigator who is in peril. The significance of this episode is particularly stressed by the talismanic property of the veil brought by Leucothea, which the Greeks themselves interpreted to be the purple band which the initiates of Samothrace wore to protect them from the perils of the sea.

Despite the considerable difference between the respective methods of operation of Leucothea and Athena, it is nevertheless in this episode in the *Odyssey* that we can most clearly distinguish the general significance of the intervention of Athena *aithuia* in the field of navigation. Two ancient interpretations go some way towards defining it. According to one, which takes the form of an explanatory comment upon Leucothea *aithuia*, the sea-crow is a 'bearer of light', *phôsphoros*. Like the Morning Star, the *aithuia* makes light appear in the midst of the darkness. According to the other, which takes Athena *aithuia* herself as its subject, the reason why the goddess is called a 'sea-crow' is that 'like this bird she has taught men to navigate in ships: by crossing the sea from one end to the other'. Teaching men to navigate, opening up a route over the sea and bringing light into the stormy night are three methods of intervention which might appear to have little in common and seem, at first sight, incompatible with the role of a single Athena. However,
these are precisely the methods of intervention illustrated by the mythical evidence and epic literature relating to an Athena of the sea.\textsuperscript{18} In the \textit{Odyssey} Athena takes over the entire organisation for the voyage of Telemachus: she chooses a vessel and anchors it at the entrance of the harbour; when they set out she seats herself in the stern in the place reserved for the pilot and summons up a wind favourable to the vessel's course.\textsuperscript{19} In the saga of the Argonauts Athena acts in a more or less similar fashion. Through Tiphys, the excellent pilot she sends Jason, she guides the steering of the Argos at a discreet remove for a great part of the voyage.\textsuperscript{20} During the most dangerous period, when the ship has to pass between the Clashing Rocks, she intervenes more directly, using methods which two different versions of the same episode make it possible to describe in detail. In Apollonius Rhodius' account,\textsuperscript{21} just when the ship is about to negotiate the 'tortuous passageway'\textsuperscript{22} between the two blocks of stone which alternately move apart and clash together, Athena seizes the ship hanging between life and death: with her left hand she snatches it away from the impact of the Clashing Rocks and with her right she propels it forward at full speed at the precise moment when a way through the face of rock seems to open up. In this first version all that she does is an extension of the actions normally taken by a pilot. The daughter of Zeus intervenes suddenly and to skilful practical effect, just as Leucothea does but while the latter offers a salvation as absolute as it is magical, Athena is simply extending the action she had already initiated through the pilot by taking him under her protection. Now however she no longer conceals herself behind the person of the steersman but herself comes forward to open up before him a route which, without her, he would never have found.

In the second version, the \textit{Argonautica} attributed to Orpheus,\textsuperscript{23} Athena intervenes in what appears to be a quite different fashion. When the Argonauts reach the Black Rocks, Athena sends them a bird which alights on the top of the mast. At a given moment the bird flies off and hovers near the rocks, waiting for an opportunity to find a way through. When at last it darts through, the two rocks, which have
moved apart, come together again fast enough to catch
the very end of its tail feathers but not to stop it reaching the
Black Sea. On its trail and following its example the Argonauts
take the same path and they too escape the trap of the Black
Rocks which, being now definitively bested, become im-
mobile, rooting themselves in the sea. Now the bird which
Athena sends to open up a way through for the Argonauts
and which thus plays the part assumed by the goddess herself
in Apollonius Rhodius' version, is an aquatic bird, the
erōidiōs, probably a type of shearwater, that is to say a bird of
a type similar to the 'sea-crow'. We know that this is a bird
closely connected with Athena from evidence provided by
Homer. When Diomedes and Odysseus are setting out on
their nocturnal expedition against the Trojan lines, the
appearance of an erōidiōs is the sign that tells them that they
will have Athena's help and protection in this enterprise
in which only cunning and a resourceful spirit can secure
success. However, the bird does not have quite the same
significance in the two episodes. Whereas for Odysseus it
is simply an augury, in the Orphic poem the erōidiōs operates
on two complementary levels, first as an effective warning
sign and, second, as an example of the techniques of naviga-
tion. When the bird sent by Athena speeds through the
Clashing Rocks, barely escaping the lethal trap, the path of
its flight indicates the course to be followed by the Argon-
auts' ship. The episode seems exactly like another passage
from Apollonius Rhodius in which a bird loosed by the
Argonauts has to try out the route through the Clashing
Rocks. In accordance with the advice given by the diviner,
one of the Argonauts holds a rock dove in the hollow of his
hand and, standing in the prow of the ship, he launches the
bird forward with the same gesture as Athena's, a little
later in the same episode, when she propels the vessel
forwards through the 'tortuous passage-way', once the way
has been opened up. A detail from the myth of the Argono-
auts indicates just how close the affinities between the ship
and the bird are. In the same way as the shearwater or rock
dove leaves a few feathers behind, caught in the Rocks
as it emerges from the passage-way, so Jason's ship looses
a few ornaments from the stern of the vessel. Whether sent
by Athena or foreshadowing her intervention, the bird of the Argonauts is, in a sense, the ship itself or at least its double, just as the sea-crow is. However, this interplay between the bird and the ship can only be fully understood by referring to certain techniques of navigation current in the ancient world. The bird which opens up the route for the Argonauts' ship is not simply an augury in the religious sense of the term; it is, at the same time, an instrument and procedure in the technique of navigation. In ancient Greece as in Scandinavia or in Mesopotamia, the loosing of birds was a common method of navigation. In an age when the compass was yet unknown, navigators took with them on their voyages birds which they launched into flight whenever they needed to know the direction in which land lay. This technical detail goes far towards accounting for the importance of certain birds in myths of the sea and navigation. There is no doubt such factors are crucial to any definition of the nature of Athena aithusa for they make it possible to establish a greater measure of correspondence between the 'sea-crow' and the handling of the ship. The bird Athena sends the Argonauts in the 'Orphic' version is much more than simply a sign from the goddess. Its behaviour accords with the model we have detected behind the interventions of Athena in Apollonius' version. In both cases its role is to pilot the ship and open up a route over the sea for it.

However, this intimate connection revealed between Athena and the art of steering in navigation only takes on its full significance once we have deciphered the marine setting which provides the framework for the interventions of the daughter of Zeus and Metis. How did the Greeks view the art of navigation in the light of their religious experience of the sea? There are two pairs of powers which will enable us to answer this question by considering their spheres of influence. The first couple consists of Pontos and Poros and belongs strictly to the world of the sea. The second is the pair formed by Tuche and Kairos which has a wider sphere of reference but which has very positive connections with the domain of navigation.

Pontos, the Salty Deep, is a primordial power of the open sea, the vast expanse bounded only by sky and water. Pontos
of the thousand routes is a disturbing and mysterious space, seen as a path constantly obliterated, a passage never plotted out, a route closed as soon as it is opened up. In this chaotic expanse where every crossing resembles breaking through a region unknown and ever unrecognisable, pure movement reigns forever. Disturbed by the winds which blow across it and by the flux and reflux of the waves, the sea is the most mobile, changeable and polymorphic space. The Greek language has a whole series of expressions to convey this fundamental aspect of the sea which, for a whole current of thought, was to be the symbol of coming-to-be and of generation. To roll like a cylinder, kulindeisthai from one side to the other, from left to right and up and down, entha kai éntha, ánô kai katô, to blow madly, to go in opposite directions, allot alloia, to turn over, to roll over, to upset, metaballein, metatrapein are all metaphors used to describe the nature of the pôntos.

Pontos, which is described as aperim, no doubt because it is impossible to cross it from one side to the other, has its counterpart in Poros, known as a cosmogonic power ever since the age of Alcman. The original sense of pôros was a ford, a passage through a stretch of water, and it thus came to mean the route or path that the navigator has to open up through the pôntos and across the sea. The interplay between Pontos and Poros is expressed in the Greek myths about the sea in dramatic accounts which tell of Odysseus or the Argonauts steering their way through the Clashing Rocks or the Black Rocks, whether these be the Plagktai, the Kuánai or the Sumplégades. At all these spots in the sea, gigantic, moving rocks rear up, constantly shifting both sideways and up and down. They convey an image of an area in which all directions are confused, where left and right, and up and down are interchangeable and ever-changing.

It is no mere chance that Athena makes one of her most significant interventions within the confused context of the Moving Rocks: just as the pilot makes the agonising discovery that he has reached a part of the pôntos that cannot be crossed Athena comes and opens a route for him, indicating a pôros which is both a solution and a way out of the aporia into which the sea may plunge sailors and navigators.
As compared to these two cosmogonic powers, the complementary pair composed of Túchē and Kairós defines more narrowly the realm of navigation and the type of human activity it involves. In archaic Greek thought Tuche appears as an ambivalent and ambiguous power.48 She is the daughter of Ocean and Tethys, a goddess of the sea and a sister to Metis and, like the sea, she symbolises change and mobility. To be more precise—and this is the negative side to her—Tuche stands for one entire aspect of the human condition in a series of representations of the individual buffeted by the waves, whirling with the winds, rolling helplessly hither and thither without respite. However, she does not only reflect the changing surface of the sea. There is also a positive side to her: it is Tuche who takes charge of the tiller and guides the ship unerringly to harbour. For a whole group of writers Tuche stands for the opportunity to succeed, the desired goal reached, success attained.49 This is the Tuche of Pindar’s XIIth Olympian, who comes aboard and relieves the pilot of the tiller.50 It is also Alcman’s Tuche, the daughter of Promēthéia who can guarantee success thanks to her gift of foresight or promēthéia which gives one control over time and things alike.51 Despite their disparity and opposition these two sides of Tuche are as inseparable as the two faces of a double Hermes.52 Their complementary nature can be understood by considering what links the activity of the pilot with the sea within which he operates. Just as the human art of foresight develops against the background of a future that is opaque and unpredictable, the art of the helmsman can only be exercised within the framework of the uncertainty and instability of the sea. The play of the tiller cannot be dissociated from the movement of the waves. Tuche brings the indiscernible future within the bounds of possibility. At this point the influence of this sea-power spills over beyond the context of navigation: Tuche becomes the model for any form of human endeavour.

The same extension of scope characterises the second term in this pair, Kairos, the propitious opportunity,53 whose ambivalence matches that of Tuche. Although Kairos is not, strictly speaking, a power of the sea as Tuche is, he has special connections with the world of the sea.
excavations at Velia, the Elea of ancient times, have revealed epigraphical and religious evidence dating from the fifth century BC, concerning a trio of sea-deities where 'Kairos the Olympian' is depicted between Pompaios and Zeus Ourios. Of the three figures—of which Pompaios, who is simply a 'companion', is the hardest to make out—Zeus Ourios is certainly the best known: this is the Zeus responsible for favourable winds. One of his sanctuaries, said to have been founded by Jason, was situated on the Asiatic coast of the Thracian Bosphorus. Before embarking upon crossing the Pontos Axéinos, or Dark Sea, sailors would go there to offer sacrifices in the hope that the sea would then deal kindly with them and would, through a favourable wind sent by Zeus, become the Pontos Eúxeinos. But the wind or ouíros which Zeus sends the sailors is not only the following wind. It can also, through a shift in metaphor, refer to the moment of departure, the opportunity for the navigator to set out over the sea. The association between Zeus Ourios and Kairos is therefore all the more significant. Aristotle says that in the art of navigation there can be no general knowledge applicable to every particular case, no certain knowledge of all the winds that furrow the waters of the sea. Even for the most experienced of pilots Pontos always remains the Unknown. The excellence of a navigator cannot be measured by the scope of his knowledge but rather by his ability to foresee and uncover in advance the traps the sea sets for him which are at the same time the opportunities it offers to his intelligence as a pilot. Alcaeus devotes an entire poem to the theme that the sea voyage is won or lost on dry land. Zeus Ourios may blow the wind of departure but to profit from it the navigator must have foreseen it and wait for it. Kairos, associated with Zeus Ourios who represents the opportunity, stands for the propitious moment which the good pilot must seize, having foreseen from afar the opportunity which will arise for him to exercise his tēchnē. Thus, the marine Kairos of Velia, supported by Zeus Ourios, can be seen as a reflection of the double Tuche within the limited context of temporality. But whether they do indeed form a pair or not, Tuche and Kairos both emphasise one essential feature of the art of navigation: the necessary
complacency between the pilot and the element of the sea.

From Pontos, the ancient cosmogonical figure symbolising the Salty Deep, to Kairos, introduced at a later date as the power of the Moment seized, all the religious representations of the art of navigation focus upon the type of man we have already seen to be related to Athena as she manifests herself in her various forms of intervention. In Greek thought the figure of the pilot, which is one of central importance, is recognisable from his possession of one major quality with which he is endowed, namely mētis. Even in the Iliad it is already a truism to say that mētis alone enables the helmsman to steer the vessel straight ahead despite the wind.57 In the chorus of the Antigone devoted to the human creature which has triumphed over the forces of Nature thanks to his inventions, artifices and expediencies, Sophocles places the art of navigation at the head of the list of enterprises undertaken by this 'resourceful', pantōporos being. To find a pórōs (path, way out, expedient), to plot against the wind, to be forever on the alert, to foresee the most favourable opportunity for action are all activities and manoeuvres—or 'machinations', mēkhanē, as the Greeks would call them— which demand a many-sided intelligence, the gnōmē polēboulos which Pindar ascribes to the pilot.58 Faced with the sea, an expanse where 'contrary winds from opposite quarters of the sky can blow within a single moment',59 the pilot can only control it by demonstrating that he himself is similarly polymorphic and can take action in as many ways.

Foresight, vigilance and ability to guide the ship straight are among the essential aspects of the mētis of the navigator.60 Plato remarks that no sailor can 'know the secret of the wrath or benevolence of the wind'61 so he must remain constantly on the look out, never allowing his eyelids to close in sleep'.62 He also notes that 'if the pilot desires to be truly skillful in guiding his craft, he must necessarily pay full attention to the weather, the seasons, the sky, the stars and the winds'.63 Like Danaos, the first navigator and a pilot as prudent as he was foreseeing, prōnoos,64 the good helmsman must weigh up all the chances like a good player of backgammon:65 he must foresee the sudden changes in the wind, meet cunning with cunning and spy out the fleeting opportunity to reverse
the balance of forces. Once launched in the pǒntos, into the shifting medium of the sea, the helmsman pits his entire intelligence in correcting the swerving of the ship by guiding the tiller and plotting his course by the points of reference that the stars trace out on the vault of the sky. To direct, to correct, to guide a straight course, tithínein, are commonplace expressions in the terminology connected with navigation but by their very banality they stress the importance in the art of the pilot of the combination of skill in foreseeing where the route lies and the ability to keep one’s sights set on one’s ultimate destination. Despite the roundabout, oblique or tortuous path dictated by the shifting movements of the sea and the whims of the wind, the intelligence of the navigator is capable of guiding the ship straight, never deviating from the course decided upon in advance. All Athena’s interventions are made on behalf of the pilot with his active role as navigator, his cunning and technical intelligence in which Zeus’ daughter can legitimately recognise a reflection of her own méttis.

But let us leave the expanse of the sea for a moment and return to dry land or, to be more precise, to that particular portion of space in which competitive racing between the fleetest of men takes place. In this domain Athena’s interventions are more discreet than in any other. Athena is not a religious power invariably connected with the gymnast as Hermes or Herakles are. Nevertheless it is here, within the area of competition and agonistic rivalry that the model of activity peculiar to Athena, which we have defined in the context of navigation, finds another field of operation exactly comparable to the first.

When Pausanias passed through Sparta in the second century AD, he discovered archaeological evidence of an unusual role played by Athena in an agonistic contest. A track known as the “Starting line”, Aphaíás leads from the Agora and close to it there is a sanctuary dedicated to Athena bearing the title of Kéléuthéia. Odysseus is believed to have consecrated the statue after his victory in the running race used as a means of selection among the suitors for Penelope’s hand in marriage. Pausanias provides a further detail of information: apparently Odysseus set up three
separate sanctuaries to Athena *Kleistheia*, each at a different spot. Why three, and what services must Athena ‘of the track’ have rendered to Penelope’s successful suitor? *Kleistheia* is an unusual epithet to be applied to Athena. Is she simply a protectress of the track, as the common meaning of the word *kéleuthos* would suggest, or is she a protectress of the race, as the whole mythical context would indicate? In default of any solution provided by etymology we have only two ways of interpreting the meaning of this religious title given to Athena. We can attempt to define, on the one hand, the specific nature of Athena’s relationship to this type of agonistic contest and, on the other, the nature of the exceptional links which bind her to Odysseus. The two questions are in fact inseparable as is shown by a passage in the *Iliad* which reveals the complicity that exists between Odysseus and Athena in an agonistic contest which is, as it happens, a running race. The occasion for the race is the celebration of the games held in honour of Patroclus. When Odysseus, the *poliméthis* one, competes against Ajax, the Fleet of Foot, he has to call upon Athena’s aid in order to win the contest: ‘Hear me, powerful one, and come in your clemency to lend aid to my feet...’ Athena’s response is immediate. She infuses Odysseus with an extra spurt of energy and causes his rival to slip. ‘Just when they are about to fall upon the prize Ajax slips as he runs—for Athena made him stumble just at the spot where there is a heap of dung from the lowing oxen sacrificed in honour of Patroclus’. Nobody is deceived, least of all Ajax himself: ‘Ah! How well she knew how to make my feet stumble, that goddess who is always there, like a mother, at Odysseus’ side, to bring him help!’

Odysseus and Athena are as thick as thieves. Athena herself reminds him of the fact when, without realising it, Odysseus has just landed on the shores of Ithaca. Athena, who wants to test the *mērīs* of her protégé, takes on the appearance of a young man and tells him the name of the land in which he has just awoken. Without hesitation, in order not to betray himself, Odysseus thinks up a few fine fibs: ‘Never was his mind at a loss for cunning tricks’. Smiling Athena hears him out: ‘Which sly one (*kerdaléos*), what
rascal (epiklopos), even if he were a god, could surpass you in cunning of every kind! ... You reach your homeland and still think only of the knavish tales and lies dear to your heart since childhood ... Enough of these stories! We are two of a kind: though I know you to be the most calculating and persuasive of all mortals, the cleverness (mētis) and tricks (hērdē) of Athena are those which all the gods praise."

The plot of the running race is the same as that of the chariot race. Odysseus, like Antilochus, is less powerful than his closest rival. Yet it is he, not Ajax, who carries off the prize. Primed with good advice, Antilochus triumphs over faster horses because he is able to foresee how the race will develop. As for Odysseus, he owes his victory to a combination of circumstances which appear in Homer’s account to depend entirely upon Athena’s intervention. However, these circumstances are an expression, in the context of the epic, of the unpredictable nature of any competitive situation and of the advantages that mētis cannot fail to derive from such unpredictability. For if the swift Ajax comes a cropper in the dung it is because he has failed to foresee an obstacle which Athena’s protégé certainly does nothing to help him avoid and which he no doubt did all he could to manoeuvre into Ajax’s path. ‘Athena made him stumble’: of course, but the fact is that, without mētis, a man cannot foresee the narrowing of the track which will provide an opportunity for taking the lead over a rival, nor recognise in advance the muddy area which can cause the competitor out in front to slip. When Odysseus set up a statue in honour of Athena Keleutheia he wanted both to indicate the complicity which placed both of them under the sign of mētis and also to stress the role which could be played by the intelligence of cunning in agonistic contests.

Was this Athena, whose image was situated close to the place known as the ‘starting line’ a power who presided over the ‘good start’ like the Athena known from an Attic inscription and who would thus correspond to the Athena of victory over rivals in the race, praised by Ajax in the Iliad? The place known as Aphetais certainly derives its name from the stating line (áphesis) in a classical gymna-
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sium. However, two religious factors suggest that there is no particular relation between Athena Keleútheia and the 'starting point' in the strict sense of the term. In the first place, the start of a race is, in Sparta, officially placed under the protection of other religious powers, the Dioscuri, known as ἀπεθέριοι, whose statues were likely to have been stationed at the entrance to the Spartan' Campus Martius, the Drómos where, in Pausanias' time, young men still went to train for the races. Besides, according to a tradition also reported by the same author, the official protector of the start of the contest between Penelope's suitors was a certain ἀφεταίος, a kind of power which presided over the initial spurt whose statue, it was said, stood at the very spot where that contest was held. These stories indeed show how important the start was in religious thought but at the same time they exclude any possible confusion between Athena Keleútheia and a deity presiding over the 'good start'.

However, there is one detail in the homage Odysseus pays her which throws some light upon the meaning of this title of Athena's. Odysseus, the victor in the contest, consecrates three separate sanctuaries. Why three places of worship? It seems very likely that it is because on every race-course, every drómos, there are three danger points, three kairoi, taking the form both of critical moments and of critical places when or where everything can change and the race again become an open contest. The first is the start, ἀπεθέσις, when the runner must leap forward to get the best advantage within the first strides. The second is the turning point, the kómpiron where the runner must turn right about in order to return on a track parallel to the first. The Horse Startler of the hippodrome at Olympia gives a perfect illustration of the dangers of the bend. Taking the corner as closely as possible, brushing past the boundary mark by holding back the left hand horse and urging on the right hand one, without becoming hooked on to another competitor's chariot are manoeuvres which demand all the skill a driver can muster. Finally, the third point, which is also the third critical moment, is the finishing line, the térma. The outcome of a race can run counter to every prediction.

The Athena Keleútheia of Sparta, who is the protectress
of the three critical places and moments in the race, is not content simply to accompany Odysseus; she controls the entire area covered by the race-course; she dominates the whole contest for here, as elsewhere, mētis confers upon her the privilege of foreseeing how the race will develop and of guiding it from start to finish. There is graphic evidence to illustrate Athena's prudence as applied to the area of competition: it is the illustration of the so-called 'Melancholic' Athena on Stele 695 of the Acropolis Museum. It shows a helmeted Athena, clad in the pēplōs, leaning with her left hand upon a lance and apparently 'meditating' with bent head, before a 'pillar'. For many years this figure was thought to represent Greek Reason. However, this humanistic and aesthetic account has recently been refuted by the archaeological interpretations put forward by C. Picard and F. Chamoux. These scholars agree that the interpretation of the stele should rest upon the significance of the mysterious 'pillar' placed before Athena. But when it comes to identifying the nature of this object, agreement disappears. Picard sees it as a city boundary mark (hēros) while for Chamoux it is one of the cippi which mark the starting and finishing lines of the track in the palaistra. In the former interpretation the 'melancholic' Athena becomes Athena Hōria, the warrior goddess 'leaning over and meditating upon the determined defence of her territory'. According to the second, Athena meditating before the cippus in the palaistra remains 'thoughtful' but there is no suggestion that she is melancholic as 'she reflects upon the vicissitudes and uncertainties of the impending race'.

By setting the stele within the context of a whole series of depictions, Chamoux has definitively established that the 'pillar' can only be a cippus 'symbolising the race over which Athena is presiding'. On the other hand, all the evidence we have collected dissuades us from interpreting the relief sculpture from the Acropolis as an Athena meditating upon the uncertainties of victory, as Chamoux does. True, it is because victory is uncertain and the outcome of the games is open that Athena meditates, but she does so in the Greek sense of mēdasthai, which is intimately connected with the intellectual activity of mētis. As she leans upon her lance
with her head inclined towards the stone marking the starting line this Athena of the Acropolis is the image not of Reason but of Prudence, the *phrōnēsis* which seeks to foresee the vicissitudes of the contest, absorbed in 'meditating upon the race' in which she is about to make her challenge.

