


***Ghost in the Shell-Game: On the Metic Mode of Existence, Inception and Innocence.***

Nandita Biswas Mellamphy.



I begin, then, properly, in and with the proper voice (that of Pierre Ménard).<sup>1</sup> To begin, then, anew: The purpose of this study is to create an awareness of the significance of technical objects. Culture has become a system of defense against technics; now, this defense appears as a defense of man based on the assumption that technical objects contain no human reality. We should like to show that culture fails to take into account that there is a human reality in technical reality and that, if it is to fully play its role, culture must come to incorporate technical entities into its body of knowledge and its sense of values. Recognition of the modes of existence of technical objects should be the result of philosophical thought, which in this respect has to achieve what is analogous to the role it played in the abolition of slavery and in the affirmation of the value of the human person. The opposition established between culture and technology, between man and machine, is false and is not well-founded; what underlies it is mere ignorance or resentment. Behind the mask of a facile humanism it hides a reality that is rich in human efforts and natural forces, a reality that constitutes the world of technical objects, mediators between nature and man.<sup>2</sup>



In Mamoru Oshii's *Inosensu* (a.k.a. *Ghost in the Shell 2*),<sup>3</sup> the inextricability of human and technical realities suggests that the established opposition between culture and nature, human and machine, is not only easily subverted, but ultimately so falsifiable that it can be technically manipulated so as to shed light on a dimension that remains indiscernible to humanism: that it is by way of technical objects and technical existence that human beings most authentically relate to their living milieu and to living processes. Humans play with dolls/automata/avatars and wear masks (faces, façades) as part of their everyday lives,<sup>4</sup> but they are ultimately blind to the technical connectors that animate them: "Life and death come and go like marionettes dancing on a table. Once their strings are cut, they easily crumble" (Batō in Oshii's *Inosensu*).



Echoing Kleist's riveting claim that puppets are like gods,<sup>5</sup> in Oshii's film the technical object is, on the one hand, the tragic protagonist that must be liberated (very much as Simondon had envisioned in his introduction to [METO](#)),<sup>6</sup> and on the other, already more liberated than the human. "The definition of a truly beautiful doll is a living, breathing body devoid of a soul [...]. The human is no match for a doll in its form, its elegance of motion, its very being [...]. Perfection is possible only for those without consciousness, or perhaps endowed with infinite consciousness" (the renegade Kim in Oshii's *Inosensu*).



And yet humans use and abuse them, enslave them without a second thought. Humans have even transferred this logic of abuse onto other humans; according to the ancient Greeks, for example, the slave was an animal machine (this idea was later modified by Descartes) and therefore not governed by political laws and philosophical principles.<sup>7</sup>



"Humans get rid of robots as soon as they are superfluous or obsolete. When constantly exchanged for newer models, some of these machines find themselves abandoned, lost, and without proper maintenance, they degrade and degenerate [...]. 'Humans are different from robots': this is as obvious as saying 'black is not white' or simply that 'man is not a machine' [...]. But why this obsessive idea humans have to want to re-create themselves? [...] In every age, children are excluded from the norms of human behavior (insofar as we consider 'human' a being having its proper identity and acting autonomously). But then what is a child that endures the chaos preceding maturity? — It differs profoundly from 'human' beings while nevertheless possessing human form. A young girl who cradles her doll does not cradle a thing replacing a baby, nor an object of maternal apprenticeship. — Neither does she imitate a mother raising its child. No: she undergoes an authentic experience; she experiences the profound nature of what it means to raise children. Raising children is the simplest way to realize an old dream of humankind: that of creating life artificially" (Haraway in Oshii's *Inosensu*).<sup>8</sup>



This is perhaps the ‘reality’ that is masked by the longstanding opposition between humanity and technicity, a reality that is supposed to constitute both the world of technical objects as well as the world of inner memory and subjectivity. “If the essence of life is information carried in DNA, then society and civilization are just colossal memory systems, and a metropolis like this one, simply a sprawling external memory” (*Inosensu*). In this view, the organic — including such metaphysical concepts as intentionality and identity — can no longer be conceived as separate[d] from its technical articulation and individuation. It is not that the body disappears in Oshii’s rendering; it is almost as if sexualization and gendering become ‘wearable’ technologies that can be tactically manipulated and recoded to produce further (often monstrous) avenues of individuation (it is well-known that Oshii was inspired by the grotesque dolls of Hans Bellmer; see Brown 2010).<sup>9</sup>