What applies to the expanse of the waters also applies to the stadium. It is on dry land, before departure from the harbour, that the contest at sea is to be won. The victor is always the one who has more tricks up his sleeve than his rivals imagine. Although the athletic contest appears to take place within a closed area whose boundaries are fixed by arbiters and where the race is subject to certain specific rules, the fact is that any agonistic activity—whether it be running or the chariot race—takes place within an area that is, in a sense, similar to the area of the sea. The agonistic area, with its dangerous points and critical moments is a place in which any kind of reversal is possible and where the path prescribed by the rules of the games is paralleled by any way that is open to and negotiable by *mētis*. It is a shifting and polymorphic area in which the intervention of Athena necessarily takes the same form as in navigation where *mētis* is at grips with the fluctuations of the sea and the blowing of the winds.

To give a more precise definition of the Athena connected with the sea we must compare the daughter of Metis with the other divine powers which intervene, as she does, within the domain of the sea, either on a permanent basis, like Poseidon, or only given certain circumstances, as in the case of the Dioscuri. Of all the powers which share with Athena a common field of action, within which they can be differentiated one from another by the forms their respective interventions take, Poseidon is incontestably Athena’s most formidable rival. In the world of the Olympians not only is he the great god of the sea but, traditionally, he is also the ‘saviour of ships’. One preliminary comparison reveals an essential difference in their respective methods of operation. When Poseidon intervenes to save ships and assist the sailors who call upon his name he does not appear in the midst of the storm, to help the pilot and open up a route through the squalls for him. The action he takes is in keeping with his
fundamental character as a marine power. He calms the violence of the sea; he restrains the anger of the waves which he himself unleashed. The sea becomes calm as soon as Poseidon’s anger dies away. When sailors came to his sanctuary to hang up their ex-voto offerings, scores of which were discovered at Penteskouphia, it was either to beg for a safe return or to thank him for an uneventful crossing. The role played by Poseidon in navigation seems to be as passive as that of Athena is active.

A similar distance can be seen to separate these two powers in another area where once again they come into direct confrontation: that of the horse, whether ridden or harnessed to a chariot. The fact that Greek thought is prone to stress the affinities that exist between the ship and the horse and equally between the tiller and the reins makes the comparison all the more natural. Here, where Poseidon Hippios is matched by Athena Hippia, the balance of power between them can be defined in two distinct contexts: that of the mounted horse and that of the unit composed of the chariot drawn by horses.

Whichever of these two is involved, the dividing line separating the two powers is clear-cut. Indeed, the opposition between their respective methods of operation is stressed by a detail concerning a religious gesture in the myth of Athena Chalinitis: as Athena gives Bellerophon the instrument in the form of the curb, chalinós, which will enable him to dominate an eminently Poseidonian horse, she reminds her protégé that he must first pay homage to Poseidon by presenting Pegasus, warning his bit, to the Tamer of Horses, the Damaios, and by sacrificing a white bull to him. By clearly indicating in this way that the horse can only be dominated with the assent of the master of horses, Athena confirms her own methods of operation as well as those of Poseidon.

Now this sacrifice offered to Poseidon in the context of horses is matched by a similar sacrifice with the same aim, offered to the same deity, but this time in the context of navigation. In the myth about the Argonauts various marks of respect are paid to the great god of the sea by the first navigators and, significantly, these are preferred only at
either end of the voyage, at the departure and upon arrival. In one version\textsuperscript{161} it is at the entry to the In hospitable Sea, the Pontos Áxeinos that the Argonauts dedicate a têmenos to Poseidon, imploring the Master of Ships to protect them from the rocks clashing together. Similarly, they offer their ship to him in his Corinthian sanctuary on the Isthmus upon their return from their expedition.\textsuperscript{162} However, according to another tradition recorded in the poem by Valerius Flaccus,\textsuperscript{163} before embarking Jason solemnly sacrifices to Poseidon, the Zephyrs and Glanocos a white bull adorned with purple bands, while he also slaughters a young cow in honour of Thetis. During this sacrifice Jason addresses Poseidon, on his own this time, humbly presenting the first ship to cross the sea to him: ‘Grant me your pardon, you who reign over the foaming waves, you who surround the whole earth with the waters of the sea. I know that I am the first man to venture upon a route which is forbidden to us; I know that I deserve to be the plaything of the storms . . .’ Then, having laid the blame for his audacity upon Pelias, Jason brings his prayer to a close with the following words, which give an exact definition of the mode of operation of Poseidon: ‘Only receive this ship . . . upon your waves without making them swell with anger’. It is the same for the ship as for the horse. Before using it one must win Poseidon’s good graces and obtain his consent. Poseidon manifests the same characteristics in the two cases. Just as he is the Master of horses so does he exert over the sea and ships a testy sovereignty.

But the comparison between these two domains can be taken yet further on the basis of this same sacrifice offered to Poseidon by Jason. Just as Bellerophon presents to Poseidon a horse equipped with Athena’s bit and tamed by her, the ship which Jason submits for Poseidon’s approval is a masterpiece wrought by Athena, as all the Greek evidence shows. In Apollonius Rhodius’ account the daughter of Zeus and Metis supervises every stage of its construction. The carpenter, Argos, works to her direction\textsuperscript{164} but it is the goddess herself who selects the trees from Mount Pelion.\textsuperscript{165} She it is too who fells them with an axe just as she then arranges the props (druochoi)\textsuperscript{166} to support the ship; and she it is, finally, who
teaches Argos how to measure the wooden cross-beams with a rule. Her role in other myths is just as crucial: when Danaos is presented as the first man to build a ship he does so upon Athena's advice and with her assistance.

Thus the parallel between the horse and the ship reveals a new aspect to Athena's interventions in the area of navigation; and, at the same time, Athena's mode of operation where the horse is concerned emerges more fully and more precisely defined. On the two levels that we have distinguished—first where the mounted horse is concerned and, secondly, in the context of the chariot and its team of horses—the line separating Athena and Poseidon appears to follow an identical course. The truth is that, where the horse-drawn chariot is concerned, Athena's activity is more complex than we first imagined: it is not restricted to driving the chariot and horses but extends to the building of the carriage and the putting together of the various pieces of wood from which the chariot as a whole is composed. In the *Hymn to Aphrodite* we are reminded that Athena was the first to teach carpenters to make chariots and wagons adorned with bronze. So far as the chariot and ship are concerned, Athena appears to have a double role which encompasses the art of building as well as that of driving.

Building and driving are two types of activity in which we are more prone to notice the differences than the resemblances. However, the ancient Greeks saw many affinities between them as is shown by a number of pieces of evidence concerning Athena. In Apollonius Rhodius' account, following the passage through the Symplegades Tiphys, the ship's pilot, rejoices at having escaped the collision of the moving rocks and gives all the credit to Athena who indeed gave the ship a push forwards at the crucial moment. However, this is not the aspect of Athena's intervention which Tiphys elects to celebrate. He gives thanks to the Athena who built the vessel, the Athena who fastened the pieces of wood firmly together with bolts, just as if there really was no difference between the two Athenas. They are one and the same as is indicated by one of the ancient commentators whose importance we have already recognised in the defining of Athena *athinaia*. Before explaining that Athena is called 'sea crow'
because she taught men the art of navigation and of opening up a route through the sea, the scholiast of Lycophron put forward another interpretation which he links closely with the former: Athena is called *aithuia* because she is prudence, the *phronēsis* by which ships are built. What this means is quite clear: the two activities of building and guiding are here connected with one single Athena of the sea because they both result from the same type of intelligence which is Athena’s most characteristic quality: her *mētis* or her prudence.

Wood-cutters, carpenters and ship builders are all craftsmen who traditionally enjoy the protection and favour of Athena. Homer writes of the great affection she has for Tekton Harmonides, the Carpenter, the son of the Joiner ‘whose hands knew how to make masterpieces of every kind’: this is the Tekton who was known for having built (tekēnasthai) the ships of Paris-Alexander. If a carpenter can cut a ship’s keel fair and straight with the aid of a line he does this by the good grace of Athena who has endowed him with skill in woodwork. When a plough needs to be made with the wood curving up under the heel well fitted to the plough-share this too is a job for a ‘servant of Athena’. Just as she has shown woodworkers how to make ships or ploughs, Athena has taught them the art of building chariots and wagons.

Whether a chariot, a plough or a ship be involved, Athena presides over all the phases of working with wood—the felling of the wood, the planing of the planks and the fitting together of the different pieces forming the framework, for all these are operations which demand an equal measure of *mētis*. As Homer says, it is ‘not strength but *mētis* which makes the good wood-cutter’. And every carpenter is first a wood-cutter: his initial task is to chop down the tree trunks that he himself has selected in the forest. When Athena decides to build the Argonauts’ ship her first care is to visit Mount Pelion to procure materials. Then, once the trees are felled, the planks have to be sawn up and planed. A myth from the *Cypria* shows that this task too was undertaken by Athena. When the magical lance which is to be the weapon first of Peleus and later of Achilles is being made, the Centaur Chiron cuts down the ash tree chosen as material; Hephaestus
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the blacksmith tips it with metal, thus making it a weapon of war; and Athena is the one who undertakes the careful planing and polishing (xēsai) of the wood for the lance.\textsuperscript{118} After the polishing and preparation of the materials the carpenter building the ship, chariot or plough sets about fitting, assembling and bolting the pieces together.\textsuperscript{119} One of the most common operations in ship-building in Ancient Greece was the construction of the hull by fitting the planking together with dowels driven through the interlocking joints.\textsuperscript{120} In the Argonautica it is this major phase in the construction of the ship which is presided over by Athena: 'While Argos was joining together the planking by means of bolts, Athena was imbuing the ship with a divine force'.\textsuperscript{121} Thus the various operations performed in wood-work are all combined together in a single whole in this mythical representation of an Athena of the sea who is also a builder of ships.

But they are also combined together in their due order by another figure who reveals the same skill in the art of steering a ship as in that of building it. He is Athena's protégé and the hero who, for the Greeks, is the perfect embodiment of all human mētis. As soon as the gods agree upon him leaving the island where he is detained by Calypso, Odysseus— for of course it is he—sets about building himself a ship. He fells twenty trees and then skilfully roughs them down with an axe. Then he cuts them carefully, using a line, and finally he assembles the planking by means of dowels driven through the interlocking joints.\textsuperscript{122} When the mast is raised into position and the sails are hoisted on this vessel which he has built as a master—carpenter (eiōs tekton smānōn), then, 'seated by the tiller, Odysseus steers as a good pilot should, never letting his eyelids drop in slumber, his eyes fixed upon the Pleiades and Bootes which sets so late and the Bear which is also called the Wain and is the only one of all the stars which never plunges into the waters of the Ocean but always revolves in the same spot, watching Orion'.\textsuperscript{123} In the very depths of the night, the night which Aeschylus calls 'the mother of anxiety for the prudent pilot',\textsuperscript{124} Odysseus steers his ship with a mētis equal to that deployed in the building of his craft.

But we can attempt to define still more closely how the
same intellectual model can be made to apply to two activities as dissimilar as carpentry and steering. In our summary of the technical operations of the carpenter we have, so far, left to one side a procedure which holds a place of considerable importance in the technology of wood-work. It is the use of the ‘line’ which makes it possible to cut beams and planks absolutely straight.126 ‘To follow straight along the line’, _epi státhmén ištánëin_ is the traditional expression used in the _Iliad_ and the _Odyssey_ to indicate both a skilfull carpenter126 and a good builder of ships.127 One of the images used to convey straightness128 is the ‘line which makes it possible to cut a ship’s keel straight when used by an expert carpenter who, being inspired by Athena, has a thorough knowledge of his craft’.129 Now in Greek the verb ‘to lead straight’ _ištánëin_, which describes a line tracing out a path without deviating to right or to left, is also a technical term used in both the contexts which we have discovered to be so closely parallel. In navigation it is used to refer to the ship’s course which the pilot, thanks to his _mètis_ (as the _Iliad_ puts it) can steer straight across the sea, through winds and tides.130 And it is also used to describe the driving of a chariot which a charioteer well-endowed with _mètis_ can steer straight towards his goal without any deviation.131 This detail of vocabulary would seem to confirm that when constructing a ship or a chariot the carpenter deploys the same type of intelligence as the pilot or charioteer when the one is steering his ship over the sea and the other his chariot and team along the track. Thus in the representation of Athena no separation is made between building and steering, between cutting the keel of a ship along the line and steering the course of the ship over the sea. Since they are both integrally associated with the technological intelligence of Athena the ship and the chariot appear not only as manufactured objects but also as instruments of her activity.

There is a point of terminology concerning _mètis_ which provides confirmation of this double aspect to Athena’s activities. Among the expressions in the Greek language used to convey the idea of plotting, planning or meditating, there is a group which employs imagery taken either from hunting or from fishing: a plot is twined together _mètìn plèkein_
just as a weel or hunting snare is fashioned by a process of intertwining. A plan is woven, μῆτις ὑπαθαινεῖν, just as is a fishing or hunting net. But there is another expression used in conjunction with these first two: to construct a cunning ploy, τεκταίνεσθαι μῆτις. Now τεκταίνεσθαι is a verb which also refers to wood-work and the activities of the carpenter. One meditates or constructs a cunning ploy in the same way as one fits together the various pieces of wood from which the trap is constructed, which form the instrument of the deception. A perfect example is the famous Trojan Horse: it is both a trick of war, devised by Odysseus at Athena’s inspiration, and a wooden instrument constructed by Epeios, again with the assistance of Athena. The same goes for the ship and for the chariot: both are the products and instruments of the intelligence of Athena in which a single μῆτις is at work, conceiving and also constructing the tools which can serve and implement its plans. To quote an epigram on the subject of the invention of the ship, Athena was the first to conceive it (μῆδεσθαι) or, in other words, she created it through an operation of intelligence as well as through an action of a technological nature.

Our comparison between Athena and Poseidon in two separate contexts, that of the ship and that of the horse, has confirmed the fact that Athena plays a doubly active role as opposed to Poseidon whose role is usually passive and confined to the exercise of a sovereignty which is barely more than nominal. Nevertheless, we cannot definitively establish the line that divides these two rival powers before putting it to the test in a number of mythical and religious situations which would appear to cast more or less serious doubts upon the validity of our analysis. For instance, is not Poseidon presented by Homer as the great god who protects the Phaeacians, a people of sailors and ferrymen? Furthermore, is he not closely connected, in a sanctuary on Cape Sounion, with a mythical pilot called Phrontis, the Knowing One? And finally, in the myth of the Argonauts, is he not the father of Anakaos whose reputation as a helmsman is sufficiently well-established for him to succeed to the position of Tiphys, Athena’s protégé, at the tiller of Jason’s ship during the entire second half of the expedition?
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The Phaeacian episode occurs just after Leucothea’s intervention. It is only thanks to the talisman brought by this "sea-crow" that Odysseus manages to reach the land of the Phaeacians and thus escapes the anger of Poseidon. Now the subjects of Alkinoos are presented both as sailors with magical powers and also as the protégés of Poseidon. Phaeacia is a town built right on the sea\(^1\)\(^3\)\(^0\) with a population of sailors whose sole topic of conversation is to do with masts, oars and finely wrought ships.\(^1\)\(^3\)\(^7\) Its streets abound in oarpolishers and makers of ship’s tackle, sails and rigging.\(^1\)\(^3\)\(^8\) The vocation of the Phaeacians is betrayed in their very names: Sea-dog, Quick-to-Sea, Sculler, Ferryman, Prowman Man-Aboard, Seaman, Of-the-Deep\(^1\)\(^3\)\(^9\) ... They are a people of ships’ chandlers and skilled oarsmen. But their exclusive passion for sea-faring is not the only distinguishing feature of the Phaeacians. Living so far off the beaten track that no other people appears to have any contact with them, the Phaeacians, unlike ordinary mortals, are on a natural footing of familiarity with the gods who come and sit amongst them on days of feasting and banqueting.\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^\)\(^0\) But, while all the gods without exception may dwell in Phaeacia if they so desire, only one of them possesses his own sanctuary there, built on the Agora,\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^1\) namely Poseidon, the god who fathered the race of Alcinoos and who grants them the privilege of crossing the seas. The sovereignty wielded by Poseidon over this land of Phaeacia would indeed seem to be undeniable.

Only one other deity could rival him if, that is, we accept the interpretation that some scholars have given to four disputed lines devoted to praising the subjects of Poseidon: 'For as Phaeacian men are skilled beyond all others in driving swift ships upon the deep, even so are the women the most cunning at the loom. For Athena has given them (\textit{sphisin}) knowledge of fine works and the gift of wise thoughts',\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^2\) Does Athena’s patronage extend only to the weaving women, as the last sentence would seem to suggest with its use of a formula elsewhere used in connection with Penelope who is also, by the grace of Athena, as skilled at weaving cloth as she is at weaving subtle thoughts?\(^1\)\(^4\)\(^3\) or does her protection extend not only to the women workers of the weaving craft but also to the amazing navigators of Phaeacia, as we should
expect, to judge from the affinities we have already noted between Athena and ships’ pilots. Attractive as it seems, this latter interpretation must be rejected for two reasons. The first is that all Athena’s interventions take place on the very periphery of Phaeacia. Before Odysseus ever sets foot on Phaeacian soil Athena appears to him once in order to stand in the path of the winds which Poseidon has summoned up to beleaguer his enemy’s ship. Athena calls up a brisk North wind which enables Odysseus to reach the shore. But as soon as he has landed in Phaeacia his protectress behaves with the greatest of discretion. She refuses to appear before Odysseus, is unwilling to take any action openly and hangs back ‘out of respect for her uncle’. As soon as she has brought her protégé to the house of Alkinoos she disappears, returning to Athena and the house of Erechtheus. A topographical detail perfectly reflects the relations between Athena and Poseidon within the confines of Phaeacia: while Poseidon has a sanctuary which dominates the Agora and town, the only place consecrated to Athena is a small sacred grove, and even this is situated outside the town, on the edge of the city of Alkinoos.

There is a second reason to account for the distance separating Athena from the Phaeacians which at the same time illuminates in a decisive manner the Phaeacians’ relations with the great god of the sea. The Phaeacians, who are sea-farers and ferry-men, possess extraordinary ships, ships as fantastic as the craft of Dionysus. Swifter than flight or thought, they advance surely: ‘the hawk, the swiftest of birds could not keep up with them ... But swiftness, the ability to move quickly over the sea, is not all that Poseidon has granted to these ships. He has also allowed that they should ‘cross the great abyss of the seas (latrna még’ ekperōsin). Shrouded in mists and clouds, not only do they cross the chasm of the sea ‘without fear of shipwreck or of losing their way’, but ‘being themselves endowed with intelligence, they know how to read the desires and thoughts of men'. In contrast to ordinary ships the course of which must be constantly corrected by means of the rudder, the ships of Phaeacia journey ‘without pilot or rudder’.

Given that Poseidon has granted them the freedom of the abysses
of the sea, the Phaeacian ships do not have to plot against the winds or reckon with the squalls. For them the sea is no abyss that cannot be crossed but instead a familiar area stripped of mystery. This is why, in the land of Phaeacia where there is no call for the art of navigation, where it is made superfluous by the ships’ privilege of knowing all the routes of the sea, there is no place for Athena and her mêtis. The Phaeacians excel over all other men in propelling a swift ship over the sea; they owe it to Poseidon alone who can give their vessels an innate knowledge of the chasms of the sea just as easily as he can deprive them suddenly of this gift, in a fit of rage, transforming ships which were swifter than a hawk into a mere lump of rock or a heavy stone rooted in the waters. The example of Phaeacia in no way undermines our analysis of the modes of operation peculiar to Athena and Poseidon. On the contrary, it affords valuable confirmation for it by showing that even when Poseidon’s power rules supreme—in a sense without competition, it operates in an area up to or beyond that of the pilot’s activities, that is on either side of Athena’s sphere of action.

In this first situation, Poseidon’s power is confirmed by the total exclusion of Athena, but we should examine two others where the two deities come into more direct confrontation, this time within the contexts of the art of the pilot and the steering of the ship, themselves. The first of the two new cases concerns the extreme point of Attica, Cape Sounion. There, facing the sea and dominating the site, stands a temple dedicated to Poseidon, 31.15 metres long and 13.48 wide. Cape Sounion was famous even in the times of the Odyssey. It was here, returning from Troy, that the fleet of Menelaus lost its pilot, Phrontis, slain by the arrows of Apollo even as his ship was speeding along and as he sat with his hand on the tiller. Menelaus decided to bury him; he beached his ships and gave Phrontis full funeral honours, in all likelihood on the promontory sacred to Poseidon. Now, some years ago, while studying on the spot of the excavations undertaken by the Greek archaeologists Charles Picard found good reasons for identifying a small building situated on the periphery of the têmenos of Poseidon as a herōon belonging to Phrontis. Thus Cape Sounion appears
to afford us an example of a particularly close association between Poseidon and a helmsmen whose very name—Phrontis, the Knowing one, is enough to show that he possesses a technical intelligence worthy of a protégé of Athena. In the Odyssey, Homer writes 'There was no man in the entire human race equal when it came to guiding his ship through the squalls'.

In the Odyssey, the events which follow the episode reveal the nature of this pilot even more clearly. As soon as he is without Phrontis Menelaus, without realising it, finds himself caught in the trap which Zeus has set for him. As it rounds Cape Malea, his fleet is taken by surprise by the storm which the king of the gods has prepared (ephraisato) for them. Several ships are destroyed and the remainder are forced back to Egypt where Menelaus finds his progress blocked by a god who holds him prisoner and 'binds his path' (édese keléouthou). It seems clear that when he abandons Phrontis on Cape Sounion, Menelaus loses the mētis without which it is impossible for ships to pass through sudden squalls. But should we therefore conclude that the skill of navigation has been more or less conscripted by the god of the sea who, up until now, has appeared to be singularly unconcerned with mētis in any form? Further examination of the religious evidence from Sounion indicates that we should not. The fact is that the site of Sounion is not exclusively devoted to Poseidon. We read in Pausanias that when navigators arrived within sight of Attica the first thing they saw from out at sea was a little sanctuary perched right at the top of the look-out point. It was the sanctuary of Athena Sounias, and has been found about 500 metres away from the temple of Poseidon, on a gentle slope. Upon excavating this religious site the Greek archaeologists discovered a piece of evidence which defines the characteristics of Athena Sounias more closely. It was a small plaque made of clay and painted, an ex-voto depicting a ship steered by a bearded pilot, seated, with his hand upon the tiller. Even if we do not go so far as to identify this as 'a souvenir of the death of Phrontis' as Picard does, it nevertheless becomes clear that the pilot who became a hero at Cape Sounion was just as closely connected with Athena as with Poseidon.
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Phrontis' position in relation to the two powers of the sea can be determined by drawing an analogy with the position of another legendary pilot, also a companion of Menelaus. In a literary tradition later than the Homeric epics Phrontis' place was taken by a pilot named Kanopos or Kanobos. It is he who guides Menelaus' fleet from Rhodes to Egypt where, having met with a sudden death, he is transformed into a star—either one which could only be seen by sailors crossing from Rhodes to Egypt or the most brilliant star in the constellation of Argo, the one which represents in the heavens the helm of the Argonauts' ship.\textsuperscript{164} Concise as it is, the legend of Canopus is a perfect illustration of the close relationship between navigation and astronomy. The mythical pilot is transformed into one of the shining beacons which help the good helmsman to find his way across the sea. Now, according to the chronicler in the temple of Athena Lindia at Rhodes, this is the same Canopus who dedicated the tiller of his ship not to the patron deity of Lindos who is the protectress of pilots, alone, but 'to Athena and Poseidon (\textit{zei Athanaiai kai Poteidani}) jointly'.\textsuperscript{165}

In Rhodes as at Cape Sounion this close association of Athena and Poseidon with the helmsman can be interpreted in only one way: it is to show that no pilot can exercise a craft which principally comes from Athena unless he simultaneously recognises the role of the sovereignty of Poseidon as manifested in the commonplace image of the Lord of the Sea carrying on his back the vessels constructed by men. However much Phrontis and Canopus may be protected by Athena, they must necessarily also depend upon the patronage of Poseidon. Although Poseidon may do without Athena it is, in contrast, as impossible for her to exclude her powerful partner as it is for the pilot's intelligence to come into play in isolation, without the collaboration of an element which is fundamentally dependent upon Poseidon's sovereignty.

At Sounion as at Rhodes, Athena and Poseidon appear as twin powers, clearly distinct from each other but whose collaboration is both effective and necessary. In the last case we must examine these powers again come into more or less direct confrontation, this time specifically in the
context of the art of navigation. Just as the *Dionysiaca* describe a chariot race between two rivals one of whom is the charioteer of Athena and the other the driver of Poseidon, in the *Argonautica* a very real opposition seems to be set up between the two successive pilots of the ship Argo: Tiphys, the helmsman chosen and sent by Athena, and Ankaios, the son of Poseidon, who is entrusted with the helm after Tiphys has disappeared, carried off by a sudden death immediately after the passage through the Moving Rocks. Although Ankaios does not, strictly speaking, compete with Tiphys, he is presented as a rival in the art of steering, as is evident from the passage in the *Argonautica* which praises his knowledge as a navigator and his skill in handling the tiller.

Here we can directly compare the behaviour of the pilot of Poseidon and the pilot of Athena. Will this lead us to modify on either count the line of separation we have drawn between these two powers of the sea? One preliminary remark can be made. These two powers manifest themselves to their protégés in very different fashions. Athena encourages Tiphys to join the Argonauts and take over the ship’s steering and herself stands at his side, acting in concert with him in the passage through the Clashing Rocks. In contrast, at no time does Poseidon intervene in favour of the man whom it is tempting to call ‘his’ pilot. It is not Poseidon but Hera who puts Ankaios up to claiming the position left vacant by Tiphys. At points of high drama it is Argos or Jason or the Dioscuri, or even Triton and Apollo *Aiglētēs* who come to his assistance and get him out of trouble. At no point does Anakios either receive or request help from his divine father. Once this difference has been noticed, the contrast between the two helmsmen becomes clear. In the same measure that Athena’s pilot shows himself to be the true master of the ship, even to the point of outshining Jason in front of all his companions, on more than one occasion, so equally does Ankaios appear as a dim, insignificant figure, more often than not inadequate to cope with events that he has been quite incapable of foreseeing.

In the *Argonautica*, Tiphys is presented as a masterly pilot. He is clever at foreseeing (*prodaēna*) changes in the weather
and veering of the wind, and also capable of calculating his course (tekhērasthai) according to the position of the Sun and stars. It is he who gives the signal for departure and who is in command of the team of men launching the ship.  
Throughout the first part of the expedition he is up with the morning star, on the lookout for a favourable wind and urging the Argonauts to set sail. It is by means of his mētis and prudence (phrēdmosínē), that the route of the expedition is plotted. At the entrance to the Bosphorus it is only his skill at manoeuvring that makes it possible to steer a course through the gigantic waves which threaten to crash down on the Argonauts. But Tiphys' mastery is most evident when the ship has to pass through the Clashing Rocks. As Phineas, the deviner, has advised, Tiphys first gives the order to release a rock dove whose flight will test out the route for the ship. As soon as the bird has passed through the gap, he orders the Argonauts to haul on the oars and speed through in between the two rocks just at the moment when they are starting to move apart again. When they are halfway through and Athena comes discretely to support him, Tiphys is still sufficiently alert to make a last minute manoeuvre to avoid a vast wave crashing down on them. When they emerge into the Black Sea Tiphys is filled with a great joy which stands in sharp contrast to the anxiety of the other Argonauts. He encourages Jason, comforts the crew and, to their general surprise, declares that henceforth the success of the expedition is assured: all Phineas' predictions have come to pass and, once through the Clashing Rocks, the way is open before them. Soon after this Tiphys suddenly disappears.

With Ankaios, who then makes his appearance, we have a radically different type of pilot. True, he has some knowledge of the field of navigation,—he knows how to take the tiller—but Ankaios never foresees anything, never decides anything or truly directs anything in the ship. At the very first difficulty they encounter, when they have to emerge from the Black Sea into the Phasis which leads to Colchis, it is Argos who takes Ankaios' place and directs the manoeuvre. On the return journey it is once again Argos who tells the Argonauts what course they must follow. And from this
point on, the route of the Argonauts’ ship is punctuated by a series of miraculous interventions. To show them the way to Istris, Hera traces out a great shining line in the sky.\textsuperscript{181} After the murder of Apsyrtos the prophetic beam built into the ship’s prow reveals that the Dioscuri must request the gods to open up the paths of Ausonia which lead to the land of Circe.\textsuperscript{182} On another occasion, when the wind is about to blow the expedition off course out into the open sea, Hera once again intervenes, this time more directly and with greater energy. She pushes the ship back and sets it on the right course again.\textsuperscript{183} In all these episodes Ankaios might just as well not be there; he plays no part at all. Nor is he any more in evidence during the passage through Scylla and Charibdis: it is Thetis who seizes the ship and propels it through, taking advantage of a moment of calm brought about through the complicity of Hephaestus, the Master of Fire and Aeolus, the king of the winds.\textsuperscript{184} The remainder of the journey simply confirms the impotence of Ankaios. When the Peloponese is already in sight yet another storm forces the Argonauts into the Libyan sea and wrecks them deep in the gulf of Syrits, in the heart of the desert region. This time it is too much for Ankaios who, in tears, declares to the Argonauts that he is abandoning his post and refuses to pilot the ship any longer.\textsuperscript{185} After this no more is heard of him. The final part of the voyage is notable for two further interventions on the part of the divine powers. First Triton rises from the depths of the lake which is called after him and guides the ship by the rudder to the spot where the waters flow into the sea.\textsuperscript{186} And finally Apollo Aiglēs causes a brilliant light to shine in the darkness of the stormy night and in this way saves the Argonauts from the perils of the \textit{katoulás}.\textsuperscript{187}

From beginning to end of the epic voyage the pilot of Poseidon stands in violent contrast to the pilot of Athena. In contrast to Tiphys, Ankaios at no moment shows that he possesses even the slightest trace of \textit{mētis}. As the expedition progresses his incompetence becomes increasingly apparent until he is forced to resign his position. But of all the episodes in the story there is one which best of all indicates the limits placed upon the power of this Poseidonian pilot: it is the role
played by the Dioscuri who take over control of the Argonauts’ ship. Upon arrival at the Stoichades Islands, the Dioscuri, who have been picked out by the prophetic piece of wood, are confirmed in their new role by the king of the gods who entrusts to them henceforth the task of saving ships that are in danger.\textsuperscript{138} Now the method of intervention of the Dioscuri is markedly different from that of Athena. These ‘saviours of ships’ make their appearance in the sky, shining at the top of the masts. The Dioscuri are bringers of light, \textit{phōsphorō}, who still the stormy winds and calm the waves in the sea.\textsuperscript{139} There is a rite which can encourage them to appear: sailors sacrifice white lambs to them on the prows of their vessels when in danger.\textsuperscript{136} This ritual is the exact converse to that which the Athenians addressed to the storm winds: when a storm threatened they would sacrifice a black lamb to the winds, on the sea shore. In the one case the purpose was to appease the dark clouds, \textit{tuphās}, averting the furious winds by the sacrifice of a victim black in colour and therefore reserved for the powers of the underworld. In the other, the Dioscuri were requested to make a light shine in the midst of the storm, a light whose dazzling brilliance is symbolised by the colour of the victims sacrificed to them. Plutarch gives a remarkable description of the singular characteristics of the mode of operation of the Dioscuri: ‘They do not navigate with men, sharing their perils, but appear in the sky as saviours’.\textsuperscript{132}

It was necessary to make this digression on the subject of the Dioscuri in order to establish that no competition exists between Tiphys and Ankaios which could in any way echo a possible rivalry between Athena and Poseidon where the art of navigation is concerned. The only helmsman who can claim to have any connection with Poseidon is compelled to abdicate care for his ship’s safety in favour of the Dioscuri. To put it another way, the point where we can compare Tiphys and Ankaios most easily is also the area which most clearly reveals the difference between the methods of operation of the Dioscuri and Athena. Ankaios appears to be as deprived of Poseidon’s blessings as the Phaeacians are showered with them. He is an appalling pilot; his only hope is for the Dioscuri to bring him assistance. It is undeni-
able that the power of Poseidon, which is limitless so far as the sea is concerned, does not apply to the pilot or the art of navigation but instead is deployed outside the limits of the sphere of technology. On the one side it falls short of this sphere, when the god unleashes or calms the elements of the sea at his will; on the other, it is deployed beyond it, when he grants to the Phaeacian ships such perfect knowledge of the paths and chasms of the sea that both the rudder and the art of navigation are rendered unnecessary.

Athena of the sea who is a ‘sea-crow’ just as is the white goddess, Leucothea, does not bring the seafarer an absolute and, as such, supernatural safety and it is similarly characteristic of her that her activities cannot be expressed in terms of the absolute contrasts of black and white which are such a feature of the interventions of the Dioscuri.\textsuperscript{193} Whether she stands at the pilot’s side to open up a path over the sea for him, or whether she dispatches a bird to effect a passage through the chasms of the deep, in the context of the sea Athena manifests herself by exercising her intelligence as a navigator who is able to plot a straight course over the sea by taking cunning account of the unpredictability and instability of the waves. Hers is a practical and cunning intelligence; but it is also fundamentally technical by reason of the complementary skills of first cutting pieces of wood straight along the line and then fitting them together to form the very instrument of navigation. Within this field of activity which she shares with Poseidon, Leucothea and the Dioscuri, Athena is clearly distinguished from all these other powers of the sea by her ability to construct as much as to guide ships. It is this twofold ability which enables us to define her own particular style of intervention in the context of navigation.

Notes

1. Paus. 1, 5, 3.
3. Hesychius, no. 2748 Latte.
4. Cf. e.g. O. Keller, Die antike Tierwelt, II, Leipzig, 1913, p. 243; Steier, s.v. ‘Möwe’, R.E. (1932), c. 2412–2418; D’Arcy W. Thomp-


6. *Schol. in Od.*, V, 66 (cf. also *Schol. in Od.*, I, 441) and Hesychius, no. 1894, Latte. Perhaps we should recognise the Yelokuan Puffin or Little Shearwater in this ‘sea-crow’ as is suggested by J. André o.c., p. 61, following D’Arcy W. Thompson.

7. This tradition is reported by Dionysius, *De situ*, II, 5, p. 26, 15ff Garezy (Bibl. Tzurn) for the *larios*, but *larios* and *aithulias* are terms so associated or even confused that the transition from one to the other happens easily. Cf. Steier, s.v. ‘Möwe’, *J. E. E. (1932)*, c. 2414ff.


16. *Schol. in Od.*, V, 32 and Eust., p. 1385, 64.


18. There have been two studies devoted to defining the Athena *aithulias*. The first collected together a number of relevant facts: A. Kock, ‘Athena Aithulias’, *ARW* 18, 1915, p. 127–133. The second, by C. Antti, ‘Athena marina e alata’, *Monum. ant. R. Acad. Linces* 25, 1920, pp. 270–318, drew attention to a number of pictorial representations which, it is suggested, might be illustrations of an Athena of the Sea either clad in a starry cloak (cf. *philéphoros*), or accompanied by a sea-bird. Neither study recognised the role of *mètis* in the representations of an Athena of the sea.


22. II, 549.

23. [Orpheus], *Argonotica*, 69ff.


26. In this context the *erídios* is probably a type of shearwater, perhaps the *Ardes Nuciforax*.

27. With Odysseus as my companion we should both escape from a
burning brazier for he is so much better than anyone else at having ideas (noésai): II, X, 246–7.

30. 601–2. There is a certain parallelism here between the monokrēpis Jason and the ship that has lost a portion of its stern. Just as Jason loses one of his sandals while crossing a ford, a póros, and thus becomes eligible for the trial of the Golden Fleece, so is the ship (like the bird which preceded it through this narrow passage—this póros of the sea) marked in the same way and in the same place by a test whose initiatory nature has, with reason, been pointed out. Cf. G. Roux, Le problème des Argonautes, Paris, 1949, passim (in particular p. 92–3.)
32. Cf. Pliny, H.N., VI, 22, 83; Charon of Lampsacue, F Gr Hist, 626 F 3; Asclepiades of Tragiros, F Gr Hist, 12 F 23; Schol. in A.R., II, 328 A; etc.
35. For the expression ēnai kai kaitê, cf. J. Verdenius, Mnemosyne, 1964, p. 387. As for ēnai kai ēntha cf. Od., V, 327, but also II, XXIII, 320 for a metaphorical use, where it is applied to the course steered by the chariot driver who possesses no metis at all (supra, p. 14; 22).
37. Euripides, Ion, 1506; Arist., Peace, 944; Plato, Rep., 208d. For the image of the sea in Greek thought various evidence has been collected, most recently by D. Wachsmuth, o.c., p. 202ff.
41. Hesiod, Theogony, 360. Plato, Axionchos, 368b) says that to launch oneself into the sea is not merely to become amphibious but to become altogether the prey of tukhê.
42. Aeschylus, Suppl., 523: effective tukhê (praktikos), associated with Peithô.
45. A passage in the Laws is an excellent example of this. At IV, 709b the Athenian stranger declares that it is tempting to claim that
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almost all human actions fall within the province of chance (tichê). But he goes on to say 'but the fact is that although one may appear to be quite right in saying this about seafaring and the arts of the pilot, the physician and the general, yet there really is something else that we must equally well say about these same things... namely that God and, with the help of God, Tichê and Kairos govern all human affairs; and that these two collaborators with God must be followed by a third which is our own, Têchnê. One must agree that to possess the art of steering ships rather than not to possess it is our means of salvation when there is a storm...'


47. This epigraphical evidence is the subject of a study by M. Guarducci, 'Divinità Fausti nell'antica Veia', La Parola del Passato 21, 1966, pp. 279-84. She misinterprets the significance of this new Kairos for two reasons. First, she does not distinguish between the first of the cippi connected with Poseidon Asphálēos—despite the fact that she herself dates it to the first half of the fourth century—and the three others which date from the fifth century and which were all three discovered in the same small tēmenos. In the second place, she translates the epithet Olimpios, qualifying Kairos, as 'of Olympia' instead of 'of Olympian', Kairos being 'the youngest of the children of Zeus' (Io of Chios, in Paus., V, 14, 9).


51. Pontos Æxinos which is the most ancient form of the name given by the Greeks to the Black Sea, is a Greek transformation of axsaena meaning dark in Scythico-Iranian. Æxinos got changed, by euphemism, into Euxinos. Cf. Chr. M. Danoff, s.v., 'Pontos euxinos', R.E. (1965), suppl. IX, c. 951ff and the remarks of D. Wachsmuth, o.c., p. 310.

52. Sophocles, Philoctetes, 855, in a context where the importance of the kairós in the action is twice indicated, at 835 and 832. Cf. Aesch., Chonch., 814ff; Homeric Hymn to Dionysus, 26.

53. Aesch., Suppl., 594-595: Zeus Oiaros is closely associated with the idea of mēchar, which is close to the meaning of mēchanē.


56. Pindar, (Nem., VII, 17) says that wise men can predict the wind which
will blow in two days time, tritaton ã̄xemon. But at Aulis, when at
last the wind which favours the departure of the Greeks starts to blow,
everyone is taken unawares, and the first thing that comes to hand is
sacrificed to Artemis Cf. Paus., IX, 19, 7 and Callimachus, fr. 200
B Pfeiffer.
57. II., XXIII, 316–17.
58. Sophocles, Antigone, 360. 'Man is the being who knows how to cross
the grey sea when the south winds and storms are blowing, and who
goes on his way amid the abysses’ (334–8).
61. As Aratus writes, Phainom., 758ff: ‘the advantages of this prudence,
epiphorosinó, are countless for the sailor who is always on his guard’.
62. Epinomis, 976a–b.
63. Like Odysseus, the polímateus one, who controls his ship as its master,
steered by the tiller (Od., V, 270ff). Cf. Aesch., The Seven, 2–3:
The leader, entirely devoted to his task, at the helm of the city, keeps
his hand upon the tiller and never lets his eyelids fall in sleep' (together
with the remarks of D. Van Nes, Die maritime Bildersprache des
64. Rep., 488d–489.
67. Astraí tekhnairesthai or semeiasthai 'to conjecture from the stars'
is a proverbial expression applied to those who undertake long journ-
eys over the sea on their own: Hesych. no. 7911 Latte; Suda, s.v.,
vols. I, p. 393; 1, 5–7 Adler; Diogen., II, 66; Eust., p. 1355, 59.
68. Tíkēmor means both a point of reference and also a plan thought up
by an intelligent being who has been capable of recognising this
sign in space. Cf. p. 145ff, 270ff. For itheia in the terminology of
navigation, the relevant texis stretch from Homer to the end of
69. The intelligence of the pilot is also of a stochastic nature: Max.
Tyr., Diss. 30, 2, p. 352, 14 ff Hobein.
70. Cf. H. Siska, De Mercurio ceterisque deis ad artem gymnicae par-
tinentibus, Diss. Halis Saxoniae, 1933, p. 3ff.
71. Paus, III, 12, 4ff and III, 13, 6.
72. Like Hermes hododos or pontipatos, or like Artemis hagênemé. S. Wide,
Lakonische Kulte, Leipzig, 1893, p. 61, sees in Athena Kalêtheia
a 'protectress of the path', while L. R. Farnell, Cults of the Greek
States, I, 1896, p. 311, who takes more account of the name of the
place where Athena Kalêtheia is worshipped sees her as 'the divine
starter of the race'. Cf. also O. Gruppe, Griechische Mythologie, II,
1906, p. 1216 n. 3.
73. Cf. the etymological studies reviewed most recently by H. Frisk,
Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, I, Heidelberg, 1960, s.v.
'keleuthos', p. 815. V. Pisanı has devoted two studies to this word.
They are ‘Miscellanea Etimologica no. 39’, Rendic. Accad. Lincei
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74. Il., XXIII, 768ff. Lines 13 to 32 in Callimachus’ Bath of Pallas refer to an Athenian who ran the diadoules (cf. E. Norman Gardiner, Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals, London, 1910, p. 51; 280; 288) an exploit which enables Callimachus to associate her with the Dioscuri who were, according to one tradition, the victors in the first Olympic race (Paus., V, 5, 4). Cf. the commentary by E. Cahen, Les hymnes de Callimaque, Commentaire explicatif et critique, Paris, 1930, p. 225.

75. Od., XIII, 221ff.

76. Od., XIII, 225.


80. In the gulf of Magnesia there was a place known as Aphidna; this is the point from which the Argonauts, having taken their provisions of water on board, were to set out towards the open sea (Hes., VII, 193).


83. Paus., III, 13, 6. Not far away there stood also the altars of Zeus Ambulios, Athena Amboulia and the Dioscuri Ambulios.

84. Of the departure or of the arrival both of which, being ‘beginnings’, are dangerous moments, Cf. for example, the religious rituals for embarcations or disembarkations in the Greek world, or the sacrifices made upon departure (e.g. H. Popp, Die Einwirkung von Vorzeichen, Opfern und Festen auf die Kriegführung der Griechen im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Diss. Erlangen, 1958, p. 63ff).


86. Supra, p. 191ff.

87. In Od., VIII, 193, the word refers to the mark or point reached by the discus: Odysseus has just thrown it and Athena runs to mark the têrma. In the games in the Iliad, têrma refers to the marker indicating the turning point.

88. Despite the criticisms of certain scholars such as A. de Rudder, ‘L’Athéné mélancholeique’ BCH 36, 1912, pp. 523–8, who saw her as an Athena, protectress of the laws, the august guardian of the city (boulêa, politeïkê), looking fixedly at the inscription supposedly engraved on the stele.

89. C. Picard, Manuel d’archéologie grecque. La sculpture, II, 1, Paris,
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1939, p. 39–40. The author returned to this interpretation and developed it more fully in the Rev. Archéol., 1958, p. 95–98.


92. In so far as he recognises the importance of Kairos (art. cit., p. 266) Charnoux allows naiss the place it deserves in order to explain how Athena is related to the palaistra.


95. Homeric Hymn to Poseidon, 5.


97. As Aelius Aristides indicates (37, 20, Keil), Athena is doubly involved in the works of Poseidon in so far as he is both the god of horses (hippios) and also god of the sea (pontios).

98. Ships are the horses of the sea (Od., IV, 707–709; XII, 818; Aet. 26. 1, 64, 17 Pack). Just as a horse is pherezeugos (Byclos, fr. 287, 6, Page), Alcaeus calls the ship pherezeugos (fr. 249, 3, Lobel and Page). Elsewhere he is (Hdt., VII, 86) refers to the horse as well as to a swift ship. Finally, 'to have mastery over the sea' can be expressed in Greek by hippokrattein (Thuc., VI, 71, 2. Cf. J. Gardiner, 'Terms for Thalassocracy in Thucydides', Rh. Mut., 113, 1969, p. 20).

99. The tilter of the ship is sometimes called the curb, chalinós (IG, II 2, 1610, 21, 14; Eur., Hec., 539; Pind., Pyth., 11, 26; Oppian, Hal., I, 229). Similarly, the curb and reins can be referred to by the term for tiler (Aesh., The Seven 206ff; Eur., Hippol., 1219–1226). Tiller and curb are frequently synonymous terms (Soph., fr. 869, vol. III, p. 69 Pearson (Cambridge, 1917); Plut., De Iside, p. 3698).

100. Pind., Ol., XII, 68ff.


102. Apollod., I, 9, 27.

103. Valerius Flaccus, Argon., I, 188–98.


108. Apollod., II, 1, 4; Hyginus, Fab., 277; Eust., p. 27, 23ff. Cf. Waser, s.v. 'Danaos', RE. (1901), c. 2054–2058.


110. A. R., II, 612–614; gemophantes suntraste...
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112. II., V, 59ff.

113. ll., XV, 410–412.


117. For xâê, to scrape, plane, polish, cf. the cited texts, s.v. 'Tignarius', ibid., p. 334ff and A. C. Orlando, Les matériaux de construction... des anciens Grecs (Fr. tr.), Paris, 1966, pp. 42–3.


119. harmôsêin, arîasthêsîn, gomphôsîn, pêgmênîn.


128. This image is used by Theognis, 945: 'eîmi pará státhmê arxhên hodôn, oudeiterê klinûmêse, I follow the straight path along the line, without deviating to right or to left. For the meaning of these lines, cf. A. B. van Groningen, Theognis Amsterdam, 1966, p. 325. The comparison between the line and straightness is to be found in lines 543–6 and 806–12 also in Theognis.

129. II., XV, 410–412.

130. II., XXIII, 316–317; Ap. Rh., I, 562, etc.

131. II., VIII, 116; XI, 228; XXIV, 149; 178; 362; [Hes.], The Shield, 324; Eur., Hippol., 1219–1220 (where the chariot is, moreover, compared, to a ship).