Outside the schema of the *logos* — of *words, reasons, rationalizations, standard measures* — established oppositions between ‘nature and culture’, ‘humanity and technicity’, ‘spirit and body’, *et cetera*, find themselves reticulated (inter-connected) as elements within a ubiquitous technical network of ongoing modifications, which Simondon characterizes as being in a constant and constitutive process of ‘transduction’. Technical objects are ‘mediators’ (mediations) between ‘man’ and ‘nature’ not only in an ‘instrumental’ sense but also in an altogether ‘constitutive’ sense; from this vantage (as Oshii, for instance, suggests), rather than ‘bodies’ and ‘souls’ we see instead ‘shells’ and ‘ghosts’. In Oshii’s *Inosensu*, death is not the cessation of life; rather, bodily life is the technical animation, individuation and articulation of death (inertia). *Life* (*æmæth* in the Hebrew text at the heart of *Inosensu*: the animating ‘truth’) is portrayed as an artifice of *death* (*mæth*) embodied in the *ningyō* — literally ‘human-shaped figures’, anthropoid forms — without consciousness. “By inscribing *æmæth* upon the Golem’s brow, the clay man lived, drawing energy from the word for ‘truth’. But simply removing the *æ* to form *mæth* or ‘death’ returned the Golem back to inanimate clay” (Hebrew Kabbalah paraphrased in Oshii’s *Inosensu*). Only the puppet truly experiences both life *and* death: life as the animation of death (something impossible for human self-consciousness). “People die simply because it is inevitable. But death is a condition of life for a doll.”





Whereas *Inosensu* explicitly questions the value of consciousness for an understanding of the human and humane (e.g. the most 'human' relationship in the film is between a cyborg and a cloned canine!), Christopher Nolan's film *Inception* suggests that although consciousness is limited (that is, ill-equipped to process all the data streaming into it), it too functions by way of technical manipulation and artifice. — Our world is full of *gaps*, *blank areas*, *dead-spaces*, *blind-spots*, and the latter tend to be problematic for humans conceived in intentional and rational terms; but this is not the case for non-conscious/non-human operators, which in Oshii's film are masters of *mètic métissage*<sup>10</sup> (i.e. able both to *make* and *maneuver in* the 'gaps', 'blanks', 'dead-spaces' and 'blind-spots' of what could be called 'aporetic architecture'). Just as Oshii's anthropomorphic *ningyō* explicitly allude to Hans Bellmer's dolls (which themselves transgress the human/machine boundary),<sup>11</sup> so also Nolan's depiction of the manipulability of consciousness in dream-states is inspired by the gestural art/artifice of Francis Bacon ("bringing us back by a commodius vicus of recirculation" to *Anthropocosmogonic Vastupurushamanism*): "I quite like the paradoxical nature of the [fact that] [...] the less [Bacon] tells you about what's there, the more I find *myself* thinking about [it]. [And] Because you never have the resources to fully create the world that you're creating, you are leaving a lot of void — you're leaving a lot of gaps — and so part of what you start trying to do is use those necessary gaps *intelligently*, so that where you're not showing something, it's helping you rather than [giving you a] feeling [of and for] the limitations of the world you're creating" (Christopher Nolan, interviewed @ <http://youtu.be/u1R4CFUxj9c?t=2m42s> — 2m42s to 3m24s).<sup>12</sup>





The kind of *intelligence* to which Nolan alludes here is not mobilized through intentionality, logical thinking, or the framework of *logos* (or indeed the search for capital-*T Truth*: a Truth beyond all deception(s)); instead it *conducts*, *transducts*, and *instructs* itself<sup>13</sup> via *randomness*, *aporia*, *kairos* and *mètic hexis*<sup>14</sup> (crafty cunning, mechanisms of manipulation). Throughout the labyrinthine twists and turns of the latter lies the question — and *quest* — of artifice (truth as deception, or if you like: “truthiness” — as the *mètic* master of and on televisual media, Sir Stephen Colbert, might have said). “They say we only use a fraction of the true potential of our brains [...] but they’re talking about when we’re *awake*. While we *dream*, the mind performs wonders [...]. In a *dream* your mind continuously does that: it creates and perceives a world *simultaneously* — *so well*, in fact, that you don’t feel your brain doing the creating. And that’s why we can short-circuit the process [...] by taking over the creating part” (the con-artist Cobb in Nolan’s *Inception*). There is no “inception” without *deception* in Nolan’s film; not only can consciousness be deceived, it is *always* being deceived. The dream-state in Nolan’s film is a stochastic ‘field’ or ‘plane of immanence’ (and the “stochastic intelligence” described in Sarah Kofman’s treatise on *Poros* and *Mètis*<sup>15</sup>): one which, as in Oshii’s vision of unconscious (‘pre’- and/or ‘post’-conscious) anthropomorphism, operates as a “perfect” and “dangerous” field of possibilities.



Oddly enough, returning now to the word *mètis* and *métis*, one can discover in its Greek grounding (as *mètis*) a two-tiered track upon the first track of which *mètis* as one word would mean ‘ruse’ or ‘deception’ and upon the second path of which *mè-tis*, two-worded, would be synonymous with another Greek word: *ou-tis*, meaning ‘no-body’ — wrapping back toward and toward the ruse — for example, the ruse played on Polyphemus by Ulysses or Odysseus. ... These two tiers (the two trajectories just traced) are fused and confused—merged, intermixed—on the horizon of its homonym *métis*. In the more Latin, less Greek *mètis* (a *métissage* manifesting itself after the Greek *mètis* / *mè-tis* scissiparity, yet opening onto an aboriginality far more ancient, in fact, than the former), we meet the meeting of the previous two tiers in an afterword that constitutes the Latin laughterword or Ullulation (U-turn/“YOU”-relation) of the two Greek tiers. This third aspect and last angle of the *mètis*-*métis* relation constitutes a fusing *métissage*.

Dan Mellamphy, 1994.

The Iseus-type, in its complicity with the accretive impulse, represents a new Buddhism “for Europeans.” As a “non-Indian Buddhist,” Jesus is associated with Buddhist nihilism that is, for all intents and purposes, superior to Christian nihilism for a number of reasons. Buddhist nihilism is constituted by the “higher and learned classes” it does not engage in debates but is “quite in accordance with actuality”; it is therefore able to overcome a reliance on the concept of sin in order to “transcend beyond good and evil.” The superiority of Buddhism is demonstrated in its peaceful overcoming of the concept of sin, it focuses on “the struggle against suffering” and combats suffering by “directing even the spiritual interests back to the individual person ... the ‘one thing needful’,” the question “how can you get rid of suffering” regulates and circumscribes the entire spiritual life.<sup>41</sup> Christianity, on the other hand, is made up of the lower types whose suffering is transformed into resentment, into “an overwhelming desire to do harm, to discharge an inner tension in hostile actions and ideas.”<sup>42</sup> Buddhism is thus superior insofar as it is itself consciously a “religion for the end and fatigue of a civilization”; its willingness to will nothingness (which, as we recall, is precisely what the Christians cannot do) is a source of its strength as the culmination and threshold of decadence. But this is also the source of its weakness: the Buddhism of the will is a danger for the “psychological type of redemptor” because here the willingness to will nothingness becomes fixed as a hyper-egoism<sup>43</sup> rather than undergoing the “sublime leap into the affirmation of life. Nonetheless, Jesus, is a kind of “non-Indian Buddha” that “lives over his time.”

The second Dionysian model or figure is that of Odysseus as *polytropos*, whom Nietzsche invokes indirectly in the *Gay Science* (§344) and directly in *Beyond Good and Evil*.<sup>44</sup> Odysseus’s ability to adapt and use cunning to achieve his task distinguishes him from all others. In addition to his attribute as ‘versatile’ and ‘unaffected,’ Homer calls Odysseus *polytropos*, a man of ‘many schemes.’<sup>45</sup> This quality is illustrated beautifully in the Cyclops episode of *The Odyssey*, in which Odysseus defeats and overcomes Polyphemus by calling himself ‘nōn-’/‘nōt-’/‘nōt-’ being no one and ‘nōt-’ being thing or body. In this passage, Homer poetically links word and act, cunningly intermingling Odysseus’s epithet *mētis* and his pseudonym *nōt-*. What’s more, here Homer equates the word ‘*mētis*’ with the word ‘*nōt-*’, having Polyphemus and his neighbor Iphiclus use ‘*mētis*’ as a word for ‘no one’ or ‘nobody,’ which of course is the very meaning of ‘*nōt-*’.<sup>46</sup> As both *polytropos* and *poly-mētis*, Odysseus is, in *The Odyssey*, both ‘unaffected,’ ‘versatile’ and ‘deceptive’ as

well as mutable, multiplicitous, multiple and in consequence ‘no one’/‘no-one’ person.<sup>47</sup>

The ‘man of wit’ [*poly-mētis*] is the Overman, and the ‘multiplicity of figures’ [*polytropos*] erupting from the instant of the ego’s splitting (the shattering of the subject as such) is the Overcoming of the Overman, the Overman’s very overcoming of the marauding whole that is the subject of man.<sup>48</sup>

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche clearly links the Dionysian task of “translation back into nature” with the attributes of Odysseus (and also of Oedipus):

‘To translate man back into nature ... in so far as it that man hereafter stands before man as even today, hardened in the discipline of science, he stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid Odysseus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears,’<sup>49</sup> dead to the Siren songs of the old meta-physical bird catches who have been piping at him all too long, ‘you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin’ — that may be a strange and ironic task, but it is a task.<sup>50</sup>

The important thing to notice here is that the superiority of having sealed Odysseus ears is inextricably linked to the task of translation. What makes Odysseus important is that his attributes as *polytropos* and *poly-mētis* are not aims, but rather are in the service of his task of returning home. Throughout *The Odyssey*, Odysseus’s journey consistently brings him face to face with obstacles that he overcomes through his adaptability and cunningness, but that nonetheless pose themselves as temptations that he must choose to overcome. For example, Odysseus hears the song of the Sirens but is able to resist their seduction because he has been bound to the mast of his ship; likewise, Odysseus rejects Calypso’s offer of immortality precisely because he refuses to deviate from his task of returning home. All this Odysseus rejects, though he knows that the alternative is to retreat himself again, this time alone and on a makeshift raft, to that sea about which he has no illusions.<sup>51</sup> Against Calypso’s divinity, Odysseus is completely and inherently ‘worldly,’ and this, from a Nietzschean perspective, is his great strength and wisdom.