132. Cf. supra, p. 45.

133. Cf. ll., X, 19, and V, 62.


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139. The English translation is based on the French one by V. Bérard.
140. Od., VI, 207ff.
141. Od., VI, 266.
145. Od., V, 382–387. Paus., IV, 35, 5 mentions an Athena amorētis who, at Diomedes' request puts an end to the violence of the winds unleashed upon Methone.
150. Od., VII, 35.
153. The word used here is elainein, not ithainein: the ship is propelled by the arms of the oarsmen (Od., XIII, 76–78).
154. This is the fate of the ship which returns after having taken Odysseus to Ithaca (Od., XIII, 163–164).
155. E. Kirsten and W. Kraiker, Griechenlandkunde, I, Heidelberg, 1967, p. 163–165. It was probably in honour of Poseidon that a festival with regattas was held every five years.
156. Od., III, 279ff.
158. Od., III, 282–3. The name Phrontis speaks for itself as clearly as does the name of the boatman Noemon, the son of Phronios, from whom Athena borrows a ship for Telemachus' voyage (Od., II, 386).
163. As it is described by Pausanias, X, 25, 2.
166. Cf. supra, p. 204.
167. This opposition has been noted and even exaggerated by H. de La Ville de Mirmont, 'Le navire Argo', Rev. intern. enseign. 30, 1895, p. 280ff.
168. A. R., I, 188; II, 867.
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170. 381ff.
171. 1, 522ff.; 1274ff.
172. 1, 559–562.
173. II, 173ff.
175. II, 584–5.
177. II, 854–60.
179. II, 1260ff.
180. IV, 254ff.
181. IV, 294ff.
182. IV, 588ff.
183. IV, 640ff.
184. IV, 930ff.
185. IV, 1259ff.
186. IV, 1588–1619.
187. IV, 1694–1718.
188. IV, 588ff and 640.
190. Ibid., 9–11.
191. Aristoph., Frogs, 847.
192. Plut., De def. orac., 426c.
193. It is through this same contrast of the colours black and white that another power of the sea, namely Thetis, manifests herself. In Book IV of the Argonautica, in the passage through the Plagketai, she plays a role similar to that of Athena’s in Book II. Thetis, who, like the goddess Metis, is a power of the sea, appears in Alcmes’ cosmogonical poem as a great primordial deity who introduces the light of day and the brilliance of the stars into a chaotic and totally nocturnal world. Because she is a deity of the primordial waters her powers, which are more ancient than those of Poseidon, to some extent duplicate his in certain regions of the Greek world. Thus at Cape Sepia, when a violent storm falls upon the Persian fleet, the Magoi attempt to dispel it by offering sacrifices to Thetis and the Nereides as well as sacrificing victims to the raging winds and addressing these with incantations (Hdt., VII, 186). But in the episode in the Argonautica the very manner of Thetis’ intervention resembles that of Athena. Accompanied by the Nereides, who are explicitly likened to sea-crows, she seizes the ship by the rudder and vigorously pushes it forward. Just as Athena earlier did, Thetis opens up a way for the Argonauts’ ship and plots out a route straight through the sheer rocks for it (IV, 938: Thetis d’echne koléouthion). Despite the apparently great resemblance between these two powers, the comparison cannot be carried any further—at least in the context we have chosen, that of a structural analysis of the power of Olympus. Thetis is a deity possessing métis, like Athena, but she does not belong to the
same generation of gods as Athena, Poseidon or the Dioscuri. Because she is a primordial power endowed with metis, Thetis, like Metis herself, transcends the methods and forms of metis peculiar to the Olympians as these appear through the respective modes of operation of Athena, Hermes, Aphrodite, Hephaestus, and Zeus. Thus there is no reason why Thetis should not intervene in the manner of Athena. The polyvalency of her metis is such that she could just as well have appeared as a craftsmanlike builder of ships (cf. supra, p. 141ff).
CHAPTER 9

The feet of Hephaestus

According to traditions from Rhodes, the Telchines\(^1\) are metal workers with the power of the evil eye, magicians who are invariably malignant and who are primordial powers. We find them at the centre of a complex of myths which comprise the series of accounts of their adventures in Rhodes and Ceos, through which one can grasp the structure of the set of connections and relationships which link them with two groups of powers: on the one hand similar metallurgical powers such as the Sinties, the Dactyli, the Cabiri and Hephaestus and, on the other hand, the primordial powers connected with the sea, namely Proteus, Thetis and Psamathe. Through the network of myths in which they play a part we can define certain aspects of metallurgy seen as a particular form of activity and also various characteristics of the blacksmith considered as a human type. We can consider how metallurgy relates to farming and how the blacksmith and metal work relate to the area of the sea, the powers connected with it and its cosmogonical role. We can also study how the metal-worker is represented as an agent, the way he walks, how his limbs are shaped and the tools he uses to hold the metal. It is impossible within the scope of this work to study the full range of mythical evidence on the subject of metal work, so we have chosen to concentrate on one animal, used as a model in this context, which incorporates the essential characteristics of the myth of the Telchines and which also enables us to draw attention to one aspect of major importance in the representation of the blacksmith in archaic Greece, namely the morphology of his lower limbs. Our richest source of information on the Telchines is a treatise on the terms of insult used by the Greeks, written
by the Roman historian Suetonius. In this erudite work produced in Greek by the director of the Greek libraries belonging to the Romans under the reign of Hadrian, a whole series of points stress the affinities between these metallurgical powers and the world of the sea: the Telchines are the children of the sea; their adventures take place on islands such as Rhodes and Crete; finally, they are presented as amphibious beings which, in the course of their metamorphoses, take on the appearance of sea creatures: ‘Sometimes they resemble demons, sometimes human beings and then again sometimes fish or snakes’. But Suetonius’ text is not limited to general information of this nature; it goes on to give much stranger details. Without undertaking a close study of the textual problems raised by the precise terms in which this information is given, it is fair to summarize it as follows: some of the Telchines have neither arms nor legs and their fingers are webbed like the feet of geese. They are also said to have a glittering gaze and black eyebrows. While the latter feature appears to refer to the magic power of the Telchines, the former two which are complementary suggest an animal form which illustrates the Telchines’ power of metamorphosis—to be more precise, the two last forms mentioned by Suetonius, namely those of fish or snakes. ‘To lack arms and legs’ (achetres kai ápodes) was, for the naturalists of antiquity, a characteristic feature of fish, the creatures whose body is one continuous trunk from head to tail. Now the fish-shaped creatures mentioned by Suetonius also have a membrane between their fingers ‘like geese’. Their webbed fingers are therefore joined directly to the trunk of their body. There is only one animal which answers this description perfectly. It is the seal, the fish-shaped mammal whose short feet in the form of flippers have five fingers contained in a sheath of skin. The behaviour that is characteristic of it, its place on the animal scale and the special qualities with which it is endowed are all features which support such an identification and enable us to define the Telchines both as primordial powers and as metal-workers.

Seals are amphibious fin-footed mammals, amazingly well adapted to the aquatic life of the sea; they have a streamlined body, a rather flat head and forelimbs which are short
and close to the trunk while the back limbs are dragged passively along behind. For us they are exotic creatures. In Antiquity, however, they abounded, being widely distributed in both the Mediterranean and the Aegean Seas. There is plenty of evidence for this ranging from Strabo, Diodorus and Agatharchides, writing on the Island of Seals and the large numbers of these mammals living in the Red Sea, to the many legends about seals, whether they be in Homer or in the *Cycnides*. Seafarers and those with specialist knowledge of the sea in Antiquity are in agreement when they declare the disappearance of the seal from the Mediterranean to be a recent phenomenon. At the beginning of this century these amphibious creatures still wintered near Cape Fegalo and until only a few years ago some were still to be seen by passing vessels on the shores of deserted islands.6

The image of the seal in Greek antiquity centres upon two essential features of this animal, namely its amphibious nature and the fact that it is fin-footed, or to put it another way, its way of life and its morphological characteristics—two aspects of the seal which are closely interconnected as is shown by comparing two texts from Aristotle. In the *Historia Animalium* the seal is described as an amphibious animal: ‘it does not take in sea-water; it breathes and sleeps and brings forth its young upon dry land (near the shore though, it is true) as belonging to the land animals which have feet; on the other hand it spends most of its time in the sea and gets its food from the sea and therefore we must discuss it along with the aquatic animals’.7 Divided between land and sea, by preference inhabiting the shore, the strip of land which borders the sea, the seal is only in a position to lead this type of double life because it enjoys certain morphological peculiarities which make it possible for it to belong to the category of fishes as well as that of land animals. This is a point which is stressed in Aristotle’s *De Partibus animalium*: ‘Seals, if regarded as water animals, are anomalous in having feet; if regarded as land animals, in having fins (their hind feet are altogether like those of fishes, i.e. fins)’.8

A number of texts define this type of double life led by the seal more closely. First there are the accounts ranging from Aristotle to Aelian of the up-bringing of the young seal.9
This is how Plutarch describes the training of this amphibian: 'Seals give birth to their young on dry land; little by little they lead them towards the sea, give them a taste of it and then immediately take them out of it again. They repeat this procedure several times until they have got them used to it and given them so much confidence that they enjoy being in the sea-water'.

This toing and froing of the young seal between the land and the sea conveys more than just the amphibious nature of an animal that belongs both to land and to sea; it also reveals one of the major roles of the seal for the ancient Greeks: the seal was a mediator between the dry and the wet, bringing together the elements of sea and land. Ever since the episode of Proteus in the *Odyssey*, seals, for the Greeks, had been animals which came up from the depths of the sea to lie in the shelter of caves along the coasts: they seem to display a particular partiality for the ribbon of wet land which links the dry to the wet. When they need to sleep the seals of the Old Men of the Sea come to lie on the seashore (parà rhēgmíni thalássēs); and it is also to the beach (eπi rhēgmíni pōntou) that Psamathe, the sister of Thetis, comes to give birth to a son called Phokos, the Seal, when in order to elude the grasp of Aeacás she has herself assumed the form of this animal. But these fin-footed amphibians do not only settle in the caves along the sea coast, they sometimes choose rocks battered by the waves, known to the Greeks as spiladēs. This is the very expression Hera uses to describe the place where Leto will give birth to a child which, for fear of the anger of Hera, no land will accept: 'Leto will give birth where the seals of the sea produce their young, upon the lost rocks'.

Now Delos, which is the place in question, is indeed a windy isle, a rock battered by the sea. It is, according to one mythical tradition, even a land without roots, a floating island. Delos wanders over the sea, borne along with the current by the Notos or the Euros winds. In contrast to the earth, 'wide-bosomed Gaia', whose deeply anchored roots ensure a solid and unshakable seat for mankind to dwell on, the floating island is a portion of earth which is half immersed in the sea and which is subject to movement in two directions, either horizontally or vertically. Sometimes it is buffeted from left to right and from right to left.
by the waves and sometimes it rises up from the depths of the sea and is then lost again in the immensity of the Pontos. The analogy between the floating island and the seal which inhabits it is perfect. For mythical thought the position of both was half-way between the earth and the water. They do not belong totally either to the one or to the other and because they combine elements of the sea and the earth equally, both act as mediators between the two.

The animal model of the seal, the amphibian whose position is profoundly ambiguous, is affected by a tension between two contrary influences; one connects it with the land and the human beings who live there, the other with the sea and the forces which are hostile to man. The disparity of behaviour which this one animal displays is underlined by the existence of two aspects of the life of the seal. One of these stresses the seal's affinities with the human race, the other its power of the 'evil eye'.

Although the seal may appear separated from the human world by both its condition as an animal and its aquatic nature, it is nevertheless linked with it through several aspects,—through certain physiological peculiarities pointed out by the naturalists, through its liking for life on dry land on shores frequented by fishermen, and also through the disturbing resemblance it bears to the human form, a resemblance often referred to in the course of a long tradition of folklore. In the Historia Animalium, after noting the seal's affinities with the quadrupeds (like them, it is viviparous and it feeds its young with its milk), Aristotle twice stresses the resemblance these amphibian mammals bear to the human race: the seal gives birth to its young at any season 'as is the case with men'; and although the genital organs of the female seal resemble those of the sow, in other respects she is 'like a woman'. Alongside these observations made by naturalists, we must consider the information given by geographers about the close relations between seals and the men who live along the coasts. In his description of the Isle of Seals, situated right at the tip of the Red Sea, off the coast of the Icthyophagoi, Agatharchides tells with wonder of the friendly relations which exist here: 'It would seem that a kind of everlasting peace has been concluded between men and seals. The men
never seek to harm the seals who, for their part, never attack the men. Each species respects the territory of the other and the two live together on terms of amicability which are rarely to be found between groups of men who live close to each other. It is in a similar context that we should locate Aelian’s anecdote about the love affair between a seal and a sponge diver: One day a seal fell in love with a man who collected sponges. It came out of the sea and was united to him in a cave by the sea. This fisherman was the most ugly of men but in the eyes of the seal he possessed dazzling beauty of the rarest kind.

One side of the seal’s way of life thus brought it close to the world of men. Furthermore the morphology of the seal was such that it presented precise features of similarity with the human race. In the *Cyranides* a passage describing it runs as follows: ‘the marine seal is a very fine animal, it has *human hands* etc’. This corresponds to Aristotle’s remark: ‘its forefeet are like hands’. This same point of resemblance struck the French traveller Thévenot, many centuries later. When he was travelling along the coast of Sinai, opposite the Seal Islands of Antiquity, he was intrigued by a certain fish known to the natives as the man of the sea. ‘This fish is large and strong and the only extraordinary thing about it is that it has two hands which are in effect like those of a man, but the skin of this fish looks like that of a chamois’. Two points should be noted about this description, published in Paris in 1664. First it mentions ‘human hands’ as do the *Cyranides* and recalls the comparison made by Suetonius, writing of the Telchines (‘they have fingers joined together by skin, like geese’); and secondly, it mentions the name ‘man of the sea’ which natives used for the seal. The man of the sea and the seal are two species which the elder Pliny cites, one after the other, in his list of sea monsters. It may be quite by chance that these two species appear together in Pliny’s list, but, nonetheless, they are two species whose affinities are noted as early as in the *Odyssey*, in the episode about Menelaus and the Old Man of the Sea. The fact is that Proteus was deceived by the seal-disguise Menelaus and his companions adopted when they dressed up in the freshlyflayed skins of these sea mons-
ters; and the reason he was deceived is undoubtedly that the
distance between man and seal is one that is easily crossed.
The resemblance between seal and man seems all the greater
because the sea-creature does in some ways look rather like
a human being. 23

So one image of the sea is that of a philanthropic animal
with close affinities with the human race. But in another set
of texts it is a misanthropic creature, a distant inhabitant
of the depths of the sea, one of the group of animals considered
impure and wicked. 24 When it rises from the sea, this monster
of the deeps seems to be returning from the Beyond. It has
a strong smell, the smell of the abyss. It gives off an odour of
death which can only be dispelled by ambrosia, the life-giving
fragrance of the Immortals. 25 The chthonic aspects of the
seal caused an evil interpretation to be put upon its physio-
logical characteristics and thus it was seen as the enemy of the
human race. It was said that when on the point of being
cought it would vomit out its rennet and eject its seed attempt-
ing in this way to deprive men of substances endowed with
highly valued qualities, rennet being a remedy for epilepsy
while the seed of the seal was supposed to cure sexual impo-
tence. 26 When Aelian reports this behaviour of the seal in his
Historia Animalium he goes on to remark: 'Yes, by Zeus,
this animal certainly is a bearer of the evil eye, báskanos'. 27
But this role is not without ambiguity for every báskanos
is ambivalent in that it is at the same time báskantion, that
is to say a means of protection against the evil eye. So the
seal, or even the smallest part of one can serve as an amulet
whose protective powers are all the more dependable because
of the very great power of the evil eye which the seal possesses.
Plutarch, the Cyranides and the Geoponica all give lists of the
various parts of the seal which can be used as amulets: 28
the heart of a seal, nailed to the mast of a ship protects the
vessel from all danger; the long, stiff whiskers from its nose
guarantee spectacular success; its finger nails afford protec-
tion against all enchantment, cure every disease and ward off
all evil. As well as these powers which it shared with a large
number of other animals, the seal was also believed to give
forewarning of, or ward off, atmospheric phenomena such as
thunder, hail and storms. Plutarch maintained that the skin
of a seal is never struck by lightning; in the *Cyranides* it is reported that if a seal-skin is nailed to the prow, the ship will never be assailed by fire from the sky; and again, in the same collection of writings, it is said that a seal-skin wards off thunder, danger and demons. Finally, on three occasions the *Geoponica* describe the seal-skin as being the most effective means of affording protection against the ravages of hail for vines, wheat fields and farming land.

The seal is an ambiguous creature, and doubly so: in its double attitude or ‘duplicit’ towards men and also in its way of life now on the land and now in the sea. And there is a yet a third side to its ambiguity: the uncertainty of an animal that is both a fish and a quadruped. This third kind of ambiguity manifests itself both in the seal’s strange gait and in its peculiar limbs. Seals move along in a strange manner because, as Aristotle points out, they are aquatic creatures with feet and at the same time terrestrial quadrupeds whose limbs end in flippers. The seal appears to drag itself along, it slithers forward, progresses in undulations, snakes along so to speak, pushing with the forelimbs on its flanks and repeatedly contracting and oscillating its body. The ancient writers did not fail to notice such a singular gait. Pliny the Elder\(^9\) writes ‘the flippers which they use in the sea take the place of paws when they drag themselves along the ground’; and Aristotle: ‘To get down steep places it just lets itself go without attempt to walk, because it is unable to get a grip with its feet’.\(^9\)

In a chapter of the *Historia Animalium* devoted to the different ways of life, Aristotle notes that among terrestrial creatures some fly while others move about on the ground, and of the latter group some walk, some crawl and others move by undulation. He then goes on to observe that some birds have ‘weak feet’ (*kakopodes*) and for that reason are known as ‘*apodes’*. And at this point he introduces a remark on the subject of the seal: ‘the seal too, has stunted feet’ (*kekolobomónoi podes*).\(^31\) The verb *kolobolústhai* is the one Aristotle uses in the same treatise to describe the morphology of fish: ‘In the tribe of fishes, the external parts are still further stunted. Fishes have neither legs, hands nor wings . . . but the whole trunk has an uninterrupted line from head to tail’.\(^32\) With its truncated external parts ‘the seal is a sort of stunted quad-
ruped' (hō sper pepēroménon, tetrápoun). Its extremities are carefully described in the Historia Animalium as follows: 'Immediately behind its shoulder blades are attached its front feet, similar to hands, like those of the bear, for each has five toes and each toe has three flexions (trel<k>is kampás) and a smallish nail. The hind feet also have five toes and flexions and nails similar to those of the front feet, but in shape they are comparable to the tail of a fish'. In this description, as in those already mentioned, emphasis is laid first and foremost on the ambiguities of the seal: now a quadruped, now a fish; now equipped with feet and hands, now without arms and legs. The tentative nature of the expressions used faithfully reflects the ambivalence of a creature forever poised between the status of a fish and that of a quadruped, equipped with feet and paws like terrestrial animals but at the same time lacking arms and legs like marine creatures. Secondly, this description makes it quite clear that the ambivalence in the seal's way of life finds its fullest expression in the morphology of the extremities which characterise this fin-footed amphibian. Are these limbs, with their multiple joints, hands or feet or flippers? It is an unresolved enigma: the feet are flippers and these flippers are hands. The passage from Aristotle indicates that several definitions are possible for the seal: a quadruped with flippers, a fish with hands, a kind of human being without arms or legs or, again, a man-fish or a fish-quadruped. Together they show clearly enough that the image of the seal oscillated between three terms: namely, fish, quadruped and man, and the tension between them made the image of the seal appear to be quite unlike that of any other animal. The third notable feature of this description of the seal's extremities is the importance Aristotle attaches to the concept of curvature. The fingers of the front paws, like those of the back feet, each possess three joints, trel<k>is kampás, and their shape is reminiscent of the sinuous appearance of the fish's tail. The extremities of both its front and its rear limbs makes the seal a creature of curves; and this fundamental feature of its silhouette is further emphasised by its rolling gait and sinuous and curved movements.

Suetonius has left us a very full description of the Telchines. They possess the power of metamorphosis so they
are not limited to a single animal form. Sometimes they resemble demons, sometimes men, sometimes fish. So the appearance of a fin-footed amphibian which the Telchines sometimes adopt is not the only fish-shaped metamorphosis within the powers of these blacksmiths of the sea. However, we may consider the seal’s form to be especially suited to the Telchines because this animal image allows the metal-workers of the sea to reveal the fundamental characteristics of their mythical personality. The fact is that there are fundamental resemblances between the image of the seal in ancient Greek thought and the representation of the Telchines in myth. As in the case of the seals, the status of the Telchines lies somewhere between that of men and that of fish. They were the first inhabitants of the island of Rhodes, having risen from the sea to which they were finally banished again by the sons of the Sun. According to the mythical traditions of Rhodes, their role was, more precisely, to act as mediators between the sea and the earth, as powers whose whole career is inseparable from Rhodes represented as a floating island, a land only half distinguishable from the waters of the sea. Finally, these metalworker Telchines who were the first human beings on Rhodes were also, for a whole set of texts, carriers of the evil eye. Their gaze changes all things for the worse, they concoct poisons from a mixture of vegetable roots, sprinkle upon the earth water from the Styx, which dries it up, and bring down hail, snow and storms wherever they choose, thus exerting upon atmospheric phenomena the same powers that seals were traditionally believed to hold.

From this brief comparison we can see that the mythical image of the metal workers of Rhodes incorporates all the conceptual features which we have found to be relevant in the representation of the seal. We should, however, make two qualifications at this point. Although the animal model of the fin-footed amphibian illuminates certain aspects of the Telchines, that is as demons of the sea and primordial beings, it does not so far appear to establish any precise connection with their role as metal-workers. Moreover, one major characteristic of the seal model, namely the strange nature of its extremities, does not appear to correspond to any feature in the representation of the Telchines. These two points are
in effect inseparable and we must undertake a direct analysis of them, for the fact is that it is this very feature of the animal model which most significantly symbolises the blacksmith aspect of the nature of the Telchines.

To discover the relationship between the ambiguous extremities of the seal and the metallurgical activity of the Telchines we must digress to consider another animal model whose fundamental elements reveal clear affinities between the morphology of its extremities and the technical activity of the blacksmith. The animal that is thus characterised both by the strange form of its limbs and by its complicity with the metal-worker is the crab, *karkinos*, the sea creature which is associated both with the Cabiri and with Hephaestus. A gloss from Hesychius makes the following two connected points: ‘The Cabiri are crabs, *karkinoi*, animals which are particularly honoured at Lemnos where they are held to be gods. It is also said that they are the sons of Hephaestus’.35 The Cabiri are powers of the Sea who are metalworkers. They were born from the union between Hephaestus and Cabeiro, the daughter of Proteus, the king of the seals, and they are identified with the creature which is closely associated with both the sea and metallurgy: *karkinos*, which is the Greek name for the crab, is also the word denoting the blacksmith’s tongs.36 Thus it seems that for the Greeks the image of this crustacean creature of the sea could not be dissociated from that of the instrument which is an appendage to the hands of the blacksmith and enables him to handle the glowing metal.

Like the seal, the crab is an amphibious creature: ‘they spend their lives near the land and creep into holes and crannies’.37 However, unlike the seal, the crab is not often regarded as a mediator between the water and the earth. Its originality lies elsewhere, in its limbs, the way it walks and the shape of its feet and pincers. Here, for example, is how the hard-tailed crab, the *págouros*, is described: ‘A beast with crooked legs (*rhábioskelé*), and two pincers (*dichalon*), which burrows into the sand (*ammoduítan*), walks backwards (*opísthobámon*) . . . a swimmer with eight feet (*oktápon náktan*).38 In a whole series of texts this monster with crooked legs, the crab, is an animal which does not move straight forwards: it walks
sideways, advancing obliquely. Aristotle says that all animals move in the same manner. Whether they have four legs or more they move diagonally (katâ diámetron), stepping first on the right forefoot then the left rear foot and so on. They all have two guiding feet—all, that is, except the crab which has four and which walks sideways, eis to plágiōn. And there is a Greek proverb which agrees with the naturalist's description: 'You will never make a crab walk straight.' The gait of this many-legged creature is the more disturbing in that its feet are twisted and in front of its carapace it carries two huge pincers. In contrast to the seal, the crab has front and rear limbs which are clearly distinguished: the pincers are used to grip tightly while the feet are responsible for movement over the ground. The extremities of the crab which are clearly differentiated in this way according to their function, are also opposed to each other in another way: the way they bend. 'These claws are not for the sake of locomotion but serve instead of hands, for catching and holding; and that is why they bend in an opposite direction to the feet which bend and twist toward the concave side while the claws bend towards the convex side (toûs mēn ... epi to kōlon, toîs d' epi to περιφέρες κἀμπτος καὶ θελίζος). The kar-kēnos has an oblique walk which involves two different directions, forwards and backwards, and similarly its morphological structure comprises a double synthesis of opposites. Instead of being turned slightly outwards, the feet of the crab turn inwards, the left one curving towards the right and the right one towards the left. The contrasting curvature of the lower limbs which thus point in two opposite directions is matched symmetrically by the pincers which also curve in opposite directions and whose movement is the symmetrical reverse of that of the lower limbs. In its limbs as in its gait, the animal model of the crab represents a synthesis of all the different directions, forwards and backwards, and left and right.