Given that the Dionysian task does involve the instantiation of a new nomothetic order, how will the potential future philosopher translate and make communicable the encounter with eternity? Does the future

philosopher become an ‘armed prophet’ as Machiavelli urged? Or does he use persuasion like a Platonic philosopher-king? The answer must be that the future philosopher, as *polytropos* as well as a *poly-mētis*, must use both tactics. As a temples-attender (Venercher), the philosopher experiments with both ‘philosophical’ and ‘anti-philosophical’ innovations that may just as likely fail than succeed. Lampert confirms this point: ‘the work of the new philosophers would not be a farsch if it were not an experiment risking failure.’<sup>52</sup> Nietzsche names a variety of qualities that the ‘free spirit’ — the ‘herald and precursor’ — possesses: malice, gratefulness, curiosity, investigation, inhibition, a sense of acuteness, inventiveness, economy in learning and forgetting and solitariness.<sup>53</sup> Although the new philosopher — that ‘very free spirit’ — may also share these qualities, in goal differs. Nietzsche directly links the ‘Thorpeus idea’ to the necessary rhetorical *qua dissimulatio* persona:

Increase in ‘dissimulation’ proportionate to the rising order of rank of creatures. It seems to be lacking in the inorganic world — power against power, quite crudely — cunning begins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The highest human beings, such as Caesar, Napoleon (Stendhal’s remark on him), also the higher races (Italians), the Greeks (Odysseus), a thousandfold craftiness belongs to the essence of the enhancement of man — problem of the actor. My Dionysian ideal — The perspective of all organic functions, all the strongest instincts of life: the force in all life that wills error, error as the precondition even of thought: before there is thought there must have been ‘invention’: the construction of identical cases, of the appearance of sameness; it more primitive than the knowledge of sameness.<sup>54</sup>

The philosopher of the future is, ultimately, not a philosopher, if by ‘philosopher’ we mean a subject constituted and unified primarily by its self-consciousness. The philosopher in its dramatization as the Overman is a representative force that cannot be confined to the model of the individual; but rather can be understood as the very activity of self-organization of multiplicity out of which individualization occurs.

The implications this has for the political dimension of Nietzsche’s thought are both concrete and imminent. By turning the ‘topos’ of the political from the activity of a subject conducted in objectifiable ‘space-time’ (the Kantian *Anschauung*, ‘intuition’ of ‘space-time’) to the ‘temporalization’ (qua organization) of flux within the local context of bodily reality (body as a quantum reality), the political (as will to





Cunning intelligence, or the *mêtic* mentality, is a mode of dissimulation (involving risk and play) that proceeds by way of skillful handling or manipulation, rather than by way of *logos* or ‘logical measures’ (e.g. logical speech and rationality); by “*tricks* [rather] than by general methods” (René Thom).<sup>16</sup> This manipulation must always involve an artfulness — a ‘gaming’, even ‘gambling’ instinct — that creates opportunities out of the gaps and weaknesses in environmental informational resources: “challenging the fatalism of the moralist, the gambler is he who, in the face of no matter what situation, thinks that *there is always something he can do*” (Thom).<sup>17</sup> For the *mêtic* player, there is no ‘knowledge’ without the gaming ‘skill’ and ‘instinct’ of ruse, of cunning, and of acting at the decisive instance (indeed in the stance /movement-space and decisive-moment/instance) in order to accomplish a trick or *truc*.<sup>18</sup> This is the attitude of the con-man who uses *sleights of reason*<sup>19</sup> to perform *sleights of hand*: “that which, in the last analysis, justifies the gaming attitude is the fact that the only conceivable way of unveiling the black box, is to play with it” (Thom).<sup>20</sup> These gaming skills are also the same used by the skilled hunter: corporeal agility including quick-wittedness (e.g. the *dromikos* of a skilled runner, the *agrupnos* of the vigilant watcher, the *stochazesthai* or keen eye of the great marksman) and skills of dissimulation (“the art of seeing without being seen” in the words of D  tienne and Vernant).<sup>21</sup>



From the Digital to the Tentacular,  
or From iPods to Cephalopods:  
Apps, Traps, & Entries-without-Exit.