All these characteristics of the crab—its twisted legs, its oblique gait, the double and opposite directions in which it moves—are unmistakably reminiscent of the most famous of Greek blacksmiths, Hephaestus, the poli̇mē̇tos god with whom the crab is specifically associated on the island of Lem-
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nos. The texts enable us to characterise the physical appearance of the god who is a worker in metals by three adjectives especially: *kullós* (in the compound word *kullopodión*), *chōlós* and *amphigêuës*. All three refer to the blacksmith's extremities: the first conveys their curved shape, the second their truncated nature and the third the fact that his limbs bend in two opposite directions. Hephaestus is *kullopodión*, a god with curved feet and twisted limbs. In medical terminology *kullós*, meaning bandy-legged, is opposed to *blaisós*, meaning knock-kneed just as a dislocation outwards is opposed to a dislocation inwards. But apart from this specialised meaning in medical terminology, *kullós* can also mean club-footed or crooked-fingered, referring to hands crooked into a curve the shape of which would, for the Greeks, call to mind the pincer of a crab. *Karkinoín tous daktühlous* means to curve the fingers, bend them inwards, making the hand of a crab. Hephaestus whose limbs are curved is certainly lame, *chōlós*. When used on its own *chōlós* describes a living creature which is truncated, mutilated or crippled; when used with the phrase *héteron pōda* this adjective means lame; used in conjunction with *tên cheîra* it takes on the meaning of one-armed. Hephaestus is not strictly speaking bandy-legged nor is he lame; he is 'mutilated in both legs', *hekatérous tous pōdas* *chōlós* or 'mutilated in his lower limbs' (*pōthentā tās bāseis*). The curvature and mutilation of his extremities are two features which are, as it were, echoed by the third epithet, *amphigêuës*. H. Vos interprets this to mean 'curved in both legs', while L. Deroy analyses it as meaning 'possessing two, opposite directions'. As used by Homer it fully conveys the morphological peculiarities of Hephaestus as depicted on vase paintings of the archaic period. On a number of vases—which Marie Delcourt has shown to be evidence relevant to any analysis of Hephaestus—the disablement of the blacksmith is depicted in various ways which can be reduced to two complementary models. One group of paintings shows Hephaestus with twisted limbs, bent feet and curved legs; in the other group we see the figure moving in two different directions, either with the left foot pointing forwards and the right bent backwards, or with the feet placed heel to heel with one facing left and the
other right, or else with his head turned to face forwards in contrast to his feet which are pointed backwards.

Whether orientated in two directions at once or possessed of crooked legs, the blacksmith of myth is always a being with an ambiguous way of walking and peculiar limbs. It is this fundamental aspect of the metal worker that is revealed, on two closely related levels, by the animal models which have appeared to us to be an integral part of the mythical representation of the blacksmith—namely the crab and the seal, the crab being associated with Lemnos and the Cabiri, and the seal with Rhodes and the Telchines. Thus our digression to establish the homology between these two animal models enables us to see the full significance of the last of the seal's characteristics, which did not originally appear to correspond to anything in the myth about the Telchines. The sinuous gait and curved extremities of the companions of the Old Man of the Sea symbolise the metallurgical function of these disturbing powers. Like the crab with its oblique walk, the seal with its sinuous method of movement represents one of the blacksmith's fundamental characteristics, namely the ambiguous nature of his limbs. This is the identifying mark of a god such as Hephaestus. The peculiar shape of his feet is the visible symbol of his métis, his wise thoughts and his craftsman's intelligence. It has been suggested that Hephaestus is disabled and deformed because he has been initiated into the arts of magic. But in the Greek world there does not appear to be any evidence for men of magic undergoing mutilation as there is in certain Australian and Germanic societies. And even if it is true that the Amazons deliberately deformed their male children by breaking their hips and knees, this was in order to prevent them from plotting anything against the women and to relegate these cripples to the sedentary trades of blacksmith or cobbler,— trades which, in a society where only the women exercised the warrior function, were the mark of the servitude and impotence which were the lot of the men.

In total contrast to this, it is the power of Hephaestus which is emphasised by his distinctive characteristic of being endowed with a double and divergent orientation. In order to dominate shifting, fluid powers such as fire, winds and
minerals which the blacksmith must cope with, the intelligence and mètis of Hephaestus must be even more mobile and polymorphic than these. They must possess the qualities of the oblique and the curved—qualities possessed in the highest degree by the crab and the seal, the creatures which half-belong to the element of the sea with which, for the ancient Greeks, metallurgy appears to have been so profoundly connected.

Notes

1. H. Herter, s.v. 'Telchinian', R.E. (1934), c. 197–224 has collected extensive data on these powers.
3. At this juncture we are following the version given by Eustathius which has the advantage of simplicity (cf. Suetonius, o.c., p. 99) whereas that reconstructed by J. Taillardat raises a number of difficulties.
4. The question of whether we should favour megaléphruses, with big eyebrows (M.L.), adopted by Taillardat, or melanéphruses, with black eyebrows, attested by Eustathius, is a matter of some uncertainty. The eyebrows are part of the glittering gaze and of the eye with the power to fascinate or terrify: eg. the eyebrows of Hermes poliÁnètis (Homerica Hymn to Heracles) 278–80, of the Cyclopes (Callimachus, Hymn to Artemis, 52), of Harpalykos (Theocritus, The Young Hercules (XXIV), 115–117). As for their dark colour, for a whole Homeritic tradition (ll., I, 528; XV, 102; XVII, 203) this is the colour most in keeping with the terror aroused by a spell-binding gaze.
10. [Plut.], De soll. anim., 982d.
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18. Aelian, Hist. anim., IV, 56. If it is felt that the amorous practices of this fish-shaped mammal should be normalised, it should perhaps be remembered that (as J. Tréheux has pointed out) the gender of the seal is feminine in the Greek language.
22. Pliny, H.N., XXXII, 144.
23. There is a longstanding tradition in folklore that seals are the descendants of the ‘People of Pharaoh’ who were swallowed up in the sea: R. Goossens, ‘Un conte égyptien: Pharson, roi des Phoques’, in Mélanges F. Cumont, vol. II, Brussels, 1956, p. 715-732.
25. Od., IV, 406; 442; 445-446; Aristophanes, Peace, 758.
28. Plut., Quaest. conv., 664c; Cyranides II, in Les Lapidaires (grec), ed. Mély and Ruelle, vol. II, 1, 1898, p. 76, 1.24-77, 1.22; Cyranides, IV, in o.c., p. 120, 1.26-121, 1.20; Geoponica, I, 14, 3 and 5; p. 29, 2ff Beckh; V, 33, 7, p. 155, 14ff Beckh.
29. Pliny, H.N., IX, 42.
31. Id. ibid., 497b 24.
32. Id., Part. anim., 695b 2.
33. Id., Hist. anim., 498a 31-b 4.
34. Cf. supra, note 1.
37. Arist., Part. anim., 684a 4-5.
40. Arist., De Inc. anim., 712b 13ff, 713b 24ff.
42. Arist., Part. anim., 683b 33ff.
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43. II., XXI, 355; 367 (poliphrón).
46. Aristophanes, Knights, 1080; Birds, 1379.
47. Cf. Antiphanes, 55 Kock.
48. II., II, 217.
49. Plato, Lato, 794c.
50. This is the expression used by Antigonus, Hist. Mirab., 45 in Paradoxog. gr., p. 54–55 Giannini, to define the meaning of amphigýaías. It is confirmed by several scholia.
51. Apoll., 1, 5, 5.
55. The scorpion seems to have the same role as the crab. The 'Pheonician' amulet of Aslan-Tash, published by A. Caquot and R. du Mesnil du Buisson ('La seconde tablette ou petite amulette d'Aslan-Tash', Syria, 1971, p. 391–406), shows a gnome with a large head with the features of a dog and a huge, bulging eye. This monster has almost completed devouring a human body, but whilst its head is turned to the left the orientation of its lower limbs is ambiguous for they end in two huge scorpions. The inscription, to which the authors provide a commentary, appears to suggest that this demon of the evil-eye is called Alasiote or 'Cypriot' and that this monstrous figure who lives on the island of metal-workers is some close relation to the Telchines who, according to Greek sources, inhabited Cyprus as well as Rhodes (p. 402).
57. On Joints, 53, vol. IV, p. 232–234 Littré. This is one of the rare pieces of information of Greek origin which appears to support the thesis of Marie Delcourt. However, it does not really do so for in this context of the myth where male and female are inverted it is simply a matter of a transposition of the classic contrast drawn between warriors and artisans.
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER IO

The Circle and the Bond

In the kingdom of the gods ruled by the serene authority of Zeus μῆτις is, so to speak, the best distributed commodity in the world. This is not because an equal share of it is granted to all the inhabitants of Olympus as if it was simply common sense but rather because the distribution of power among the various figures in the pantheon inevitably entails some degree of sharing out of this form of intelligence. Μῆτις is polymorphic and diverse; it can be applied in the many forms of knowledge which are the particular privilege of the various gods. However, if μῆτις is widely shared it follows that there must be an agreed limit set upon how much of it may be possessed by a single god. Zeus is the most richly endowed with it but this is not so that he can use it as he will at the expense of others less richly endowed; the age of Kronos is over and the sovereignty can never again be seized by another. On the contrary, the only reason why Zeus, as King, carries the full weight of all the μῆτις in the world is that he is responsible for making each of the divine powers respect the limitations placed upon him in the organisation of the cosmos. However, this does not mean that all the gods are more or less endowed with μῆτις. Neither Demeter nor Poseidon nor Artemis nor Apollo appear to have any share in it. Nor does Dionysus whose spells and tricks never spring from pure μῆτις. Any general analysis of the organisation of the Pantheon must recognise this fundamental distinction between the gods who possess μῆτις and those who do not. However in pursuing our enquiry we shall begin by pointing out, rather, the differences within the group formed by the gods who do possess μῆτις.

It is in their different ways of using μῆτις that we can see the dissimilarities and differences between the particular
methods of operation of the individual powers. This is the case even within an area over which one particular power may appear to hold sway with as much right as his immediate rival and it holds as true in the field of technical knowledge shared by Athena and Hephaestus as in the whole area of love relationships where Hermes and Aphrodite preside. The Orphic tradition according to which Hephaestus and Athena together receive the gift of mastery of the arts from the Cyclopes does not mean that the powers held by Hephaestus and Athena correspond exactly with those of the Cyclopes, as if the three workers in lightning and thunder had subsequently, in a later generation, been replaced by a pair of gods expert in every kind of technical knowledge. In the myths about the struggles for power in which they first appear the role of the Cyclopes is essentially that of the artisans of kingship. Their task is provide Zeus with magic weapons hardly to be distinguished from the mastery of fire—the terrifying, paralysing fire which is not so much a technical power as a pure means of binding and dominating the enemy. In contrast, once we turn to the Olympians, Hephaestus and Athena are responsible for the entire collection of technical activities represented in the world of men by a wide range of know-how from metallurgy and pottery to weaving and carpentry and including the skills of the charioteer and the pilot and one particular aspect of the use of arms. Where Athena is promoted to the dominant position as a deity who is a city patron, as for example in the festival of the Apatouria—a festival celebrated by all those belonging to the same phratry—it may happen that Hephaestus' role expands as much as possible so that from being the master of the fire used in metal-work he becomes the inventor of civilising fire—fire used for cooking and for sacrificing without which human life could never have become an established institution. However, as a general rule, whenever Athena and Hephaestus meet together, the range of powers of the one is strictly limited by that of the other. As we have seen, using fire to manufacture the horse's bit is part of the art of the blacksmith, but the application of the device to the creature of Poseidon is reserved for the hand which knows the art of controlling and guiding straight. So far as the horse
and the control of the horse are concerned. Athena's mastery comes about through the use of powers that are technical as much as magical, by means of the curb with which the rider controls his mount. But it is only with the active cooperation of her partner Hephaestus that Athena can exercise the particular mode of operation which characterises her in this context. For if the metal instrument is so effective a curb on the violence and mettlesome spirit of the horse this is because it is born of the flame, it is the product of the fire used in metal-work and this is what gives it its twofold powers: of binding in a magic grip, and of never relaxing.

'Nothing so much resembles a living creature as fire does', This remark of Plutarch's is evidence that justifies the affinities of this element with both Hephaestus and Hermes in Greek thought. The méthis of each of these figures must be defined in relation to fire with its vital force two different aspects of which are represented by these two deities. Working as a blacksmith, Hephaestus is a god inseparable from fire, but fire of the kind which can melt mineral ore and make it possible to weld metals together. Because of its function, the fire in the forge never goes out. Hephaestus is not concerned to create it by rubbing one piece of wood patiently against another. His power manifests itself spectacularly in his mastery of the bellows which make the intensity of the furnace wax or wane. When Thetis comes to his cave to order new weapons for her son, Hephaestus is described as some kind of master of the winds. He has only to give the order for his bellows to start to blow; they immediately 'gave a burning blast of varying (pantoîos) force which increased at critical moments and subsided at others, according to Hephaestus' requirements and the stage that the work had reached'. Fire, like méthis, is a multiple thing (pantoiós); it can assume any shape, the most terrifying or the most familiar, attacking savagely or licking gently with tiny flames. But the polymorphism of fire—which is another aspect of its méthis—is also able to adapt with flexibility to the methods of metal-work. It can adapt itself to the phases which govern a technical operation and in this way create dazzling jewels and finely cut necklaces, the daidala whose
brilliance, richness of colour and infinite attraction are manifestations of the life which animates them no less than of the 'wise thoughts' of the craftsman who conceived them. Compared with the craftsmanlike fire of Hephaestus, the fire of Hermes is more like some dancing will-o’-the-wisp. True, this too is a fire which cooks meat and which it is the messenger's responsibility to kindle. But the metis of Hermes produces this fire for cooking by rubbing two pieces of wood rapidly together; it devises it in the night after some foray over the woods and fields. And as soon as the fire has served its purpose Hermes, with his mētis, contrives to make all trace of it disappear. The mobility of this fire resembles Hermes himself; its origin is sexual as is that of the god. It sparks into life in an open space when this transient deity sweeps through—an elusive god, rascally and resourceful who makes a strong contrast to the mighty blacksmith rooted to his forge by the fire around which he moves heavily and clumsily, lurching from one bellows to another. The Greeks have a word to describe the resourcefulness which characterises Hermes poliōmētos. It is a term which combines the idea of fire with that of a sleight of hand: purpalāmēs. In Suetonius' treatise devoted to terms of insult the word means a scheming rogue, but for the lexicographers, Hesychius and Pausanias for example, the purpalāmēs man is simply a wily fellow, a poikilos one, someone who can take in a situation at a glance and in less than no time come up with a ploy: as quick as fire, palamōmenos isa puri. In the Homeric Hymn which tells how he spirited away the cattle of Apollo at dead of night Hermes makes his sudden appearance as some kind of daemonic will-o’-the-wisp, such is his quickness and dexterity. A series of images and comparisons portray his metis as concentrated in his flame-like glance.

Hermes was born in the morning. By mid-day he is already playing a lyre and his intelligence is already so alert that it bears comparison only with the eye's flashing glance. By the evening Hermes has spirited away his brother's herd of cattle and when he slips secretly back into the swaddling clothes he abandoned in the morning, hoping thus to escape the notice of Apollo, he resembles a brightly burning brand of young oak, covered over by a thick layer of ashes.
Apollo gives a solemn account of what has happened to the assembled gods; the darkness of the cave becomes thicker and thicker so that not even the piercing eye of an eagle could see anything there. But the darkness gives added emphasis to the flash of Hermes' eyes. He pretends to be plunged in gentle sleep but in reality he is on the watch, wide awake, and so busy devising cunning plots that he is obliged to rub his eyes frequently with his hand to hide their fiery flashing gleam which could give him away even in his dark hiding place. It is as if this god of the night who knows better than anyone how to conceal things even while lying in concealment can be betrayed only by the flashing light of his own mētis.

Apollo can drag his younger brother, winking and making play with his eyebrows, before the assembled Olympus. But all the same he is obliged to concede to Hermes the privileges that are due to his mētis in the world of the gods. The division of powers between the two brothers is made much easier given that, although their spheres of influence may overlap on certain points, the one is endowed with mētis while the other is not.

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Once the Pantheon has its organised system, the only role remaining to mētis is that of pinpointing differences, distributing areas of knowledge and establishing the limits to the powers of the various gods. Most of the Greek myths about the gods are told within a theological framework but in a sense it is outside this framework that we must seek the accounts and stories that tell of confrontations between divine powers who, being no longer in a position to call the order of the world into question, amuse themselves by giving playful demonstrations of their respective powers. Given that in principle every god who can impose bonds can also loosen them and that the hold of each of them is by definition absolute, a confrontation between gods equally endowed with mētis would be like Cephalus' hound chasing Teumesse's fox: the former was so fleet that no beast could shake it off while the latter ran so fast that no creature could catch it. To indicate the gratuitous nature of such confrontations and to present them as no more than pastimes it was necessary to
devise situations in which the legitimate rights of one protagonist would ensure that he gained a temporary victory or would at least give him a fleeting opportunity to impose his power of binding and domination upon one of his rivals.

It is a tale of this kind that the bard Demodocos tells in honour of Odysseus to the assembled Phaeacians: Hephaestus is fooled by Aphrodite who is unfaithful, deceiving him with Ares. The husband takes his revenge upon the two lovers by imposing his constraining bonds upon them. According to a proverb anything that cannot be avoided (aphukta) is called a bond of Hephaestus, but when Hephaestus’ magical power of binding is given free rein the very act of binding reveals the fundamental features which ensure victory and success for metis.

Warned by the Sun that his wife is deceiving him in the marriage bed, Hephaestus hurries to his forge to make some unbreakable chains, bonds that no-one can loosen (desmoi árrhēktai, ãlutoi). As soon as he has made his trap (teichesti dōlon) he lays a part of it in a circle around the foot of the bed (chē diēmata kükloi hapantēn), while suspending the remainder from the ceiling like a spider’s web so light and delicate that even the eye of a god could not discern it. Then all he has to do is pretend to go off to Lemnos, and the two lovers fall into the trap: ‘The netting which Hephaestus’ knowledge (tēchnē) and prudence (polûphrōn) had contrived fell around them in such a way that they could not move or lift a limb (oukâti phukia).’ The husband knows his rights and the gods are invited to come and witness the adultery. There is much laughter and joking. They all marvel at the ‘work’ of Hephaestus, his tēchnai, admiring both the trap he set and his skill in making the unbreakable bonds. A saying is circulated by the gods, heaping derision upon the conquered Ares and praising the metis of Hephaestus: the tortoise catches up with the hare. ‘See how our slow-moving (bradûs) Hephaestus has caught Ares though no god on Olympus can run as fast (ókûtatos). Hephaestus may be lame (chōlós) but his craft (tēchnē) has won the day’. In a contest of speed Ares is the favourite but the tables are violently turned by the cunning trickery of Hephaestus. It is a victory no less surprising than the sight of Antilochus in
the chariot race coming in in front of Menelaus whose horses are the swifter or—to revert to the animal world—the discovery that within the body of the exceedingly slow (bradúta-
tos) sea frog there are little fish which are more agile (táchistos) than any other water creature. Ares, whose arms and legs are as swift in action as befits a god of war, does not enjoy much of a reputation for subtlety. He is a brute without a vestige of mētis. And these bonds which hold him prisoner alongside Aphrodite are not the only ones to which he is forced to submit: he is not much of a catch for the web of Hephaestus. The blacksmith's real catch is not Ares but his accomplice for the wife of Hephaestus is a power of cunning and deceit: her sinuous mētis (aiolómētis), her skill in setting traps (doloplókos) and her insatiable desire to deceive and seduce make Aphrodite a goddess to be feared among the gods as well as among men. Like Eros, the grandson of Metis, Aphrodite loves to hunt down, trap and catch in her nets victims who are reduced to impotence (amechania) by her love philtres, spells and charms. Aphrodite even knows how to gull and possess Zeus himself despite his own great mētis, that is at least when he is agreeable that she should do so and when he cooperates—as he frequently does with a good grace—in the hunting of the golden Aphrodite.

True, in this instance Aphrodite does not appear as daunting as usual. The erotic desire which prompts her to sleep with Ares to some extent lands her in her own trap since it momentarily deprives her of the vigilance without which all mētis is, so to speak, half paralysed. But the bonds which Hephaestus has forged with her in mind are certainly of the type necessary to capture a power of cunning. The role played by Hermes in this affair illuminates one of his essential aspects. It is certainly by no mere chance that he stands out from the rest of the crowd of gods gathered to view the trap in which Aphrodite is caught. Apollo teases him, for everyone is aware of the attraction Hermes feels towards Aphrodite: 'You wouldn't mind, though held in those unyielding shackles, lying in bed with the golden Aphrodite'. In the Greek marriage ritual Hermes and Aphrodite often work as partners, he leading the bride from the house of her father to her new hearth and she presiding over the sexual union of the couple
without which the change over from one domestic fire to another would remain without effect.\footnote{22} Also common to both of them are the words of deceit which promote all seduction and cunning.\footnote{23} And in his reply to the taunts of his brother, Hermes not only acknowledges his special relationship with Aphrodite but even emphasises it further by associating it with bonds so compelling that only a god with the power of binding could possibly wish to be bound by them: ‘Though the apeirones bonds that kept me prisoner were three times as many ... yet would I gladly sleep by golden Aphrodite’s side’.

What is it that is so special about these bonds which Hermes requests in order to be able to embrace Aphrodite more closely?\footnote{25} Earlier they were described as unbreakable, as chains from which there is no escape but now they are defined by the adjective apeiron the meaning of which is a matter of some controversy. Some interpreters suggest that it conveys the image of infinite bonds while others prefer to stress the fact that the bonds are innumerable. However ever since Porphyry’s Homeric commentaries the meaning of the expression: bonds which are apeirones has been quite clear.\footnote{26} The neo-platonist philosopher begins by noting that the meaning of the word apeiron cannot be ‘innumerable’ given that this aspect of the bonds is already stressed by the expression ‘three times as much’ (tris toxoi) Porphyry goes on to point out that the idea of apeiron refers to the power of these bonds which, he says, extend on every side, having neither end nor beginning, neither peras nor arche. There is no ambiguity about this interpretation: the reason Homer chooses the adjective ‘apeirones’ to qualify chains which are unbreakable, diutoi, is that these bonds are circular, enukloi, in the form of rings, kriktoi and enclose things within their circles, dia to en kukloi periechein. The problem is this: these are ‘circular’ bonds, forged by Hephaestus, capable of chaining down a mobile and cunning god for as long as the latter wishes to remain their prisoner in order to be closer to Aphrodite; but what is their significance in the overall framework of the activities and forms of the intelligence of cunning? Within the context of mètis what is the place of such a concept
as the ‘limitless’, the *apeiron with its twofold connotation of binding and circularity?

To get a preliminary picture of what the Greeks understood by the ‘limitless’ and to begin by distinguishing some of the main concepts included in the semantic field of the word *apeiron, we may (without becoming entangled in a complicated etymological study) take as our starting point the controversy that has arisen between various linguists around this word.66 The linguistic analysis, which establishes a close connection between *apeiron and peras, appears to oscillate between two solutions. According to the first the negative prefix a— is combined with the word peras; according to the second, the same negative prefix is connected with the root *per (peraō, peirō, perainō) meaning a passage or crossing. As to the etymological meaning of peras which appears in Greek both in the form of peiras and in that of peirar, these same Greek scholars and linguists are again divided. Some favour ‘limit, end, extremity’ while others believe the fundamental meaning of peras to be ‘bond’. The semantic complexity of this word provides good grounds for a divergence of interpretations. From these we have selected two, major, trends in the semantic field encompassing the pair of words *apeiron-peiras. One involves the idea of a path, the other that of a bond. The interaction between journeying and binding will help us to define the position of *apeiron, the limitless, in the context of the conceptual equipment of the practical intelligence.

Of these two trends there is no doubt that the first emerges the more clearly from a preliminary enquiry into the word peirar made by G. Björk and C. Kahn. The idea of journeying present in the word peirar, used in its common sense of limit, implies a certain organisation of space. In this first sense peirar is usually used with a verb denoting movement but it never suggests a fixed frontier or any stable line of demarcation. It is always the extreme limit, the point beyond which the void begins. A piece of evidence in Aristotle’s Rhetorica makes it possible for us to get a more precise image of the kind of space that is associated with this term meaning ‘limit’ (peirar): Aristotle remarks that in the ancient language67
péras (an alternative form for peíras) has the same meaning as tékmor (or tékmôr), namely that of sign, indication, guide-mark. It was only in 1957, with the discovery of a cosmogony by Alcman,\textsuperscript{49} written in Sparta during the archaic period, that it became possible to derive full advantage from the evidence in the Rhetorica of this synonymity between a 'limit' and an 'indication'.

In this cosmogony Alcman writes of a power called Tékmôr, or Guide-mark, present at the origins of the world. Together with Póros or Path, this power plays the role of acolyte to Thetis, the great goddess of the Sea. In a primordial situation ruled by a power from the depths of the sea whose affinities with the goddess Metis we have already noted, the function of Tékmôr and Póros appears to be to dissipate the darkness personified by Skótos and to open up the routes by which the Sun can come, bringing the light of day as it moves along while the shining paths of the constellations appear on the vault of the sky. Within the expanse of the sea where they exercise their powers Guidemar and Path, Tékmôr and Póros, are the terms which define the activity of an intelligence entirely directed towards escaping from the aoríe of a world dominated by confusion. Póros, a word which also belongs to the semantic family of peraò, to cross, means the stratagem or expedient invented by ëtis so as to open up a path. As for Tékmôr which means not only the goal aimed at but also the plan or remedy to cope with a difficult situation, it is a concept which relates to the intersection of three separate but complementary domains, namely navigation, astronomy and divination. In the context of navigation Tékmôr means the end of the journey; the point on the horizon which serves to orientate the course of the ship. In the elementary astronomy which the art of the pilot would seem to imply this same word denotes the position of the stars by which the course of the ship must be determined. But these two areas cannot be separated from a third: for the entire body of myth to which the saga of the Argonauts is the culmination, to navigate by following the guide-marks fixed in the sky is also to trust in the signs sent by the gods and revealed through the intermediary of a diviner. It is divination which reveals to the pilots the shining signs on the basis of which they will 'conjec-
ture' (*teknairesthai*) their itinerary, by recognising signals and choosing guide-marks in such a way as to construct a bridge between the visible and the invisible. It is in the context of this dangerous passage over the sea that we can most clearly understand the ancient synonymity of *peirē* and *tēkmōr* mentioned by Aristotle. In the accounts of the adventures of the Argonauts, when Jason is about to set out on an expedition which is often taken to have been the first sea-journey, in the presence of all his companions he addresses a solemn prayer to Apollo. He reminds him of the promise made him by the oracle at Delphi when he went to ask for advice about the enterprise his jealous uncle was forcing him to undertake. Apollo thereupon promised to 'trace out the path' for him. The expression occurs twice, each time in a different form. On one occasion the sense is 'to indicate the *peirē* of the voyage',\(^{38}\) On the other, 'to reveal the *pōroi* of the sea'.\(^{40}\) These *pōroi* are the routes of passage, the paths which Apollo promises to open up over the inhospitable expanse of the waters; but they are also routes which the Delphic god 'indicates' (*sēmāsein*) as befits an oracle whose pronouncements are, by tradition, delivered through signs. He plots out the route for the ship with guide-marks, or *peirē*, shining beacons or points on the horizon each one of which, following on from the one before, will stand as the ultimate destination of the journey of the Argonauts. Thus each one is an ultimate boundary but also a guide-mark and a path; *peirē* is a part of the same terminology of the sea as its synonym *tēkmōr*.

In another episode in the adventures of Jason the two terms are even directly associated together. Before attempting to pass through the Bosphorus the ship Argo anchors at Thynia on the Eastern coast of Thrace. Here the ruler is Phineas, the diviner guilty of having misused his power by communicating Zeus' plans to men. Now afflicted by sightlessness and condemned to e...
tēkmar in detail to the pilots', thanks to which the companions of the ship Argo will succeed in passing between the 'shifting' rocks and in reaching (perāō) the open sea (pōntos). Here tēkmar means the way to get through the 'oblique passage' between the Shifting Rocks: the flight of a rock dove ahead of the ship will serve as an omen. As for the term peirar, it conveys both the guide-marks which plot out the crossing and the path that the ship opens up for itself through the expanse of the sea, expressed by pōntos meaning the open sea. Peirar whose affinities with journeying (pōros) are stressed by the use of the verb 'to cross', perāō, here stands in contrast to Pōntos meaning the sea seen as a yawning, chaotic chasm unchartered by any routes, the kind of space that the Greeks call apeiros or apeíritos not because it is without limits or boundaries but because it is the expanse that cannot be crossed (perāō) from one side to the other, an impassable expanse where a path is obliterated as soon as it is made and disappears from the everchanging, smooth surface of the waters.

The second trend in the semantic field of peirar appears to take a more precise form. The sense of 'bound' is immediately suggested by a number of instances in which it is used where the context seems unaffected by the wide range of meanings attached to the concept of 'binding' in Greek thought. In the episode of the Sirens Odysseus has himself firmly tied to the mast of the ship; his arms and legs are bound (dein) and these bonds which tie him to the mast are called sometimes peirata and sometimes desmoi. The words are again used as if they are synonymous in the Homeric Hymn which tells the story of the magical childhood of Apollo. Like his brother Hermes who grows under one's very eyes, Apollo, being fed on ambrosia, is an infant who grows so quickly that his swaddling bands (stróphoi) cannot keep him wrapped up; they all come undone. Here again 'bond' is expressed by the words peirata or desmá. In the form of pēras the same word is used in medical terminology to refer to the end of a bandage or piece of material which surrounds a wound or protects a limb. Following a certain 'intuitive empiricism' which E. Benveniste has attacked in many examples of semantic reconstruction some Greek scholars
have believed that the concrete, technical meaning of πόρος, namely band or rope afforded proof that the abstract meaning of 'limit' was derived from a 'perverted' use of πείρα in the sense of bond or knot. Other, more subtle philologists have, on the other hand, taken strict etymological derivation to the point where they find the abstract sense of the word within its concrete meaning. For them πείρα means not the bond or knot but the end or tip of the rope. For our own part, we believe that the 'meaning' of a linguistic form is to be determined by the sum total of the ways in which it is used. Thus the problem is not to deduce one meaning from another but rather to understand what kind of relationship the Greeks may have established between a path and a bond and how it is that the sense of 'binding' of the word πείρα, — a meaning which appears quite different from that of 'journeying' which is suggested in other contexts — may in fact simply be a variation of the latter meaning. The answers to these problems are to be found in the semantic field of πείρα; here we find one particular type of path which takes the form of a bond which fetters and, conversely, the action of binding is sometimes presented as a crossing, a way forward.

The word πόρος when used in certain ways is an example of the first of the two types of relationship we have just referred to. Πόρος means a path traced over a sea that cannot be crossed, but it also means the way over a river, the ford or bridge without which the river cannot be crossed and is consequently described as ἀπέρατος, impossible to cross. When Xerxes sets out to cross the Hellespont in order to enslave the Greeks, his overweening arrogance manifests itself in his plan of constructing a bridge to provide an open route over the sea, tracing a fixed and unmoving path across the ever-changing surface of the waves. The construction of this bridge makes great demands upon the technical knowledge of the engineers responsible for designing and building it. To cross the straits of Helle they devise the expedient of an impressive 'machine' composed of many ships linked together by cables stretching from one bank to the other. But this passage way, this πόρος devised by the Persians to bind the sea is itself a bond, a 'yoke cast about the neck of the sea'. When the shade of Darius, summoned up by the chorus
in Aeschylus’ Persians appears to condemn the mad folly of the Great King, his chief reproach is that Xerxes has tried ‘to arrest the sacred course of the Hellespont with the chains of a slave’ and ‘to fetter it with chains forged under the hammer’. Herodotus uses identical expressions: the ‘architects’ of the Great King bind, chain the straits (σαύγναινα τον ψηρον) and when a violent storm destroys the bridge over the sea Herodotus says that this unbinds (λειειν) what men in their proud folly had dared to heap with chains. Again the same image of the yoke reappears in the episode which conclusively proves the madness of the King of the Barbarians: to wreak his vengeance on the Hellespont Xerxes ordered that it should be chastised with three hundred strokes of the whip and that a pair of fetters (πέδέων και ζεύγος) should be cast into the sea. Because the Hellespont has dared to throw off the yoke it is beaten like a rebellious slave and the chains cast into the straits confirm that it is the will of the Great King to bind the arm of the sea and transform it into a still and submissive path.

If Greek thought can conceive the passage way or path as an imprisoning bond the converse is equally true. When Odysseus gives the order for Melantheus, the goatherd who betrayed him to the suitors, to be bound hand and foot, he uses an expression in which the bond becomes a journey or crossing wound about his victim: ‘Wind him in a plaited rope’ (σείρειν δε πλεκτήν ει του περίεναι). Petrainειν which means to cross here takes on the sense of winding around passing a plaited rope from one end of the body to be fettered to the other. As it passes around the arms and legs the bond follows a circular movement, imperfectly simulating the hoops or rings which the Greeks customarily called ‘rings without limits’ (απείροι) for, as Aristotle explains, these rings carry no stone or setting and so have no end or beginning, no πέρας and no αρχή; thus they are perfectly circular.

This image of the bond which follows a path to which no limit is set begins to make the semantic field of πείραρ look more complex than was suggested by the two trends already indicated within it. The first depended entirely upon the antithetical complementarity of πείραρ·απείροι: πείραρ denoted a type of path opened up in a defined area while απείροι
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meant, by contrast, that which cannot be crossed and to which there is no ultimate limit. On the other hand the second trend was for the same terms peirar and apeiron to mean ‘bond’ and to form, not a contrasting pair, but rather a new complementary combination conveying the paradoxical image of a peirar apeiron: an impassable bond and an inextricable path. Now there is in Greek mythical thought a space which resembles the expanse of the sea, where that which is without limit, the apeiron, means sometimes bonds which cannot be undone and sometimes paths along which none may pass. It is Tartarus. We have seen how Hesiod describes it, full of furious winds, beset by eddying gusts, a place of total confusion without orientation, devoid of fixed directions or regular guide-marks. Just as the open sea is an impassable expanse, apeiros, apeiritos, so too Tartarus is a space in which an anvil hurled from whatever point would never reach the bottom or end of it but would wander there forever on an endless course. It is not that Tartarus is without limits but, like the sea, it is an impassable space, one that cannot be crossed from one end to the other. In the Orphic literature Tartarus has not only no bottom but no guide-marks either allowing no orientated path to be traced there; it has no peirar. Apéraftos, impassable, is the epithet chosen by Prometheus to describe the Tartarus where he would prefer to be buried rather than being exposed in the open air, to the eyes of his enemies. But Tartarus is not only ‘uncrossable’, without pòros, for Prometheus it is also—in the same passage—the space where ‘one is cruelly caught in bonds which it is impossible to loosen’ (desmoi álutos). These are two aspects of Tartarus which reappear, in a slightly different form, in the Tartarus with which, after his escapade, Hermes is threatened first by his mother and then by his brother. One of them speaks of the impenetrable (améchanos) dullness while the other refers to the grip of inextricable (améchana) bonds. It is as if, being impassable, the space of Tartarus also has the power to bind and fetter with chains forever. In Hesiod’s Theogony it is indeed to Tartarus that the defeated gods are relegated both by Zeus and by Kronos. This is the lot of the Titans, overcome by the fire from the sky and the blows dealt by the Hundred-Armed. They are hidden in the
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shadows and laden with chains.\textsuperscript{66} Earlier, the Hundred-Armed had suffered the same fate: they were secured in a powerful bond and confined to Tartarus.\textsuperscript{66} Whoever penetrates this space from which no exit can be found, however well equipped with métis he may be, will inevitably find himself imprisoned in the cruellest bonds.\textsuperscript{67} Conversely, to escape from Tartarus by the grace of a sovereign god is to be immediately liberated from one’s chains and find one’s bonds loosened. All those whom Zeus delivers from the mists of Tartarus after his victory over Kronos are at the same time freed from their fetters, whether they be the Hundred-Armed or the brothers of Kronos.\textsuperscript{68} These cruel, unbreakable bonds are not fetters such as are laden upon prisoners by their jailors. Because it is, like the open sea, a space which cannot be crossed apérontos or apeírôn, Tartarus is not only a prison from which there is no escape; it is itself a space which binds; the expanse of it is indissociable from inextricable bonds. Tartarus is a space from which there is no exit and which, being devoid of guide-marks, without peírar, it is impossible to cross, so it is also seen as a gigantic bond without beginning or end for whoever is imprisoned within its sphere. It is a peírar apeírôn in the double sense we indicated above: being without direction it cannot be crossed, is impassable but, at the same time, for those who find themselves in this place which is in a sense the opposite of organised space there is no way of ever escaping from it; they remain enclosed within it indefinitely as Ares and Aphrodite are enclosed in the unbreakable bonds of Hephaestus.

The distressing image of Tartarus in myth which continued to be reflected in certain representations of a Hades whose magic chains cannot be cast off by its inmates was not the only means whereby the Greeks expressed the aporíe of a bond without limits. The concept of a circular bond is given concrete form in a reassuringly familiar object, namely the hunting or fishing net whose importance within the terminology of métis we have recognised from the start.\textsuperscript{69} Whether snares, nets or weels are involved and whatever the thickness of the threads or the size of the mesh, the net is a composition of woven or plaited links and its structure marks it out as the epitome of the bond for it is both bound together and, at the
same time, its effect is to bind. It is therefore fully qualified to be called *apeirôn*, without limit, and circular. In a poem by Ibycos there is a description of Eros out hunting, full of lures and cunning, his eyes black and glistening. He is a hunter to be feared, making his prey fall straight into the ‘inextricable snares of Aphrodite’ (*apeirôna diktya*). Let us recall the image Hesiod uses to describe Pandora, the first woman, invented by the all-powerful *mētis* of Zeus. She is ‘a sudden trap from which there can be no escape’ (*dōlos atipus amēchanos*). Resistance is impossible. Aphrodite is ‘irresistible’ *ánmachos* and the prey that falls into her nets is struck by stupefaction (*amēchanía*) and grows dizzy (*illigos*) as suddenly as sea creatures, even barely brushed by the torpedo fish are struck motionless, paralysed as if imprisoned in heavy chains. It is in just such a circular net that the victor over the Trojans is captured and put to death—the man used by Night and the Sovereign of the gods to cast over the walls of Troy the enveloping net (*steganôndiktyon*), the huge network of Misfortune which reduces them all, adults and children alike, to the bonds of slavery. In Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*, the cunning of Clytemnestra incorporates various aspects of the woven bond. Like Penelope who, through the favour of Athena, becomes as clever at weaving a piece of cloth as at devising a plot, Clytemnestra is capable both of conceiving the trap and also of weaving the veil in which to catch her prey. Hunting, fishing and weaving are constantly interrelated. Clytemnestra sets out her net with care, *peristichizei*. This is the technical verb to denote the labour of the hunter when he sets his snares with the aid of pegs aligned in rows. When Agamemnon falls into the trap it is a fishing net. There is no way out: ‘He can neither escape nor avoid death’. This fishing net, called *amphibiôstron* is a kind of cast-net which the watchful hunter can throw by hand. As its name indicates it envelopes, seizing upon its victim from every side (*amphibiôlein* or *peribâlein*). But when Electra and Orestes, at the tomb of their father, refer to this encircling, *épeiron* net, they call it ‘chains without bronze’ (*pēdai . . . achalkeutoi*), and, conversely, the fetters of a metal riveted by Hephaestus to the limbs of Prometheus are referred to by Aeschylus as a net, *amphibiôstra* because these
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chains of steel encircle (kirkōion) the arms and legs, clasp Prometheus in a circular bond so powerful that it can compare only with impassable Tartarus itself. Furthermore, the trap set for Agamemnon by his wife takes the form of a veil, a piece of finely woven cloth. It is depicted on a crater in the Boston Museum; it delivers up to the blows of Aegisthus the conqueror of Troy, trapped in "a garment from which there is no way out" (apeirōn uiphasma), as impossible to escape from as was for Hercules the tunic drenched with the blood of Nessos, the cloud (nephēlē) of death devised by the cunning of the Centaur.

The hunting or fishing net is a circular bond and a binding circle not only by virtue of its texture, the more or less close network of its knots and stitches, but also from the point of view of some of the technical uses to which it is put. As we have already mentioned, fishermen catch certain kinds of fish by encircling them. As soon as they have tracked down a shoal of fish they cast their nets at some distance and then approach as silently as possible until the fish find themselves encircled (kukloisoin). Once the circle is closed the signal is given to shout and make a noise and the terrified fish jump into the nets awaiting them. To envelop and encircle (kukloin, perikukloin, sugkukloisthai) are the technical terms used to describe this type of fishing where the net, through its movement, becomes an encompassing bond, an impassable circle. But the same expressions are also current in the military sphere where certain stratagems in naval warfare are directly inspired by the techniques invented by fishermen. At Salamis the Greeks manoeuvre as if they were engaged in fishing for tuna; they lure the enemy into the straits where the ships crowd each other, hampering each others' movements; the Greeks then encircle them and close the net so that the Persians resemble the vast catch of tuna fish trapped by the tunney-net, the huge weel from which the fish are subsequently ejected and clubbed to death with great blows from the oars. At Artemision the manoeuvre is just the reverse. The Greeks hold their position without moving and Xerxes' fleet surrounds them on all sides, but just as the Persians, in a crescent moon formation, as Herodotus describes it, are about to close the circle, the Greeks suddenly
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surge forward, breaking out of the trap. In contrast to the
tuna fish which, as all the ancient writers agree, are slow-
witted and incapable of deciding upon bold action the
Greeks leap right out of the net just like the fish Oppian
writes about who, when on the point of falling into a trap,
thinks up a thousand wiles to avoid it. In sea battles cunning
comes into play in the two classic manoeuvres in this kind
of warfare: the periplous and the diékplous in which reversal
alternates with a circular movement. In the periplous the
fleet, positioned in a line, starts to encircle the enemy, hoping
to close the circle. It watches for a moment when there is
disorder among the enemy ships which are pressed close
together and then makes a surprise ramming attack. This
was the manoeuvre adopted by the Athenian stratagos Phormio
at the battle of Patrae in August 429 B.C. As soon as
the Athenian fleet appeared the Peloponnesian ships came
together in a large circle to avoid being attacked separately.
But Phormio had foreseen his enemies reaction and it was he
who had decided the place and time of the encounter, know-
ing that the wind blowing from the bay at this time would
increase the confusion already provoked by the manoeuvres
of his fleet moving in circles round the Peloponnesian vessels
which ‘they drove into a narrower and narrower space, almost
touching as they passed and leading the crews to suppose they
were on the point of charging’. With only twenty triremes
the Athenian admiral won a victory over forty seven Pe-lop-
nonesian vessels. However, the triumph of the Athenian
fleet over one twice as large was not simply due to a manoeuvre
which was as controlled as the choreography of a ballet
and which was, furthermore, equally familiar to both
adversaries. Victory was won by the commander clever
enough to foresee the different phases in the encircling
movement and to understand at once what manoeuvre would
make the circle impassable. In the diékplous, the second
manoeuvre of naval warfare, clever deployment plays just
as important a role. Strictly speaking, diékplous means ‘the
way to disengage’. For example, when the Argonauts’ ship is
blown by storms on to the sandbanks of Lake Tritonis, the
god Triton comes to the surface and promises Jason that in
exchange for a tripod which he had planned to present at
Delphi he will show him the fairway to lead him out of the shallows and the route they should subsequently follow on their voyage. Triton, like other gods of the sea, shows seafarers faced with an aportia 'the way to disengage', póros or diékplous. However, from the technical point of view the diékplous is an expedient involving a greater degree of skill. This time the fleet is deployed along a single line with the prows facing the enemy. Each trireme has to slip between two enemy ships, attempting in the process to break a few oars. Once the enemy line has been crossed the ships must make an about-turn and, profiting from the disarray of the enemy, attack from the side or the rear. But this abrupt about-turn or reversal which is supposed, in a successful manoeuvre, to take the enemy by surprise is a movement which a commander of rather more than average intelligence should be able to foresee and turn to his own advantage by catching his adversaries in their own trap. Such was the plan of action successfully put into operation by Heraclides of Mylasa, which served as a model for the Massaliots when they inflicted a severe defeat upon the Carthaginian fleet in the second Punic War. The Massaliots were mistrustful of the Carthaginians. 'The fact is that when the Phoenicians attack ships drawn up in a line facing them, their custom is to advance upon the enemy as if they were going to ram them. But instead of attacking them immediately they cross through the enemy line, turn about (diekpleitantes epistrephei) and then fall upon the enemy vessels just at the moment when they are sideways on (plagiai). As they knew the story of the battle fought at Artemision by Heraclides of Mylasa, a man whose intelligence (agchnoi) towered above those of his contemporaries, the Massaliots drew up the front line of their vessels facing the enemy and ordered other reserve ships to be stationed behind at nicely calculated intervals. As soon as the Carthaginians broke through the front line these reserve ships, without moving from their assigned positions, were to attack the enemy vessels at the propitious moment (eukairoi), as they passed by with their sides unprotected'. This was what Heraclides of Mylasa had done. Just when the Carthaginians thought they were about to surprise the Massaliots with an abrupt right about turn
they themselves fell into the trap and found they were exposed to the attacks which the men of Marseilles decided to launch upon them at that precise moment. The volte-face thanks to which the ships of Carthage hoped to deceive their adversaries is reversed against them. They are caught in the mesh of a circular net which reduces them to a state of impotence. Heraclides of Mylasa who was the first to bring off this fine stroke of the net was renowned through the whole of Caria for the terrible blow he dealt the Persian army. He had learnt that the enemy was preparing to sack the town so he set an ambush during the night along the road they would have to take. The Persian army was annihilated. On land or on sea, in a nocturnal ambush or in fighting on the moving expanse of the waters, exactly the same intelligence is at work, combining the suppleness of the bond with the power of the circle, and the treachery of the octopus with the cunning of the fox.