that are “the extremities of its digestive apparatus”—an apparatus “which sucks-in the environment”).<sup>4</sup> In this “infernal” I.T. vision,<sup>5</sup> the app-user gets sucked into a seductive, tricky, *truc*-like, many-tentacled trap and in this way appropriated by the app, which takes on the character of what Marcel D  tienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, in their study of *tricks, traps* and *cunning intelligence*, called the *polyplokton no  ma*—the tentacular savvy—of a “living trap”: *un pi  ge vivant* exemplified again by the octopus and

of the Figure *within the place or upon itself*” (*ibid.* 2). Deleuze’s use of an uppercase F in ‘Figure’ (and here, in addition, *scare-quotes*<sup>8</sup>) serves to distinguish it from normative figuration[s]: an important distinction, since the ‘Figure’ in this case is, as Gilbert Simondon—formative influence (speaking of *forms* and *formation*) on monsieur Gilles Deleuze—put it in his treatise *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, “the [F]igure of a [G]round” as opposed to a figure *distinct* and *distinguished* from ground (hence we have here a “distinction” by way of *indistinction*, or again a “clarification” by *blurring*).<sup>9</sup> [>IMAGE 6<]



<sup>4</sup> A “*truc*” in French: i.e. a tricky little ‘device’, ‘gizmo’, ‘gimmick’ or ‘thingamajig’; Machine Translation, <http://translate.google.com/#fr/en/truc>.

<sup>8</sup> The scare-quotes ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/scare\\_quotes](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/scare_quotes)) that suggest the existence of a ghost in the shell (押井 守).


<sup>9</sup> Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. E.N. Mellamphy, D.A. Mellamphy and N.B. Mellamphy,




*M  tic* mentality is thus intimately involved with bodily conditions (*hexeis*; singular *hexis*; synonymous in many respects with the Sanskrit *vastu* — indeed *vastupurusha* — of [Anthropocosmogonic Vastupurushamanism](#)) which are themselves “indistinguishable from habits and practices” (Debra Hawhee).<sup>22</sup> Dissimulation here is synonymous with dissimulative bodily states: “thought does not just happen within the body, it happens as the body” (Hawhee).<sup>23</sup> *M  tis* always involves a *m  tissage* (Mellamphy 1994),<sup>1</sup> a [ghost-in-the-]shell-game involving pretense, the mixing and mixing-up of appearances and consistencies, corporeal quantities and qualities in order to be able to do something that gains advantage. Thus cunning intelligence since Greek antiquity has involved the ability to deceive by way of the *technical* manipulation of appearance and multiplicity (i.e. abilities to alter and morph *bodily conditions* or bounded *physical states* of any kind). The countless cunning conceits (*polym  tis*), streaming series of stratagems (*polym  chanos*) and ubiquitous ‘U-turns’ (*polytropos*) of Ulysses,<sup>24</sup> attest to the artfulness of a *m  tic* mathematician who invokes the mathesis of *m  tis* and its *m  tissage*[s]e when faced with “a puzzling local situation” for which ‘universal reason’ (*logos*, the logistics of ‘logic’) proves inadequate: “All the major achievements of mathematicians are due at the outset to ‘artfulness’: a paradoxical situation, for in mathematics — a science of exemplary rationality — progression is accomplished more by *tricks* than by *general methods* of great weight” (Thom).<sup>25</sup>




Articulating itself techno-mechanically (as *polymechnoi*) via cunning chthonic twists and turns (*polytropoi*) that *polymèticamente* pull[s]-into-being-or-action what which would otherwise remain mere *potential*, the architecture and architectonics of deception in *Inception* make technical use of *traps, tricks, gestures, suggestions, forgeries, impersonations*, mirror-reflections, staircases, labyrinths and other sorts of hooks and/or bait that play with the limitations of physical boundedness. The team of technicians qua assembled con-artists consists of agents whose functions in Nolan's *Inception* are those first of confusing *construction* (for "the architect" Ariadne, the *web-spinner*), second of drug-decoction (for "the [a]lchemist" Yusuf, *le souffleur*), third of *impersonation* (for "the forger" Eames, the *not-what-'he-seems*), fourth of the watcher and gatekeeper (for "the watcher and gatekeeper" Arthur, *rounding-out* the four-square *round-table*), and fifth — *quintessentially*, as the *pempte ousia* in the midst of the previous four-square/round-table — of "inception" and/or of "extraction" (for "the Inceptor" and/or "the Extractor" Mr. Cobb, a husk of a man who manages to infiltrate — incept-and/or-extract — other men's husks in this splendid shell-game). The "inception" or "extraction" always begins with an aporetic architectural diagram/*yantra*, in this case that of a circular maze: a labyrinth explicitly situated outside the domain of *logos*, as the character Cobb confesses to the architect Ariadne (these deceptive designs and their *mètic métiissage* are "not, strictly speaking, *legal*," he tells her).



Deception is embodied from the outset in that aporetic architectural *design, diagram, mandala* or *yantra*, which is **gestural** in that its aim is less that of *representation* and *expression* than that of *suggestion* and *impression*. "This architectural technique, the *yantra* ('literally the 'vessel of yoking': [the] device, sacred diagram, [that is] the Foundation of the temple' according to the *Vastu-Shastra*), 'do[es] not consign the Figure to immobility but, on the contrary, render[s] sensible a kind of progression, an exploration of the Figure *within the place* or *upon itself*,'" wrote Dan Mellamphy in the previous week's Funambulist Paper (referring in this passage to Stella Kramrisch, Gilles Deleuze, *The Vastu-Shatra* and *The Logic of Sensation*).<sup>26</sup> Like Oshii's sublime puppet animated by its strings (strings that intertwine its 'Figure' with its milieu and/or 'Ground'<sup>27</sup>), *mètic* mentality is manifest and/or '*bodied forth*' in the tricks and traps of paradoxical or aporetic architecture. 'Body' becomes the interface of Figure and Ground, at times appearing distinctly as Figure, and at times remaining indistinguishable from Ground (hence becoming its associated milieu).<sup>28</sup>



“In a dream you can cheat architecture into impossible shapes” explained Cobb at the outset of *Inception*. “That [fact] lets you create closed loops, like the Penrose Steps, the infinite staircase, [...] paradox[es] of all kinds]. A closed loop like this helps you disguise the boundaries of the dream you’ve created.”



The *mètis* mentality relies on its technical finesse, on its ability to invent ways out (*poroi*), ways of getting out of *aporias* (spaces in which there are no apparent ways out): “Where indeterminacy (*apeiras*), reigns [there is] the absence of limit and direction — obscurity; where you are trapped, surrounded, prisoner of inextricable entanglements, it is *mètis* that intervenes — inventing strategies, expedients, tricks, ruses, machinations, *méchane* and *technai*, in order to go from *absence-of-limit* to *determination*, from *obscurity* to *light*.”<sup>29</sup> Within *logos*, reality is understood to be involved in a complex dynamic of *appearance* and *disappearance*, making ‘truth’ a process of ‘unconcealment’; the pursuit of ‘truth’ becomes synonymous with the systematic separation and exclusion of deception from knowledge. But from the *mètis* perspective, the complex dynamic is understood completely differently; it is the perspective required of the hunter/gamer who must survive not by logic but by cunning. Consciousness, intentionality and experience ‘turn out’ to be constructs within a fundamentally deceptive environment of asymmetrical conflict between predator and prey.





Dissimulation, the “ability to see without being seen” (Détienne and Vernant),<sup>30</sup> depends entirely on seizing decisive moments (not on *chronos* or *æon* but on *kairos*) and on making them tactical weapons, moreover, within a theatre (or network: a ‘net’) of predatory operations. In *Inception*, the mètéc operators act as ‘hunters’ within a mètéc theatre of operation — the target’s subconscious — but the mètéc operant must also see *itself* as ‘hunted’,<sup>31</sup> as bait for the traps of other mètéc operators (e.g. in *Inception*, the ever-threatening “projection” of Mal, Cobb’s dead wife — yet another ghost amongst shells). In the dream-state, any awareness or self-consciousness is always constituted by deception and illusion, and so self-consciousness is haunted and tainted by self-deception and the mentality of traps: are ‘you’ who ‘you’ think you are? How are ‘you’ lure or bait for something else? The mode of existence of technical objects is *mètéc*. *Inception* plays out a *mètéc* view of asymmetric war between deceptive operants in a deceptive milieu of operation.





Although it employs and deploys both military and political tactics, the mètéc model of asymmetric war (based on predator/prey ecology) is not inherently military or political if one considers the close relation between *agon* and *logos* in occidental thought (the struggle — *agon* — between equal opponents being the basis both for the military and the communicative/political ethics). The face-to-face contestation between equal opponents in war is also the model/disposition of political association that enables the intertwining of various *logoi*, and hence making possible public *dia-logoi* or dialogue. *Logos* governs the logic of war and political association in the history of the occident. *Mètis*, in contrast, is the mode of intelligence that belongs not to war or the city but to technics, namely the machinations of hunting and trapping (not symmetrical and agonistic but asymmetrical and deceptive).

One of the problems in the study of warfare today is that it has identified elements of asymmetry in the paradigm of war that cannot be understood within 'the governing logic' of war as 'symmetrical' and 'agonistic', and yet it does not know how to make sense of asymmetric warfare outside of the *logos*-driven framework of occidental thinking (this is notable, for example, in light of the absence of any mention of the concept of 'cunning intelligence' in Grégoire Chamayou's recent work on predation and warfare: *Les Chasses à L'Homme*); asymmetry outside the laws of war is simply called 'terrorism'.<sup>32</sup> But, as I argue here, the very *mode of existence of technical objects* is mètéc. As such, it is not simply that mètéc warfare "makes use of" ruse[s]:<sup>33</sup> mètéc wars are *designed* and *conducted* as (*i.e.* in terms of, along the (twisted and turning) *lines* of) 'ruse', 'rebus', 'riddle', and cunning conceit[s] (in this sense, the mythic sphinx's riddles can be seen as an example of mètéc warfare) such that any possible solution to a problem of (and in) war is discovered only through the twists and turns — labyrinthine lines — of technics rather than straightforward logics/logistics. Moreover, whereas the aim of dialogical persuasion is to change another's thinking — this is the point of *dia-logoi* — mètéc persuasion aims directly at changing *bodily conditions* (*hexeis*), thereby automatically changing the target's *thinking process*. "For Empedocles says those who change their bodily conditions (*hexin*) deem to change their thought (*phronesin*)."<sup>34</sup>