If the shifting net is the most perfect of images for mēsis, the combination of the circle and the bond also appears in a whole series of actions and objects of an equally technical nature which are both the products and the instruments of the intelligence of cunning. Certain traps present an example of this— for instance the trap designed for catching deer. The framework is of yew wood with the bark stripped off, forming circular rings, and bolts made alternately of metal and of wood are embedded in the texture of the lid. Around the ring is a plaited rope with a slip knot to which a heavy log is attached. Twisted branches and plaited esparto grass are intermingled and intertwined inside the trap designed to destroy any deer imprudent enough to place its hoof within the binding circle. But the complicity between the bond and the circle is most clearly to be seen in the action of the basket maker plaiting a basket. This was first noted by the author of the Hippocratic treatise, On Regimen. As they plait, the basket-makers (plokeis) build up the basket progressively in rings (huklōi) so that instead of working through from the beginning to the end as happens in other work, they return to the beginning each time they come to the end: they proceed from the archē to the archē. Similarly in weaving and in wool-work once the warp threads have
passed around the spindle they intertwine with the woof to form the assembled cloth, but the weavers' movement goes one way and returns the other whereas in basket-making the movement follows a perfectly circular course so that the twisted willow never meets with any limit except that of its own point of departure. It is a model pattern which calls to mind the definitive form of those ornaments which also have neither beginning nor end, the perfectly circular rings uninterrupted by any stone or setting. Now, Hephaestus spends nine years at the bottom of the sea, in the company of Thetis and Eurynome, making this very kind of jewellery, learning to become a master of the skill of metal-work. Among the daidala, the dazzling products of his mētis, there are necklaces (hōrnoi) and coils of metal to be wound round the arms and neck like spirals (gnamptai hēlikes). They are all masterpieces whose circular or curved shape emphasises the analogy with the trap Hephaestus forges to catch Aphrodite and Ares: all are products of the same mētis. Moreover, the talismanic power which these rings and necklaces derive from the glittering of the metal and the richness of the curved designs is simply another form of the magic power possessed by the network of unbreakable bonds made by this same craftsman. It is because it is a bond animated by the most intense power of life that the net of Hephaestus has no limit other than the orbit of a circle closed upon its prey. But whether it be a net or a piece of jewellery the circular bond with its rejection of the imposition of any limit to its polymorphism is simply an expression of one of the fundamental characteristics of mētis. The veil and net woven by Clytemnestra form a trap 'with no way out' which is a reflection of the cunning woman whom the chorus in the Agamemnon call the 'snake with two heads', for the amphisbaina ends in its beginning. In just the same way the masterpieces of Hephaestus resemble their master through the very quality which has seemed to us best suited to define the mētis of the blacksmith the circular nature of his gait and the double orientation of his twisted and curved limbs, imprinting upon the ground enigmatic tracks which, like these rings 'without limit', appear to have neither end nor beginning.
But Hephaestus is not the only god with the power of binding whose tracks suggest the *apeirôn*. If Hermes is positioned in the front ranks of the spectators summoned by the offended husband it is because he is a connoisseur on the subject of twisted ropes and knots and because, as with Hephaestus, his *mênis* leaves a trail which can be neither deciphered nor followed, a trail which leaves his pursuers dumbfounded and at a loss. The theft of the cattle of Apollo reveals the deep affinity between the intelligence of Hermes and the chains 'without limit' in which he so passionately desired to be bound. Hermes deploys all his cunning trickery (*dolhê techne*) to wipe out the hoof prints and confuse the trail.\(^{110}\) As soon as he has separated the beasts he has selected from the rest of the herd he causes their tracks to be reversed. The *Homeric Hymn* gives two slightly different accounts of this operation within a few lines of each other. In the first Hermes drives the cattle before him and turns the imprints round (*ichnê apostrêpás*) reversing the tracks (*antia poîêas hoplás*) by putting the front hoofmarks at the back and the back ones at the front (*tês prôtas ópisthe, tês d'óptithen prótas*). And while he thus drives the beasts before him, magically reversing their tracks, he himself walks 'backwards' (*empalin*).\(^ {111}\) In the second version it is the cattle which proceed backwards, their heads turned towards their herdsman who, for his part, adopts a 'twisted' gait (*epistrophadên*).\(^ {112}\) This apparently means that Hermes goes along with his head turned towards his cattle and his feet inverted in the same manner as the tracks of the herd in the first version. The only difference between the two versions lies in the direction in which the cattle face: in one version they proceed quietly in the direction chosen by Hermes while magic does all the rest; in the other they perform the somewhat unusual exploit of walking backwards, thus saving their herdsman the trouble of 'reversing' their tracks. In any event, Hermes and his cattle together form a group orientated in two divergent directions and the strange situation is perfectly conveyed by the disconcerting stance of this figure whose upper and lower halves face in two opposite directions just like the doubly orientated Hephaestus known as *amphigwëesis*. The trap devised by Hermes consists in these double tracks.
For those who fall into it the trail is blurred once and for all; the tracks lead in the opposite direction to that which the stolen herd must have taken and trace out a path which, instead of leading from a beginning to an end, is bound by no limit except that of its own point of departure. Moreover the ambivalence of the tracks is further stressed by the emphasis the account lays on the synthesis of opposites exemplified by the trail of the animals and of Hermes. This is a double reversal which baffles and terrifies the bloodhounds Apollo sets to track down the thief. They suddenly discover that ‘what was going forwards goes backwards’ and that ‘contraries are mingled one with the other’ (τὰ δ’ ἀλλὰ ἐνέκτι ἀλλέλοις sump eplegménai). These double, unnatural tracks invented by the métis of Hermes do more than simply imitate the hare’s cunning trick which hunters call ‘doubling back’, that is retracing its steps in order to confuse the hounds. The technical intelligence of the basket-maker is as much in evidence as the skill of the hunter in the intermingling of what is in front with what is behind, for Hermes, to drive the cattle he has stolen home, weaves himself (diplékein) some extraordinary magical sandals (thaumata èrka), interlacing (summmisgôn) branches of tamaris and the twigs of a type of myrtle. In this context, where hunting and thieving take the form of an agonistic exploit, the métis of Hermes at no time makes any distinction between the most sophisticated methods of twisting plant fibres together and the construction of the traps he intends to set. By interlacing what is in front and what is behind and by weaving together two opposite directions Hermes traces out in the dust and sand baffling shapes which cannot be followed and which make him impossible to catch, meanwhile consigning whoever tries to decipher them to dismay and impotence. Apollo admits it openly before all the gods: Hermes is amēchanos, impossible to seize or overcome; plotting against him is inevitably doomed to failure. Now it is this god whom no chains can bind that his mother and brother try to frighten, the one with threats of inextricable (amēchana) bonds and the other with warnings of the shadows of Tartarus from which there is no escape (amēchana). Apollo is wholly incapable of implementing his threats. When,
angered by the slaughter of two of his beasts, he tries to
strangle his brother and surround him (peristréphein) with
powerful bonds (karterà desmà), Apollo is met with a sight
which yet again leaves him dumbfound. The branches of
the agnus castus which ought to be binding the guilty Hermes
instead grow down into the earth where they take root,
becoming entangled (estramménat) together and have no
difficulty in stretching as far as the herd and cows of Apollo.129
Hermes offers the unusual spectacle of mètis weaving its
bonds purely for the pleasure of fascination. And as the
sinuous twigs of the agnus castus weave a living net under
the bemused gaze of Apollo, the spark of mètis glitters in
the eye of the rascally Hermes.

Like the double tracks, bonds which can undo themselves
are yet another trick of cunning magic to be added to the
other achievements of the mètis of Hermes. Such an astonish-
ing sight leaves the spectator dumbfounded and makes him
feel dizzy. It is the same effect as is provoked by the enig-
matical questions Socrates puts to his interlocutors,
confounding them and leaving them speechless, reduced to
aporia and the state of mind 'that is provoked by the equal
force of contrary arguments'.131 The interlacing of opposite
directions which Hermes' mètis imprints upon the soil
produces an enigma, in the true sense of the word. It is what
the Greeks sometimes call ainigma and sometimes gríphos,183
for an enigma is twisted together like a basket or a weel.
In one of his dialogues Plutarch writes of the Sphinx twisting
together her enigmas or riddles (ainigmata hǎi gríphoun
plékouan), devising the questions which Sophocles
describes as poikilà, shimmering, many-coloured, shifting.
The composition of some of the best known riddles reveals
the tangle of forms and the shimmering of different colours
which give them the disturbing mobility of speech which
seems constantly vibrating, never for a moment remaining
the same as it was. When the diviner Polyeidus is faced with
the riddle set him by the Courêtes: 'What is the cow of three
colours which belongs to the herds of the king? what does it
resemble?' he finds himself at grips with an incomprehensible
saying, couched in many forms but never contained by any
one of them. The diviner resolves the many shimmering
possibilities of meaning by replying: 'It is a blackberry; first it is white, then red, then black'. The answer which allows him to escape from the *aporia* is the infallible grip with which he catches and binds the shifting and mobile words of the riddle.

The interweaving of contrary terms intensifies the shifting quality of the riddle: 'A man who was not a man, seeing and not seeing a bird which was not a bird, perched on a branch which was not a branch, threw and did not throw a stone which was not a stone'. That is the child's riddle about the eunuch throwing a piece of pumice at a bat perched on a reed, without hitting it. It is an example of those two-edged sayings such as Plato uses to define the sphere of opinion, *dōxa*, the intermediary world which participates both in Being and in Non-Being, where the dark and the bright are mixed and confused and where the true and the false are closely linked. These two-headed statements that pull in contrary directions (*epanphoterizein*) are sometimes called 'crab words' because they are so oblique and never come straight to the point. They are traps conceived and devised by cunning, intelligent beings such as, in myth, the Sphinx of Thebes and, in a less disturbing world, Cleobuline, the daughter of one of the Seven Sages. Whereas Oedipus' questioner is a monster whose manifold knowledge is symbolised by her triple form as woman, lion and bird, the daughter of Cleobulus whom Plutarch introduces in the *Banquet of the Seven Sages* is a delightful child who runs to meet Thales and embrace him and whose intelligence is so remarkable that, as Thales explains, her father calls her Eumetis or Good Metis because she is so clever at solving and asking riddles. Moreover Thales makes no distinction between this cleverness and the intelligence she also manifests in the political domain. The knowledge possessed by Eumetis is double. She can twist together ambiguous words, combining opposites and interlacing their two meanings but, conversely, her *mētis* also enables her to find the formula or answer which gives a single meaning to a polymorphic pronouncement and, like a magic bond, forces the baffling plurality of an elusive saying to be expressed in a single meaning. The daughter of Cleobulus is like one of those
sea deities—Thetis, Proteus or Metis—all of whom possess oracular knowledge and the gift of metamorphosis. But whereas the power of these deities is often kept in check by the magic hold of a more cunning being who has watched for his chance to take them by surprise, Eumetis, who knows how to resolve ambiguous words as well as twist them skilfully together is like Hephaestus and Hermes in that she possesses the double power of acting both as a bond and as a circle. Through her riddles she unfolds the endless cycle of her changing forms and with her subtle solutions she weaves around her questioners the same impassable circle that the hero who triumphs over the enigma binds about the elusive gods, with the vice of his two arms closed about them.

* * *

Metis cannot be fully deployed without this fundamental combination of the bond and the circle. To exercise all its powers the intelligence of cunning needs the circular reciprocity between what is bound and what is binding. But it is somewhat paradoxical to point to this as the dynamic force underlying the métis deployed in the tricks devised by one crafty Olympian to get his revenge. For as from the day when Zeus’ sovereignty became definitively established the operation of métis was radically altered. By swallowing the goddess Metis, whom he had taken as his first wife, Zeus at one stroke eliminated the element of unpredictability and disorder which had previously given rise to revolts and conflicts among the gods. He replaced it with an order which was immutable. Thereafter there could be no more chancy ventures or surprises; no more reversals in which the master of bonds could, in turn, find himself bound. When Zeus is urged by the other gods to distribute honours and privileges among them the knowledge he allots them is prudently defined and the powers they acquire have limitations carefully set upon them. The disorders brought about by the power of Metis when she was left to her own devices are thus eliminated from the world ordered by the gods of Olympus. Thanks to the prudence of Zeus his first wife is even less in a posi-
tion to threaten the established order given that she is, so to speak, forced to guarantee its stability and permanence. The new master of the world has not made the mistake of relegating Metis to some place that falls short of or is beyond the frontier of his kingdom. By swallowing her he has made her a part of his own sovereignty. Being, as she is, inside Zeus Metis makes it possible for him to meditate in advance upon all the cunning tricks which might be devised in the future by men, gods or monsters yet unknown. By setting up a world in which each individual enjoys his own privileges without fear of ever being deprived of them, the conqueror of Kronos simultaneously establishes the law legitimising the immutable exercise of his own sovereignty. To his own advantage he takes over the only force which could again bring into question the distribution of power, and he uses it to maintain the system of differentiation which the pantheon under his authority in a sense represents. Thereafter métis is simply one of the components of certain forms of knowledge or certain powers possessed by a small group of gods whose activities are functionally orientated towards spheres in which such a type of intelligence is most advantageous. Given this new role of métis, the Olympians are bound to win whatever the circumstances. Odysseus is reminded of this fact by Athena who smiles when she hears him elaborating upon his lies for the benefit of whoever happens to be passing, without suspecting that the daughter of Metis herself has just set a trap for him by taking some disguise. Any contest between a god and a mortal is bound to be unequal even when the mortal involved is one whose métis makes him the equal of Zeus.

However, it is in the world of men at grips with human problems that the intelligence of cunning comes into its own. When it operates in the sphere of Becoming it is constantly faced with unforeseen happenings and ambiguous situations. The unpredictable lies in wait for it and it must be sufficiently vigilant and polymorphic to reverse or divert to its own advantage the powers of cunning which plot to turn its own traps and nets against itself. In this context there can never be any end to the circular interaction between the binder and the bound. And ever since the list rapidly drawn
up in the Iliad for Antilochus’ edification the species of men of mētis has continued to proliferate. For just as the mētis of the woodcutter develops into that of the carpenter and the shipwright, the skill of the chariot driver is itself simply one form of the intelligence demanded from the athlete in any agonistic situation, and the prudence of old Nestor, the man who gives the best advice to the assembly directly foreshadows the cleverness of the politician, the man who can, in the shortest space of time, come to the most correct view on the most wide-ranging of matters. Leaving aside the hunter and the fisherman, there remains for us to mention only the doctor, the strategus and the sophist, the three types of men of mētis most frequently associated in Greek thought with the pilot guiding his ship straight across the sea in spite of the squalls that assail it. From the carpenter to the general, the politician to the doctor and the blacksmith to the sophist, the fundamental characteristics of mētis remain unchanged throughout Antiquity. The episode of Antilochus enabled us to distinguish them as early as in Homer. For the sophist, the doctor and the politician there is only one field open: that of Becoming, of change and of that which never remains the same as itself. Sickness and argument are forces just as hostile and disturbing as the sea, fire or molten metal. In dealing with them it is always necessary to foresee when the fleeting opportunity for tricking the polymorphic powers will arise. The presumptuous victory of Antilochus who outstrips the faster horses of Menelaus is directly comparable to ‘the prestigious power’ of the sophist136 who puts forward two opposed views on every subject and is able to turn the weaker argument into the stronger so that, contrary to all expectations, it demolishes the other in its irresistible grip.

Over more than ten centuries the same, extremely simple model expresses skills, know-how and activities as diverse as weaving, navigation and medicine. From Homer to Oppian practical and cunning intelligence, in all its forms, is a permanent feature of the Greek world. Its domain is a veritable empire and the man of prudence, of mētis, can assume ten different identities at once. He is embodied in all the principal types of men who go to make up Greek society, ranging from the charioteer to the politician and including
the fisherman, the blacksmith, the orator, the weaver, the
pilot, the hunter, the sophist, the carpenter and the strategus.
He turns up everywhere and yet he is strangely absent, at
least from history as we know it. It may well seem para-
doxical that a type of intelligence as fundamental and as well
represented in a society such as that of ancient Greece should
have remained so neglected. It is all the more surprising in
that the fourth century philosophers, Plato and Aristotle,
certainly referred to it, describing its characteristics and
defining its qualities. The voracity of Zeus may perhaps
account for the silence which has shrouded the gods of mētis,
but whom are we to suspect of having swallowed up their
human equivalent, the man of prudence, the man who can
take on a thousand forms?

It is not, as might be supposed, a useless quest for it leads
us, in the first instance, directly to the philosophers who have
such an intense and legitimate interest in the various forms
of knowledge. In their analysis of what we have so far termed
practical intelligence Plato and Aristotle discern two major
qualities which, while not having gone entirely unremarked
until then produce, when combined, the conceptual model
most suited to demonstrate that mētis proceeds obliquely,
that it comes straight to the point in the shortest way, that
is by taking a detour.\textsuperscript{137} The first of these intellectual qualities
highlights the necessary relationship between mobility of
intelligence and swiftness of action: this is agchinoia, quick-
wittedness, where the emphasis lies on alertness and perspic-
cuity. To be the possessor of agchinoia is—as Plato explains
in the Charmides\textsuperscript{138}—to be most agile and quick at resolving
one’s decisions or ideas, whether it be a question of deliberat-
ing or of carrying out some intellectual research. Aristotle,
for his part, points out that this kind of intelligence operates
within a period of time ‘too short to be observed’ \textit{diskeptos}.\textsuperscript{139}
an instant so fleeting that it escapes the notice of even the
most vigilant man on the look-out (\textit{skepōs}) for it; it is a space
of time so brief that it is like a hair too short to be cut,
\textit{akarēs}.\textsuperscript{140} Plato says that this sharp, agile type of intelligence
operates in the domain of deliberation and of intellectual
research. But Aristotle, while not actually contradicting him,
gives agchinoia a much wider field of application for he writes
of the ‘quickwittedness’ shown by the midwife when she cuts through the umbilical cord: ‘Cutting the cord demands from the midwife a certain reflection which makes no mistake about the goal to be reached (οὐκ ἀστόχου διανοίας) For she must not only be able in difficult births, to bring skilful aid (εὐχηρά) to the patient but also be sufficiently quick-witted to react to everything that happens (πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα αγχίνουν) and to tie the baby’s umbilical cord’. Manual dexterity is not enough; the midwife needs experience for her action will vary according to whether the after-birth is ejected at the time of the birth or not and according to the position in which the infant presents itself. In one case it will be necessary to cut the cord inside the mother’s womb after having tied it; in another the cord will have to be separated from the after birth by a thread of wool and cut above this line. Aristotle’s description of a type of intelligence wholly orientated towards the movement of things and actions as they are being carried out suggests that the skill of the midwife is no different from the subtlety of the politician and that the same kind of sharp, agile intelligence can be claimed by both a warrior skilled in strategy and a power of the sea whose offspring devotes himself to working with metals. Lemnian myth has it that the Cabires, the blacksmith gods born from the union between Hephaestus and Cabeiro are, on their mother’s side, the grandsons of Proteus and of a goddess called Anchinoe. These powers connected with metallurgy whom the people of Lemnos associate with the crab, are descended on the maternal side from a goddess who resembles Metis but whose power of metamorphosis takes the form of a dauntingly quick intelligence. Being on the watch for anything that might happen is a way of being able to forestall the cunning tricks of an enemy and to devise, in advance, ways of trapping him in his own net. This is what Heraclides of Mylasa achieved at Artemisium. He was the man who surpassed all his contemporaries in æchinoia. He succeeded in enclosing the enemy ships in an unbroken circular grip just when they thought they would enjoy the advantage of surprise by putting into operation the reversal which is a part of the diékplous manoeuvre.

In the philosophers’ discussions about intellectual acute-
ness _agōnia_ is, so to speak, inseparable from another quality of the intelligence with which Aristotle again credits the midwife ‘who makes no mistake about the goal to be reached’. This, in its positive form, is a good eye, _eustochia_. A sharp intelligence is never aimless, it implies an ability to reach a desired goal.\(^\text{148}\) Now the Greek word for taking aim is _stochazesthai_,\(^\text{149}\) a verb which is part of the terminology of archery and hunting. In writing of _eustochia_ Plato several times refers to the skill of the archer bending his bow in the direction of the target.\(^\text{147}\) And when writing of a boar hunt, Pollux the lexicographer emphasises how useful a good eye is to the hunter for he cannot hope to dispatch the animal unless he shoots it either at the level of the shoulderblade or else plumb between the eyes.\(^\text{148}\) In all the various domains in which _mētis_ operates a good eye is as important as an agile mind. The craftsman who makes a lamp must have a ‘sure eye’,\(^\text{149}\) and to bring a ship straight to harbour the pilot must be able to ‘aim straight’.\(^\text{150}\) Where practical medicine or military manoeuvres are concerned the action of the general or of the doctor is always determined by the goal he is aiming for.\(^\text{151}\) Similarly, the politician must, if he wishes to guide the city, have a goal to aim for. He must not allow his gaze to waver by aiming in several directions at once but must operate as does the Central Committee of Plato’s City: ‘concentrating its gaze always on one particular mark and at that one mark it shoots, as it were, all its arrows continually’.\(^\text{152}\)

Swiftness and a good eye are two qualities which Aristotle and Plato retain in their definitions of the specific nature of _mētis_ and in doing so they stress the _stochastic_ nature of practical intelligence, thus indicating the conjectural aspect of a type of knowledge whose method of operation is illustrated as early as in Alcman’s cosmogony where we find Thetis, the power of the expanse of the sea, and her two acolytes, Guide-mark and Path, _Tēkhnē_ and _Pōros_. To conjecture, _tekhnairesthai_ is, in effect, to open up a path for oneself with the aid of guide-marks and to keep one’s eyes fixed on the goal of the journey just as the navigators do, placing their trust in the signs of the diviners and the luminous signals in the sky.\(^\text{152}\) The lexicographers establish an equivalence between ‘to adopt as target’ (_stochazesthai_) and to ‘conjecture’ (_tekh-\text{148}\)
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maires for which is justified by the fact that approximate knowledge is explicitly represented as a long journey through the desert (érëmos) where there are no visible paths and where one must constantly guess the way, aiming at a point on the distant horizon. This oblique, stumbling knowledge is the kind which Alcmaeon of Croton, in his Treatise on Nature written at the end of the sixth century, allots to mankind in contrast to the certain knowledge the gods enjoy concerning both invisible things and the affairs of men.155

We shall be able to define the forms taken by this conjectural type of knowledge which is at work in all the activities involving métis if we consider two examples, namely medicine and politics. These are two domains which the Greeks associated closely together and, from the beginning of the fifth century onwards, they devoted much reflection to them in their attempts to provide them with a conceptual framework. At this period no branch of knowledge appeared to have so much in common with the art of navigation as the art of the doctor and it was almost a commonplace to compare the pilot at the helm of a ship with the doctor seeking to save the patient from the perils of disease.156 For the Greeks disease was indeed something poikilòn;157 the forces which the medical art must confront are multiple and shifting.158 The Epidemics draws up an impressive list of the factors which a doctor must take into account when he is examining a patient: 'the common nature of all and the particular nature of the individual, the disease, the patient, the regimen prescribed and the prescriber—for these make a diagnosis more favourable or less; the constitution, both as a whole and with regard to the parts, of the weather and of each region; the customs, mode of life, practices and age of each patient, talk, manner, silence, thoughts, sleep or absence of sleep, the nature and time of dreams; pluckings, scratchings, tears; the exacerbations, stools, urine, sputa, vomit; the antecedents and consequences of each member in the succesions of diseases and the abessions to a fatal issue or a crisis; sweat, rigor, chill, cough, sneezes, hicoughs, breathing, belchings, flatulence (silent or noisy), haemorrhages and haemorrhoids'.159 If he is to be able to find his way in this world of fluctuating symptoms the doctor must have at his disposal all the resources of an intelli-
gence as polymorphic as his enemy; he must show that he can adopt as many disguises as Homer’s Proteus with his thousand tricks. Similarly, one essential aspect of the practice of medicine is the need to act swiftly and surely. There is an aphorism which notes that medicine is an art of the fleeting moment (ὀλιγόκαιρος), and in which the opportunities for intervention are always critical (οξύς). It is no good treating at midday what should have been treated in the morning. Just like the hunter lying in wait, the doctor must watch for the precise moment when his intervention will prove decisive. But he will only be in a position to seize the opportunity of grasping Kairos by the hair if he is sufficiently primed with all the knowledge acquired through experience to guess and foresee when the propitious moment will arise. For although disease is a power endowed with the gift of metamorphosis it is at the same time imbued with its own rhythm. There comes a moment in its development when a decisive change takes place and suddenly the course of events is turned and reversed. This is the crisis: these are known as the critical days, the fleeting instant when the τέχνη of the doctor who is usually so powerless can triumph over the hostile powers of the disease. As a guide by which to act medical knowledge has at its disposal an appropriate method, prognosis, which incorporates three intellectual operations: reflection on the present case; comparison with past cases which presented analogous circumstances and drawing from these conclusions which make it possible to foresee how the disease will develop. But it is not only through his grip of time that the doctor appears to be able to foresee the course of events, being—as Pindar puts it—ἐπικαρπώτατος like the pilot at the tiller on the raging seas. He can only reach his goal if he conjectures (τεκμαίρεσθαί) his route with the aid of the signs that his flexible intelligence enables him to recognise, compare and use to the full. On Ancient Medicine declares that it is necessary to aim for some kind of measure (στοχάζεσθαι μέτρου τίμων) for in this domain there are no numbers or weights which could make it possible to attain the exact truth (ἀκριβές). The only criterion possible is what is correct, ὀρθόν; the doctor undertakes what is possible, whatever is not he
abandons; if he makes a mistake he is capable of putting it right. Like the sailor who is skillful enough to avoid every catastrophe which his uncertain art forces him to confront—for, as Plato says, it is impossible to know the secret of the anger or benevolence of the winds—the doctor is obliged to make his way by conjecture based on opinions (dóxa).