The persuasive techniques of mètéc war would thus be found not in deliberative/communicative political models and strategies, but instead in the manipulative tactics of marketing and public relations (in my current book manuscript [The New 'PR': Post-human Rationality in War, Cognition & Culture](#), this is the basis for what I am calling the New 'PR' of "post-human rationality" in contemporary modes of technical persuasion). Mètéc warfare, which manipulates the boundaries of classical warfare (*e.g.* the military logic/logistics of defining a 'theater of war') thus plays on *æsthesi*s and depends on *manipulative, technical tools* rather than on *logical/dialogical principles* (be these in the guise of military 'reason' or communicative 'ethics'). Where *logos* sees 'minds' and 'bodies', the technics of mètéc war (like the marionettes of Kleist and Oshii) see[s] 'shells' animated by 'ghostly



strings' that are inextricably bound to a broader (albeit obscure or occluded) associated 'machinic milieu'. To consider war and politics from the perspective and on the basis of such mètéc mentality is to discern it from a technically *anthropomorphized* but never quite *humanized* (human-all-too-human) perspective.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jorge-Luis Borges's *Pierre Ménard, autor del Quijote* (May 1939).

<sup>2</sup> Gilbert Simondon, quoted in <http://twitter.com/theorycentre/status/389084619871514624> (a Centre for Peripheral Theory/CPT twitter-post). This passage, however, is not "quoted" here — in the name, again, of Pierre Ménard — see the previous note, immediately above this one.

<sup>3</sup> Footnote 8 (∞) of The Funambulist Papers' previous *Anthropocosmogonic Vastupurushamanism* (<http://thefunambulist.net/2013/11/21/the-funambulist-papers-43-av-anthropocosmogonic-vastupurushamanism-by-dan-mellamphy/#8>); the present essay, in certain respects, emerges from (and extends) that Footnote, as well as (emerges from and extends) [an early essay by that very same author](#), written when the latter was about to begin his mètéc master's degree (M.A.).

<sup>4</sup> (<http://twitter.com/zachblas/status/330408167060148225>)

<sup>5</sup> Heinrich Kleist's *Über das Marionettentheater* (1801; online translation @ <http://www.southerncrossreview.org/9/kleist.htm>).

<sup>6</sup> Gilbert Simondon, *Du Mode d'Existence des Objets Techniques* (Paris: éditions Aubier, 1958), trans. Ninian Mellamphy, Dan Mellamphy & Nandita Biswas Mellamphy (*On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 2010, available online @ <http://www.academia.edu/4184556>).

<sup>7</sup> Book One of Aristotle's *Politics*, Chapters iv-vii. Georges Canguilhem, Simondon's teacher, incisively articulates the set of questions that arises when considering the opposition between nature and culture, human and technical object, master and slave as developed by the ancient rationalist tradition: "The slave, according to Aristotle in the *Politics*, is an animated Machine. This is the crux of the problem to which Schuhl only alludes in passing: Did the Greek conception of the dignity of science lead to their disdain for technique and the resultant paucity of inventions? And did this in turn lead to the difficulty of applying the results of technical activity to the explanation of nature? Or, rather, did the Greeks' high regard for purely speculative science and detached contemplation explain the absence of technical invention? Did their disregard for work cause slavery, or did the abundance of slaves due to military supremacy explain their low regard for work? Are we obliged to explain the ideology in terms of the socioeconomic structure or, rather, the socioeconomic structure in terms of the ideology? Did the ease of exploiting human beings make it easier to disdain the techniques that would allow them to exploit nature? Does the arduousness of exploiting nature justify the exploitation of man by man?" ('Machine and Organism' in *Incorporations: Zone 6*, eds. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 49.

<sup>8</sup> (<http://twitter.com/youtopos/status/402287599009554432>)

<sup>9</sup> Steven Brown, *Tokyo Cyberpunk: Posthumanism in Japanese Visual Culture* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

<sup>10</sup> (terms which will be defined in detail below)

<sup>11</sup> Steven Brown, *ibid.* 23; also see the passage from Bellmer's *Petite Anatomie de L'Inconscient Physique, ou L'Anatomie de L'Image* quoted in Footnote 19 of The Funambulist Papers' previous *Anthropocosmogonic Vastupurushamanism* (<http://thefunambulist.net/2013/11/21/the-funambulist-papers-43-av-anthropocosmogonic-vastupurushamanism-by-dan-mellamphy/#19>).

<sup>12</sup> Christopher Nolan, *interview* (<http://youtu.be/u1R4CFUxi9c?t=2m42s> — 2m42s to 3m24s; c/o <http://twitter.com/youtopos/status/406472726992265216> viz. "the Baconian Gesture" of "Nolan's Vastupurushaporetic-architecture"; Re: those gaps, blank areas, dead-spaces, blind-spots, also see <http://www.academia.edu/4184538>).

<sup>13</sup> (the Latin *e-ducere*)

<sup>14</sup> (these terms, *mètis* and *hexis*, will be explained in detail below; they are also explored in a recent essay — written last year, in a publication scheduled to come out next year — at <http://www.academia.edu/4185250>)

<sup>15</sup> Sarah Kofman, *Comment s'en sortir?* (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1983), 14.

<sup>16</sup> René Thom, *Modèles Mathématiques de la Morphogenèse* (Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1974), 300.

<sup>17</sup> Thom, *ibid.* 297.

<sup>18</sup> "A *truc* in French" is "a tricky little 'device', 'gizmo', 'gimmick' or 'thingamajig'; *machine translation*, <http://translate.google.com/#fr/en/truc> (Dan Mellamphy and Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, 'From the Digital to the Tentacular, or From iPods to Cephalopods: Apps, Traps, and *Entrées-without-Exit*' in *The Imaginary App*, eds. Svitlana Matviyenko and Paul 'DJ-Spooky' Miller (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, forthcoming).

<sup>19</sup> cf. Mary Beth Mader, *Sleights of Reason: Norm, Bisexuality & Development* (New York: SUNY Press, 2011).

<sup>20</sup> Thom, *ibid.* 298.

<sup>21</sup> Marcel Détienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Les Ruses de L'Intelligence: La Mètis des Grecs* (Paris: Flammarion, 1974), 35, 36.

<sup>22</sup> Debra Hawhee, *Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 58.

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<sup>23</sup> Hawhee, *ibid.* 58. Mellamphy, <http://www.academia.edu/4185250>

<sup>24</sup> D  tienne and Vernant, *ibid.* 39.

<sup>25</sup> Thom, *ibid.* 300.

<sup>26</sup> cf. Dan Mellamphy, *Anthropocosmogonic Vastupurushamanism* (<http://thefunambulist.net/2013/11/21/the-funambulist-papers-43-av-anthropocosmogonic-vastupurushamanism-by-dan-mellamphy>).

<sup>27</sup> "Deleuze's use of an uppercase F in 'Figure' (and here, in addition, *scare-quotes*) serves to distinguish it from normative figuration(s): an important distinction, since the 'Figure' in this case is, as Gilbert Simondon — formative influence (speaking of *forms* and *formation*) on monsieur Gilles Deleuze — put it in his treatise *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 'the [F]igure of a [G]round' as opposed to a figure *distinct* and *distinguished* from ground (hence we have here a 'distinction' by way of *indistinction*, or again a 'clarification' by *blurring*)."

<sup>28</sup> ([http://twitter.com/babette\\_babich/status/323110951303929856](http://twitter.com/babette_babich/status/323110951303929856))

<sup>29</sup> Kofman, *ibid.* 16.

<sup>30</sup> D  tienne and Vernant, *ibid.* 36 (<http://twitter.com/lnakamur/status/330412642499969024>)

(<http://twitter.com/lnakamur/status/330411782348873729>).

<sup>31</sup> This is a point also made by Gr  goire Chamayou: "hunting presupposes a form of empathy with the prey: to track prey effectively, one has to put oneself in its place." The hunt is "not a fight among equals." *Manhunts: A Philosophical History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 65.

<sup>32</sup> Take for example the concept of 'asymmetric enemy'; see Gal Hirsch, 'On *Dinosaurs and Hornets*: A Critical View on Operational Moulds in Asymmetric Conflicts' in the *RUSI Journal*, August (2003): 60-63.

<sup>33</sup> Chamayou, *ibid.* 71.

<sup>34</sup> Hawhee, *ibid.* 57.

<sup>35</sup> "Although *anthropoid*," it cannot be considered "*human*" — "hence Ren   Schwaller's observation that it can be 'anthropomorphized but *never humanized*' (1957, 27; emphasis in the original); Kollar calls it 'superhuman' (2001, ix), and indeed it is in many respects *  bermenschlich*" — its conflictive *coherence* and *cohesion* is "a unity 'incorrectly deemed human';" cf. <http://www.academia.edu/5110304> and <http://www.academia.edu/4185540> (D. Mellamphy's 'Anthropocosmogonic Vastupurushamanism' and 'Sorcerer's Magic Milieu').