The same indirect and groping knowledge is the lot of the type of man whom Plato’s and Aristotle’s contemporaries described as ‘prudent’ (phró̂nimos), namely the politician. The first sophists, those who immediately preceded the brilliant generation of the fifth century, appear to have specialised in political activity. One example is Mnesiphilus who was said to be the master of Themistocles: ‘He had inherited from Solon what was at that time called wisdom (sophia), that is to say political skill (deiñoêta politikên) and the intelligence that is at work in action (drastêiron sinesin)’. When a trap has to be laid for the Persian fleet at Salamis, Mnesiphilus is on the scene, in the guise of the wise counsellor, whispering to Themistocles what Aeschylus, in his account of the event, calls ‘a Greek’s trick’. But, in Herodotus’ account, this same sophist appears as a discreet kind of shadow to the intelligence of Themistocles, the man whom his contemporaries nicknamed Odysseus, by reason of his great prudence, his phró̂nēsis. Like the hero of the Odyssey, Themistocles was ‘always as the circumstances demanded he should be’. In the assembly and in council he was the orator who knew better than anyone how to adapt himself to the time, the place and his audience and how to give the best reply in all circumstances. But as well as these qualities Themistocles also possessed an exceptional political flair: ‘In immediate problems he excelled in forming the best opinion, thanks to the most rapid reflection, and where the future was concerned he also knew how to come to the most correct conclusion on the most distant perspectives. When dealing with any matter he also knew how to explain it clearly; even if he was not familiar with it he nevertheless formed a valuable opinion about it. Finally, even if the advantages and disadvantages were still indiscernible he was capable of foreseeing them as accurately as possible. In short, through his natural resources and facility this man
was without equal when it came to improvising whatever was necessary.¹³¹ An agile mind, a good eye and immediate understanding of any new situation: these are the canonical virtues of the man of prudence but here they are all present in a man who, in Thucydides' eyes, was superior to his contemporaries by reason of his political clear-sightedness. He who can form the most accurate idea of the most wide-ranging problems is, according to Thucydides, 'the man most skilled at conjecture', arístos eikástês.¹³² Conjectural knowledge, here referred to as ēkázein operates through drawing a comparison which makes it possible to grasp an unknown event through its resemblance to a familiar one. For Aristotle the 'good eye', eustochía brings the same result: it makes it possible to sense a similarity between things which, at first sight, appear to be profoundly different.¹³³ This is an intellectual operation which lies half-way between reasoning by analogy and a skill at deciphering the signs which link what is visible to what is invisible. The temporal scope of such an operation is immediately apparent from the passages in the Ilíad in which the figure of the wise counsellor appears. Whether he be Polydmas, Nestor or Halitherses, the key phrase used is always the same: he can see in front and behind at the same time, hámá próssô kai opisso.¹³⁴ In other words, in the first place he possesses experience of the past so that he can guess what is going to happen; but he can also compare the future with past events, moving from one point on the horizon to another across what is invisible. Using their own methods, this is what diviners, for their part, do. They are the men whose knowledge is described at this period by Euripides as the skill of guessing, eikázein.¹³⁵ the ability to form the most accurate idea possible of the most wide-ranging problems.

This last comparison shows how important stochastic intelligence was in fourth century thought. But it also gives some idea of the widely contrasting evaluations made of this approximative knowledge. For Euripides the diviner of ancient times, who derived his inspiration from the gods, was finally unmasked. His famous gift of second sight turned out to be no more than the art of making good guesses. Thucydides, in contrast, felt the greatest admiration for Themistocles
and his political intelligence because the author of the Peloponnesian War believed that history should be more than simply a collective memory of the past actions of the city; like the activity of the politician that it set up as a model for itself, it should aim at a fuller understanding of the present, capable of projecting some measure of foresight relating to the future. The philosophers who were, at this period, engaged in defining the intellectual qualities of the man of mētis similarly passed their own value judgements upon this type of knowledge. They were all the more inclined to do so given that their own undertaking implied a systematic hierarchy of the various possible relationships between Being and knowledge. On this point Plato’s position is of the first importance. His condemnation of knowledge and skills based upon the stochastic intelligence is quite unequivocal. In the Gorgias rhetoric, having been found guilty of owing its success to intuition and a good eye, is condemned to be considered as neither an art nor a rational form of knowledge. The Philebus, which is even more unequivocal, makes a distinction between human achievements which are dependent upon uncertain knowledge and those which are based upon exactitude. On the one hand there are the stochastic arts and on the other productions which are the object of calculation (arithmēs), measuring (mētron) and weighing (stathmēs). Only that which is measurable can belong to exact science, to epistēmē and the domain of truth. Although Plato makes an exception in the case of the art of building, no doubt through respect for its impressive tools: the rule, kanōn, the lathe, tōrnos, the compass, diabētēs and the line, stathmē, he is uncompromising in his condemnation of medicine, the arts of the strategos and the shipwright, not to mention rhetoric and the tricks of the sophists. Sophia becomes contemplative wisdom and ceases to refer to the knowledge of the skillful craftsman as it had ever since Homer’s writings where sophia was used of any organised body of knowledge with its own rules and methods handed on from one generation to another within professional groups such as those of the blacksmiths and carpenters. The author of the Republic roundly condemns and rejects all these forms of knowledge, his exclusion embracing at the same time
who has only a manual, practical skill and the craftsman who
knows the rules of his art, the man who is called, in On Ancient
Medicine, the techmitēs.\textsuperscript{191}

Plato is at pains to give us a detailed description of the
components of mētis in order to lend added weight to his
reasons for condemning this form of intelligence. He goes
to considerable lengths to expose the wretched impotence
and, above all, the harmful nature of oblique procedures,
of devious methods and of cunning involved in making
guesses. The various forms of practical intelligence are
weepingly condemned once and for all in the name of the one
and only Truth proclaimed by philosophy. The fact is that
the Philosopher who appears as a sovereign arbiter of this
classification is also responsible for the ephemeral definition
which, so to speak, unifies the diverse forms of mētis, bringing
them together into a composite image presented in stark con-
trast to the immutable Knowledge claimed by a system of
metaphysics based on Being and by the logic of Identity.

To be sure, Aristotle’s system does something to correct
the distinction made by Plato. There are good reasons for
believing that the theory of prudence expounded in the
Nichomachean Ethics expresses a desire to embrace once more
the traditions of the orators and sophists and the types of
knowledge which are subject to contingency and directed
towards beings affected by change.\textsuperscript{192} There is no doubt that,
for Aristotle, the model of the man of prudence, the phrōnīmos
man, is the politician, the man whose ‘success owes more
to a good eye than to an unshakable knowledge’\textsuperscript{193} the man
whose actions are oriented towards an end and who must
always appreciate the importance of opportunity and under-
stand that he is operating in a domain in which there is no
stability. On the other hand it is equally true that in his
analysis Aristotle is anxious to make a distinction between
prudence, phrōnēsia, and cleverness, deinōtēs,\textsuperscript{194} showing
that the former is more than mere intuition or a good eye;
it is a type of skill founded upon ‘deliberation aimed at a
good result’ (euboulia), which is different from the ability
‘to do things with a particular aim in view’,\textsuperscript{195} the quality
which defines the man whom the Greeks call a panoūrgos,
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a sly one or a rogue, the man who is endowed with a disturbingly over-subtle intelligence.

This is not the only problem of demarcation that Aristotle appears to face for his 'man of prudence'. The author of the Nichomachean Ethics points out, in reference to the common meaning of phronēsis, that 'some people go so far as to say that certain species of animals have prudence'.195 This threatens to call into question the radical separation between man and beasts, between reasonable beings and the rest, living creatures without lógos, the dōga zōia.196 The danger is all the greater given that the basic models for mētis are, by very nature of their semantic context, to be found in a domain where human intelligence is constantly at grips with that of the land or sea animals which men confront in the activities of hunting and fishing. Despite these dangers, it is nevertheless a fact that Aristotelian thought accepts that there can be a type of knowledge bearing upon what is inexact even if, like its subject, this knowledge can itself only be inexact.197 For given that the realities of science are necessarily and eternally what they are198, no intelligence of a practical nature can hope to achieve any stable knowledge: there can be no science of that which belongs to the category of the unlimited. In a way, and despite all the reservations we have indicated, Aristotelian philosophy rehabilitates conjectural knowledge and the type of intelligence that proceeds obliquely.

However, it is not possible to limit to the confines of a discussion between two Greek philosophers of the fourth century all the problems that the question of mētis raises for a history of the intelligence. The options offered at that time had such a profound influence on the development of Western thought that even in modern times they have directed historical and philological studies into avenues which are, from many points of view, restricting. In studies of the Greeks pursued by scholars who claim to be their heirs, there has been a prolonged silence on the subject of the intelligence of cunning. The fundamental reasons for this have been two-fold. The first is perhaps that, from a Christian point of view, it was inevitable that the gulf separating men from animals should be increasingly emphasised and that human reason
should appear even more clearly separated from animal behaviour than it was for the ancient Greeks. The second and even more powerful reason is surely that the concept of Platonic Truth, which has overshadowed a whole area of intelligence with its own kinds of understanding, has never really ceased to haunt Western metaphysical thought.

Notes
3. Istros, FGistHist 334F 2 Jacoby.
4. Phædrus, Qwast. conviv., 7, 4, 703 a–b; Qwast. Roman., 75, 281f. 
   Cf. L. Rademacher, ‘Lebende Flamme’, Weiner Studien 49 1931, 
   pp. 115–118.
5. II., XVIII, 468–73.
7. II., XVIII, 327; heliōnomen peri phisias.
8. Psaltē, palm or hand, means cleverness, know-how, ploy, knack 
   (Alcaeus, fr. 249, 7 Lobel and Page; 380; 378; Theognis, 624; 1018; 
   Herodotus, VIII, 19; Aristophanes, Wasps, 645; Pindar, Olymp. 
   XIII, 52; etc.
    Hymn, 357 uses diapourpalamēsen in connection with Hermes driving 
    home his booty.
12. 45.
13. 237–238. There is a Hermes, daubed with black ashes, who appears 
    from the depths of a house to frighten the children (Callimachus, 
    Hymn to Artemis, 68–9).
14. 241–2. When Odysseus arrives at the land of the Phaeacians he 
    falls asleep, exhausted, under a deep covering of leaves, protected 
    by the thick trees; he is buried like the firebrand under the ashes, 
    like the embers hidden in the depths of the countryside ‘in order to 
    preserve the seed of the fire, sērma purō, so that it will not be 
    necessary to go and seek some far away’ (Od., V, 488–490). But 
    while her protegé is sleeping Athena of the flashing gaze watches 
    over him.
16. 387; 278–280; 415.
17. Antoninus Liberalis, Metamorphoses, 41, 10.
18. Od., VIII, 266–266.
19. Apostolius, 8, 76, in Paroemiographi graeci, II, 452, 4 Leutsch and 
21. 296–9.
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21. 327.
22. 329–32. According to Eustathius, p. 1599, 36, the expression kichanei to bradis õkia is derived from a proverb. Cf. B. Bilinski,
Aphr.*, 249 (sorai kai méisis), etc.
27. II., XIV, 214ff; *Hom. Hymn Aphr.*, 7.
29. In a conversation with a courtesan named Theodote Socrates explains to her how she hunts men, with what artifices, traps and beaters she catches her prey (*Xenophon*, *Memorabilia*, III, 11, 5ff).
31. Hesiod, *Works*, 800 (with the commentary by Proclus). Cf. Jessen,
s.v. 'Hermaphroditos', *R.-E.* (1913), c. 718.
33. *Od.*, VIII, 340–342: desmoein mein tris tisoi apairomen amphis échoin...
34. Porphyry, *Comment. in II. XIV*, 200, p. 191, 9–192, 13 Schrader.
35. It was a brief but very stimulating article by B. Gentili, 'Sul testo
del fr. 287 P di Icisco', *Quaderni Urbinati* 2, 1966, pp. 124–7, which
prompted us to explore the semantic field of peirar-apeiron.
W. Krause, 'Die Ausdrücke für das Schicksal bei Homer', *Glotta* 21,
1936, p. 148; G. Bjorck, "Moizou", *Mélanges E. Boussoq*. I Brussels,
origins of Greek Cosmology*, New York, 1960, p. 230–239; P. Seligman,
*The Apeiron of Anaximander*, London 1962; H.B. Gottschalk,
40. I, 361.
41. I, 411–12.
42. 412–413.
43. 549.
44. *Od.*, XII, 50–54.
45. *Hom. Hymn to Apollo*, 129. Not to mention the common expression
used in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: 'the bonds of death' olithrou peiratou (II.,
VII, 401; XII, 79; *Od.*, XXII, 33; 41).
46. Galen, *Opera omnia*, vol. 18, 2, p. 748 Kuhn, cited by G. Bjorck,
*art. cit.*, P. 147.
47. E. Benveniste, *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, Paris 1966,
49. Plutarch, *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute*, I, 1, 326 e. Cf.
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L. Robert, *Documents de l'Asie Mineure méridionale*, Paris 1966, pp. 40–4. In the *Supplices*, 1049–1050, it is the mind of Zeus that is ἀπέρατος, impassable, or ἀπραβατός, which cannot be crossed. But in line 470 Misfortune, Ἀτρεδ, whose “impassable”, ἀπέρατος, net is mentioned in the *Prometheus* (1078), appears as a bottomless sea, difficult to cross, or μάλιστα ἐπιρον.

50. Herodotus, VII, 36.
52. 745–50.
53. Herodotus, VII, 34; 35; 36.
55. Od., XXII, 175.
57. Aristotle, *Physics*, III, 6, 207a 2. Cf. Pollux, VII, 179: the ring which has no setting (ἀλίθος) is called by us ἀπέραν.
58. Cf. supra, 152ff.
60. O.F., 66 a and b Kern.
62. 154.
64. 256–7.
66. 622; 652–653; 658–659.
67. Hades chains up his guests, restraining them with the most powerful of bonds (Plato, *Cratylus*, 403 c–d). In a fragment attributed to Pindar (fr. 207 Schroeder), the weight of invisible Taurusus is that of chains which have been forged with a hammer, σφυρηλάτικος ἀμφιβάλοις. The analyses undertaken by H. Schrekenberg, *Ananke. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Wortgebrauchs*, Munich 1964, have made considerable use of the relation between the idea of ‘necessity’ and the constraints of the yoke and bonds of the slave.
70. Ibycus, fr. 287, 2 Page, where the correction of ἀπορία to ἀπορίωνa has been suggested by B. Gentili, ‘Sul testo del fr. 287 P di Ibyco’, *Quaderni Umbrianis* 2, 1966, p. 124–127. In his book *Sappho und Simonides*, Berlin 1913, p. 125, Wilamowitz suggests that the epithet ἀπειρόν applied to this net belonging to Eros should be understood as an allusion to πέρας, the stone used as a weight in the net. This is a meaning of πέρας with which we are unfamiliar and the explanation of ‘net without limits’ seems obvious, at least in the series of examples which, following B. Gentili, we have attempted to establish. Cf. the remarks of F. Lasserre which have already appeared, *La figure d'Eros dans la poésie grecque*, Lausanne 1946, p. 57, n. 2.
74. ‘My eyes are sightless, my ears are humming, the sweat runs off my body, I am overcome with a fit of shivering; I become greener than grass . . .’: Sappho, fr. 31 Lobel-Page. Cf. Plutarch, Eroticos 763 a (illogos). And for the dizziness which accompanies the aphereis in the discussions between Socrates and his adversaries: Plato, Lysis, 216 c; Protag. 339 e; Euthydemus, 303 a; a dizziness which becomes a kind of trance brought on by Socrates as if he was a torpedo-fish: Mono., 80 a-c; 84 b-c; etc.
75. Plutarch, De soll. anim. 978 c-d; Oppian, Hal., II, 72 (amâkaniēsis pedâthēs); 84-85 (tòi en guoipâdên technâxetai ichthûsi nârkê).
77. Sarpedon is afraid for the Trojans of the ‘net which catches everything’, liton pânagor (II., V., 487).
78. It is Clytemnestra who is responsible for the trick (doðai): Aegisthus recognises this (Aeschylus, Ag., 1636) the more easily given that in the guilty couple it is Clytemnestra who plays the role of the man. Wherever cunning plotting or fraudulent manoeuvring is concerned the Greek likes to believe that it is a matter for a woman (cf. Euripides, fr. 288 and 464 Nauck); Herodotus, VI 77; Apollonius Rhodius, Argon., III, 557ff). But Clytemnestra knows how to sew the fox’s skin to the lion’s.
80. Agam., 1382.
81. [Hesiod], Shield, 215.
82. Herodotus, I., 141.
83. Aeschylus, Choephoroi, 981-982: both mèchanēma and desmîs.
84. Prometheus, 81.
85. 74.
86. 152-8.
88. Euripides, Oreste, 25: the verb used is poribâlein.
89. Sophocles, Trachinian Women, 1051-1052: huphâniōn amphibîstron; 1057 (bond); 831-832: net of death (phônia nephêla).
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against Thebes, 120ff, Thebes under attack from the men of Argos is a town trapped inside a ring, like a lion encircled by hunters (Od., IV, 791–792: ἑλίμω... ἅκλων).


94. La Grande Encyclopédie, art. ‘madrague’.

95. Herodotus, VIII, 16.

96. Aelian, Nat. anim., XV, 5.

97. Oppian, Hal., III, 41–43.


99. Thucydides, III, 84.

100. Herodotus, IV, 179.

101. Account of Sosipolos of Lacedemonia (PGrHist 176 F 1 Jacoby).

Cf. J. Taillardat art. cit., whose translation we follow.


103. Herodotus, V, 121: ἡγεμών τοι πόλιον.

104. Xenophon, Cynegetica, 9, 11–16, ed. tr. E. Delebecque (see fig. 5, p. 122).

105. Hippocrates, Regimen, I, 19.

106. II., XVIII, 395–403. There is nothing to prove that Hephaestus gets his blacksmith’s knowledge from Thetis, as Guy Berthiaume points out to us, even if Alcam’s cosmogonical poem does raise the problem of Thetis’ activity in metal work (supra, p. 140–141).


108. Aeschylus, Agam., 1233. Pliny (H.N., VII, 85) says that the amphiokhrána has a double head, that is to say an extra head instead of a tail, as if one mouth was not enough for spitting out its poison. It is also described as ‘two-headed’ amphiokhrána (Nicander, Theriaca, 372–373) and ‘with two mouths’, distomos (Nonnus, Dionys., V, 140).


110. Hymnic Hymn to Hermes, 76.

111. 77–9.
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114. Xenophon, *Cynagoretica*, VI, 21 Delebecque (p. 76 n.1).
116. Lines 346–9 certainly refer to metis, in connection with these amazing tracks left by the sandals of Hermes.
117. 346.
118. 157.
119. 257.
120. 409–415.
123. Cf. supra, p. 53, n. 111.
127. Plato, *Republic*, 479a 480a (together with the scholia).
129. Plato, ibid.
130. Menander, fr. 525 Kock. The reference here to the crab, karkinos, is contained in the name of one or several writers of Comedy (cf. Diehl, s.v. ‘Karkinos’, *R.E.*, [1919], c. 1951–1954).
132. Plutarch, *Banquet of the Seven Sages*, 148c–d.
134. Il., II, 169; 407; 636; X, 137; Od., XIII, 89.
142. 587a 22–23.
143. Stephen of Byzantium, s.v. ‘Kabiria’.
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144. Cf. supra, p. 298–299. *Achinoia* is a necessary quality for the *stratagos* (Aeneas the Tactitian' *Polioretica* XI, 10; XXIV, 11) and for the sovereign (Pollux, I, 42: *oxia* and *achinios*). For Polybius it means an intelligence acute enough to perceive the hidden consequences of actions and decisions (P. Pedech, *La méthode historique de Polybe*, Paris, 1964, p. 211).


146. Plato, *Euthydemus*, 277b; Aristotle, *De divinatione* per somnum 464a 32; Aristoxenus fr. 41 Wehrli.

147. *Laws*, 706a; 934b.


150. Maximus of Tyr, 30, 2, ed. Hobein, p. 352, 14ff: *eisstochos kubernēs*. Among the dedications made by sailors found in the Grotta Porcinaria at the Cape of S. Maria di Leuca (Salento) there is one, addressed to Ino, which thanks her for having brought the ship safely to harbour and the verb used is *tuchānēthei* which is a synonym for *stochānēthai* (cf. Hesychius, s.v. "tuchānēthai"); C. Palliara, "La grotta Porcinaria al Capo di S. Maria di Leuca, I. Le iscrizioni", *Annali dell' Università di Lecce: Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia*, VI, 1971–1973, p. 20–21.


152. 962a.


154. Cf. Suda, s.v. "rhaimōmenoi".


160. The author of *On Regimen in acute diseases* speaks of *polutropī* and *poluschidē* (Litré, II, 226, 11–12) when he describes, in order to criticise, the Cnidians' attempts to classify diseases and divide them into sub-categories.

161. On *the places in man*, 44 (Litré, VI, 338).


164. On *the Art*, 8 (Litré VI, 14, 1–3) Speaks of *epitrapein*. 

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166. This is how Pindar describes Arcesilas of Cyrene whose orthokóulos méra he has praised a few lines earlier (262) (Pythion, IV, 270).
168. On Ancient Medicine, 9.
169. On the Art, 5 (Littre, VI, 8, 19–20), etc.
171. Epinomis, 976a.
172. Ibid.
173. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI, 7, 1141a 25, 27; b 5 refers to the ordinary use of πρόνοιας in his theory of prudence, as P. Aubenque quite rightly points out (o.c., p. 23–24).
175. Plutarch, Themistocles, II, 6.
178. Plutarch, De Herodoti Malignitate, 869f. The Spartans admired Themistocles for his qualities of sophê and dæxihê.
179. Sophocles, Philoctetes, 1049.
185. Euripides, fr. 973 Nauck; Helen, 751; Antiphon, in FVST, II, p. 337, 18–20. In [Apolodorus], Bibl., III, 3 the same phrase arista eikãsai refers to the particular type of knowledge of the diviner.
189. 56b-e.
191. On Ancient Medicine, 4.
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196. Id., ibid., VI, 7, 1141a 27–28.

197. Are animals intelligent or not? Can they possess a kind of ability to reflect, a certain form of intelligence? It is an open question, widely debated in the schools of philosophy by the Stoics, Epicureans and members of the Academy. Porphry De Abstinencia echoes these discussions in Book III, in view of the importance of what is at stake: namely, how to behave towards the animal world.


Bibliography

For the reader’s convenience we should like to point out that while the authors have always worked in close collaboration to produce these studies, some work has been published separately, often under single authorship in various scholarly and specialist journals. So we thought it might be useful to give a list of these, in chronological order.


These studies which were, from the start, planned as chapters in a single volume have for the purpose of this publication, been revised and expanded with the addition of hitherto unpublished material.
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